

**MID-TERM EVALUATION:
JOINT INTEGRATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMME (JITAP II) ***

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Abstract

This evaluation is a follow up to JITAP Part I and examines the progress and impact of the JITAP programme in each of the eight participating countries - Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda. The report highlights in particular, how country specific issues and circumstances require customised programme implementation.

* This report was commissioned by WTO, ITC and UNCTAD. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not represent the views of the UNCTAD secretariat or of the organizations or institutions with which the author(s) may be connected or organizations or institutions that commissioned this evaluation. The designations and terminology employed and the presentation of the material in these publications do not imply the expressions of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or the authorities or of its frontiers or boundaries. This document has not been formally edited.

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
Main Report

(Revised)

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JITAP Footprint



JITAP I countries ●
JITAP II countries ●

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List of Acronyms

ACP	Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Group
ADSL	Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
AFD	French Development Agency
AFE	Authorization for Field Expenditure
AGOA	Africa Growth Opportunity Act
APEX-CI	The Côte d'Ivoire Export Promotion Agency
ATC	Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
ATPP	Africa Trade and Poverty Programme
AU	African Union
CBCE	Benin Centre for External Trade
CDF	Communication and Discussion Facility
CDs	Compact Disks
CEDEAO	West African States Economic Community
CEEAC	Economic Community of Central African States
CFA	African Financial Community Franc
CHF	Swiss Francs
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CTF SG	Common Trust Fund Steering Group
CTF SG	Common Trust Fund Steering Group
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDA	Doha Development Agenda
DFID	Department for International Development
DK	Danish Krone
DTIS	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
EAC	East African Co-operation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIF	Enhanced Integrated Framework
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPC	Export Promotion Council
EPRP	Export led Poverty Reduction Programme
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
G7	Group of Seven Countries
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ	The Africa Association and German Technical Cooperation
HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points System
HR	Human Resource(s)
HQs	Headquarters
IF	Integrated Framework

IFWG	Integrated Framework Working Group
IIC	Inter-Institutional Committee
IITC	Inter-institutional Trade Committee
ILEAP	International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty
IMC	Inter-ministerial Committee
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMUTSAR	Institute of the Multilateral Trading System Analysis and Research
IP	Intellectual Property
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IPSM	International Purchasing and Supply Management
ISPM	International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITC FP	ITC Focal Point
JITAP	Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme
JSM	Joint Steering Mechanism
JSM/ TL	Joint Steering Mechanism- Technical Level
KEBS	Kenya Bureau of Standards
KEPHIS	Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service
KEPLOTRADE	Kenya-European Union Post Lome Trade Negotiations
KTPP	Kenya Trade Poverty Programme
LDC	Least Developed Countries according to UN designation
MAS	Market Analysis Service
MCTS	Multipurpose Community Telecentres
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
MTS	Multilateral Trading System
MTTI	Ministry of Tourism, Trade & Industry
NAMA	Non-Agricultural Market Access
NCTPN	National Committee on Trade Policy
NCWTO	National Committee on WTO
NEDS	National Export Development Strategy
NEPs	National Enquiry Points
NETT	National EPA Technical Team
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Steering Committee
NTBs	Non-Tariff Barriers
OAPI	African Intellectual Property Organization
PACCIA /PACT	Programme for building African Capacity for Trade
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PC	Programme Coordinator
PCU	Programme Coordination Unit
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PMM	Performance Measurement Matrix
PMU	Project management Unit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSDP	Private Sector Development Programme
Q & A	Question and Answer
R&D	Research and Development
RBM	Results-based Management

RCs	Reference Centres
RRT	Results-based Reporting Template
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SATRNET	Southern African Trade Research Network
SG	Steering Group
SM	Senior Management
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures
TA	Technical Assistance
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TFOC	Trade Facilitation Office Canada
TIS	Trade Information Services
TND	Tunisian Dinar
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPNWG	Trade Policy National Working Group
TRALAC	Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa
TRIPS	Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UEPB	Uganda Export Promotion Board
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade & Development
UPTOP	Uganda Programme for Trade Opportunities & Policies
US	United States
US\$	US Dollar
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAEUMU	West African Economic & Monetary Union
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZAMTIE	Zambia Trade and Investment Enhancement Project

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S.V.Divvaakar
Team Leader

The Evaluation Experience

This Mid-Term Evaluation of JITAP II was commissioned by the JITAP Joint Steering Mechanism, and administratively managed by ITC, which is the Managing Agency for the Programme.

Two international evaluators- of which one was to be Team Leader for the entire Evaluation- and 16 national evaluators were appointed by the three agencies for the evaluation for tasks outlined in the Terms of Reference. The evaluation methodology was discussed in May 2006, with the heads of evaluation units of the three agencies, and the Programme Coordinator. The selection of countries for field missions by international evaluators was undertaken in consultation with the agencies and also discussed with the donors. A description of the methodology and country selection criteria appears in Annex 3 to this report.

There were two unforeseen events – the delay in the national evaluation in Tanzania, caused by the demise of the evaluator’s mother, and the resignation of one international evaluator (Francophone) prior to undertaking field missions. These were resolved through timely and adequate interventions undertaken in consultation with the agencies and with some donors. To achieve the deadlines without adversely affecting the evaluation quality, it was agreed that the Team Leader would undertake the Francophone field missions, although to two instead of for three Francophone countries planned originally, and the initial idea of visiting a non-JITAP country was dropped (on grounds that new members of JITAP could provide more relevant evidence of the value addition from JITAP). These unforeseen events have delayed the submission of the Evaluation Report by two weeks, but, in the assessment of the team leader, have not affected the quality and content of the final product on grounds of departure of the second international evaluator.

Despite the increased support from ITC and the Programme Coordination Unit to the francophone field missions- necessitated by the Team Leader’s lack of fluency in French, the evaluation has maintained its independence. As committed to a donor that had concerns on the presence of agency staff on field missions, no agency persons were present in the interviews with respondents, and the proceedings of several interviews were taped for translations and future reference.

In the interests of a forward looking evaluation, the Team Leader also followed a process of discussing major findings, emerging conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation individually with key persons at the three agencies, with the Coordinator- including on some sensitive issues linked to the Coordination Unit, and a few donors. These were done to reconcile or revalidate contradictory findings, set right factual errors and avoid flippant recommendations, but without seeking consensus or common ground. These ensured a transparent process of opinion sharing without sacrificing independence of the evaluator’s conclusions.

The national evaluation reports are independent products, and the Team Leader is a ‘consumer’ of these reports as much as the agencies and the national counterparts. The Team Leader has based his conclusions and recommendations on a combination of useful and validated inputs from these reports and also his own first hand observations in five of the 16 countries. There

may be some variance in the Team Leader's positions from those of the national evaluators. However, a summary of findings and recommendations issued by all national evaluators have been annexed to the main evaluation report.

All the reports have gone through a factual validation exercise. However, there may still remain some un-reconciled data or factual observations on programme activities- this may happen due to the divergence of perceptions among various sources. The evaluators cannot possibly verify these individually, given the short time span of engagement with the implementing agencies in Geneva and in the participating countries. If discrepancies remain in the report with regard to factual information, the evaluators do not wish to enter into any further validation, except if such discrepancies have a significant bearing on the conclusions.

Lastly, the Team Leader wishes to place on record the highly professional manner in which all the three agencies and the Coordination Unit have engaged with the evaluators, providing all information and clarifications efficiently and transparently, respecting the independence of the evaluation, and speaking freely and frankly on all aspects discussed. All the references to events, anecdotes and perceptions appearing in the report have originated from specific persons, whose identities will remain confidential and it is for these individuals to find themselves in the texts of the report. The Team Leader solemnly assures all respondents of his commitment to the covenant of confidentiality even after the evaluation is closed.

S.V.Divvaakar
Team Leader

Executive Summary

A. Programme Description

The Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) was developed as a response to needs expressed by Trade Ministers of the African Union for assistance from the international community to help strengthen their capacity to participate meaningfully in trade negotiations and integrate into the new Multilateral Trading System (MTS).

JITAP is essentially a capacity building programme serving three objectives:

- Developing national capacity to understand and address the implications of the new Multilateral Trading System (MTS);
- Building capacity to implement legislation and take the needed measures to conform to undertakings under the MTS in the most beneficial way; and
- Enhancing the readiness of national exporters to take advantage of trading opportunities.

The programme was launched in 1998 in eight countries and, following a positive evaluation, a second phase of the programme was launched in 2003, extending the programme to eight new countries. JITAP II has a Programme budget of US\$ 15.8 million, over a four year period 2003-2007. It emphasises a greater level of national self-implementation by beneficiary countries with support from the Geneva based organisations, and the use of networking among beneficiaries in all partner countries, as elements to build sustainability of the benefits.

A. Needs and Challenges addressed

Integration into the global economy remains a key priority and challenge for many JITAP countries, rooted in low levels of development, a narrow range of tradable goods and services, inadequate export readiness, and the lack of human and institutional capacities to participate in the international trade order.

There is an urgent need to diversify the export basket and address new products and services, which requires a better understanding of international market requirements, price and non-price competitive aspects, market access conditions, supply side constraints and market linkages.

Several countries are engaged in a multitude of bilateral, regional and multilateral trading agreements at the same time. These have also led to several overlapping regional formations under various negotiations. The provisions of some of these agreements are contradictory to one another.

Countries face varying degrees of challenges in integrating trade into the mainstream national development agenda. This is, in large measure, due to a lack of appreciation of the development gains from trade, which results in inadequate attention to developing resources and capacities to enhance trade participation. In many countries, Trade often remains a 'poor cousin', even though it is combined with the Ministry of Industry in some cases.

Some of these needs are addressed by JITAP and other trade capacity development in Africa. These have varying degrees of overlap and synergies with JITAP. Coordination mechanisms do not exist or are rudimentary in many countries.

C. Programme Implementation

JITAP follows a Joint and Integrated Approach: it is jointly developed, coordinated and implemented by three agencies-UNCTAD, WTO and ITC, each having different trade-related specializations. This approach remains unique in the trade-related technical assistance universe, although it has not been without difficulties.

The agencies have been unanimous in their appreciation of the joint implementation of activities, irrespective of differences as to the design and scheduling of the various events themselves. Delivery of technical assistance has been on target, especially in three of five modules. Notwithstanding the smooth implementation of joint activities, there are emerging supply side constraints within the agencies in respect of enhanced involvement in JITAP activities.

Funds transfers are reported to be very efficient, and there were practically no reports of delays in disbursements, from donors, as well as from the Trust Fund administration. The authorization and disbursement of decentralized funds to beneficiary countries too, has been swift and efficient. However, there has been a poor utilization of decentralized funds.

Accounting for JITAP is on an inputs-basis, i.e. resources used, where as programme results are on an output-basis. The accounting system does not reconcile these two aspects. Once the transfer of funds has taken place to the agencies and the pre-encumbrance is completed i.e. when the funds are earmarked for the project, there is no mechanism to regulate budget deviations for each activity group. Programme Management and Support Costs (Geneva located), represent close to 31% of Programme expenditure, of which support costs account for 13%.

There have been some challenges in Programme Coordination, caused due to a complex mesh of factors, which need to be addressed to improve the efficiency and effective delivery of the Programme.

D. Programme delivery

JITAP II activities have been designed under five modules, each addressing a specific theme of the intervention design/logic:

Module 1: MTS Institutional Support, Compliance, Policies and Negotiations, addresses capacity building for trade negotiations, implementation of trade agreements, and formulation of trade and development policies.

Module 2: Strengthening MTS Reference Centres and National Enquiry Points, supports capacity building for providing reliable technical information on MTS, by providing equipment and documentation for establishing 3 MTS Reference Centres and 4 National Enquiry Points (NEPs).

Module 3: Enhancing MTS Knowledge and Networks, aims to enhance the countries' capacity for a better participation in the ongoing negotiations at the WTO and other frameworks.

Module 4: Product and Services Sector Strategies, is aimed at building capacity to derive benefits from the MTS through improved export readiness. It aims to assist entrepreneurs and policy-makers in a country to formulate strategies for specific sectors (goods and services), which have a high potential for exports.

Module 5: Networking and Programme Synergy, focuses on developing linkages among MTS networks created in JITAP and with other regional and global networks including those of the three agencies, including through extensive use of the JITAP Portal and its facilities.

Agencies report JITAP II to be more efficient and smooth in programme delivery than JITAP I. However, there were several challenges and resultant delays in the initial preparatory stages, covering practically all of 2003 and a part of 2004. Some delays have been due to inadequate readiness of counterpart institutions in beneficiary countries, the absence of agreed counterpart funding, and attrition of human resources that participated in various modules.

Results vary significantly across the 5 modules of JITAP. Modules 1, 2 and 4 have performed satisfactorily in most countries, and several results are attributed to JITAP by involved stakeholders. In contrast, Module 3 and Module 5 have consistently underperformed in almost all countries. This is considered to be a collective result of conceptual difficulties, absence of commitment and motivation of national stakeholders, and the use of a supply-based rather than demand-driven approach, leading to lack of ownership and poor performance.

E. Outcomes

Shaping trade positions, strategies and policy: This is considered to be the most important contribution of JITAP. The creation of an institutional mechanism for formulating national positions on MTS issues, the stakeholder consultative processes in the Inter Institutional Committees, analytical and research inputs on key trade themes, and the trade-related capacity development (training) of negotiators, together provided the countries with the basic confidence to appreciate, develop, debate and articulate their positions and negotiating priorities at the WTO. Though these, JITAP has enabled a cross section of stakeholders to better understand the significance of MTS and make an objective assessment of the gains and losses from integration.

Strengthening trade stakeholders' capacities: Strengthening of capacities has been addressed through the setting up of trade information infrastructure under Module 2, and training on MTS issues under Module 3. Although outputs have been delivered, only some National Enquiry Points are performing their statutory roles as provided by WTO, downloading notifications, disseminating them to stakeholders, and responding to domestic and international enquiries on their mandated areas. Staff attrition at reference centres and enquiry points has nullified any gains from JITAP in some countries. Although JITAP has enabled a group of MTS trained persons, which form the core of trade related capacities in these countries, further dissemination and outreach of MTS knowledge has not taken place as originally envisaged. In some countries, MTS networks never got formed, while in others, they have dissipated. But the most important deficiency has been the disconnect between the offerings of master trainers and the needs of the

secondary beneficiaries. Additionally, there has been practically no buy-in from beneficiaries (MTS professionals), and a lack of conviction over the effectiveness of these modules.

Export strategies as a response to market opportunities: All countries have identified priority export sectors for strategy formulation under JITAP. These are at various stages of finalisation and implementation. The main challenge is that sector strategies remain outputs on paper, failing policy actions and budgetary resource allocations to implement them. The constraints mentioned by country focal points include: financial implications of implementing policy, low commitment on the part of policy change champions, and the institutional environment - notably complications that arise when policies and practices are under the purview of multiple ministries/regulators.

Improved ability to formulate, manage and/or coordinate trade development programmes:

JITAP does not directly assist trade and development stakeholders in coordination of TRTA programmes. Therefore, any attribution of results on this aspect is erroneous. However, some JITAP concepts and institutional structures have been used in other programmes. For instance, the National Steering Council (NSC) is the common coordinating mechanism for JITAP and some other programmes, especially the Integrated Framework (IF). The composition of the NSC has been amended to include donors as well. In some countries, focal points of the IF and JITAP are the same persons, which has improved coordination between some JITAP and IF activities in these countries. The concept of Reference Centres was first introduced under JITAP, and is now used in over 100 WTO member countries.

F. Impacts and Sustainability

There is tangible evidence of the increased participation by African countries in MTS negotiations, indicated by the increasingly well-articulated and well-formulated African Union common positions at the WTO. Negotiation priorities are based on views articulated by multiple stakeholders, including the private sector. Civil society positions are also receiving due attention at stakeholder consultations on MTS in many JITAP countries.

Implementation and domestication of the WTO agreements, i.e. amending national legislation to conform to the provisions of the WTO commitments, remains a challenge in many countries, including in JITAP I beneficiaries. There are unmet needs in these respects, which are considered to be more important in future than the enhancement of trade information points, which need to explore ways to sustain themselves from some form of revenue generation.

The initial steps toward export readiness, export awareness and strategy formulation, have been initiated in all JITAP countries. Sector counterpart teams have been exposed to the basics of sector strategy formulation through a mode of self-implementation with ITC assistance. However, unless there is a source of funding to assist in implementation of the sector strategies, there is a danger of dissipation of the work that has been done under JITAP. Engagement with donors and lending institutions is a key need to be addressed by the export development agencies and other departments related to the respective sectors. In LDCs, the launch of the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) holds out a new promise for the sustainability of these elements.

On the whole, many of the JITAP institutional structures are technically sustainable. The sustenance of some JITAP institutional structures like IICs, trade information points, and sector counterpart teams, is more about political will and stakeholder motivation than about capacities and economic viability.

JITAP's future challenges emerge from: agency constraints in meeting new demand; sustaining the joint and integrated approach; and the Enhanced Integrated Framework.

Synergies with Enhanced Integrated Framework

Funding constraints, which are beyond the scope of JITAP to address, need to be bridged through effective donor coordination mechanisms, under the emerging Aid for Trade architecture, which will result in a reallocation of development assistance across bilateral and multilateral programmes. The positioning of JITAP in the emerging Aid for Trade architecture is important, given the increased emphasis on the Enhanced Integrated Framework as the principal instrument to deliver trade related technical assistance.

Although JITAP and the present IF are significantly different, there are possibilities of greater overlap at the activity level with the proposed design of the EIF. Synergies between the two can be enhanced substantially by ensuring in their Programme documents, a mutual recognition and willingness to explore synergies, undertake periodic meetings and coordinate work plans in countries that (are likely to) have both these programmes.

Lessons learnt

The experience of JITAP II endorses the following aspects as success elements:

- Multi-pronged approach
- Joint and Integrated approach
- In-built stakeholder structures
- Sub-regional delivery model
- Flexibility, customization, and adaptation
- Synergies among TRTA structures

At the same time, the following features have not delivered due to some limitations:

- Self-implementation
- Rigid geometric design
- Master trainers
- Supply driven networking
- Over adherence to the Joint and Integrated approach
- Compulsory consensus principle
- Decentralization of resources
- Coordination and implementation

Recommendations

Based on the findings, the evaluator recommends a JITAP III to continue with the same objectives, although with improvements in the ‘formulation’.

Design: The appropriate response needs to be a Programme that **is lighter** (fewer, more focused activities), **simpler** (cost-effective delivery and management structures), and resultantly, **larger** (footprint), than JITAP II, without diluting focus on its main objective.

Regional Dimension: The increasing agenda in regional and bilateral trade negotiations in Africa present an opportunity for JITAP to extend support to deal with some specific issues, such as clarifying rules of origin and exercising a selection between two customs union groupings. A deadlock or slow progress in the multilateral negotiations may lead to enhanced attention to regional trade as a next best alternative. The conclusion of the Doha Round will, hopefully, clarify some of these issues.

Redistribution of Modules: The evaluator recommends a JITAP III with four modules instead of five: three modules for centralized delivery, each identifiable and corresponding to one agency’s competence areas, and a fourth, decentralized module to be implemented by national and regional networks and not prescribed by Geneva.

Country Coverage and Selection: Resources permitting, JITAP III should include at least 16 countries as in JITAP II, and ideally, 20-24 countries. Selection criteria should include a balance among regions as well as language, and, ideally, the new list should include at least one country that is capable of taking a regional leadership role in supporting networking events and logistics for regional delivery of programme contents. South Africa and Nigeria, both being applicants, appear strong contenders in this respect. There should be an equal mix of LDCs and non LDCs. Among LDCs, there should be preference for countries that are entering or have just entered the IF, in order to derive maximum benefit of inter-programme synergies.

Stricter preconditions should be insisted in terms of political commitment to legal recognition of IICs (such as steps toward a cabinet decision and draft legislation); and sufficient counterpart funding to meet essential staffing of IIC, essential staffing of RC, and a guaranteed level of internet access and quality of access for all counterpart agencies and trade information points. These should exist before any delivery of programme contents.

Financial Envelope: The financial requirements of JITAP III would depend on the final design and contents, and the number of participating countries. JITAP II had allocated an average of \$ 500,000 per country over a 4-year duration. Based on the same levels, a programming for 16 or 24 countries, JITAP III can entail funding between \$ 11 million and \$ 16 million.

Programme Management: A restructuring of the Programme Coordination Structure is a serious priority in order for JITAP III to perform to its potential. Most important is the choice between a Coordination Structure and a Delegated Implementation Structure, and this requires discussions among the three agencies. In either structure, the organization has to be strengthened to take on increased delivery.

Relationship with the IF: The relationship between JITAP and EIF should be cemented through the explicit mention in the Final documents of JITAP III and the Enhanced IF of:

- Formal recognition of JITAP as a trade capacity delivery mechanism under the Enhanced IF; and
- Formal Adoption of Inter-Programme Coordination between the IF Working Group and JITAP Joint Steering Mechanism at the Technical Levels in Geneva.

Chapter I. Chapter 1. Programme Concept and Design

Section 1. JITAP: an Introduction

1. The Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) was developed as a response to needs expressed, by Trade Ministers of the African Union at their meeting in Tunis, Tunisia, in October 1994, for assistance from the international community to help strengthen their capacity to participate meaningfully in trade negotiations and integrate into the new Multilateral Trading System. At the UNCTAD IX Conference in Midrand, South Africa, in May 1996, the heads of WTO, UNCTAD and ITC announced their commitment to develop a joint programme to help meet the needs expressed by African countries. Based on needs-assessments carried out in eight countries, in March 1998, donor support was mobilized for eight individual projects, which were later regrouped under one programme, JITAP, with a four –year period 1998-2002.
2. JITAP is essentially a capacity building programme, focusing on developing trade-related capacities to respond to trade opportunities and challenges. It was designed to serve three objectives:
 - Developing national capacity to understand and address the implications of the new Multilateral Trading System (MTS);
 - Building capacity to implement legislation and take the needed measures to conform to undertakings under the MTS in the most beneficial way; and
 - Enhancing the readiness of national exporters to take advantage of trading opportunities.The primary beneficiaries are the important trade related institutions in the public and private sector and civil society organizations.
3. JITAP is characterized by two fundamental principles: ‘Joint’ and ‘Integrated’. It is a programme jointly developed, coordinated and implemented by three agencies-UNCTAD, WTO and ITC, each having different trade-related specializations. The integrated approach delivers a well-rounded complement of trade capacities by addressing different types of needs expressed at three levels: government-policy making, institutional- legal/ technical, and enterprise-export readiness; by pooling and delivering the knowledge of the three agencies on the same platform to the same beneficiaries at the same time. This approach remains unique in the TRTA universe to date. The eight countries in the first phase were: Benin, Cote D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda.
4. Following a positive evaluation of JITAP I, a second phase of the programme was launched in 2003, to extend the programme to eight new countries – Botswana, Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia – and to deepen and consolidate the gains in the first batch of beneficiary countries. JITAP II involved a change in design, including a reconstitution of the 15 clusters of JITAP I into 5 modules. JITAP II emphasises a greater level of national self-implementation by beneficiary countries with support from the Geneva based organisations, and the use of networking among beneficiaries in all partner countries, as elements to build sustainability of the benefits. JITAP II has a Programme budget of US\$ 15.8 million, over a four year period 2003-2007.

Box 1. JITAP II- A Snapshot**Objective**

Building capacity and strengthening national knowledge base on the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) in the partner countries, for:

- **More effective participation** in the trade negotiations, implementing the WTO agreements, and formulating related trade policies;
- **Improved supply capacity and market knowledge** of exporting and export-ready enterprises, to derive benefit from business opportunities resulting from better market access under the MTS.

Key features and strategy

- **Partnership** among the executing organizations, the participating countries and the donor community with involvement of other providers of trade-related technical assistance (TRTA);
- Building **networks and synergies** among participating countries and extensive use of existing national capacities;
- **Self-implementation** of programme modules based on generic **tool kits** provided by the agencies;
- **Pooling of resources** in a Common Trust Fund and **coordination** with other TRTA programmes;
- **Selection of partner countries and their commitment** based on criteria, notably (i) Allocation of counterpart resources to support programme activities, (ii) Setting up a National Steering Committee (NSC) and Creation / institutionalization of an Inter-Institutional Committee on MTS (IIC), (iii) Mainstreaming of trade as an engine for poverty reduction.
- **Result-based Management** and particular attention to **gender issues** and **poverty reduction**.

Partner Countries

6 developing countries and 10 LDCs:

- Consolidation period of three years for the first group of countries (2003-2005): Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania;
- Implementation period of four years for the "new countries" (2003-2007): Botswana, Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia.

Executing agencies

- International Trade Centre (ITC); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); World Trade Organization (WTO).

Donor countries for JITAP II

Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom.

Modules and toolkits

- MTS Institutional support, Compliance, Policies and Negotiations (Module 1)
- Strengthening MTS Reference Centres and National Enquiry Points (Module 2)
- Enhancing MTS knowledge and networks (Module 3)
- Goods and Services Sector Strategies (Module 4)
- Networking and Programme Synergy (Module 5)

Resources and time horizon

- US\$15.8 million over four years.

Source: One Pager on JITAP II, June 2006

5. JITAP II activities have been designed under five modules, each addressing a specific theme of the intervention design/logic.

6. Module 1: MTS Institutional Support, Compliance, Policies and Negotiations (lead UNCTAD). This module addresses capacity building for trade negotiations, implementation of

trade agreements, and formulation of trade and development policies. The module seeks to assist countries in constituting Inter Institutional Committees and enable them to develop as the apex multi-stakeholder consultative bodies to build consensus on national negotiating interests and priorities on trade issues.

7. Module 2: Strengthening MTS Reference Centres and National Enquiry Points (lead WTO). This module seeks to provide support for building capacity for providing reliable technical information on MTS, by providing equipment and documentation for establishing 3 MTS Reference Centres and 4 National Enquiry Points (NEPs). Through the proper operation of enquiry points, partner countries will be able to implement their statutory commitments in each of the WTO Agreements. The three reference centres, one each for government, business and academia (not mandatory) aim to enhance institutional and human capacities of partner countries to integrate into the MTS.
8. Module 3: Enhancing MTS Knowledge and Networks (Joint leadership- Programme Coordination), aims to enhance the countries' capacity for a better participation in the ongoing negotiations at the WTO and other frameworks. At the end of the programme, each partner country is expected to have developed a network of MTS trainers and professionals who understand the WTO rules, the policy dimensions and issues related to such rules and the business aspects of both the rules and the policies.
9. Module 4: Product and Services Sector Strategies (lead ITC), is aimed at building capacity to derive benefits from the MTS through improved export readiness. It aims to assist entrepreneurs and policy-makers in a country to formulate strategies for specific sectors (goods and services), which have a high potential for exports.
10. Module 5: Networking and Programme Synergy (Joint leadership-Programme Coordination), focuses on developing linkages among MTS networks created in JITAP and with other regional and global networks including those of the three agencies, including through extensive use of the JITAP Portal and its facilities.
11. The current phase of JITAP will come to an end in mid 2007 for the eight new countries. The older participants have exited the programme in December 2005 except for a few residual activities.

Section 2. Development problematic and programme relevance

i. Trade integration

12. Africa has a marginal presence in international trade: share of trade has declined from 5.9% in 1980 to 2% in 2002¹. Integration into the global economy remains a key priority and challenge for many JITAP countries, rooted in low levels of development, a narrow range of tradable goods and services, inadequate export readiness, and the lack of human and institutional capacities to participate in the international trade order.

13. Many JITAP countries have a narrow base of exports-mainly commodities, with little value addition in processing. In recent years, the terms of trade have worsened for many countries as a result of significant declines in international market prices for key commodities. As a result, there is an urgent need to diversify the export basket and address new products and services, which requires a better understanding of international market requirements, price and non-price competitive aspects, market access conditions, supply side constraints and market linkages. The availability and quality of trade information to address these issues is highly insufficient. For many JITAP countries, supply side constraints impede the use of available market access opportunities under preferential agreements, such as the Africa Growth Opportunity Act, and EU- Economic Partnership Agreements.

14. Implementation of the WTO agreements brings its own challenges. Countries face difficulties in adapting or amending domestic legislation to comply with or incorporate WTO agreements. Drafting of legal texts for technical subjects like SPS, TBT, and TRIPS compliant laws has been difficult for the law departments in some countries, as has been the implementation of regulatory and infrastructure arrangements to meet the import requirements of key trading partners.

15. JITAP countries are engaged in several regional and bilateral trading arrangements simultaneously, which involve considerable time and human resources, which are scarce in most JITAP countries. These engagements impose new demands on preparation of national negotiation priorities, based on adequate analysis and consensus over the implications of trade agreements for the national economy as well as for diverse stakeholders. Capacities to understand these implications and to negotiate national interests remain inadequate

16. The provisions of some of these agreements were contradictory to one another. These have also led to several overlapping regional formations under various negotiations. For instance, in Africa, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU call for the ACP states to be signed with free trade areas or customs unions instead of individual countries, which has resulted in the creation of two new country groupings: the ESA-EPA group consisting of 16 of the 20 COMESA members, and SADC-EPA group consisting of seven of the 14 SADC

¹ UNCTAD Report: Economic Development in Africa, 2003

members. The deepening of trade initiatives within Africa will bring challenges, which need to be assessed and understood by negotiators and other stakeholders.

Table1. Memberships of key regional trade groupings in Africa

Arrangement	Members
COMESA-20	Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
COMESA FTA -11	Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe
ESA-EPA -16	Burundi, Djibouti, Comoros, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
EAC -3	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
SADC -14	Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
SACU -5	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa
SADC-EPA -7	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania
ECOWAS -13	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
WAEMU -6	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal
UEMOA -7	Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo

Source: assorted websites

17. These asymmetric configurations create confusing and conflicting situations, which are bound to intensify over time as the integration agendas of the EAC, SADC and COMESA deepen. For instance, the EAC customs union is operational, while COMESA and SADC are planning to form customs unions by 2010 and 2012 respectively. Since one country cannot realistically apply two different common external tariffs, or implement customs and fiscal integration which are required in customs union, some EAC members will need to choose one agreement and exit another. Overlapping memberships also lead to conflicting commitments and potential trade deflection. Some countries face risks of becoming transit routes for goods originating in non-treaty countries, e.g. Tanzania becoming a transit route for SADC goods into Uganda and Kenya- which are not in SADC, and Uganda becoming a transit route for COMESA goods to Tanzania- which is no longer a COMESA member². Coordination among the trade negotiation teams is reported to be unsatisfactory in several JITAP countries, as pointed out in field missions in Uganda and Kenya.

² Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, Uganda, page 33.

ii. Mainstreaming Trade in National Development Strategy

18. Countries face varying degrees of challenges in integrating trade into the mainstream national development agenda. This is, in large measure, due to a lack of appreciation of the development gains from trade, which results in inadequate attention to developing resources and capacities to enhance trade participation. Many countries do not have a Trade Policy Vision or strategy for using trade to address development objectives, and adopted in National Development plans. Trade departments receive inadequate budgetary resource allocations, and face internal challenges in engendering due participation on trade issues from key government departments especially agriculture, which has a primarily domestic, production focus. This position is altering, although not to the extent necessary for countries to respond effectively to the challenges posed by international trade.

19. A major challenge is the lack of appreciation of the significance of multilateral and other trade negotiations by most stakeholders, including key government ministries, which did not perceive the development effects from trade. Given the marginal African participation in world trade, trade was seen as a remote subject, and not directly connected with economic and development priorities, even though many JITAP countries were experiencing adverse terms of trade, erosion in buying power from currency devaluations and increasing international debt. Many stakeholders saw only the adverse effects of trade liberalization under MTS- potential revenue losses, high compliance costs from changes in technical regulations; enhanced international competition in the domestic markets, and reduced margins for domestic players.

20. This resulted in a poor buy-in among national stakeholders on trade issues, including the MTS negotiation agenda. Of the 16 JITAP countries, only seven have a formal Trade Policy/Strategy, or have integrated trade in their mainstream development strategy as embodied in the Poverty Reduction Strategy documents. However, ten countries are also participants under the Integrated Framework, which has trade mainstreaming as its key objective.

Table 2. Trade Mainstreaming Indicators for JITAP Countries

Country	Reference to Trade in Poverty Reduction Strategy Document	National /Export Strategy	Trade Strategy	Legally constituted institutional mechanisms on Trade issues	Budgetary allocation trends to IICs, \$*	Membership of IF
Benin	Yes			Yes	14,500, no change	Yes
Botswana	No			No	200,000 total budget	
Burkina Faso	Yes			Yes	Increasing	Yes
Cameroon	Yes			Yes	Increasing	
Cote d'Ivoire	No	Exists		Yes	No data	
Ghana	No	Under formulation			50,000	
Kenya	Yes	Exists		No		
Mali	No			Yes	increasing	Yes

Malawi	Yes	Under formulation		20,000, increasing	Yes
Mauritania	Yes		Yes	15,000, increasing	Yes
Mozambique	Yes			None	Yes
Senegal	Yes		Yes	No change	Yes
Tanzania	Yes	Exists	Yes	16,000, increasing	Yes
Tunisia			Yes		
Uganda	Yes	Exists	Awaiting parliament approval	20,000, major Increase	Yes
Zambia	Proposed	Exists	No	No data	Yes

*from country e-surveys for Management Review, 2006

Sources: assorted documents- DTIS, JITAP Programme Documents, Evaluation Reports, etc.

21. Trade integration necessitates, at the very minimum, a Department or Ministry of Trade that is suitably funded and appropriately staffed to take on its role in the international trade negotiations, and also spearhead the development of exports through sector- and market-specific strategies. In many countries, Trade often remains a ‘poor cousin’, even though it is combined with the Ministry of Industry in some cases. This affects the country’s ability and capacity to take part in trade negotiations and also to benefit from technical assistance available from development assistance community.

22. Participation in JITAP and other Trade-Related-Technical-Assistance (TRTA) programmes has exposed this vulnerability in the countries, with the absence or inadequacy of counterpart funding in most countries. The legal constitution of the IICs, a precondition designed to ensure continued counterpart support after JITAP, has not taken place in 7 of the 16 countries, even though the process has been initiated in Parliament in some. In some countries, JITAP funding had to be used for support staff to facilitate the Focal Point in managing the programme. Beyond a point, lack of progress in creating and financing these essential institutions is to be seen as inadequate political commitment to trade capacity development and ipso facto the mainstreaming of trade in national development priorities itself.

23. Yet, there is a dawning recognition of the key role of the Trade Ministry, and budgetary allocations tend to be increasing, albeit modestly, in some JITAP countries. In most countries, a basic appreciation has been seeded in important ministries on the relevance of trade as an important issue on the government agenda, which goes beyond the Ministry of Trade. This is being expressed in the modest but increasing counterpart resource allocations to JITAP in several participant countries.

Section 3. Stakeholders’ capacities and commitment

24. The key stakeholders associated with JITAP are:

- Government ministries: Trade, Industry, Finance, Planning, Agriculture, Law, Foreign Affairs, and others
- Statutory technical institutions: Standards Authorities, Intellectual Property Registrars, Health and Safety Regulatory bodies

- Trade support institutions: Export promotion agencies, Business Chambers, Sector-based associations
- Academic institutions of higher learning, think tanks, economic research institutions, and training institutions
- Private sector business enterprises
- Civil society organizations including gender organizations

25. The Ministry of Trade is the principal body associated with MTS issues in most countries. However, in some countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the frontline role in negotiations, with due support from the Ministry of Trade and other key ministries. These diverse stakeholders together constitute the Inter-Institutional Committee (IIC), a structure that has been developed under JITAP. In JITAP countries, IICs have memberships ranging from 8 to 85 institutional members.

26. Capacities to understand international trade agreements and to negotiate national interests remain inadequate, although programmes such as JITAP have led to a noticeable increase in these capacities. Many JITAP countries became members of the WTO in 1994 by default, by virtue of their membership of GATT since 1962, which in a sense, did not involve fresh negotiations for membership, unlike for the new entrants. As a result, joining the WTO was not a challenge for these countries. Also, the special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries implied that there were no current concessions to be made or offered as a condition for membership. Ten of the sixteen JITAP countries are LDCs, which benefit from several non-reciprocal market access and tariff preferences for trade with the EU and the US.

27. There is a very small pool of trade officials and negotiators in most JITAP countries (ranging from 5 to 30 persons in the 16 JITAP countries) to deal with an increasing agenda of WTO, bilateral, and regional trade agreements. In some cases, the Geneva missions, which come under the Foreign Affairs Ministries, do not have trade attaches or specialists, which handicap participation and follow up of negotiations in close coordination with the capitals. Of late, some countries have taken steps to post trade officials in Geneva missions, while in others there is extensive travel of the Ministry of Trade officials to Geneva for the negotiations. This is a sub optimal solution, and a larger complement of suitably qualified trade human resources is an absolute necessity to cope with the negotiation workload. Despite the significant increase in involvement in trade negotiations, there has not been a corresponding increase in human resources and budgets for the trade departments in several countries. In some countries, even government delegates have had to depend on external funding from donors and civil society organizations to enable their participation in WTO meetings.

28. Parliamentarians, being elected representatives, are an important stakeholder group in trade issues, and can play a significant role in mobilizing public consensus or opinion on international trade issues. However, by and large, elected representatives are found to have very limited understanding of the trade negotiations. Also, being highly sensitive to media and domestic public opinions, they often succumb to a populist stand on trade issues without engaging in objective debate. This poses challenges in enacting legislation on trade, and in the domestication of the WTO agreements, resulting in several bills pending for parliament

approval. In many countries, even the statutory creation of IICs remains incomplete due to these delays. There has been an increase in the general awareness among parliamentarians, especially among ministers connected with negotiations, including as a result of participation in trade capacity development programmes. Yet, their limited tenure in office impairs continuity in their influence on a larger awareness and acceptance of trade as an important instrument of policy.

29. Private sector involvement with the MTS has been a cause for concern in many JITAP countries. The national business federations and industry chambers of commerce are members of the IICs in all JITAP countries. Besides these apex bodies, sector-based organizations, and producer groups are also members in some JITAP countries. Business stakeholders generally find trade negotiations to be very time-consuming, and sometimes not immediately relevant to their business. This is particularly true of the WTO, which receives less attention from business associations than the regional negotiations on grounds that the African market is the main and immediate interest for businesspersons in Africa. Also, with rather limited resources, many of these bodies do not have research units or specialists to provide analytical assessments to enable industry positions on a range of trade issues, nor adequate networking. This limits their contribution to development of national negotiation priorities, which rely more on the research inputs from economic research units and think tanks, rather than analyses prepared by/ commissioned by business stakeholders.

30. Civil society positions on WTO have changed considerably over the years. Civil society groups (Action Aid, Consumer International, etc.) are very keyed in on trade issues and, unlike private sector bodies, network effectively, sharing policy advocacy focus on key issues with counterparts in other countries. This has enabled them influence popular national or regional positions, based on research and analytical evidence rather than from a principle standpoint.

31. Civil society positions are also receiving due attention at stakeholder consultations on MTS in many JITAP countries. An interesting example is the total re-orientation of TRIPS focus from the popular issues of affordable access to medicines to one of food security for small communities. This originated from a Uganda civil society position, but became a common concern for African LDCs after being voiced at an LDC conference in Zanzibar. Similarly, Uganda's positions on undertaking limited commitments in education under Mode 3 also emerged from a minority position to the mainstream voice, based on adequate evidence and articulation by the civil society groups.

Section 4. TRTA programmes

32. JITAP I countries are almost unanimous in their view that JITAP was the first programme to address their trade capacity needs in respect of MTS issues. In that sense, any synergies and overlaps with other programmes need to be considered from the viewpoint of JITAP being the precursor. However, in some JITAP II countries, other TRTA programmes were addressing some trade-related needs at the time JITAP was extended to these countries.

33. The key programmes/processes that address trade capacity development in Africa are the Africa Trade and Poverty Programme (ATPP) funded by DFID, the Integrated Framework

(multi-donor), Africa Competitiveness Hubs (USAID), and Programme for building African Capacity for Trade (PACT) funded by Canada, these being undertaken in several JITAP countries. In a few countries that are also part of the SADC, the Southern African Trade Research Network (SATRN) and Trade Law Centre (TRALAC) are programmes that are complementary with JITAP.

34. The three implementing agencies ITC, UNCTAD and WTO too, have other technical cooperation activities in JITAP countries which complement some JITAP activities. Both WTO and UNCTAD deliver training through distance learning programmes and other contact programmes, from their trust fund budgets. ITC undertakes country-specific projects such as the Export Strategy Development, or Export Poverty Reduction Programmes, which complement JITAP's activities aimed at increasing export readiness. Also, ITC's programmes like World Tr@de Net facilitate stakeholder consultations and networking on MTS issues as in some JITAP modules. In some cases, these interventions have not been found to be well-coordinated, e.g. in Zambia, the parallel involvement in ITC's Export led Poverty Reduction Programme (EPRP) covering coffee and honey, while undertaking implementation of sector strategies for horticulture under JITAP module 4.

35. Donor coordination remains inadequate in most countries. According to many persons consulted in the evaluation, the reality on the ground is that donors, implementing agencies as well as beneficiaries have some interests in a multiplicity of programmes, arising from different needs: inadequacy of programme funds to resolve supply side constraints, among beneficiaries; competition and appetite for donor funds for technical assistance, among agencies; and enhanced profile and visibility, among donors. This explains why there are bilateral, regional as well as multilateral funded projects/programmes/processes addressing the same needs in trade capacity building. Therefore, inter-programme coordination, while welcome, is not an overriding priority at many of these entities.

36. There is some country-level coordination between the Integrated Framework and JITAP in a few countries, e.g. Uganda, Tanzania, Mali, Mozambique, and Zambia, where the institutional mechanisms have been merged, and complementing activities undertaken in respect of export prioritization studies. In a few cases, additional sector strategy studies have been conducted under JITAP using IF resources. However, JITAP resource persons in the agencies have seldom been involved or consulted in the preparations of the DTIS reports under the IF as such.

Chapter II. Programme Implementation

Section 1. Implementation Arrangements

37. The challenge of delivering the programme to 16 countries, which is twice the footprint size of the earlier phase, placed increased demands on JITAP II, especially in inter-agency coordination and in the delivery of training contents and workshops. JITAP II implementation is based on a principle of national self-implementation with less Geneva support; choosing a sub-regional rather than country-level delivery of contents; and an increased reliance on building networking and synergies among country networks. The following elements were designed to achieve the enhanced scope of delivery:

- Needs assessments and programme documents were prepared for each country with considerable detail, in order to arrive at the optimum common scope of delivery at the regional or sub-regional level.
- Tool kits were developed for each Module to support national self-implementation.
- Regional workshops were designed for common delivery of training and capacity development collectively to beneficiaries in all JITAP countries.
- Persons trained in JITAP I countries were proposed to be used as resource persons to develop a network of MTS professionals for dissemination and sensitization activities.

38. JITAP II's initial design provided for a foundation track for the new countries, and an advanced track for the older participants. However, this could not be implemented due to the attrition of the base of trained government officials in JITAP I countries, including the posting of some officials to missions in Geneva and in important capitals. As a result, JITAP II was constrained to implement a common, foundation course for all countries. Needs assessments in JITAP I countries do not seem to have captured this important dimension in the programme. At the same time, strict entry conditions, such as retention of trained persons, cannot be enforced by external agencies on grounds that these impinge on sovereign powers.

i. Inter-agency cooperation in implementation

39. **Joint and Integrated Approach** One of JITAP's unique features is the joint and integrated approach of the three implementing agencies. At the programme coordination level, inter-agency cooperation is reflected in the budget preparation exercise, implementation planning, sharing of implementation responsibilities under each module and joint monitoring missions. Specific to the programme, agencies observe that the arrangements are overall, satisfactory. Members of the Joint Steering Mechanism from the three agencies also report being able to undertake 'healthy debates' at the Programme level, in isolation of the hierarchic relationships that exist among the agencies themselves. Discussions on apportioning of budgets and implementation arrangements are undertaken without a feeling of being dominated or led. The apportionment of resources is generally agreeable, and each agency has sufficient flexibility to manage its funds for the agreed work programme.

40. However, intra-agency cooperation i.e. between JITAP units and other divisions in the implementing agencies appears to have been a mixed lot. Of particular importance is the organization of technical cooperation activities outside JITAP but directed at the very same stakeholders/beneficiaries that participate in JITAP, without coordination with the JITAP calendar or with the focal points in the agencies. This has led to some (although very few) instances of parallel events being staged in the same locations, overlapping with JITAP events, or some planned JITAP events being cancelled at the last moment due to non-availability of key experts from one of the agencies.

41. To the extent feasible, inter-agency coordination mechanisms have tried to address these constraints and demands by synchronizing JITAP activities to dovetail with monitoring/evaluation missions, or with other training programmes (for instance, regional WTO training courses for government officials preceded JITAP networking events). Similarly, monitoring missions in JITAP dovetail regional seminars or workshops convened under JITAP.

42. **Resource mobilization.** The mobilization of technical inputs and resource persons within each agency are the responsibility of the respective Focal Points, with assistance of the Focal Point Supports, which are JITAP-funded resource persons. Considerable planning and inter-agency consultations are involved in mounting and delivering joint missions. The agencies have been unanimous in their appreciation of the smooth coordination of delivery of activities, irrespective of differences over the design and scheduling of the various events themselves. Delivery of technical assistance has been on target especially in modules 1, 3 and 4.

43. Notwithstanding the smooth implementation of joint TA activities, there are emerging supply side constraints within the agencies in respect of enhanced involvement in JITAP activities. In the past ten years, technical cooperation activities have exploded for all three agencies, and more particularly for UNCTAD and WTO, whose main functions were not the provision of technical assistance. The WTO has a direct mandate from the Ministerial Declarations to provide technical assistance to all developing countries on trade rules and negotiations, which devolve on its internal technical cooperation resources. UNCTAD has a technical cooperation division to coordinate with donors and beneficiaries, but the services are provided by its line divisions, such as the Division of Trade Services, whose principal mandate is to undertake research and analysis on trade and development. Yet, technical cooperation has increased from \$3 million to \$30 million in the last fifteen years, without a proportionate increase in staff. UNCTAD faces constraints in stepping up its TA activities, considering the limits to which mainstream research staff can be deployed on missions, without compromising their mainstream activities.

44. In comparison, ITC has more flexibility than UNCTAD and WTO in planning its human resource strength, and uses a large complement of L-staff (non-permanent cadre) to deliver its technical assistance programmes. It is able to leverage its field presence- its country officers and consultants- to deliver/ implement a number of activities across different programmes in beneficiary countries. Yet, such flexibility has its own limits, and there is an increasing pressure on the human resources at ITC also, with the steady increase in technical assistance delivery in the past ten years.

45. **Backstopping at field level.** Although there have been delays in delivery under some modules, counterparts in all countries are of the unanimous opinion that the implementing agencies have been responsive to their requirements, and offered them full support in managing the programme within the countries, as and when requested. The support in Modules 1 and 4 is highly appreciated, as these modules addressed country-specific issues raised by the stakeholders. However, implementation of Module 2 and use of decentralized funds received some criticism. On the other hand, in-country management has been uniformly weak in many countries, given the time and human resource constraints faced by focal points, and the inability of the programme to fund support staff to facilitate in-country implementation.

46. **Monitoring** of the programme is a joint responsibility of the three agencies, led by the Programme Coordination Unit. At present, the monitoring arrangements consist of six-monthly stock-taking missions undertaken by staff from all the three agencies, including the Programme Coordinator. These missions are dovetailed with training events to the extent possible.

47. **Problems.** The joint and integrated approach has not been without its difficulties and sacrifices. Two issues, in particular, have been brought to the attention of the evaluator. The first relates to an over-adherence to jointness, manifesting at macro as well as micro levels of the programme implementation. Some participants find this to be very laborious, dilatory and counterproductive, and would like to see a greater level of delegation to the Programme Coordination Unit, once the core concepts and implementation modalities have been agreed jointly. The second is the principle of absolute consensus, which, according to some participants, led to a reluctant acceptance of some proposals by other agencies, despite a lack of conviction, and resulted in low levels of ownership and sub-optimal delivery. It is understood that there have been disagreements on conceptual as well as operational aspects in some modules (number of centres under Module 2, and the scope of Module 5, in particular) but these have yielded to the principle of consensus. The programme needs to find alternatives to the absolute consensus principle at least on operational issues, delegating more authority to the lead agency concerned.

ii. Delivery of activities and timeliness of inputs³

48. It would appear logical to assume JITAP II to be more efficient than JITAP I, benefiting from the experience in implementing the programme under a joint and integrated approach, and the foundations laid by JITAP I in eight countries. However, this assumption has not been found to be true in reality.

49. JITAP II had a calendar of four years 2003-2006 to complete its activities. JITAP II implementation has been designed through Annual Plans documents. Perusal of implementation plan documents for 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 indicates that the better part of 2003 and 2004 went into preparatory activities in Geneva and in the participating countries. The evaluator learnt of several challenges and resultant delays in the initial preparatory stages, covering practically all of 2003 and a part of 2004. There were problems with finalization of the

³ The detailed status of completion of activities appears in Annex 4.

programme document, the country documents, and even appointment of the Programme Coordinator. Despite these problems, some activities were carried out even before the official adoption of the programme documents, the emphasis dictated by the calendar of (Cancun) negotiations more than any other aspect.

50. Country-wise implementation plans exist only for 2005 and 2006. There is practically no difference in content among the country plans, except for the differences in the sectors chosen for export strategy formulation. This is reflective of considerable Geneva-based planning, with practically little customization for country-level activities. Further, budget allocations have not been specified for several activities in 2005 and for almost all activities for 2006.

51. Some delays have been due to inadequate readiness of counterpart institutions in beneficiary countries, the absence of agreed counterpart funding, and attrition of human resources that participated in various modules. Programme delivery suffered considerably in Zambia due to non availability of focal points and other key persons to manage and coordinate the programme in the country. This was attributed to human resource constraints arising from Zambia's coordination responsibilities of the LDCs group, which have ended in 2006, with the coordination responsibilities passing to Bangladesh.

52. In terms of completion of deliveries, Modules 1 and 4 have performed better than other modules. Module 2 has been delivered in all JITAP I countries, although not in many JITAP II countries. The deliveries of regional training workshops under Module 3 have also been completed according to schedules. However, in-country activities such as the sensitizing workshops and training have not been held as scheduled in most countries. MTS professional networks have not been formed in many of the JITAP II countries. In Module 5, videoconferences have been held as planned. However, the JITAP Multi portal, a major component, has not taken off due to conceptual differences among the agencies, which were resolved through a decision to commission a feasibility study under an external agency. There continue to be doubts as to whether this component should be implemented or not.

53. Module 1. By end of July 2006, UNCTAD will have led delivery of 48 activities under Module I since the beginning of JITAP II. These include: national retreats of the IICs; training and capacity building workshops on negotiating skills; training workshops organized by negotiation subjects- agriculture, NAMA, GATS, etc.; preparatory workshops for trade negotiations; and pre-and post-Ministerial events. However, some challenges are observed in the operation of IIC subcommittees.

54. The main problem is that a few key persons are members of several subcommittees, which presents bottlenecks in preparing work plans and undertaking activities without overlaps. Over time, these subcommittees have weakened due to the time pressures on members, who also have commitments to attend various trade negotiations. The participation of private sector bodies on subcommittees has been less than satisfactory in many countries, and was seen as a concern in Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, the three Anglophone countries visited by the evaluator. The preparation of technical inputs also faced challenges in some countries, as the

research studies by resource persons were unable to translate into country priorities. Therefore, the technical inputs from IICs were of limited use, according to some focal points.

55. Module 2 activities included development and distribution of the tool kits, procurement/delivery of hardware and reference materials, and 4-day training missions on documentation contents and document management. There have been delays in arrival of equipment in Botswana, Mozambique (resulting from the local UNDP office's initial refusal to handle procurement for WTO, a non UN body) and Malawi. According to the implementation schedule for Module 2 (provided by WTO), implementation in Botswana, Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia is scheduled only for June 2006 to early 2007. Agencies also reported differences of approach on the implementation modalities for Module 2, especially with regard to needs assessment missions for what was considered to be a rather standard scope of delivery. As a result, implementation could only begin in late 2004, which meant that reference materials were not available to support IIC sub committees for almost two years of JITAP II.

56. According to some agency persons who participated in training missions, scheduling was inappropriately early in some cases; missions took place at a few locations where the reference centres had not yet been fully commissioned. In such locations, in situ training and mentoring could not take place as planned, which is considered sub optimal, considering that there is no further scope under the implementation plans agreed for Module 2, which provided for one 4-day mission to each of the 16 beneficiary countries. There were also cases where the equipment has been delivered but has not even been unpacked, and where no training has been provided. For instance, in Botswana, none of the managers have been trained, reference materials have arrived only in the two of the seven information points, and no equipment has arrived at any of the reference centres. Technical persons from all three agencies were also concerned over the rather thin spread of training activities in Module 2. External factors such as non availability of electricity (e.g. two entire days in Tanzania), absence of internet connectivity, inadequate internet access speeds, and other unforeseen developments further challenged the implementation of Module 2.

57. Staffing reference centres with the requisite profile of persons is another challenge in Module 2. Effective operation of MTS reference centres requires the presence of at least one person having a minimum threshold level of document management skills, besides at least one resource person having specific domain knowledge. This has not been possible to implement in some reference centres set up under JITAP. The conditions are worst in some reference centres set up in the Ministries of Trade, which at best have documents and a computer, but no suitable persons with basic library management skills to manage these centres. e.g. Senegal and Mali. In sharp contrast, the business reference centres, mostly located in the Trade Promotion Organizations, are found to be well managed and well organized, expectedly due to the charter of these organizations- provision of trade information and handling of trade enquiries from business stakeholders.

58. There are also some discrepancies in delivery of equipment. Some beneficiaries received additional equipment, while some others did not receive the agreed initial complement (photocopiers were not provided to some centres, while even LCD projectors -not in the standard scope- were given to some centres). There have also been concerns on the absence of

flexibility in selecting equipment, considering that some beneficiaries already had some equipment specified for Module 2, and wished to use the funds for supplementary equipment like LCD projectors in place of scanners and printers.

59. There was also disagreement among the agencies as to the number of centres to be set up using JITAP resources. One view was that the pooling of resources into fewer centres could have provided for more sustainable alternatives, instead of having several centres, each with suboptimal levels of skills and capacities.

60. Module 3. Ideally activities under Module 3 were to include training of master trainers on MTS issues (by Geneva agencies), the creation of MTS networks and sensitization/dissemination programmes with some decentralized funding support from JITAP. In all, 16 training events (compiled from schedule of JITAP activities), were scheduled over 2005 and 2006, which cover a range of MTS subjects, delivered by one or more agencies. All of these events have been held, the last one being a sub regional workshop on Services, held in Tunis in June 2006. However, sensitization and dissemination events, which are the follow up from these events, were undertaken only in Kenya (6 events), Ghana, Mali, Uganda (5 events) and Tunisia, according to the document listing all approved activities for Modules 3 and 5 (Coordination Unit). These sensitization events are very general and do not necessarily follow the subjects on which Module 3 training has been provided.

61. Module 4, dealing with sector export strategy development, has been highly 'prolific' in terms of programme outputs, and has delivered a number of sector strategy documents in all countries. Module 4 has been seen to be highly efficient, considering the scope of its activities, and ITC's efficiency and responsiveness have been highly appreciated in many countries. However, Module 4 has a limited scope for influence at the ground level in the export sectors, which require substantial financial interventions beyond the scope of Module 4.

62. Activities have progressed well under Module 4, relating to the development of sector strategies for a number of products and/or services. According to the Management Review, in all, more than 50 sector export strategies are under various stages of formulation in the 16 JITAP countries. This proliferation has been possible in large measure due to the availability since JITAP I, in some countries, of the Module 4 Tool Kit, besides other trade and market information tools such as Trade Map, Product Map, which have been developed at ITC. However, even the new entrants to JITAP have carried out a large number of prioritization studies, already.

63. Compared to the other modules, implementation of Module 5 has lagged considerably, except for the Videoconferencing events. Programme agencies faced problems of a conceptual nature while designing the architecture of Module 5, which involves, among other features, setting up of a JITAP multiportal (to be hosted and managed in Geneva), networks of national trade hubs within each beneficiary country, and content specific portals under the other JITAP modules, especially the IICs, RCs, NEPs, and MTS professionals. To address these issues, an external consultant was appointed to produce a feasibility study for the JITAP Multi portal, based on a survey of user needs in the sixteen countries in order to determine a suitable architecture for the multiportal and the network of country specific portals. The feasibility report has been completed, although with considerable delays (it was originally targeted to be completed by end 2005), partly due to lack of understanding on part of the consultant of the

concept and the specific deliverables. At the time of the briefing visit in Geneva, a call for tender for setting up of the Multiportal was under finalization.

64. The quality of content on the present JITAP, as well as the usage of the Communication and Discussion Facility (CDF), aimed at facilitating regular interactions and online consultations among the MTS network, have been less than satisfactory. Although e-surveys carried for the Management Review report varying degree of usage of the portal, visits by the international evaluator to the portal (during 17 -22 May, 2006) indicated that several country pages had scant country-specific information, other than the list of members of the NSC and IIC. While it is understandable that web portals would allow only limited access to unregistered users, even persons connected with the programme concede that the portal is not up to the mark and needs to be brought up to date.

65. The essence is that Geneva agencies have completed their activities so far in a somewhat compressed and difficult schedule, with some inadequacies in Modules 3 and 5, and partly in Module 2. On the other hand, activities under the responsibility of national counterparts have floundered. And, JITAP II has had an actual implementation window of two-and-a- half years against the four initially envisaged.

iii. Utilization of decentralized funds

66. JITAP II has provided for approximately US\$ 1.6 million of decentralized funds for consumption by beneficiary countries for pre-specified local expenditures. These funds were decentralized by the agencies directly or by the Coordination Unit, to facilitate pre-approved activities under various modules, in the countries. The major consumption heads of decentralized funds are:

- Preparation for Ministerial Conferences at Cancun and Hong Kong: \$ 240,000
- Local information dissemination and training activities: \$ 298,000
- Setting up reference centres and Enquiry points: exact amount not known
- Support to JITAP networks of trainers and professionals: exact amount not known
- Formulation and implementation of sector strategies: exact amount not known

Decentralization has been done either through UNDP local offices under the Authorization for Field Expenditures (AFE) route, or through MOUs between the agency and the beneficiaries directly (as in Module 4). Decentralized funds have a limited window, and lapse automatically upon expiry.

67. The authorization and disbursement of decentralized funds has been swift and efficient. However, there has been poor utilization of decentralized funds. Only two countries, Uganda and Benin, have used a substantial part of their allocations. Authorizations lapsed in at least 2 countries due to absence of any requests to UNDP. The causes of low utilization are varied: lack of information among counterparts about availability of funds; cumbersome disbursement procedures in at least one agency; a long chain of communication between agencies and recipients; unwillingness by one local UNDP office to undertake procurement on behalf of WTO-not being a UN body; insufficiency of budgets to undertake any meaningful activities,

and so on. At the time of evaluation, unused funds were being decentralized again to enable their use for newly approved activities.

Table 3.Utilization of Decentralized Funds

	Budgeted	Authorized	Spent	Remarks
Benin	55,000	51000	43971	low usage for Hong Kong preparations and Module 1
Burkina Faso	54500	17342	17648	No usage for Honk Kong preparations
Botswana	53760	10620	24124	No usage of Module 3 and 5 MTS training, and Hong Kong
Cameroon	56700	18957	15311	No usage of funds for Mod 3 and 5 training
Cote d'Ivoire	59530	29095	19896	No usage of funds for Module 3 and 5
Ghana	49530	31727	8450	No usage for Cancun
Kenya	59530	54786	28682	
Malawi	53760	29502	14791	
Mali	53760	41328	12125	No usage of Module 3 and 5 MTS training and Cancun
Mauritania	53760	43972	43972	
Mozambique		3696	2891	No usage of Module 3 and 5 MTS training, and Hong Kong
Senegal	53760	31100	10273	No usage of Module 3 and 5 MTS training, and Hong Kong
Tanzania	54530	21458	21458	No usage of Cancun and Project Document budgets
Tunisia	59530	54632	23150	
Uganda	59530	59530	58375	Almost fully used
Zambia	53760	30002	11709	Used mainly for Cancun

68. Several focal points reported dissatisfaction with the decentralized budgets. There was not sufficient clarity on the volume of decentralized funds available, and the types of activities that could be designed to access these funds. As a result, local counterparts designed activities without the knowledge of available ceilings, and also activities that would be directly under the implementing agencies. The lack of adequate inputs from local counterparts is also an important cause of this low utilization rate. In some countries, counterparts simply did not have time or human resources to prepare requests according to procedures, leading to eventual lapses of the authorized amounts. Some countries also do not agree to the rationale of ‘lapse of AFEs’, i.e. financial authorizations in a particular period which cannot be carried forward, considering the severe human resource constraints at the counterpart organizations, which are known to all agencies.

iv.Quality, relevance and usefulness of tools developed

69. JITAP provides a set of tool kits to guide self implementation, and subject-specific training in various modules. Workshops are usually followed by a participant feedback survey to gauge the usefulness and quality of the contents delivered. The evaluator analyzed the feedback

reported in the Management Review on tool kits, and the feedback results of two workshops, to provide examples of the ‘perceived’ quality and utility of the programme contents to beneficiaries.

70. Tool kits. Materials provided under for Module 4, especially Market Analysis tools provided by ITC (Trade Map, Market Access Map) appear to be the most used in JITAP countries. Reference centres in many countries as well as the strategy teams reported a high popularity of these tools among their stakeholders. In contrast, other tool kits and reference materials are used occasionally and in an ad hoc manner in many countries.

71. JITAP Training Workshops. This assessment is made on the basis of post training forms filled by 165 participants under seven JITAP training workshops held during February to July 2005. These workshops were on: Services Negotiations; SPS; Results-based Management; High-level IIC meets; TBT; Customs and Trade Facilitation; and NAMA.

- Training approaches and learning: A large majority of two thirds or more participants rated the workshops as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ on all 7 parameters of efficient communication by trainers of the knowledge of the topics covered. About 30% or more participants rated the workshops ‘excellent’ on 4 parameters. About a quarter of the participants found coverage of national/regional considerations being ‘medium’ in these workshops, while 8% rated practical exercises as ‘poor’.
- Training material and Technical documentation: Over 90% of the participants rated the workshops ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ on all three parameters relating to effectiveness of different learning methods in the acquisition of the knowledge / skills on the subject of the workshop.
- Concept and Issues: More than two-thirds (69%) of the participants did not feel that any important concepts / issues were missing in the programme, while 19% do. Another 12% participants have not responded indicating that they are not sure.
- Suggestions for improvement:
 - Programme duration should be extended to 7 – 10 days to ensure in-depth coverage of all aspects
 - More emphasis on regional case studies and practical exercises
 - Some facilitators/trainers need to be better equipped to handle the topics presented
 - Resource persons from Africa should also be included
 - Training materials/ documentation should be communicated well in advance (through JITAP website, in electronic form) for better preparedness
 - Field visits should be included
 - Lap top computers should be provided for use by participants, for hands-on simulation⁴
 - Private sector participation should be increased
 - Simultaneous translation service should be included
 - Answers to practical exercises by participants from different regions should be compiled and circulated

(The evaluator does are not necessarily agree with the above suggestions.)

⁴ The team leader does not agree to these recommendations

72. Self Evaluation of the acquisition of MTS knowledge. This assessment evaluation is based on the feedback of 128 participants from 6 JITAP training workshops held during February to July 2005.

- Objectives from participation in the workshops: 65% of the participants wanted to update their personal expertise on the subject of the workshop, while 33% considered the workshop as a first learning experience. Other objectives were:
 - to learn trade policy negotiation,
 - to prepare for the CTS meeting in June 2005
 - deeper understanding of TBT agreements
 - share & learn from other participants
- Capacity building & meeting expectations: By and large, a majority of the participants indicated that their expectations were fully met. Less than 20% were of the view that their expectations were not fulfilled, especially with regard to better management of RCs & NEPs and to participate in sectoral strategies. About 25% of the participants did not respond.
- Achievement of the aim of Workshop (to provide better understanding, enhanced skills and training materials on the MTS): 72% of the participants found that the aim of the workshops was globally achieved, while 22% indicated that it was partially achieved.
- Preparedness to train other professionals: 55% participants felt they had acquired enough skills to train other professionals. The percentage who were not entirely or not at all confident of training others was 30% and 4% respectively. The remaining 11% offered no comment.
- Acquisition of enough skills to adapt and use training material: 56% of the participants confirmed that they had acquired skills to adapt and use training material, while 31% were not entirely confident in this aspect. Only 5% were not at all confident. The remaining 9% offered no comment.
- Suggestions for improvements:
General suggestions common to all workshops
 - Up-date and send the relevant information by email after the workshops.
 - Increase duration of the workshops
 - Encourage practice sessions and case studies to derive optimum benefits from the training
 - Introduce a programme of follow-up strategy

(The evaluator does are not necessarily agree with the above suggestions.)

73. There has been concern about the content of training in JITAP II, both among beneficiaries as well as observations by agency staff involved in implementation. JITAP II uses a sub-regional delivery of training under Module 3, in which beneficiaries from several countries participate at 3-5 day workshops delivered by the three agencies together. In JITAP II, this is considerably less than the training in JITAP I, in which master trainers received 6 or more weeks of intensive training on the same subjects. The assumption that master trainers of JITAP I would be available as resource persons did not hold true, as there was considerable attrition in the resource base in some countries, some for good reasons; JITAP trained persons were sent to

Geneva and other capitals as negotiators. Yet, the final outcome is that master trainers received considerably less training in JITAP II than in JITAP I, and this has had an impact in the further dissemination and outreach objectives of the programme.

74. Export Sector Identification and Strategy Formulation. Needs have been expressed to deepen the approach in Module 4, perhaps with greater involvement of UNCTAD's research inputs, to qualify the selection of export priority sectors based on a more rigorous analysis of export factors. There are concerns that a prolific cookie-cutter approach to sector prioritization is likely to exclude deeper analysis of the weaknesses in various economic sectors- constraints in resources, capital and infrastructure, pro-poor aspects and inter-sector trade offs.

75. Currently, prioritization is based primarily on the viewpoint of trade opportunities as assessed by trade flows- often, these do not take into account the range and complexity within in the same category of products. For instance, trade flows may lead to livestock being identified as export opportunities in Mali. But practical difficulties faced in exports do not get captured in this analysis. For instance, Mali's livestock base consists of nomadic cattle, and rearing animals to high body weights is considered impractical given the nomadic way of life for cattle farmers. Also, exported cattle can lose up to 20% of their body weight in the arduous road journey from Mali to Ghana (a market destination), resulting in serious loss of revenue⁵. Export of live animals can be a very sensitive issue in some countries, under SPS regulations. This introduces new dimensions like breed development and ranch farming.

76. While Module 4 advocates priorities from export potential and opportunities view points, a further criterion can be the presence of a large livelihood/employment generation component, especially for women. ITC is addressing these criteria in its improved tool kit, in the form of a 'social desirability' index for each of the sectors, enabling stakeholders to make an informed choice among the identified sectors, considering trade offs among economic and social benefits.

77. The quality of sector studies in Module 4 needs to be improved. Many of the strategy documents in JITAP do not go deeper than the mapping of constraints and opportunities and listing the actions required, which falls a bit short of strategy in the true sense of the term. The results could have been better had there been provisions under Module 4 for more in-depth training in strategy formulation than explained in the tool kit. Module 4 has a high sustainability potential and more attention to the quality of the end product prepared by local resources would lead to sustainable improvements in capacities related to export strategy development. Given that some countries have produced good studies, there is also scope for exchange of best practices among JITAP countries. Many countries have also selected the same sectors for export strategy development, which makes it easier to undertake studies in the new JITAP countries under the same sectors.

78. JITAP Portal. Website statistics provided by the PCU show that in May 2006, close to 2000 unique visitors accessed the site and about 600 persons have visited the website more than once. However, there are some observations on the quality of the website leading to doubts about its actual utility as the reference site for JITAP participants. The user registration facility accepts only entries under the old list of JITAP countries, and it is not possible for a person

⁵ These findings are from UNCTAD studies in Mali to apply and test the export strategy module

from any new JITAP country to register at the facility. As a result, many new users have been listed under older countries. Yet, it is known that adding a few more entries in the pop-down toggle list is a rather simple task for any administrator and does not require a revamp of the portal itself. As to old users, most respondents in the countries visited by the evaluator have forgotten their passwords, and are being encouraged to re-enroll at the portal.

79. The latest article on the JITAP news page was posted in December 2004, as observed by the evaluator, even with a high level access password to the site. The Documents Exchange facility shows only one entry under the frequently asked questions list; the query is about uploading a document, and not on technical issues relating to trade. The online discussions on the site are not used actively. The records of online discussions on the two entries visible (both in September 2002, relating to the JITAP II programme activities) indicate very little content and practically no participation by several focal points. In fact, several visitors are shown to have logged in and logged out within minutes, without contributing to the discussions.

80. The Q & A forum contains details of discussions on the CDF around the videoconference on development issues and special and differential treatments- June 2006 indicated 16 entries, including 7 questions from Malawi and Mozambique, all on June 21 and June 22, 2006, of which one was answered online. Whether these questions were taken up at the conference, and, if so, what answers were provided, are not ascertainable unless a transcript of the same is posted at the forum subsequently. Similarly, the session around the videoconference on textiles and clothing dated June 24 2005 has eight questions dating from June 9 to June 23, i.e. preceding the conference. There are no replies to the questions posted. It is not ascertainable whether these issues were taken up at the videoconferences.

81. Results Based Monitoring Template. One of JITAP II's interesting tools is the Results Based Reporting Template, which tracks the Programme against indicators at the level of outputs, outcomes and to a lesser extent, impacts. The initial template, called the Results Based Monitoring Matrix, is self explanatory and has very clear and quantifiable indicators for almost all entries. This was modified into a Results Reporting Template, without any significant changes in content. The tool was developed with the financial assistance from CIDA and national focal points were trained in Geneva on the use of the template. Although recent progress reports have been submitted in the prescribed format, several indicators are not reported. This needs to receive more strict attention on part of focal points and also the implementing agencies.

Section 2. Programme Coordination Unit

JITAP II is vested with a Geneva-based Programme Coordination Unit (PCU), envisioned as a common and joint mechanism for all three agencies, distinct from the Common Trust Fund administration function, and the management of activities falling under the individual responsibility of ITC, UNCTAD and WTO respectively, as the three implementing agencies. The PCU is hosted and located within ITC and the Coordinator reports to the Chief of the Office for Africa within the Division of Technical Cooperation Coordination, which sometimes creates confusions in the perception of its role and status. The present structure of the Programme Management and Coordination arrangements is presented schematically in Figure 1.

82. Coordination arrangements in JITAP have undergone several changes. JITAP I started with two Regional Coordinators in Abidjan and Kampala, with an overall Programme Coordinator from Geneva. Following the recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation of JITAP I, the Regional Coordination structure was disbanded and its role assumed by the Geneva-based Programme Coordinator.

83. As at the time of this evaluation, Programme coordination continues to face serious problems, created by a complex mesh of factors, some of them owing to the persons and personalities involved. These are analyzed below for the benefit of all stakeholders.

84. **Job description.** The tasks of the Programme Coordinator cover a range of technical, administrative and monitoring functions, extending to: programme planning; execution and monitoring. There is considerable overlap of coordination functions and direct implementation responsibilities of some modules.

85. The Programme Coordinator also interfaces with three or four levels of management in the agencies and in the countries: the national focal points in the beneficiary countries and their senior supervisors, including ministers, for implementation, awareness raising, sustainability and ownership; national stakeholders in the national steering committees concerned by the five programme modules; the Technical Committee of the Joint Steering Mechanism- three agency focal points for planning, budgeting and implementation coordination; and the Senior Level of the Steering Mechanism- senior managers connected with JITAP at the three agencies, for strategic issues and reporting. However, the Coordinator does not have any direct administrative and financial authority, for which he reports to and depends on the JITAP Focal Point at ITC, i.e. the head of the Africa Unit. This presents a difficult setting for the positioning of the Programme Coordination Unit in the management structure of JITAP.


86. The Coordination Unit also has implementation responsibilities for two of the five modules. As a result, there is an enormous work load that needs to be addressed in field level coordination, implementation planning of Module 3 and 5, and monitoring missions, not considering the responsibilities of inter-agency coordination in Geneva. The programme coordinator is supposed to spend a considerable part of his time in field missions (nearly 4 to 5 missions per year to visit the sixteen countries, much more than any other resource person from the three agencies).

87. Staff strength. According to a document describing the distribution of duties at the Coordination Unit, the Coordination Unit has an assigned strength of nine members. However, besides the Programme Coordinator, there are only four persons in the Unit, of which two are short-term consultants, one is a temporary assigned staff; and one person is on a side assignment at ITC. Understaffing has been a regular feature, despite the resources initially earmarked to support the Coordination Unit, and attributed partly to interpersonal relationships in ITC and to the Programme Coordinator's (lack of) popularity with some ITC staff at senior and junior levels, particularly at the administrative level. These have resulted in a sub-optimal functioning of the Coordination Unit, overload and lack of clarity of jobs for the persons involved, and constant firefighting to deal with pending tasks rather than a focus on the qualitative content of the jobs.

The Programme Coordinator. The incumbent is much more than just a Coordinator; he is the Father of JITAP, who conceptualized JITAP, has been involved with the Programme since its inception, and is the main repository of institutional memory of JITAP among the three agencies. The Coordinator also has excellent relations with the implementing agency counterparts as well as key stakeholders in each partner country, which have been an important factor in fostering the ownership of JITAP within the beneficiary countries. He is also the single full-time senior-level resource person in JITAP, unlike the Focal Points and Senior Management persons associated with it. This has resulted in a much greater level of personal ownership and leadership of the programme than could be expected normally from any appointee. While appreciated for initiative and his key role in the programme, the perception by some persons associated with the Programme is that the Coordinator's passion and personal involvement with JITAP has not always fostered co-ownership of all aspects of the programme, and at times led to rigid positions and limited flexibility at inter-agency meetings. *Caveat: These perceptions have been shared voluntarily with the evaluator, and there may be other differing views and perceptions on these aspects as well. The evaluator is not qualified to endorse or negate these perceptions, therefore this should not be taken as an independent concluding observation on the personality of the Coordinator as a single cause for any difficulties in Programme Coordination. Nevertheless, the assessment of the difficulties in the Coordination would not be complete without a mention of the personality aspects, even though these are perceptions.. Therefore these are mentioned in this section without any specific attribution to any one of the many actors involved in programme management.*

88. Despite these constraints, JITAP has not faltered much in the field, due to the overall high commitment of all the three agencies and the coordinator to tide over internal differences and deliver to agreed targets. However, cracks have appeared in the wall, and the quality of coordination is likely to suffer if the various issues and constraints relating to the Programme Coordination Unit are not resolved satisfactorily.

Figure 1. Programme Administration and Coordination Arrangements – Present Structure



Section 3. Budget and Financial administration

89. Financial administration of JITAP is vested with ITC, which manages the Trust Fund. JITAP II has received trust fund commitments or around US\$15.76 million, of which \$15.3 million (last reported in the Management Review report of March 2006) were received. As of June 2006, about \$ 11.6 million had been utilized, as summarized in Table 5. More than 50% of the Programme resources devolve to ITC, which implements Module 4 and also handles the trust fund administration, besides hosting the Programme Coordination Unit. Programme management and support costs account for 31.4% of Programme expenditure, which include agency support costs, provided at 13% to cover for technical and administrative backstopping.

Table4. Programme Funds Utilization by Agency, status June 2006, figures US\$.

Total	UNCTAD	WTO	ITC	PCU
11,700,318	2,062,624	2,599,989	3,826,465	3,211,240

Source: Data provided by Programme Coordination Unit

90. In JITAP II, funds transfers by agencies are reported to be very efficient, and there were practically no reports of delays in availability of funds, from donors, as well as from the Programme Management. All three agencies receive their funds annually or half-yearly, according to budgets agreed under the annual consolidated implementation plans (although there is a single plan for 2006-2007).

91. Accounting for JITAP is on an inputs-basis, i.e. resources used or apportioned, where as programme results are on an output-basis. The accounting system does not reconcile these two aspects. Once the transfer of funds has taken place to the agencies and the pre-encumbrance is completed i.e. when the funds are earmarked for the project, there is no mechanism to regulate budget deviations for each activity group. According to the PCU, large parts of an agency's JITAP budget can be re assigned without adherence to the agreed work plans. Some cases of over-assignment of agency staff time and travel costs have been shared with the evaluator. These were regularized *post facto* through discussions between the Programme Coordinator and the Focal Point. Appropriate procedures for prior authorization should be designed and made mandatory for charging expenditures under JITAP's work programmes adopted by each agency. Over-utilization of funds should be monitored and reported on a quarterly basis by each agency and reasons explained to the JSM, in the interests of transparency.

Table 5. Agency-wise expenditure per country per module, status June 2006, Figures in US\$

IIC							UNCTAD					
	Module 1	Module 2	Module 3	Module 4	Module 5	Total	Module 1	Module 2	Module 3	Module 4	Module 5	Total
Management						327,659						283,413
Toolkit	0	9,195	0	235,400	0	244,595	67,832	0	0	25,000	0	92,832
Benin	19,530	12,594	20,200	171,831	0	244,155	53,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	85,700
Botswana	23,760	12,250	20,742	167,674	8000	232,426	78,500	0	27,200	0	0	105,700
Burkina Faso	19,530	12,806	20,200	146,873	0	199,409	53,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	85,700
Cameroon	23,760	14,448	20,200	135,077	0	193,485	53,500	0	27,200	0	0	80,700
Cote d'Ivoire	19,530	2,000	20,200	50,342	0	92,072	53,500	0	27,200	0	0	80,700
Ghana	19,530	13,389	20,742	76862	0	130,523	53,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	85,700
Kenya	19,530	6,551	20,742	121276	0	168,099	53,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	85,700
Malawi	23,760	12,250	20,742	150,750	5,126	212,628	66,500	0	27,200	0	0	93,700
Mali	23,760	11,006	20,200	137,905	5,090	197,961	63,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	95,700
Mauritania	23,760	14,448	20,200	74356	1,850	134,614	53,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	85,700
Mozambique	23,760	2,000	20,742	85,063	0	131,565	73,500	0	27,200	0	0	100,700
Senegal	23,760	14,448	20,200	88,848	2,771	150,027	78,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	110,700
Tanzania	19,530	11,462	20,742	54,613	0	106,347	53,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	85,700
Tunisia	19,530	9,361	20,200	106,645	1,947	157,683	53,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	85,700
Uganda	23,760	11,462	20,742	113,268	0	169,232	53,500	5,000	27,200	0	0	85,700
Zambia	19,530	2,000	20,742	128,286	8,000	178,558	53,500	0	27,200	0	0	80,700
Sundry						135,216						14,886
Support cost						440,213						237,293
Total	346,320	171,668	327,536	1809669	32,784	3,826,465	949,000	50,000	435,200	0	0	2,062,624
WTO							Coordination Unit					
	Module 1	Module 2	Module 3	Module 4	Module 5	Total	Module 1	Module 2	Module 3	Module 4	Module 5	Total
Management						342,585						1,569,387
Toolkit	11,526	391,217				402,743						
Benin						173,157	1,494	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	76,732
Botswana						141,624	3,981	1,511	52,059	1,784	25,076	84,412
Burkina Faso						159,906	1,494	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	76,732
Cameroon						159,379	1,494	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	76,732
Cote d'Ivoire						87,521	1,494	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	76,732
Ghana						154,227	1,494	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	76,732
Kenya						140,857	1,494	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	76,732
Malawi						164,186	1,494	1,511	56,246	1,784	22,429	83,464
Mali						194,054	1,494	1,511	50,900	1,784	22,429	78,118
Mauritania						158,497	1,494	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	76,732
Mozambique						99,136	1,494	1,511	52,059	1,784	22,429	79,277
Senegal						163,097	1,494	5,868	65,043	1,784	22,429	96,618
Tanzania						174,738	1,494	1,511	53,846	1,784	22,429	81,064
Tunisia						99,250	2,080	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	77,318
Uganda						140,231	3,057	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	78,295
Zambia						91,015	1,494	1,511	49,514	1,784	22,429	76,732
Support cost						299,114	3710	3710	107,288	3,710	46,996	167,413
Total	78,794	921,416	485,450	5,074	12,513	2,599,989	32,250	32,250	932,583	32,250	408,499	3,211,240

Note: Most entries are apportionments of Geneva costs, and not actual expenditures in each country, i.e inputs-based accounting.

92. An important issue is the ambiguity over the Programme Coordination Unit's responsibilities in budget monitoring. The job description includes budget and financial administration in JITAP. According to the PCU, its mandate includes managing the Programme Budget, and the PCU is answerable to the Joint Management and the CTF SG, on the financial performance of the Programme, including on amounts allocated to the three agencies under various programme activities. However, within ITC, this responsibility is understood to be under the jurisdiction of the Finance and Administration Section. The ambiguity over the Programme Coordination Unit's responsibilities in respect of financial monitoring of JITAP budgets needs to be resolved through a suitable amendment or confirmation of the job description.

Section 4. Cost Effectiveness

93. The inputs based accounting system does not provide an accurate basis for cost effectiveness analyses. The Summative Evaluation Report of JITAP I had expressed its concerns over the absence of adequate data, which remain to a considerable extent even at the time of this evaluation. However, some attempts have been made to examine the costs of delivery of technical assistance in JITAP II, keeping in mind that the implementing agencies have rather proprietary domains, and are, therefore, not comparable with external service providers. Therefore, assessments are undertaken only from the view point of delivery efficiencies and cost of delivering the technical services under various Modules.

94. For purposes of cost effectiveness, Module 1 and Module 3 have been clubbed, as many beneficiaries are common to both, and there is considerable involvement of all three agencies in both these modules. Together, these two modules incurred \$ 3.55 million in net delivery (i.e. excluding management costs), covering close to 700 beneficiaries in various regional training workshops. Nearly \$540,000 was decentralized to fund local participation related costs, including preparations for Hong Kong and Cancun Ministerial events. Accordingly, nearly \$ 3 million is estimated to have been spent on short-term capacity building activities, most of them not exceeding 7 days in duration. In terms of unit costs, this corresponds to less than \$5,000 per participant, assuming close to 700 persons were trained under JITAP (Progress Report March 2006). A large part of these costs relate to travel and logistics, besides personnel service costs associated with training missions.

95. At least two implementing agencies, faced with increasing pressure on their time and human resources from a steep increase in technical cooperation demands, are finding it increasingly difficult to undertake training missions, and consider it to be a potential supply side constraint in the context of an enlarged footprint for JITAP III, warranting the need for new delivery mechanisms. Distance learning products- CDs and web based curricula, offer possibilities for cost-effective distribution of training materials and mentoring.

96. UNCTAD and WTO have a range of distance learning products, many featured on their websites. In this regard, existing models, particularly the WTO's Regional Trade Policy Courses and the distance-learning modules offer interesting prototypes for development in JITAP. These two products have been identified by the evaluator on account of their focus on the same or nearly same beneficiary groups as targeted in JITAP.

97. In 2006, WTO has planned seven online courses will be organized for government officials from developing members and observers (countries). Four online courses have already been delivered as of 26 June 2006 to 477 participants, average 120 persons per course. The estimated number of participants in the next 3 courses is therefore expected to be around 360, giving a total number of 837 participants in 2006⁶. The seven courses, each administered to about 120 persons, include 4 “Introduction to the WTO” courses of 42 hours duration i.e. 7 days equivalent, and 3 specialised courses of 30 hours duration, representing 5160 man days of training. The eTraining budget for 2006 amounted to around 316,000 CHF (US\$ 243,000), of which nearly 80% will be used for 3 staff members: 1 eTraining assistant, 1 webmaster and 1 legal expert, besides a supervisor, whose costs are covered from the regular budget. Software licenses and certificate costs amounted to nearly 19,000 CHF, while hosting and maintenance services, provided by private companies, make up the remaining 43,000 CHF. The average cost works out to CHF377 (US\$ 290) per beneficiary and CHF 61 (US\$ 47) per participant per day. The huge saving potential offered by such models can offset the high costs of internet connectivity in some JITAP countries, and facilitate the kind of dissemination being addressed under Module 3.

98. The success and popularity of the WTO Regional Trade Policy Courses, initiated at the University of Nairobi and now replicated in five regions world wide, provides a good example for a more cost-effective and increasingly sustainable delivery model, using experts from regional institutions of higher learning. There is merit in examining a two tiered capacity development model, with regional institutions providing the foundation level training for beginners in the region- including beneficiaries in JITAP III countries, while the implementing agencies focus on developing a higher level training for practitioners and experts on the ‘leading edge’ of MTS issues.

99. Module 4: Export Sector Strategies. Based on the budget allocations for 2006 and 2007, a total amount of \$ 415,000 has been earmarked. Field costs account for a significant part of delivery. Of the \$90,000 allocated for UNCTAD’s Commodity Diversification Guide, about \$ 70,000 has been earmarked for workshops to launch the guide. Close to \$ 220,000 from ITC’s total budget of \$ 325,000 have been apportioned toward local activities- national consultants, market studies and other subcontracts within the countries. Overall, the average expenditure under Module 4 translates into \$ 110,000 per sector, based on expenditure of \$ 2.1 million until June 2006 apportioned to 19 sector strategies. This figure is comparable with standard studies undertaken by international consulting agencies.

100. Module 5- Synergies and Networking. A look at the budgets for 2006 and 2007 under Module 5 indicates a total provision of nearly \$ 690,000, all under the budget of the Coordination unit. Of this amount, the new JITAP multiportal has received close to \$290,000, videoconferencing \$55,000, and networking workshops, \$200,000, besides the maintenance of the existing website \$ 117,600. The cost effectiveness of this module is questionable, considering that beneficiaries in many countries found only the video conferencing and the organization of regional retreats of any value. Even in these components, the decentralized amounts (\$15,000 per country) were considered rather low to organize inter-country networking events. In fact, some countries arranged retreats and networking events using funds

⁶ this analysis is based on cost details shared by WTO with the evaluator.

from other programmes, citing JITAP budgets to be very low. In contrast, the JITAP website, which has been perceived to be of limited utility, has a very high cost of maintenance associated with it- \$ 60,000 per year for the website manager alone- for its present level of performance.

Chapter III. Programme Results

101. JITAP uses the Results-based Reporting Template as the formal reporting tool for the Programme. The same template is used for reporting country-level performance as well as for the Programme as a whole. The template lists a set of indicators at the level of outcomes, outputs, and activities, which are self-explanatory. The last report using this template covered the status as on September 30, 2005, and was a part of the submission to the CTF Steering Group in October 2005.

102. A Management Review of the programme was undertaken in March 2006. This review was based, not on the standardized template but on an elaborate e-survey administered to the focal points of participant countries. According to the evaluators, the responses to the e-survey are incomplete on key aspects and limit the usefulness of the e-survey in the management review. The evaluation has used data from the latest Results based Report as well as the e-survey data used in the Management Review, and recreated the Results based Report, based on updates or revalidation of the existing information, by national evaluators (summarized in Annex 6)

103. There has not been significant variance in the information provided by the Management Review of March 2006 and the findings by National Evaluators in terms of the outputs delivered. Therefore, the data provided by the Programme Management is taken as validated.

104. The results at the level of outputs and deliveries appear in Annexe 5 to the report, and are compiled from the data provided by the Country Management Review Reports. However, they have been segregated for JITAP I and JITAP II countries to enable differentiation. The table is self explanatory. Therefore, no text descriptions are added in this section.

Section 1. Outcomes against Programme Indicators

105. JITAP II targeted four outcomes for its intervention areas. These are:

- Shaping trade positions, strategies and policies
- Strengthening trade stakeholders- capacities
- Export strategies as a response to market demands and opportunities
- Improved strategic capacity of trade and development stakeholders

Each outcome has a set of well-defined indicators to compare the results against preset targets. The summaries of the outcomes as reported in the Results Reporting Template appear in Table 6, segregated for JITAP I and JITAP II countries. However, the following analysis of outcomes included the evaluators' observations, based on the national reports and the field missions undertaken by the Team Leader, besides information provided by persons in the three agencies.

Table 6. Outcomes against Programme Results Matrix indicators

Outcomes	JITAP I Countries	JITAP II Countries
<p>Shaping trade positions, strategies and policy a. Number and proportion of negotiating proposals advanced by the IICs that are used at the WTO and by African groups to shape common positions b. Role of IIC in shaping trade positions: o Degree to which IICs provide inputs on the compatibility of national laws and regulations with WTO agreements, and keep notifications up-to-date o Degree to which IICs contribute to changes in trade policies</p> <p>8. Strengthening of trade stakeholders by IICs, MTS professionals⁸ and information points⁹ a. Use of inputs of MTS professionals, NEPs and RCs by the IIC b. Use of inputs in establishing trade initiatives c. Extent to which successful experiences or lessons have been share in other countries</p>	<p>Utilization of IIC initiated Negotiating Proposals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Country focal points from JITAP I countries record 33 negotiating proposals advanced by respective IICs - ranging between 2 (Tanzania) to 10 (Kenya) per country ▪ 14 proposals have been 'substantially' used at WTO negotiations by JITAP I countries, and 8 of them have been used partially. ▪ 22 proposals by JITAP I countries have been 'substantially' incorporated into Africa group positions. <p>Frequency of IIC inputs on Compatibility of National Laws and Regulations with WTO Agreements, and Constraints:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Six IICs 'frequently or always' provide these inputs. <p>Frequency of Update Notifications by Ministry in charge of Trade, and Constraints:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In six of the eight JITAP I countries, the ministries in charge of trade 'frequently or always' update the notifications. <p>Assessment of IIC contributions to changes in Trade Policy, and Constraints:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Four JITAP I IICs have 'substantially' contributed to trade policy, while two report partial contribution. ▪ Constraints: not indicated. ▪ Only one country focal point (Uganda) has noted a significant trade policy initiative on TRIPS and Public Health, which has resulted in a specific impact in terms of affordable medicines being available to people. <p>Assessment of IICs Utilization of Inputs of MTS Professionals, NEPs and RCs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Seven JITAP I countries make 'substantial' or 'partial' use of inputs of MTS Professionals, NEPS and RCs. <p>Main Constraints on IIC in using these Inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Most common constraints are limited financial and human resources. <p>Assessment of the Utilization of these Inputs in prominent Trade Initiatives under JITAP or other frameworks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Five of the eight country focal points indicate that inputs of MTS professionals, NEPs and RCs are 'substantially' used for such trade initiatives. <p>Assessment of Benefits obtained by IIC from Trade Stakeholders in other JITAP countries:</p>	<p>Utilization of IIC initiated Negotiating Proposals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Country focal points from JITAP II countries record 24 negotiating proposals advanced by respective IICs - ranging between 1 each by Botswana and Mozambique to 7 by Senegal ▪ 7 proposals have been 'substantially' used at WTO negotiations by JITAP II countries, and 16 of them have been used partially. ▪ 7 of these proposals have been 'substantially' incorporated into Africa group positions. <p>Frequency of IIC inputs on Compatibility of National Laws and Regulations with WTO Agreements, and Constraints:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only two country IICs 'frequently or always' provide these inputs, while three do so sometimes. Two IICs 'rarely or never' provide these inputs. ▪ Two JITAP II respondents indicate a lack of human resources (expertise) and financial constraints as current constraints. <p>Frequency of Update Notifications by Ministry in charge of Trade, and Constraints:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In three of the seven JITAP II countries, the ministries in charge of trade 'frequently or always' update the notifications while two IICs 'rarely or never' update the notifications. <p>Assessment of IIC contributions to changes in Trade Policy, and Constraints:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only one of the JITAP II IICs (Senegal) have 'substantially' contributed to trade policy, Among other JITAP II countries the contribution is only partial, which is not surprising given the stage of the programme in these countries. ▪ Constraints: not indicated. <p>Assessment of IICs Utilization of Inputs of MTS Professionals, NEPs and RCs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Four of JITAP II countries country IICs make 'substantial' and the other four 'partial' use of inputs of MTS Professionals, NEPS and RCs. <p>Main Constraints on IIC in using these Inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ limited financial and human resources <p>Assessment of the Utilization of these Inputs in prominent Trade Initiatives under JITAP or other frameworks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Six country focal points indicate that inputs of MTS professionals, NEPs and RCs are 'substantially' used for such trade initiatives. <p>Assessment of Benefits obtained by IIC from Trade Stakeholders in other JITAP countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focal point in only one JITAP II country

⁷ The expected outcome is formulated as follows in the PMM: "Inter-Institutional Committees and their membership support the development of trade negotiation positions and strategies, and related policy formulation, as well as the implementation of WTO agreements". Corresponding performance indicators are: 1. Number and proportion of negotiating proposals advanced by the IICs that are used at the WTO and by African groups to shape common positions, 2. Degree to which IICs provide inputs on the compatibility of national laws and regulations with WTO agreements, and keep notifications up-to-date, 3. Degree to which IICs contribute to changes in trade policies.

⁸ Network refers to an association or structured group with balanced representation from the private and public sectors, and the civil society. The balance is to include due consideration of gender.

⁹ The expected outcome is formulated as follows in the PMM: "Trade stakeholders and IICs rely on or use the support of a trained network and MTS professionals and draw upon more accessible information resources provided by NEPs, RCs, and through the exchange of experiences among countries". Corresponding performance indicators are: 1. Extent to which IICs and other trade initiatives take into account inputs from MTS professionals, the NEPs and RCs, 2. Extent to which countries have established useful working relations and are replicating successful experiences or learning lessons from specific cases

Outcomes	JITAP I Countries	JITAP II Countries
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focal points in two JITAP I countries indicate that they have gained 'substantially' from their association with trade stakeholders in other JITAP countries, while two indicate that they have 'partially' gained from cross border associations. <p>Assessment of IICs being able to replicate an innovation from other JITAP countries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focal points in three JITAP I countries indicate that their IICs have been able to replicate an innovation from other JITAP countries. However, only one country focal point (Tanzania) has elaborated the specific innovation (streamlining of IIC to negotiate all trade issues – bilateral, regional and multi-lateral). <p>Assessment of IICs being able to promote other country IICs with good practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No responses <p>Main Constraints on Building Working Relationships across JITAP countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focal points in three countries indicate that they did not face any constraints in building relationships across countries. Only one country focal point (Tanzania) has noted lack of communication infrastructure and understaffing as constraints. 	<p>(Malawi) indicates that they have gained 'substantially' from their association with trade stakeholders in other JITAP countries, while two others 'partially' gained from cross border associations. The focal points in three JITAP II countries notes that there has been no gain (Botswana no response).</p> <p>Assessment of IICs being able to replicate an innovation from other JITAP countries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focal points in five JITAP II countries indicate that their IICs have been able to replicate an innovation from other JITAP countries. However, none of the focal points have elaborated the specific innovation <p>Assessment of IICs being able to promote other country IICs with good practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No responses <p>Main Constraints on Building Working Relationships across JITAP countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No responses.
<p>9. Export strategies as a response to market demands and opportunities¹⁰ a. Status of strategy implementation b. Policy recognition of export strategies</p>	<p>Summary Status of Implementation of Sector Strategies previously noted as being under implementation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only two JITAP I countries (Kenya and Tanzania) have indicated that export sector strategies are under implementation. Of these only Tanzania has indicated that the sector strategy is under active implementation and the same is recognized in Government policy documents <p>Main Constraints on Strategy Implementation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The main constraints faced in Tanzania are financial resources and lack of a strong industry association. 	<p>Summary Status of Implementation of Sector Strategies previously noted as being under implementation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ None of the JITAP II countries have indicated any export sector strategies being under implementation. Only Cameroon mentions 'minimal action but strong intent'. <p>Main Constraints on Strategy Implementation: Chapter I. No responses.</p>
<p>10. Improved strategic capacity of trade and development stakeholders¹¹ a. Significance of JITAP experience to design and delivery of other TRTA programmes b. Coordination and complementarity of TRTA programmes and JITAP c. Constraints to coordination and complementarity</p>	<p>Assessment of Significance of JITAP to the Design and Delivery of other TRTA programmes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ One country focal point (Tanzania) reported that JITAP experience has 'significantly' helped in design and delivery of other TRTAs. Two countries find JITAP experience as 'mildly significant'. <p>Trends in the way TRTAs, Coordinate and Complement each other:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Three country focal points agree in their general observation that there is an increasing level of coordination among TRTAs, and also increasing level of complementarity of TRTA activities. <p>Main Constraints on Efforts to Coordinate and Complement TRTAs:</p>	<p>Assessment of Significance of JITAP to the Design and Delivery of other TRTA programmes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Two country focal points (Malawi and Mozambique) report that JITAP experience has 'significantly' helped in design and delivery of other TRTAs. <p>Trends in the way TRTAs, Coordinate and Complement each other:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All country focal points agree in their general observation that there is an increasing level of coordination among TRTAs, and also increasing level of complementarity of TRTA activities. <p>Main Constraints on Efforts to Coordinate and Complement TRTAs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No comments

¹⁰ The expected outcome is formulated as follows in the PMM: « Export stakeholders in priority sectors apply adapted strategies in response to international market requirements and potentials ». Corresponding performance indicators are: 1. Degree to which export sector strategies are implemented, and reflected in relevant development agendas, and 2. Number of sector strategies formulated using methodologies introduced by the programme

Outcomes	JITAP I Countries	JITAP II Countries
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No comments from any of the countries. 	

i.Outcome 1: Shaping Trade Positions, Strategies and Policies

Target: IICs and their membership support the development of trade negotiation positions and strategies, and related policy formulation, as well as the implementation of WTO agreements.

Indicators:

- *Number and proportion of negotiating proposals advanced by IICs for the WTO, and to shape common regional or African positions;*
- *Degree to which IICs provide inputs on compatibility of national laws and regulations with WTO agreements and keep notifications up-to-date;*
- *Degree to which IICs contribute to changes in trade policies.*

106. Module 1, covering MTS Institutional Support, Compliance, Policies and Negotiations, is singularly considered to be the most important contribution of JITAP. The creation of an institutional mechanism for formulating national positions on MTS issues, the stakeholder consultative processes in the IICs and its subcommittees, analytical and research inputs on key trade themes, and the trade-related capacity development (training) of negotiators, together provided the countries with the basic confidence to appreciate, develop, debate and articulate their positions and negotiating priorities at the WTO. Through these, JITAP has enabled a cross section of stakeholders to better understand the significance of MTS, and an objective assessment of the gains and losses from integration.

107. In all the 16 JITAP countries, the Inter Institutional Committees have been formed, although they have been accorded legal status only in five JITAP I and four JITAP II countries. IICs managed to enlist a broad spectrum of stakeholders, consisting of between 10 and 85 institutional members, covering government, private sector and civil society groups including gender representative organizations. IICs in JITAP I countries have more diversified membership and are more broad based in terms of number of member organizations, as compared to JITAP II countries. In both sets of countries, Government representatives make up the largest group of participants. Although it has been observed that the participation of gender organizations is considerably low, the evaluators recognize that this is not intended, but rather a result of the absence of a sufficient number of gender organizations, especially those having an interest in/ relevance to trade matters. As long as the IICs are open to memberships from gender based organizations, there will be opportunities for all stakeholders to participate in the deliberations and also put forward their concerns and priorities.

108. According to the management review, all IICs are meeting expectations in providing analysis on relevant trade negotiation issues, preparation of background and technical notes on topics relevant to WTO negotiations advising government on negotiating issues, positions and strategies (except in Uganda and Mozambique). Sub-committees- ranging from three to fifteen in JITAP I countries and from six to nine in JITAP II countries-have been constituted according

¹¹ The expected outcome is formulated as follows in the PMM: "Trade and development stakeholders (i.e. private sector, government, and donors) demonstrate improved ability to formulate, manage, and/or coordinate trade development programmes".
 Corresponding performance indicators are: 1. Enhanced coordination and complementarity of TRTA programmes within a country, and 2. Utilization of JITAP concepts, methods and toolkits in other TRTA programmes

to negotiation themes of importance to each country. IICs have held meetings rather regularly, with more than 10 meetings in each country under JITAP II. Some IICs meet almost monthly.

109. A concern in some countries is the lackluster participation of the umbrella private sector organizations, which are assumed to be representing the final beneficiaries from trade. In some countries visited by the Team Leader (Kenya, Uganda, Mali), business chambers and apex industry organizations appeared to be disconnected and out of sync, although they were members of the IICs. The sector or product level relevance of WTO negotiations is not adequately perceived by businesses, which look for direct and immediate benefits such as tariff concessions or market openings as the outcomes, rather than the enabling framework of international trade arrangements. In comparison, regional issues seem to be of greater interest and current relevance than the WTO agreements- regional markets being more relevant to many JITAP countries, and greater participation has been noticed in the regional negotiations. Also, business stakeholders tend to find their participation in trade events to be very time consuming and a drain on their day to day businesses.

110. On the other hand, civil society groups have been very proactive at the IICs, not only contributing to positions, but also supporting events financially, including trips of government officials to the negotiations. In many countries, they have shed their adversarial character and are seen as partners of the government, being part of official delegations, a long way since the Seattle demonstrations.

111. The quality of the consultative process raises some aspects that need more attention. Of concern is the extent to which participants' views and inputs at IIC meetings are 'representative' of the collective positions of their stakeholder constituencies. The IICs do not enjoin formal consensus building within stakeholder groups, before presenting them through the IIC nominees. Under these arrangements, the permanent membership arrangement, while offering advantages of continuity, presents a risk of the IICs becoming an elite group, disconnected from and not carrying through the combined or consensus positions within their own constituencies.

112. There is certainly scope for improvement of national ownership, through the enlistment of development financial institutions and banks, which seems less than satisfactory. Many countries have pointed to lack of access to credit as one of the supply side constraints. While this is true in the macro economic sense, approaches toward 'priority sector lending' will need to be developed in order to channel scarce financial resources into export-oriented sectors having a large-scale social benefit. Banks and financial institutions can also tap into lines of credit, bringing down the interest rate for export-financing against confirmed letters of credit, based on projected export earnings.

113. JITAP has enabled participant countries to generate negotiating proposals for the WTO negotiations and articulate them effectively into common regional positions. In JITAP I countries, 33 negotiating proposals were advanced by the IICs, ranging from 2 (Tanzania) to 10 (Kenya) per country. Fourteen of these proposals have been 'substantially' used at WTO negotiations by JITAP I countries, and 8 of them have been used partially. Further, 22 proposals by JITAP I countries have been 'substantially' incorporated into Africa group positions. Among JITAP II countries, a total of 24 negotiating proposals were advanced by

respective IICs, ranging between 1 each by Botswana and Mozambique to 7 by Senegal. Seven proposals have been 'substantially' used at WTO negotiations by JITAP II countries, and 16 of them have been used partially. Seven of these proposals have also been substantially incorporated into Africa group positions.

114. There is variance among countries as to the perceptions on contribution of the IICs toward shaping trade policy. Substantial contribution of the IICs is perceived in Uganda, Senegal, Ghana and to an extent Kenya. However, focal points in some countries (Uganda, Kenya and Ghana) felt that the technical work of IIC subcommittees, though detailed, did not translate readily into policy recommendations. Similarly, IIC inputs on the compatibility of national laws with the WTO vary from country to country. In Uganda and Kenya, the Law Commission rather than the Ministry of Trade plays the major role in this aspect, and has benefited from JITAP as well as other programmes. However, the overall technical capacities to notify laws after considerable debate are limited in all countries. The lack of involvement of technical institutions in negotiations also affects articulation in technical subjects like SPS and TBT agreements.

ii. Outcome 2: Strengthening trade stakeholders' capacities

Target: Trade stakeholders and IICs rely on or use the support of a trained network of MTS professionals, and draw upon more accessible information from RCs and NEPs, and through the exchange of experiences among countries.

Indicators:

- *Extent to which IICs and other trade initiatives take into account inputs from MTS professionals, RCs and NEPs;*
- *Use of inputs in establishing trade initiatives*
- *Extent to which countries have established useful working relations and are replicating successful experiences or learning lessons from specific cases*

115. Strengthening of trade stakeholders' capacities has been addressed through trade information infrastructure under Module 2, and establishing a resource pool of MTS persons trained by the three agencies on a number of subjects, under Module 3. In all JITAP I countries the four specified National Enquiry Points (NEPs) and three Reference Centres (RCs) have been set up physically. In JITAP I countries, new Enquiry Points were set up for Services and TRIPS, and SPS in some cases. In a few countries, NEPs as well as the reference centres for business and government are adequately staffed and functioning well, their managers having received adequate training, with reasonable internet connectivity and download speeds in JITAP I countries (although Net speed can never be enough!). However, in some countries, there is no internet connectivity, even months after the equipment has been delivered. In Kenya, activities for the NEPs are under suspension due to a stand-off between WTO and the Dept. of Trade over the location of the Services NEP.

116. Only some National Enquiry Points are performing their statutory roles as provided by WTO, downloading notifications, disseminating them to stakeholders, and responding to domestic and international enquiries on their mandated areas. This is due to a lack of appreciation of the statutory duties, and due to the misconception in some countries (Mali as

seen by the Team Leader) that the enquiry points are the administrative responsibility of the Ministry of Trade, as a result, technical bodies under other departments or ministries do not man the NEPs or even use equipment funded under JITAP. Staff attrition at reference centres and enquiry points have nullified any gains from JITAP in some countries, and the new managers that have been appointed to these positions, are untrained.

117. Reference Centres have been used substantially by IIC members and other professional users. The trade and market analysis tools available at these centres are popular with business users. However, reference centres have remained de-linked from MTS networks because the latter have not been formed or have remained dormant in JITAP I countries. In most JITAP II countries, the documentation and equipment has been delivered only in late 2005, which meant that there was no use of these centres in Cancun and Hong Kong.

118. Besides the supply of trade information hardware, capacity development has been attempted through the large complement of training workshops under Module 3. According to the Progress Report of March 2006, nearly 700 persons were trained under JITAP II. Master trainers in JITAP I and II countries have availed of the full set of JITAP Trainings (nine subject areas). JITAP has been helpful in raising the capacity of Geneva missions as well as the Trade Ministries, and one result has been the posting of some JITAP trained persons to Geneva missions.

119. Although the Geneva agencies delivered their training and capacity development to beneficiaries in Module 3, the further dissemination and sensitization of stakeholders by these trained persons has suffered. Stakeholders from all JITAP I countries have participated in training provided by country network in all eight subject areas (Country Network Training) in all eight subject areas. However, sensitization and dissemination of MTS knowledge by these trainers has practically not happened, except in Kenya and Uganda. Among JITAP II countries, only stakeholders from Botswana have participated in such training in 2 subjects. Although training networks have been formed in some JITAP countries, these are not active, not only due to lack of adequate resources.

120. This lack of outcomes is attributed to conceptual flaws as much as resource constraints. There has been practically no buy-in from beneficiaries (MTS professionals), and indeed a lack of conviction over the effectiveness of Modules 3 and 5. In some countries, MTS networks never got formed, while in others, they have dissipated. But the most important deficiency in Module 3 has been the disconnect between the offerings of master trainers and the needs of the secondary beneficiaries. Figure 2 shows this disconnect in the present arrangements and possible ways to address them.

121. For dissemination and awareness of MTS to have meaning for downstream stakeholders, the most important issue is to 'demystify, simplify and contextualize' the contents of training, to the level of product or services of interest to the stakeholders. For instance, it is probably much more relevant for cashew nut processors in remote areas to know what are the legal and regulatory requirements to be fulfilled at the farm, processing and export level, in order to export cashew nuts to a particular market, which emanate from the SPS and TBT agreements, rather than understand the agreement itself in a simpler, though still abstract, form. This has not


been addressed in Module 3, and is the key reason for lack of interest and ownership. Also, to expect that some one who has received a 3-5 day training to start preaching others could be fallacious. Customizing the agreements at this level requires a change in Module 3 methodologies, including a re profiling of master trainers, to include persons from key sectors (identified through the prioritization process of Module 4) and train them as resource persons specific to these sectors, in the various trade subjects.

122. Networking and exchange among MTS persons or JITAP institutional structures is practically missing. Only two JITAP I countries and one JITAP II country indicate that they have gained 'substantially' from their association with trade stakeholders in other JITAP countries, while two each have indicated 'partial' gains from cross border associations. However, focal points in three JITAP I countries and five JITAP II countries indicate that their IICs have been able to replicate an innovation from other JITAP countries.

123. In JITAP II, the key elements in networking are the JITAP multi-portal, the regional conference events including videoconferences, and inter-country networks among peer groups of the five modules. Some aspects of Module 5 – the multi-portal, national hubs, and modular inter country networks are considered to be 'over-aspiring' and 'premature' in light of the ICT non-readiness in most countries, while demand has not been substantiated for other aspects – CDF, inter country networking among modules, etc., given the availability of other direct alternatives. The JITAP portal is rarely used, and many users have even forgotten their passwords. As a result, there are concerns as to whether there is actually enough demand and motivation for networking among JITAP beneficiaries to warrant the substantial investments in the creation of ICT based infrastructure

124. In view of these observations, serious reconsideration, of concept clarity, content details, motivation and commitment of national partners and final beneficiaries, is warranted in respect of both Module 3 and Module 5 before committing any major expenditure for the remainder of JITAP II, including setting up the Multi portal. Relaunch of these modules should involve stricter eligibility norms for beneficiaries and preconditions for financial support. Also, funding support should be incentive-oriented, and to the extent possible, decentralized, and competitively awarded to regional entities.

Figure 2. Module 3: MTS Training and Dissemination: Inadequacies in present arrangements



iii. Outcome 3: Export strategies as a response to market opportunities

Target: Export stakeholders in priority sectors apply adapted strategies in response to international market requirements and potential.

Indicators:

- *Number of sector strategies formulated using the methodologies introduced by the programme*
- *Degree to which export strategies are: a) implemented; b) reflected in relevant development agendas*

125. All countries have identified priority export sectors for strategy formulation under JITAP. The survey records seven strategies as being finalised and under implementation, two strategies under development and one suspended in JITAP I countries. In JITAP II countries a total of 10 strategies are reported as under development. Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire have identified 12 sectors each, while Tunisia, Mauritania and Senegal, with one sector each, are at the other extreme.

126. Only two JITAP I countries (Kenya and Tanzania) have indicated that export sector strategies are under implementation. None of the JITAP II countries have indicated any export sector strategies being under implementation. Of these only Tanzania has indicated that the sector strategy is under active implementation and the same is recognized in Government policy documents.

127. The main challenge is that sector strategies remain outputs on paper, failing policy actions and budgetary resource allocations to implement them. The constraints mentioned by country focal points include: financial implications of implementing policy, costs of the factors of production, low commitment to advocate on the part of policy change champions, and the institutional environment - notably complications that arise when policies and practices are under the purview of multiple ministries/regulators. Only three countries have reported specific strategies to successfully address the constraints: Permanent Secretaries, the senior most officers of the concerned ministries/agencies, involved as Chairpersons of the respective Task Forces, to ensure higher degree of commitment (Kenya); enabling easier access to credit (Ghana) and actively engaging local experts paid through international resources (Mozambique – JITAP II).

128. Module 4 could benefit from an inbuilt component to facilitate development of project proposals for submission to donors for bilateral funding whether under bilateral funds or under Window II of the IF in case of LDCs. This would increase JITAP's synergies with other donor programmes in the participant countries.

iv. Outcome 4: Improved capacity for programme formulation and management¹²

Target: Trade and development stakeholders (i.e. private sector, government and donors) demonstrate improved ability to formulate, manage and/or coordinate trade development programmes.

¹² Substituted for title "improved strategic capacity of trade and development stakeholders"

Indicators:

- *Enhanced coordination and complementarities of TRTA programmes within the country*
- *Utilization of JITAP concepts, methods and tool kits in other TRTA programmes*

129. According to the National reports, seven of the 16 JITAP countries have some form of formal donor coordination mechanisms. JITAP does not directly assist trade and development stakeholders in coordination of TRTA programmes. Therefore, any attribution of results on this aspect is erroneous. However, some JITAP concepts and institutional structures have been used in other programmes as well. For instance, the National Steering Committee is the common coordinating mechanism for JITAP and some other programmes, especially the IF. In many LDCs, focal points of the IF and JITAP are the same persons, which has improved coordination between some JITAP and IF activities in these countries. The composition of the NSCs has been amended to include donors as well. And, the concept of Reference Centres was first introduced under JITAP, and is now used in over 100 WTO member countries.

Section 2. Impacts and Sustainability

130. Given that JITAP II is still under implementation, impact measurements are not justified for the new participants. However, the eight countries of JITAP I have exited the programme in December 2005, except for the completion of a few residual activities. Therefore, measurement of impacts is attempted only in respect of the eight JITAP I countries. The observations are based on the national evaluator reports as well as the evaluator's first hand observations in field missions to three Phase I countries: Benin, Kenya and Uganda.

i. Participation effectively in integration into MTS

131. There is tangible evidence of the increased participation by African countries in MTS negotiations, indicated by the well-articulated and well formulated African Union common positions at the WTO.

132. There has been perceptible improvement in the African participation in the Ministerial meetings, reflecting a progressively enhanced understanding and confidence, manifested as effective articulation, which is visible from Marakkesh through Doha, Seattle, Cancun unto Hong Kong. Participating countries attribute this change almost singularly to JITAP. While all the three agencies have been commended, several beneficiaries have particularly singled out UNCTAD for its responsiveness and assistance in clarifying implications of specific rules and agreements, provision of useful research materials and the assistance with preparation of technical papers by IIC subcommittees.

133. Negotiation priorities are based on views articulated by multiple stakeholders, including the private sector. Civil society positions are also receiving due attention at stakeholder consultations on MTS in many JITAP countries. An interesting example is the total re orientation of TRIPS focus from the popular issues of affordable access to medicines to one of food security for small communities, which originated from a Uganda civil society position but

became a common concern for African LDCs after being voiced at an LDC conference in Zanzibar. Similarly, Uganda's positions on undertaking limited commitments in education under Mode 3 also emerged from a minority position to the mainstream, based on adequate evidence and articulation by the civil society groups.

134. In some JITAP countries (Uganda stands out as an example among the field mission countries) the civil society organizations are now partners of the government and members of the official delegations, at trade negotiations, rather than adversaries, lodging protests outside the Ministerial venues.

135. Despite the presence of many programmes, beneficiary countries consider JITAP to be the most important influence on their capacities to participate in trade negotiations. This is attributed to the unique project concept that includes: an integrated approach, involving the complementary technical expertise of the three agencies; focus on institutional and human resource development at various levels and among diverse stakeholders; and facilitation of inter country networks to engender a common regional or African position on key negotiation issues. More important, JITAP offers real-time, practical and demonstrable assistance on trade negotiations, which is a unique service.

ii. Export readiness

136. The initial steps toward export readiness, export awareness and strategy formulation, have been initiated in all JITAP countries. Trade stakeholders have identified products and services through an export prioritization process, and validated these priorities through stakeholder consultations. Donors were included in these consultations in some countries. Training and the use of trade information tools provided by JITAP have been instrumental in the selection of these export sectors.

137. Sector counterpart teams have been exposed to the basics of sector strategy formulation through a mode of self-implementation with ITC assistance. Although there is a need to deepen these capacities, the modest beginning under JITAP is a key first step in decision making amidst resource constraints that limit the export readiness of these countries.

138. However, unless there is a source of funding to assist in implementation of the sector strategies, there is a danger of dissipation of the work that has been done under JITAP. Engagement with donors and lending institutions is a key need to be addressed by the export development agencies and other departments related to the respective sectors. In LDCs, the launch of the Enhanced Integrated Framework holds out a new promise for the sustainability of these structures.

iii. Implementation of Doha Round

139. Implementation and domestication of the WTO agreements, i.e. amending national legislation to conform to the provisions of the WTO commitments remains a challenge in many countries, including for JITAP I beneficiaries. JITAP I support enabled some success, especially in implementation of the Customs Valuation agreement in many JITAP I countries and in introducing legislation on TRIPS subjects. However, the formulation of laws and

regulations on a wide range of technical subjects is impaired due to the lack of adequate knowledge and drafting skills on technical regulations. In some countries (Uganda), other programmes are addressing capacity development of legal institutions to address these issues.

140. National Enquiry Points have statutory functions under the WTO agreements. However, many of these points are not equipped to perform even basic functions due to inadequate attention and financial support. Implementation of the Doha Round will result in a significant increase in obligations under the transparency requirements, and an increasing load of notifications to be disseminated to domestic stakeholders and to trade partners as well.

141. Even when technical bodies connected with notifications are active, they need to be included more actively in the negotiation processes, by virtue of the technical content of some negotiation areas. There is inadequate attention and lack of expert knowledge of the issues among Ministry officials, and inadequate consultations with technical bodies on regulatory aspects. For instance, despite its careful monitoring of issues by Kenya's SPS body, to date, Kenya has never questioned any SPS notification issued by any country, nor issued any notifications on Agriculture.

iv.Exit Readiness

142. For purposes of this evaluation, the following criteria have been used to characterize 'Exit Readiness':

- Adequacy of trained trade-related human resources in government
- Legal Status of Inter Institutional Committees and adequate budgetary support from counterpart funding
- Arrangements for continuance of JITAP institutional structures
- Donor coordination mechanisms to supplement funding for building and improving upon JITAP initiated actions
- Active and effective MTS networks to spread awareness and preparedness on MTS issues within and among countries

On the above criteria, the eight JITAP I countries have shown differing levels of exit readiness. However, to attribute exit readiness only to JITAP would be fallacious. Therefore, the above indicators need to be monitored as an aggregate output of all TRTA in the countries, including JITAP.

143. JITAP, and other programmes, have enabled all countries to develop a pool of trade negotiators and resource persons within government agencies, extending beyond the Ministry of Trade. This pool of 10 to 30 persons forms the **core of trade capacities**, from a negotiation perspective, in each country. There has been some attrition of trained persons in some countries, including postings and transfers outside the trade department, but the sediments of these capacities are expected to remain and contribute in some for or the other, in the long run. These countries will remain eligible for other training programmes from WTO and UNCTAD even outside JITAP, and therefore, will be able to build on the base created under JITAP. The residual activities under JITAP had foreseen the creation of MTS curricula in regional and national universities, in order to create a 'trade cadre' of professionally qualified persons. This is already being taken up by the WTO in some countries. With these arrangements, countries

can plan toward the creation of an adequate trade cadre in several key departments having a close influence on trade, notably agriculture, industry, tourism, communications, etc. However, the influence of the Ministry of Trade will always remain variable across countries, although there is an increased recognition of the role and contribution of trade to economic development.

144. Legal recognition of the IIC and budgetary support for its activities is important to the sustainability of this mechanism, in order to perform its role as the apex advisory body to government to negotiate national interests in trade. In the absence of such a status, there is no legal basis for other ministries to act on its advice or recommendations. However, budgetary support for the IICs has been increased in most countries. Nine of the 16 JITAP countries have accorded legal status to their IICs, and bills for the same are pending before Parliament in Uganda. The overall support may still be inadequate to address the annual work programmes and the technical work of sub committees. New sources of funding have been tapped by some countries (UPTOP in Uganda and KTOP in Kenya) to supplement some IIC activities. In some countries, the IICs mechanisms are becoming common for the Integrated Framework as well.

145. Increases in budgetary allocations for trade commitments remain a challenge in many countries due to weak internal acceptance and, in some cases, external (IMF, World Bank) prescriptions on government expenditure. For instance, in Uganda and Kenya, there were pressures on the standards and certification bodies against charging private users for export inspection services. Attempts by at least one JITAP country to introduce a trade cess to support the increasing scope of trade related government functions (enquiry points, inspections, certification, etc.) were criticized by the World Bank in the DTIS report. Despite constraints, some countries (Uganda, Kenya) have increased/ are planning to increase the strength of their trade departments/ministries, and even strengthened diplomatic missions in key capitals, responding to the increased requirements imposed by trade negotiations. Some reference centres have been more enterprising, and are recovering a reasonable share of operating costs from visitors. The business reference centre in Kenya and Benin are examples of best practice in this respect. But, for most, counterpart funding support to the National Enquiry Points and Reference Centres – even for internet connectivity, renewal of licenses and maintenance of equipment- has not been forthcoming in many countries.

146. The evaluator considers that the long-term sustainability of trade institutions must be ensured from the increased throughputs, through the recovery of trade service charges on a no-profit basis. To illustrate its feasibility, the following table has been compiled from the World Banks' biannual publication, World Development Indicators. A budgetary allocation of \$100,000 per year represents between 0.077% and 0.002% of international trade taxes for JITAP beneficiaries. Given the positive trade trends in all countries, this is seen as self-sustaining despite the political noise on counterpart funding. This also corroborates why many countries have not had to use external support to fund the negotiation teams for an increasing schedule of regional, bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

147. Therefore, the sustenance of some JITAP institutional structures like IICs, trade information points, and sector counterpart teams, is more about political will and stakeholder motivation than purely economic viability. For a future phase of JITAP, these should be addressed in the form of preconditions.

148. Exit readiness is a greater challenge for the private sector structures, i.e. sector strategy teams and MTS networks.

Table 7. Trade share of GDP and taxes from international trade

	GDP 2004	GDP per capita	GDP growth 2000-04	Goods trade % of GDP 2004/1990	Services trade % of GDP 2004/1990	Export value growth % 1990-2004	Import value growth % 1990-2004	Govt. revenue % of GDP 2004/1995	Intl Trade taxes as % of revenues 2004/1995
Benin	4075	509	4.5	37.7	12	3.6	6.3		
Botswana	8974	4487	5.5	75.9	17	3.4	1.3	(40% 1995)	15
BF	4824	371	5.2	33.2	9 (1990)	10.5	5.2		
Cameroon	14391	899	4.5	33.4	12.8	2.7	4.6	11	22
Cote d' Ivoire	15475	859	-0.7	66.3	17.8	6	3	17.1	46
Ghana	8869	403	4.9	77.8	19.9	6.6	6.6	23.8	29
Kenya	16088	487	2.7	45	14.1	5.5	5.5	18.2	3 (15)
Malawi	1879	144	2.9	65.6	14	0.8	1.0		
Mali	4863	374	6.3	50.2	16.3	8.6	5.7		
Mauritania	1534	511	4.7	52.8	16	-3.0	0.3		
Mozambique	6086	320	8.8	57.1	12.9	16.3	3.1		
Senegal	7775	706	4.4	54.5	15.5	4.7	5.8	18	7
Tanzania	10851	285	6.8	35.3	17.6	8.7	2.7		
Tunisia	28185	2818	4.3	79.6	19.9	6.5	5.5	29.7	7
Uganda	6822	243	5.8	31.2	16.8	9.8	12.7	12.1	16
Zambia	5402	491	4.4	68.8	15	-0.1	4.5	20	36

Source: compiled from World Development Indicators 06

Programme needs of \$ 100,000 per annum represent 0.065% of GDP for the lowest, and 0.0035% of GDP for the biggest beneficiary. Or about 0.002% of international trade taxes for Tunisia highest and 0.077% of trade taxes for UGANDA. Therefore sustainability is not an issue for the Programme funds.

149. The sustainability of MTS networks rests on three factors: a critical mass of persons to formulate a formal structure with a work programme; motivation and self-activation; and formal recognition by government to engage with TRTA programmes. There are inadequacies in all three respects. The networks have not been formed in some countries, while in others—Kenya and Uganda, they are rudimentary or atrophying in the absence of activities. In Benin, an active network does not enjoy formal recognition from the Ministry of Trade, which prevents its participation and benefiting from calls for proposals issued under other TRTA programmes. Motivation and self activation on part of MTS networks were key assumptions in JITAP that the evaluation finds have been ‘over-aspiring’, given the weak baseline positions on trade knowledge and financial capacities. It would be unrealistic to expect MTS network members to sensitize the peripheral stakeholders, without supporting them financially for convening dissemination activities. In the absence of meaningful engagement of the networks, there is a risk of these becoming completely dissipated. In this respect, Phase I countries are left with a void in Module 3 without suitable alternatives. Some recommendations for better use of these networks appear later in the report.

150. At the higher level of objectives, i.e. adequacy of national trade capacities, the evaluators feel that ‘exit readiness’ is still a distant goal in the JITAP I countries. Irrespective of JITAP, trade negotiations are a moving target, and there are continuing needs for enriching the basic knowledge acquired on MTS issues, and graduating trade negotiators through the next levels of

learning, besides widening the pool of trade related human resources. These would need to be addressed through more permanent in-country mechanisms, including creation of curricula in the institutes of higher learning, developing and deepening a 'trade cadre' in various ministries, and developing 'common pool' donor support to supplement budgetary resources to fund trade capacity building on an on-going basis. Some countries have taken initial steps in this direction, which can be imbibed by others, as demonstrated by the selection of best practices cases below.

Section 3. Best practice cases

151. Based on the first hand observations in field missions in five countries, the evaluator has identified a few best practice cases in respect of SPS and TBT Enquiry Points; Reference Centres; Export strategy formulation; and TRTA coordination. Regrettably, there were no striking examples that could qualify as best practices for Module 1-IICs, Module 3 – MTS networks, and Module 5- Synergies and Networking, although there are a few isolated cases of initiative shown by national stakeholders in Kenya, Uganda and Benin. Additionally, a few good cases of TRTA coordination and specifically IF-JITAP coordination have been selected. The evaluator did not wish to draw on secondary information in reporting these best practices, for reasons of consistency. The best practice cases are:

- TBT and SPS Enquiry Points: Kenya
- Reference Centres: Benin
- Export Strategy Formulation: Uganda
- IF-JITAP Coordination: Mali
- TRTA Coordination mechanisms: Zambia, Kenya

i. TBT and SPS National Enquiry Points in Kenya

152. **Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS):** The NEP, in operation since 1999, is located inside the Information Centre of the KEBS. It received the stipulated equipment- one PC, Copier, scanner and printer each- besides TBT databases, training and study tour, for the operators. JITAP has made an important difference to the functioning of the NEP. In the past, it used to receive notifications from the WTO, without even realizing that these were the TBT notifications from other countries. Following JITAP, there is an appreciation of the obligations to frequently check out notifications and disseminate those of relevance to Kenya to the stakeholders. There has been a steady increase in the number of enquiries handled by the NEP, from 3 international and 34 domestic enquiries in 2002-03, to 60 international and 254 domestic enquiries in 2004-05.

153. KEBS circulates fortnightly TBT bulletins carrying latest international notifications of interest to Kenya, to which there is practically no response from industry stakeholders which are the final beneficiaries/stakeholders. KEBS officials acknowledge specific benefits from JITAP workshops, such as the knowledge on the rights of countries to seek recourse to trade disputes in respect of TBT measures that are considered to be unduly trade restricting. However, KEBS has concerns on poor attendance of members in the TBT Standards

Committee, but these committees are not proving to be effective, as there is very little feedback from the industry. Even the administrative ministries do not take the TBT Committees outputs seriously.

154. **Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS):** As the NEP for SPS issues, KEPHIS received a PC, scanner, printer and reference materials, but not the photocopier and fax. The KEPHIS has a 64 kbps leased line, and connectivity speeds are slower than desirable, but these are being upgraded to 128 kbps. The staff at the NEP is also involved in other functions, and a need is felt for at least one dedicated officer at the NEP. The NEP accesses SPS notifications regularly and whenever there is something of relevance to Kenya, a meeting of officials is held to understand the notifications.

155. KEPHIS also intervenes in resolving SPS issues raised by importing countries. For instance, it was successfully able to lobby the case for Kenya's horticulture interests, based on implementation of Pest Risk Analysis programme certified to US requirements, and then prevailing on the US Trade Representative Office to concede market access for Kenya. Similarly, effective responses to Japan's notifications placing Kenya's tea exports on red alert on account of pesticide residues (actually these were Sri Lankan tea consignments, packed in Kenya and exported) enabled Kenya's plantations to be included as pesticide-free areas.

156. KEPHIS is a revenue-earning body, is willing to fund its costs of participating at trade negotiations, and does not count on financial support from the Ministry of Trade or any external source.

157. KEPHIS finds limitations in its ability to draft and analyze notification texts, which are legal, and this is not its core expertise. At the same time, legal institutions do not possess knowledge of technical issues. This 'blind spot' needs to be addressed through some training for a drafting group composed of SPS and legal persons. There is inadequate attention and lack of expert knowledge of the issues among Ministry officials, and inadequate consultations with technical bodies on regulatory aspects. As a result, despite its careful monitoring of issues, to date, Kenya has never questioned any SPS notification issued by any country, nor issued any notifications on Agriculture.

ii. Business Reference Centre, Benin

158. The Business Reference Centre is located in the premises of the CBCE, Benin's Export Promotion Agency. The reference centre has nine computer terminals and an ADSL Internet connection with a basic broad band capability. Two computers, besides a multifunction copier, scanner, printer and fax machine, have been funded under JITAP. The centre has four staff, each with university level qualifications in information science/ document management.

159. The centre has all the documents provided under JITAP besides several other information products including trade databases, journals and market research publications. ITC's trade analysis tools – Trade Map, Product Map, etc- are available as well, but the licence for 2006 has expired and is yet to be paid. The library is well organized and user-friendly. The log book is the well-maintained, and the best among all centres visited by the Evaluators in the field mission countries. A cursory examination indicated more than 400 visitor entries in 2006.

160. Users include members of the private sector, research students as well as some government staff, including persons working in the Export Promotion Agency. Internet usage is charged at the rate of 250 CFA per hour, which covers the cost of internet connectivity (estimated at around 20,000 CFA per month) and consumables.

161. Currently, the centre does not provide any desk research services on trade information to the private sector, and this is an area that can be developed in tie ups with the MTS professional network. The reference centre managers would be benefited by having a list of useful websites and freeware for online document searches, including a database of free information sources related to the subjects of their interest, in order to register the centre in the mailing lists of these sources.

iii. Export Strategy Formulation, Uganda

162. Uganda Export Promotion Board (UEPB), is the counterpart agency for Module 4, dealing with the development of sector export strategies. Under JITAP I, among several sectors identified as having export potential, two – horticulture/ legumes, and spices, were taken up for sector strategy development. All procedures were followed as stipulated in the toolkits, with specific attention to the composition of the sector counterpart teams which include government agencies, trade support institutions, sector associations, private sector enterprises as well as civil society organizations including some with a gender focus. Strategy documents were developed by the teams, composed of 9 to 12 members each, over a period of six months. There is regular use of the trade information tools and the business reference centre is well stocked and well-managed.

163. The UEPB considers that the real challenge is to bankroll the actions agreed in the strategy documents. Under JITAP II, UEPB resisted the extension of sector strategy preparation for additional sectors, on grounds that the earlier studies remained starved for implementation. Therefore, JITAP II was urged to include at least a few implementation actions in the sectors already taken up in JITAP I, which was agreed to by ITC. UEPB, on its own initiative, has put together a project for spices with an Indian consultant, to implement some of the actions in the strategy documents.

164. Meanwhile, it has already begun engaging with bilateral donors, and has posted all the strategy formulation documents on its website as well. However, donor assistance is not easily available for private sector projects. Uganda is still developing its National Export Strategy Document, which, once approved in Cabinet, could become the basis for sector-wise allocations under the budgets, besides engaging with donor assistance processes.

iv. IF-JITAP Coordination: Mali

165. The Director, Directorate of External Trade is the Focal Point for both IF and Module 4 of JITAP. Different officers under the Director, located in the same premises, are responsible for the IF and JITAP export strategy activities, but there are regular interactions between the two. A decree was issued to make one inter-ministerial committee to coordinate all TRTA activities in Mali, which include JITAP, IF and PACCIA. The IMC is chaired by the Prime

Minister. Counterpart funding of \$500,000 per year has been allocated for trade support activities.

166. JITAP had started before the IF in Mali, and eight sectors were identified as export priority sectors. When the IF process was launched, the market analysis tools of JITAP were found to be very handy in preparing the DTIS in Mali. Four of the export priority products identified in JITAP, were included in the Action Matrices resulting from the DTIS. Subsequently, sector strategies were prepared in JITAP II for three products: karite (shea nuts), sesame and gum arabic, these are in the validation process at present. The implementation of these sector strategies, once validated, is now proposed to be taken up under Window II funding under the enhanced IF, with an indicative envelope of \$8 million. Some commitments are expected under bilateral funds as well, initiated through the donor coordination committee.

167. According to the IF coordinator, the ideal sequencing between the IF and JITAP is that the DTIS Action Matrices should correspond and lead to the JITAP Programme Document, and sector strategies of JITAP should correspond to and feed into actionable projects under Window II. This has indeed been achieved in Mali, and is being shared as a case in other IF countries.

v. TRTA Coordination Mechanisms in Zambia and Kenya

168. In April 2006, Zambia formally recognized the Private Sector Development Programme as the overarching umbrella programme for interventions covering trade and investment. The PSDP has within its scope, a Trade Expansion component, which seeks to address all the gaps in trade policy, trade capacity building and supply side issues affecting exports. The government intends to use the PSDP as the reference document for all donor support in TRTA. An in-principle decision has also been taken to use Window II of the Integrated Framework and bilateral funds to address trade capacity needs identified in the DTIS, which has been completed recently. The Trade Expansion Group officially endorsed and adopted the DTIS, and priority proposals under Window II have already been made to UNDP, Zambia. JITAP activities, slow until date, are proposed to be subsumed under the PSDP.

169. The PSDP faces some donor resistance, despite its logic. Already, US and Japan have declined funding to the PSDP, and have expressed intentions to continue their programmes independently, but without any overlaps. Therefore, the PSDP is likely to end up with a consortium of smaller donors, especially if the EU decides to operate independently as well.

170. In Kenya, steps are underway to coordinate all donor support in TRTA under the Ministry of Trade. To this end, a Private Sector Development Strategy document has been prepared and shall be finalized in 2006. A key feature of the document is the decision to bring all donor support to actions and work plans for trade enhancement under the ambit of the PSDS, to be coordinated by the Ministry of Trade. This will enable donors to relate to a common vision, and allocate their support to specific components. However, the Ministry foresees some reluctance on part of donors to come on a common platform, despite stated commitment to the Paris Declaration.

Chapter IV. JITAP in the Emerging TRTA Architecture

Section 1. Aid for Trade

171. The successful conclusion of the Doha Round would be characterized by actions by developed countries in respect of agriculture market access and subsidies, industrial and agriculture tariff reductions by developing and least-developed countries, and the provision of assistance to help countries address supply-side constraints to their participation in international markets, and to cope with transitional adjustment costs from liberalization¹³.


172. Mechanisms like the Aid for Trade are being developed to address these constraints. Though the shape and final architecture of 'Aid for Trade' is still under formulation, its proposed content essentially consists of: technical assistance; capacity building; institutional reform; investments in trade-related infrastructure; and assistance to offset adjustment costs, such as fiscal support to help transition from tariffs to other sources of revenue.

173. Aid for Trade is not a new trade instrument, rather a new delivery mechanism with greater emphasis on effective aid delivery demonstrated by concrete results on the ground. In that sense, besides additional funding, Aid for Trade may aggregate a substantial part of existing TRTA under its definition and classification. Going by the Geneva consultation process (coordinated by the Permanent Mission of Sweden) on the subject, 'Aid for Trade' endorses the Integrated Framework approach, based on broad-based trade development agenda, prioritization of needs, ownership by beneficiary country and donor coordination, as a good practice in aid delivery. Accordingly, Aid for Trade seeks to strengthen the IF and supplement it through predictable and credible financing for prioritized trade related needs, and specific adjustment issues arising from preference erosion, loss of fiscal revenue, etc.

174. The positioning of JITAP in the emerging Aid for Trade architecture is important given the increased emphasis on the Enhanced Integrated Framework as the principal instrument to deliver trade related technical assistance. Therefore, a deeper analysis of the relationship between JITAP and the IF is warranted.

¹³ Development Committee paper DC 2005-0016 dated Sep 12, 2005 prepared by IMF and World Bank

Figure 3. JITAP in the AID- FOR -TRADE Map (US\$ 1.8 billion)



Schematic: by Ace Global Pvt. Ltd. India, not to scale

Section 2. JITAP and IF: Distinctions

175. The Integrated Framework (IF) is a joint undertaking of the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, WTO, UNCTAD and ITC, which seeks to mainstream trade into national development and poverty reduction strategies, and to assist in the coordinated delivery of trade-related assistance. The IF was first launched in 1997, mandated as part of the Action Plan for LDCs to ensure their more effective participation in the world trading system. It was revamped in 2001 with several institutional changes and pilot-tested in three countries before being relaunched. According to the IF Trust Fund report May 2005, the IF has received pledges to the tune of US\$30.2 million, from 17 donors, and is currently operative in 28 of the 50 LDCs, with another 9 in the offing. As of May 2006, 20 countries have completed DTIS studies and validated the Action Matrix, 7 are in the process of preparing the DTIS, and 3 are about to be launched¹⁴.

176. Various evaluations of the IF have concluded that the IF has provided a good framework for helping the LDCs enhance their trade development capacity and facilitate adjustment and integration into the multilateral trading system, but that there are still significant shortcomings in the process¹⁵.

177. The fact that ten JITAP countries are also IF beneficiaries raises the obvious questions on value addition and overlaps. Although some actors associated with IF and JITAP are quick to protest that the two are not strictly comparable, the fact is that comparisons continue to be drawn, including in former evaluations of both JITAP I (2002) and IF (2003). The Summative Evaluation Report of JITAP I observed that instead of being in conflict and overlapping with each other, they are mutually complementary and can indeed be supportive of each other. For instance, JITAP activities could take into account the actions identified as a result of any prior DTIS done under the IF in the country. The independent evaluation of the IF in 2003 conceded a degree of overlap at the level of actual activities under JITAP and the IF Action matrices, and recommended that “the operations of JITAP and IF be harmonized in countries where both offer their services, and their resources to be used in a coordinated way.”

178. Ideas of subsuming JITAP under the IF have been mooted since 1998 among and within the three JITAP agencies. In 2003, even a retreat was organized (at the initiative of the Deputy Director General of WTO) to assess the performance of both instruments with all the agencies involved. According to all the three agencies, these ideas have not borne fruit. Yet, this does not imply that the agencies are unwilling to link more integrally with the IF. Indeed, the emerging shape of the Enhanced IF and the larger context of the Aid for Trade would dictate more engagement among the agencies in this direction. However, a *sui generis* model needs to evolve, rather than a rigid arrangement of merging the structures, tempting as it may be for donors and agencies to consider.

179. In the opinion of the evaluator, **there are some clear distinctions between the IF and JITAP** which are significant in any consideration of realignment or merger of structures and working arrangements between the IF and JITAP:

¹⁴ source: materials provided by IF Focal point at one of the agencies

¹⁵ For details, readers may like to refer to the Report of the Task Force on the Enhanced IF

- **Perspective:** JITAP represents issues at the **tactical** level of **preparation and response**, unlike the IF, which involves a more **strategic consideration of trade issues** in national development. While countries can allocate varying priorities for trade in the mainstream development strategy, thus resulting in differing levels of implementation in IF, there is always a greater sense of urgency with regard to JITAP, because the immediate agenda is driven by a current calendar of external events- ongoing trade negotiations. As a result, even countries with a low share of external trade in their GDP and a very narrow range of export products have ongoing priorities to engage in trade negotiations, once they are members of any given agreement. JITAP has specific relevance even to such countries.
- **Orientation:** JITAP addresses the **external challenges** in trade integration and channels stakeholders toward a **coalescing position on external trade** issues- especially WTO and other important regional or bilateral agreements, whereas IF addresses the **internal mainstreaming** of trade into development strategy, and seeks an **internal buy-in** for trade as an engine of growth, to be reflected in policies designed by in-country stakeholders. In a sense, the trade capacity building activities under IF and JITAP can be seen as **two divergent rays** sharing a small overlap in the spectrum of trade related needs.
- **Scope:** JITAP has an **extreme focus on institutional trade capacity development**, while the IF has a **broader focus**, covering reforms in the macro policy environment (areas extending beyond external trade), donor coordination, internal trade aspects and even trade infrastructure needs. This is in keeping with the distinctions between a Programme and a Framework. However, with the enhanced IF, some lines are blurring.
- **Geographic scope:** JITAP is presently and likely to remain, an Africa-focused Programme (although there are demands for JITAP in other regions too), unlike the IF, which extends to beneficiaries from all regions.
- **Development status:** only LDCs are eligible for the IF, whereas both African LDCs and non LDCs are eligible for JITAP.
- **Design:** The **critical distinction** between JITAP and IF is the **design and delivery** concept. While the **unit of delivery in the IF is always a country**, **JITAP is delivered at the regional and sub regional level to beneficiaries** from several countries, owing to its **joint and integrated** approach. This **multi-country approach, which is the essence of JITAP**, simply **cannot be subsumed in the current IF structure**.

180. The above factors substantiate that even despite some overlap at the level of activities, JITAP and IF are sufficiently distinct in design, geographic scope and beneficiary criteria to continue on their paths. It is important to remember that, in many JITAP countries, the three agencies already have other technical cooperation activities outside of JITAP. Yet, none of these programmes has matched JITAP's effectiveness and resultant popularity. In some ways, JITAP's Joint and Integrated Approach has demonstrated that 'the whole can be better than the sum of its parts'. Therefore, subsuming JITAP without the Joint and Integrated Delivery principle would yield no value addition: the three agencies are already engaged in several of these countries independently.

Section 3. Enhanced IF and Implications for JITAP

181. While there is sufficient current distinction between JITAP and the current IF, the evaluators as well as the agencies involved in JITAP observe that the distinctions in activity coverage are likely to blur significantly under the emerging architecture of the enhanced IF. The specific activities in which overlaps are foreseen are:

- DTIS coverage: response to needs emanating from on-going trade liberalisation processes and new trade rules, including the DDA;
- Institution-building to handle trade policy issues;
- Strengthening of export supply capabilities;
- Strengthening of trade support services;
- Training and human resource development; and
- Assistance in the creation of a supportive trade-related regulatory and policy framework to encourage trade and investment.

182. How should donors balance funding allocations for JITAP and IF, which are quite different-sized pots, and begin to address overlapping activities? The enhanced IF, with a \$ 400 million belly, stands to dwarf JITAP, which is unlikely to consume more than \$ 20 million, if a third phase were to come into being. The sheer difference in magnitudes can spark off discussions to consider the need for independent funding and monitoring mechanisms for the two instruments, especially in the LDCs in Africa. The answers to this question depend on a) expectations about the future performance of the IF given its past track record; and b) the country –selection policies of individual donors based on geographic versus development-status. Some countries have an Africa focus, while others have an LDC-non LDC approach in donor policies. The Enhanced IF, with its funding requirements, may further polarize these positions.

183. JITAP has provided considerable evidence of its usefulness in building trade related capacities related to the MTS. This can serve as a foundation not only for future JITAP interventions but also for all TRTA programmes in these countries, for deepening of capacities through coverage of next, higher levels of capacity needs, depending on absorptive capacities. Therefore, there is a strong case for continuing the JITAP or a JITAP-type intervention, especially in Africa. Therefore, if a working arrangement can be structured between the enhanced IF and a possible JITAP III, JITAP can deliver on an enlarged mandate, possibly using the IF Tier II as a funding mechanism in African LDCs, but preserving its core focus, design and format and its regional/sub-regional delivery mechanism.

184. Specifically in the Enhanced IF, JITAP can bridge the gap between Action Matrices and actionable projects, by improving its contents under Sector Strategy Formulation to include capacity building on project formulation skills, and develop specific projects targeted at removing supply-side constraints as the end products from the Export Strategies Module. A large number of outputs in JITAP, such as technical studies, export prioritization studies and sector strategies, though lower in quality against international benchmarks, are the outputs of beneficiaries themselves. This is reflective of rudimentary capacities being created as part of the process. This method is also being proposed for preparing the new DTIS under the enhanced IF. For all these aspects, JITAP has the potential to become a standard delivery

mechanism even under the IF, without the need to develop new means of delivering such assistance, and at the same time benefiting from the skills of other partners, such as the World Bank, in improving the quality of some products developed by in-country stakeholders. Similarly, implementation of the Doha Development Agenda would entail new demands on developing WTO compliant domestic legislation, which has already been identified for inclusion under Module 1 and 2 of JITAP.

185. The evaluator contends that **synergies between the enhanced IF and JITAP can be enhanced substantially** by ensuring periodic meetings and a coordination of work plans between the JITAP's Joint Steering Mechanism (Tech Level) and its counterpart level at the IFWG, both being located and operating from Geneva. At the very minimum, activity plans can be exchanged through emails, and clarifications or requests for coordination be expressed for sequencing of specific activities such as the DTIS, sector strategy formulation, etc, in the same countries. For this to happen, two upstream steps are absolutely necessary to be adopted in the Programme Documents of both instruments:

- Formal recognition of JITAP (among other alternatives) as a trade capacity delivery mechanism to be recommended under the Enhanced IF; and
- Formal Adoption of Inter-Programme Coordination between the IF Working Group and JITAP Joint Steering Mechanism at the Technical Levels in Geneva.

186. Inherent in the above suggestion is an assumption that the IF agencies, beneficiaries and donors consider JITAP to be an effective mechanism for delivering trade related capacities, and that JITAP will merit such recognition only on its ability to demonstrate its value addition over other TRTA options available to beneficiaries as well as partner agencies. The long waiting list of African countries is a good indicator of JITAP's recognition by potential beneficiaries. However, donors and the other IF agencies need more awareness about JITAP's attainments, at the levels of field offices, donor country capitals and Geneva missions. The most important aspect to be clarified is the complementarities between JITAP and other technical cooperation activities of the three agencies in the same countries. This is particularly necessary for ITC, which has a large number of activities outside JITAP in related areas: National Export Strategy development; Export Poverty Reduction Programme; World Tr@de Net; etc., with some overlaps in concept with JITAP.

187. If beneficiaries and donors are convinced of JITAP's synergies with the IF, the current redesign of the IF presents **an opportune timing for donors as well as beneficiaries to prevail on both instruments for a consultative mechanism for implementation aspects**. This will become even more important in the Enhanced IF.

Chapter V. Lessons Learnt

Section 1. What has worked

188. **Multi-pronged approach.** JITAP demonstrates the advantages of using a multi-pronged approach to addressing trade related capacity needs at various levels- trade negotiators; national implementation agencies connected to trade legislation; trade practitioners/ exporters; and trade support institutions. The JITAP II modules- a marked improvement in design than the 15 clusters of JITAP I- represent a wholesome pack of capacity development content aimed at these different stakeholder groups, and provide a mechanism (the IIC) for their interaction toward a national position on trade issues and priorities.

189. **Joint and Integrated Approach.** The involvement of three specialist agencies, each bringing a distinct domain expertise in trade related technical assistance, is a unique feature of JITAP. Beneficiary countries are unanimous in their appreciation of the joint and integrated approach, which brought them a range of perspectives on the realm of MTS integration: enabling them to know and apply the rules (WTO); interpret the significance and impact of undertakings, and articulate the negotiating priorities (UNCTAD); and enhance export capacity to benefit from market access opportunities (ITC). The delivery of training by all three agencies on a common platform enabled participation by all stakeholder groups connected with MTS issues.

190. **In-built stakeholder structures.** The creation of institutional structures is an important element to ensure sustainability of programmes such as JITAP. The JITAP Programme Design is unique in its in-built structures under various modules– the IICs, the Reference Centres, Sector Counterpart Teams and MTS Networks, which are the institutional repositories of knowledge and capacities transferred by the programme, whose direct beneficiaries are individuals from various trade related institutions and agencies. Some of these structures e.g. the IICs and Reference Centres have been pioneered by JITAP, and are now being adapted to or merged with similar structures designed under other TRTA programmes.

191. **Sub-regional delivery model.** JITAP II introduced a major change from JITAP I through the use of sub-regional delivery of training contents, in order to manage the enhanced geographical coverage from eight to sixteen countries. This is a practical solution to meet increased demands for technical assistance from beneficiaries, while factoring in the increasing human resource shortages within the agencies, which present supply side constraints in delivery of technical assistance. In the likelihood of a larger geographic coverage, these constraints may become more pronounced. Therefore, the use of sub-regional delivery for training is the only option to deliver joint and integrated delivery, which is the essence of JITAP.

192. **Flexibility, Customization, and Adaptation.** The JITAP II programme design provides for sufficient customization in Modules 1, 3, and 5, in order to adapt to local and current requirements. The customization and flexibility are inherent in the principles of self-

implementation and decentralization of funds (no matter how inadequate these may be perceived) and have been used fruitfully by some countries, depending on their initiative. Key examples are the topical focus of retreats and training workshops in each country based on the immediate negotiation calendar (Cancun and Hong Kong Ministerial); and the effective use of Module 4 resources in Uganda (some funds from JITAP II were earmarked for implementation of sector strategies developed in JITAP I) and Mozambique (budgets for external consultants were diverted to other actions considered more important). Similarly, the availability of decentralized funds for Module 3 and 5 enabled users to determine activities based on current and localized requirements. That many countries did not use the decentralized funds effectively is another matter, and not reflective of design inadequacy.

193. **Synergies among TRTA structures.** There are signs of convergence of institutional structures between JITAP and IF in the LDC countries. Some countries (Mozambique, Benin, Mali, Zambia) have formally merged the National Steering Committee structures of JITAP and IF, and many countries even have a common focal point for JITAP and IF. With the enhanced IF proposing to strengthen the National Implementation Units in order to streamline TRTA coordination, activity level coordination between JITAP and IF especially Window II is expected to benefit JITAP activities considerably. The increased attention by donors, agencies and beneficiaries to enhance synergies at the activity level is a positive development, although coordination with bilateral programmes remains a mixed lot, for several reasons, including some practical difficulties in coordinating programme calendars across various programmes.

Section 2. What hasn't worked

194. **Self-implementation.** A key feature of JITAP II implementation was the greater emphasis on national self-implementation¹⁶, and less on Geneva support. The key assumptions i.e. adequate counterpart resources; existence of suitable counterpart institutions that could take leadership, and vibrant national MTS networks, were not held true in practice. As a result, JITAP II remains a Geneva-delivered programme, with most in-country management responsibilities devolving to the Focal Point. This meant that activities led by Geneva were completed, while others floundered.

195. **Rigid Geometric Design.** Standard designs and formats can be very useful for efficient and uniform delivery of programme content and outputs. However, a rigid adherence to the design and format can be counter productive and yield bad results, as seen in some aspects of JITAP II. Module 2 reveals several inconsistencies and suboptimal results on account of such rigidity. First, there are several cases where a second set of computer and peripheral equipment has been delivered to some existing JITAP I reference centres, without due assessments of requirement, or incorrect submission of needs by beneficiaries. In most cases, these are now superfluous: in Kenya's business reference centre, there are more than 20 work stations supplied by USAID. Similarly, in Benin, there were already 4 computers in place at the Business Reference Centre, when the additional set of equipment came from JITAP II. Beneficiaries, instead of assessing and articulating their real needs as reference centres, and

¹⁶ JITAP II Programme Document, para 70, page 21.

seeking other complementing equipment within the available budget allocations, preferred to use their entitlements under Module 2, duplicating some equipment- printers and copiers in some cases.

196. Second, the suboptimal status of several enquiry points and reference centres in all countries is also a manifestation of the ‘fixed geometry’ imposed by JITAP II. In many countries, the absence of any tradable services (other than tourism) and intellectual property repositories raises questions over the current relevance of TRIPS and Services Enquiry Points, unlike the TBT and SPS enquiry points. In case of TRIPS enquiry points, JITAP contribution to reference materials is insignificant compared to those from WIPO and OAPI. On the other hand, internet connectivity is a major problem at enquiry points. If Module 2 were to be measured in terms of outputs i.e. the performance of the Enquiry Points against their statutory duties, strengthening two NEPs instead of setting four NEPs would seem a better action toward MTS integration.

197. **Master Trainers.** Module 3 required Master Trainers trained under JITAP I (six persons in each country, many of whom are trade officials) to disseminate MTS knowledge to IIC members, provincial government officials, business, academia and general public, through dissemination programmes developed by an officially registered MTS network. These Master trainers underwent a 3-week training in JITAP I on important MTS subjects. JITAP II did not provide an intensive Master Trainers’ programme on grounds that there were 45-50 Master Trainers from JITAP I who could be used as facilitators in Phase II. The reality is that many master trainers have moved on from their previous positions, networks have not been formed in most countries, and master trainers who are also members of trade delegations are already burdened with preparations for negotiations, and cannot be reasonably expected to contribute regularly to dissemination and sensitization events.

198. **Supply driven networking.** The poor performance of Module 5 is reflective of the issues that determine effective networking. JITAP II has been generous in providing resources to encourage synergies and networking among beneficiaries, and supporting them with web-based networking tools such as the JITAP portal. However, evidence suggests a lack of adequate demand and motivation for beneficiaries to network with one another. This is partly due to the nascence of networks fostered under JITAP, and financial resource constraints to meet costs associated with networking events, inadequate internet access, etc. These external bottlenecks result in low viability of supply-driven networking as presently the case in JITAP.

199. **Over adherence to the Joint and Integrated Approach.** Even though a large part of JITAP’s success is attributed to the joint and integrated approach, at least one agency considers it to be overdone. While there is consensus on the need for joint involvement in project design, programme-level planning/budgeting and management reporting, there is discontent and disagreement on extending the principle of jointness to the level of detailed implementation organization and planning of all activities, which is seen as a drain on precious time and human resources, and reflecting an under-delegated management structure. Delegation of authority and division of labour, principles of implicit consent, and simplified documentation are considered necessary improvements without detracting from the principle of jointness underlining JITAP.

200. **Compulsory consensus principle.** The creation of a joint and integrated approach has been challenging. The three agencies have agreed to a principle of consensus on all decisions in the programme. There have been serious differences (particularly in Modules 2 and 5) over design concepts, scope, contents and implementation modalities, which have delayed activities in JITAP II in 2003 and 2004. Protracted debates on these issues, including personality plays, have often resulted in some actors yielding ground to others, only in order to move ahead. Therefore, such consensus, being reluctant and tolerant, cannot be equated to agreement. Alternative democratic mechanisms, including majority decisions in absence of consensus, need to be explored in decision making in a complex programme such as JITAP.
201. **Coordination and Implementation.** The effectiveness of the JITAP Programme Coordination Unit is partly impaired by the overlapping mandates given to it: as coordination of the Programme (implementation, monitoring and reporting) and direct charge of implementation of two of the five modules. The fact that these modules are not independently delivered by the Programme Coordination Unit, and engage expert resources from the three agencies, further complicates roles and responsibilities. There needs to be a clear demarcation of coordination and implementation functions in the Programme. This leads to needs for a reconsideration of the structure of Programme Management and Coordination. Two options for a revised structure are presented in the next chapter.
202. **Decentralization of resources.** Although decentralization is a good concept, the devil has been in the details; as a result, only 2 countries –Benin and Uganda- have come close to complete utilization of their decentralized funds in JITAP II.

Section 3. Future Challenges to JITAP

203. **Agency Constraints in Meeting New Demand:** The three implementing agencies are severely stretched in their human resource supply capacities to assume increasing commitments under a new phase of JITAP. The staff strengths (Regular Budgets) are at critical levels in WTO and UNCTAD, and facing increased demands for their main technical cooperation activities, besides JITAP. This would limit their ability to participate in an enhanced IF as well as in a larger JITAP III, unless new innovative methods of delivery are found, and unless further staff resources are available from Programme funds. However, UNCTAD has been able to manage an increase in its Permanent staff ceilings, which will enable it to recruit more people at technical levels. A future version of JITAP will need to look at more effective and resource-optimizing delivery mechanisms, including a blend of distance learning materials and agency-delivered training, based on a gradation of skills qualifying for each type of delivery. The use of trained resources from JITAP alumni countries would also be essential for some activities. All these would need to be thought through in an inception phase of JITAP III.
204. **The Enhanced Integrated Framework:** Given the proposed scope of actions under the Enhanced IF, the current state of (absence of) coordination between the IF and JITAP presages an increasing overlap and likely encroachment of IF on trade capacity interventions already well demonstrated under JITAP, but without alternative solutions. The absence of synergies

between JITAP and IF poses the risk that that JITAP would be confined only to African non-LDCs, while the IF may not have a JITAP- equivalent mechanism for the LDCs. This would be seriously damaging, as it would potentially affect the confluence of common African positions on trade negotiations, which has been a key accomplishment of JITAP. The exit readiness of JITAP LDC alumni countries would also be debilitated in the absence of their participation in some regional activities. The window of opportunity to ingrain such synergies in the designs of the enhanced IF and the Programme Document of JITAP III is rather limited. That the involved agencies and donors may not be able or willing to stitch up a working alliance is a risk. The eventual outcomes would depend on donors' and beneficiaries' collective influence and intervention on both programmes.

205. **Sustaining the Joint and Integrated Approach:** This risk is likely fallout of the eventuality of the two risks outlined above. JITAP has succeeded in bringing the three agencies together to deliver their unique expertise together, at the same time, and for the same users, although with some difficulties and considerable effort in coordination. The continued interest toward this approach will be sustained only by a growing demand, followed by its endorsement under the much- larger Enhanced IF. If not, agencies may find it a lot easier to position themselves individually within the Enhanced IF. That would be the most unfortunate dénouement for JITAP.

Chapter VI. Looking Ahead: Recommendations

Section 1. JITAP III: Need, Rationale and Scope

Note: At the time of the evaluation, a concept paper for JITAP III had been prepared and was under discussion among the three agencies and also placed before donors. The evaluators, ITC evaluation unit and the Coordination Unit decided that this paper should not be shared with the evaluator on concerns that it could influence the evaluation. The Evaluator did not discuss contents of the paper with any respondents, even at the stage of concluding the report. Therefore, the recommendations in this report are based on the continuation of the present intervention logic of JITAP and are to be read as the evaluator's suggestions for improving the present design of JITAP II, and not in the context of an *ab initio* approach to a third phase of JITAP. Therefore, the evaluation recommendations and the contents of the JITAP III concept paper should not be compared for approach or concurrence of ideas, and any contrasts or similarities should be treated as purely coincidental.

206. As a programme, JITAP has been operational for eight years, with a reasonable degree of success in its objectives:

- There is tangible evidence of the increased participation by African countries in MTS negotiations, indicated by the well-articulated and well formulated African Union common positions at the WTO.
- Institutional mechanisms for consultation on trade issues are operational and active in all countries, with varying degrees of legal recognition. However, the domestication of MTS commitments in the form of compliant national legislations has been far from satisfactory.
- The initial steps toward export readiness, export awareness and strategy formulation, have been initiated in all JITAP countries.

207. JITAP has demonstrated that trade capacities can be introduced and enhanced in developing countries and LDCs through a joint and integrated approach of specialist agencies with different competencies under the MTS spectrum. However, beyond a point, strengthening these capacities requires domestic initiatives by countries to develop mechanisms for deepening and institutionalizing MTS knowledge among the key trade actors, and to disseminate this knowledge among various stakeholder groups. Therefore, from an appraisal view point, the end of JITAP II can be seen as a good exit point for both donors and agencies to *quit while one is ahead*.

208. JITAP has touched only 16 African countries, including 10 of the world's 50 LDCs. The JITAP experience has created expectations from a large number of countries, and there is a long waiting list for a further phase of the programme, including from countries outside of Africa. At the time of the evaluation, JITAP had received formal requests from 24 countries to join JITAP, which are under initial consideration. While Africa has special needs, there are large unmet needs for trade capacity enhancements in all other regions too. These needs arise from the same

causes: non familiarity with MTS issues and a low level of trade integration in these countries, although the difference may be in degree.

209. Even for current JITAP beneficiary countries, trade negotiations are an ongoing process, and only the rudimentary capacities have been built among a small base of persons. In case of LDCs, negotiation challenges were fewer: the negotiations were mostly non-reciprocal and did not enjoin LDCs to make commitments that were required of other developing countries. However, in regional and bilateral agreements involving these countries e.g. the EU-EPA, the negotiations are based on reciprocity. If the Doha Round concludes satisfactorily, there will be a continuing rationale. Implementation of commitments would necessitate further capacities in domestication of these agreements, understanding implications and implementing mitigating measures. Even if the Doha Round fails, the regional and bilateral agreements are expected to continue, and they will need to adhere to general principles and disciplines of the WTO.

210. With these observations, it is the evaluator's contention that JITAP is transcending from being a specific Programme to a tested Delivery System for Trade Capacity Enhancement in developing countries. There is a high probability that the JITAP ingredients- packaged under the same or any other Programme- would be able to engender consistent and repeatable results in new countries as well. In this perspective, the decision to continue or close JITAP after Phase II is tantamount to a decision to continue or suspend commercial production of a tested formulation or recipe for treating a symptom, rather than a decision on which patients should be treated with the formulation and for how long.

211. Based on the findings, the evaluator recommends a JITAP III to continue with the same objectives, although with improvements in the 'formulation'. These are described in the Modalities section below.

Section 2. Modalities

i. Programme Design

212. JITAP III needs to strike a balance among three different dimensions: demands for a enhanced geographical coverage; effectiveness of delivery; and supply side constraints among implementing agencies. The evaluator considers that the appropriate response needs to be a Programme that **is lighter** (fewer, more focused activities), **simpler** (cost-effective delivery and management structures), and resultantly, **larger** (footprint), than JITAP II, without diluting focus on its main objective- **strengthening trade-related human and institutional capacities to deal with opportunities and challenges from globalization.**

213. JITAP III should strike a balance between geographic coverage and spreading resources too thin for any effect. In this respect, supply capacities at some agencies are seen as a key constraint in delivering JITAP effectively to a larger number of beneficiaries, say 20-24 countries. Therefore, future versions of JITAP perforce need to consider regional delivery partnerships, along the lines of the WTO's initiatives in the trade policy courses. These possibilities certainly exist in Eastern Africa and Southern Africa.

214. **Regional Dimension.** The increasing agenda in regional and bilateral trade negotiations in Africa present an opportunity for JITAP to extend support to deal with some specific issues, such as clarifying rules of origin and exercising a selection between two customs union groupings. However, it is not clear how the WTO would perceive an explicit involvement in technical cooperation to address bilateral and sub-regional trade arrangements, which are a variant of the MFN principle. On the other hand, a deadlock or slow progress in the multilateral negotiations may lead to regional trade as a next best alternative. The conclusion of the Doha Round will, hopefully, clarify some of these issues.

At the time of finalizing this report, news had just come in of the failure of the Group of six developed and developing countries to arrive at a consensus to progress and conclude the Doha Round Talks within a definite time frame.

ii. Programme Elements

215. **Redistribution of Modules.** The evaluator recommends a JITAP III with four modules. **three modules for centralized delivery**, each identifiable and corresponding to one agency’s competence areas, and a **fourth, decentralized module** to be implemented by national and regional networks and not prescribed by Geneva. The decentralized module shall operate purely on an Incentive concept, providing for variable geometry among countries and regions, but following a standard template. With this redistribution, there is expected to be a further simplification of roles, delegation of responsibilities, resulting in better coordination, and a lighter load on in-country structures.

Table 8. Correspondence of JITAP II and JITAP III Modules

	JITAP II	JITAP III
Module 1	MTS Institutional Support, Compliance, Policies and Negotiations (lead UNCTAD)	MTS Institutional Support, Compliance, Policies and Negotiations (lead UNCTAD), but will also include videoconference events earlier under Module 5 of JITAP II
Module 2	Strengthening MTS Reference Centres and National Enquiry Points (lead WTO)	Strengthening MTS Reference Centres and National Enquiry Points (lead WTO); to add new content on implementation and domestication of WTO agreements
Module 3	Enhancing MTS Knowledge and Networks (lead Programme Coordination)	Export Strategy Implementation (lead ITC) will build on Sector identification/ prioritization, formulation, and also address product-level SPS and TBT issues in key markets, and ground-level solutions to overcome them.
Module 4	Products and Services Sector Strategies (lead ITC)	JITAP Network (Decentralized to national or

	Strategies (lead ITC)	(Decentralized to national or regional entities, only contracting and light monitoring by Programme Coordination); this combines Module 3 and Module 5 of JITAP II, except videoconferences which are under new Module 1.
Module 5	Networking and Programme Synergy (lead Programme Coordination)	None.

216. **Module 1: MTS Institutional Support.** Module 1 should target as its beneficiaries, an inner core of trade negotiators- a cadre of officials in main ministries, technical professionals (technical persons at recognized technical and trade support institutions) and trade practitioners. This would normally not exceed 25-30 persons per country, who will become leading authorities in each country on MTS issues. Training content may consist of two levels: a foundation component to be administered through a combination of distance-learning and mentoring; and an advanced ‘higher-grade’ component to be delivered by experts, on a regional basis- as in JITAP II. The advanced component will include updated materials, focusing on new trade issues negotiations and shall be focused on trade negotiators. The IIC subcommittees in new JITAP countries could also be provided with a compendium of all technical papers already prepared under JITAP I and II under UNCTAD guidance, as reference materials. Thereafter, only customized research specific to a negotiation issue shall need to be undertaken by the new IICs. This would address some concerns that the technical submissions to IICs are often academic and research-oriented, and do not provide actionable inputs for policy formulation or negotiating positions.

217. The evaluator also recommends that the outreach of Module 1 be enhanced through small innovations, such as developing audio-visual reproductions of all training programmes and workshops, copyrighted by the respective agencies, and licensed as reference materials, for use by JITAP structures-IICs, universities, MTS networks, etc., as in case of the trade information tools presently supplied by the agencies. These materials can be disseminated through the IICs and universities as preparatory materials or as coaching tools for trainers. Such steps will support in institutionalizing the content of JITAP, which will continue to evolve further as new materials are developed by the agencies.

218. The regional videoconferencing events, whose main participants are trade negotiators and key IIC members, should be subsumed under Module 1, as they are thematically linked to negotiation events rather than with the dissemination processes of Module 5. If administrative procedures are cumbersome in the implementing agency, the financial contracting of these events could be undertaken by the Coordination unit, as being done presently.

219. Key resource persons in JITAP ‘alumni’ i.e. exiting countries should be made eligible to attend all Module 1 activities in JITAP III, subject to their being able to arrange reasonable funding for their participation. Synergies with other TRTA programmes should ensure that participation costs are covered. This would enable ‘alumni’ to benefit from new knowledge delivered under JITAP, at the same time prevent a duplication/proliferation of JITAP-like

activities in these countries, only on grounds that JITAP no longer supports their capacity needs.

220. **Module 2: Strengthening Trade Enquiry Points.** There is merit in reconsidering the number of enquiry points to be set up under JITAP, given that the scope of Module 2 is only the supply of basic hardware, documentation, and document management orientation. Module 2 funding could be reallocated to enable countries a sequencing of the NEPs and RCs to ensure that at least some of these are functional to acceptable standards: good internet connectivity, technical staff to respond to notifications and clarifications, and work programmes linked to the IIC subcommittees, priority export sectors for which strategies have been formulated, and MTS networks. The evaluator strongly emphasizes a prescribed level of connectivity (counterpart funded) as a pre-condition for any RC and NEP. Costs and quality of internet connectivity cannot be made excuses for not having a statutory trade information point, and JITAP should not fund any equipment until this problem is resolved.

221. Particularly, the location of the services enquiry point needs reconsideration: in the view of the evaluator, it should be located in a multi sector body, and not a single sector body like the Board of Tourism. Its ideal location is the Export Promotion Agency, which is an official agency and can issue notifications or respond officially to requests. The NEP-Services can be located in the Business Reference Centre itself, which would add to the equipment complement of the Business RC, and also enable users to interact with the staff connected with the export promotion agency, the assumption being that service trade would also be under the purview of the same agency. In Benin and Uganda, the NEP is in the private sector, which has the advantage of a wider representation of services, but also disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that in the long term, a private sector body cannot have international recognition as an official agency with the imprimatur of the government, to issue or respond to trade notifications, implement trade measures, or certify to international requirements, which are government functions.

222. In several countries, creating the TRIPS enquiry point under JITAP is superfluous, given that these countries follow common regional (OAPI etc.) regulations in terms of IPRs, and already have all relevant documentation from WIPO and OAPI to implement IPR registration in their territories. WTO has very little to offer the TRIPS NEP besides hardware and basic documentation, which may be too general for the IPR offices. Therefore a TRIPS NEP may make sense only in non OAPI countries, but not without examining the reasons for non-membership in a regional body.

223. Implementation of WTO agreements in the form of compliant national legislation is far from satisfactory in JITAP countries. Besides the tardiness in approvals of bills pending before Parliament, there are problems of a technical nature, as recounted by persons connected with technical bodies and also agencies in charge of preparing legal texts. Drafting of legislation on TBT, SPS, TRIPS, trade measures (e.g. anti dumping), etc. requires a mix of technical and legal skills, and necessitates a common training and orientation for drafting committees (ideally including technical and legal persons) connected with the subjects. JITAP II has not addressed this aspect, which will become more and more critical, especially for implementation of the Doha Round. In comparison, JITAP I countries were able to introduce laws on Customs Valuation, TRIPS, under specific clusters. Uganda has also used donor support (USAID) to

enhance the capabilities of its Law Reforms Commission to introduce WTO compliant legislation on a number of subjects. JITAP Module 2 could consider these additional capacity elements besides the one-time provision of reference centres and enquiry points.

224. **Module 3. Enhancing Export Readiness** (Sector Export Strategies Module 4 in JITAP II). The evaluator recommends strengthening this module by adding three elements: specific training to deepen the concepts of strategy formulation; inclusion of project proposal preparation techniques; and product/sector-level contextualization of market access issues, especially non-tariff measures. The strategy document should reflect the strategic choices made in the light of the analysis: the scope of value addition to be prioritized in a sector, product-market choices and tradeoffs, costs of implementation of various options, and the final choices within the available financial resources. Development of skills for project proposals would enable more bankable and actionable submissions whether under bilateral funds or under Window II of the IF. This would increase JITAP's synergies with other donor programmes in the participant countries. Phase III of JITAP should also consider providing for at least some studies being spearheaded by regional experts, selected objectively by the implementing agencies.

225. Responses to deal with market access barriers are highly product and market specific, and are not easily understood by individual exporters. This calls for a very product-market specific focus, and ITC needs to bring in this element in order to customize the MTS for the private sector, at least for the identified export sectors. A typical illustration could be for ITC to provide SPS and TBT experts to visit a country with fruit fly contamination in mangoes, and prescribe a code of practices for the export value chain to meet the regulations of a focus market (say Japan). Or, for instance, to assist in an implementation plan to conform to the new export packaging regulations of International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM 15), which requires pest and pathogen-free wooden packaging. Currently, this is an emerging specialization in ITC, but has considerable potential for ITC in the TRTA universe, and can reinforce ITC's position as a field-level trade capacity development agency. To a large extent, this will also replace the format of generalized dissemination and sensitization activities that were attempted in JITAP II with poor results.

226. **Module 4. JITAP Networks** (Combined Module 3 and Module 5 of JITAP II). The evaluator proposes a conceptual departure in JITAP III in respect of networking and dissemination activities, by making this incentive driven instead of the prescriptive approach used in JITAP II. This module shall co-finance or support specific activities of relevance to JITAP, to be undertaken by national or sub regional entities having specific interests in the analysis and/or dissemination of MTS issues to a large range of stakeholders. All activities of this module shall be supported from decentralized funds. The activities would typically be in the nature of in-country support to JITAP activities, besides outreach and dissemination.

227. JITAP in-country support could include:

- Developing and maintaining a national web site for reporting on all in-country JITAP activities, using the guidelines and templates prescribed by the Multi portal design already completed in JITAP II
- Creating/updating a (high quality) database of national resource persons based on strict enrolment criteria and actual contribution/involvement in trade issues- including former

trade negotiators, national and regional consultants working on TRTA projects, university faculty specialized in trade subjects, trade practitioners (key exporters in the priority sectors, technical officers in standards and certification bodies, etc.)

- Linkages with JITAP institutional structures:
 - Convening consultative meetings of Enquiry Points and Reference Centres with business stakeholders, exporters on the implications of major regulations notified by the country and by key trade partners.
 - Convening dissemination meetings twice a year on status of trade negotiations and also on emerging trade priorities and challenges- briefing by IIC members and trade delegates
- Selecting regional and national experts to produce technical papers on specific current topics of concern to private stakeholders and those identified by the IICs, based on calls for proposals listed in the JITAP Portal
- Posting technical content on MTS issues; and providing links to the national expert database, the JITAP portal in Geneva and JITAP websites in countries.
- Providing resource persons for technical exchange with other JITAP countries and under other TRTA programmes

228. This group of activities (illustrative and non exhaustive) would assist in-country implementation of JITAP by shouldering some responsibilities of over-burdened Focal Points, yet working in close contact with the JITAP structures. Ideal candidates for these activities would be: private sector business associations/ chambers of commerce, new registered MTS networks formed in JITAP countries; or even some enterprising Reference Centres, especially the Business Reference Centres. By linking these entities to programme activities and website management, it is possible to support these entities with essential human resources and web connectivity for the duration of the programme or the contract, without creating permanent costs for the government or for the entities themselves. Also, competitive bidding would induce private sector beneficiaries to offer some level of cost-sharing, instead of JITAP funding all costs as expected by several Enquiry Points.

229. Selection of beneficiaries could be on the basis of **Calls for Proposals** posted on the JITAP portal, with funds to be sanctioned only for those countries which have developed qualifying proposals meeting a set of criteria. Thus, JITAP III can set aside an **Incentive fund**, which can be used productively, based on real demand and enterprise rather than prescribing a rigid and common structure for networking and information sharing among all partner countries with considerable Geneva-based costs. For enterprising applicants, this would mean a reasonable level of decentralized funds for activities under JITAP, provided there is identified demand and commitment.

230. All (exiting) Alumni countries should also be made eligible for participating in the Networking Module, and accessing the incentive funds. This would demonstrate the state of JITAP structures in these countries, and also facilitate deployment of resource persons from exiting countries to support JITAP activities in new JITAP countries.

231. The utilization of the incentive fund can be seen as an acid test of motivation: poor utilization would imply the lack of demand and motivation on part of the private sector and ordinary stakeholders to engage on MTS issues, which would be a valuable input for JITAP to

limit its focus on bare essentials i.e. the enhancement of capacities of negotiators and the support to key export stakeholders in priority sectors. At the same time, if a few countries become active in managing JITAP national networks, notwithstanding the incentive funding, a regional or sub regional network would become feasible, as the next step.

232. Dissemination and outreach activities: This group of activities, to be ideally undertaken by suitable academic institutions, seeks to build on the training materials provided by the Geneva agencies, and customize them for the local setting, depending on the stakeholders groups concerned. The activities could include:

- Developing MTS curricula for university programmes and executive development programmes (these were to be taken up as residual activities in JITAP I countries but have not been done) based on the training kits already developed in JITAP II and the contents of training regional workshops to be delivered by the Geneva agencies
- Developing local content on MTS for specific business sectors and products, and linking the importance of trade issues for various elements of the value chain in those products and sectors.

The Programme could support content adaptation and resource person costs, but not participation costs, which need to be funded by participants or other donors.

233. JITAP Multi Portal. The development of the JITAP Multi portal is presently under way in JITAP II. The evaluator strongly advises against any haste in commissioning the portal and the national hubs- which entail more than \$500,000 in costs- in view of the observations on the current state of internet infrastructure, and the present usage levels of the JITAP portal, which point to a serious lack of motivation and interest among JITAP countries to use web based networking tools to share information. In the short term, the use of the portal and other electronic means is likely to remain limited due of the low penetration and high costs of internet access in most JITAP countries.

234. It is easy to create national information hubs as envisaged in the design of the Multi Portal, especially if all costs were to be borne by Geneva. But, the hubs would need constant creation and updating of content from the module implementation partners. It is unreasonable to expect a uniform level of interest and commitment from all counterparts to such an arrangement. It was with these concerns that an incentive fund has been suggested. If the national hubs were to be created before or without developing content sites first, the Multi Portal will risk becoming only a hub with few spokes. Therefore, the successful creation of a threshold number of national JITAP information sites, with dynamic content through the utilization of the incentive fund, should be seen as a compulsory precondition for setting up the multi-country portal in Geneva. In this direction, the results of the feasibility study may be used to develop a standard specification for the web platforms and a standard template for contents to be posted on all national JITAP sites, so that there will be compatibility among these sites when networked. To begin with, simple hyper links would be sufficient to provide references among JITAP network websites. These hyper links could also be posted on the JITAP portal in Geneva.

235. One way of catalyzing more frequent use of the **JITAP portal is to position it as a management tool rather than an information tool**. A lot of programme information that stakeholders could not receive from the Focal Points, e.g. AFE lists, budgets and deadlines, if made available on the portal, would provide information directly to all persons interested in JITAP activities. Similarly, registrations for events, even country-wise activities list and budgets, programme schedules, and even progress reporting templates can be managed better and more cost-effectively on the Portal than through faxes, emails and letters. In JITAP III, calls for proposals for decentralized activities can be used as a further incentive for regular use of the Portal by persons connected with the programme.

Section 3. Country Coverage and Selection Criteria

236. JITAP is presently an Africa-focused programme, covering LDCs and non-LDCs. There is a high demand among African countries to be included in JITAP. In all, 24 countries have applied for coverage, of which 16 are LDCs. These are: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Niger, Rep Central, Rwanda, Sudan and Togo (LDCs); and Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe (non-LDCs). Arab countries have requested for a JITAP type programme.

237. For JITAP III, the current priority of Africa should be retained given the large presence of LDCs, the low and declining share of Africa in world trade, the numerous requests for inclusion and also due to the advantages of contiguity in terms of trade opportunities and also trade capacity development. Donor interest remains keen on Africa, and funding is more likely for Africa than for other regions.

238. Resources permitting, JITAP III should include at least 16 countries as in JITAP II, and ideally, 20-24 countries. Selection criteria should include a balance among regions as well as language, and, ideally, the new list should include at least one country that is capable of taking a regional leadership role in supporting networking events and logistics for regional delivery of programme contents. South Africa and Nigeria, both being applicants, appear strong contenders in this respect.

239. Selection criteria.

- There should be an equal mix of LDCs and non LDCs. Among LDCs, there should be preference for countries that are entering or have just entered the IF, in order to derive maximum benefit of inter-programme synergies.
- Pre-conditions: Stricter preconditions should be insisted in terms of political commitment to legal recognition of IICs (such as steps toward a cabinet decision and draft legislation); and sufficient counterpart funding to meet essential staffing of IIC, essential staffing of RC, and a guaranteed level of internet access and quality of access for all counterpart agencies and trade information points. These should exist before any delivery of programme contents take place.

Section 4. Financial Envelope

The financial requirements of JITAP III would depend on the final design and contents, and the number of participating countries. JITAP II had allocated an average of \$ 500,000 per country over a 4-year duration. Considering this as a benchmark for JITAP III as well, especially after provisioning for increased delivery efficiencies, and judicious use of decentralized funds, JITAP III can entail between \$ 11 million and \$ 16 million, based on a programming for 16 or 24 countries, as illustrated below. However, these are only indicative and should not be considered a recommendation for the size of JITAP III, given that some of the recommendations in this evaluation, if implemented would have financial implications.

Table 9. JITAP III funding, Ambitious, based on 24 countries

Description	Per country	Period	No. of Countries	Total Cost US\$
Capacity Building Modules 1,2 and 3	\$300,000	2 years	24	7,200,000
Decentralised funds	\$ 50,000	3 years	24	1,200,000
Incentive Funds for networking and synergies	\$75,000	3 years	40 (includes 16 Alumni countries)	3,000,000
Programme Management Costs	-	3 years	-	4,500,000
Total				15,900,000

Table 10. JITAP III funding, Conservative, based on 16 countries

Description	Per country	Period	No. of Countries	Total Cost US\$
Capacity Building Modules 1,2 and 3	\$300,000	2 years	16	4,800,000
Decentralised funds	\$ 50,000	3 years	16	800,000
Incentive Funds for networking and synergies	\$75,000	3 years	32 (includes 16 Alumni countries)	2,400,000
Programme Management Costs	-	3 years	-	3,000,000
Total				11,000,000

Section 5. Programme Management

240. A restructuring of the Programme Coordination Structure is a serious priority in order for a possible JITAP III to perform to its potential. At the centre of the issue is a need for further clarity on the following issues:

- Should it be a Coordination unit or change to a Delegated Programme Implementation Unit?

- Should it have a mix of coordination and implementation responsibilities?
- What should it coordinate and at what level is coordination necessary?
- What should its organization structure and size be?

The evaluator received several, divergent view points on these issues from key persons connected with JITAP at all three agencies, as well as the Programme Coordinator. Based on these viewpoints, there are at least two emerging alternatives, which are being put forward for the benefit of collective wisdom, and to be debated among the agencies. The evaluator does not wish to recommend one over the other, as it is for the agencies to decide on what is the more feasible option, or consider other alternative arrangements.

241. **A. Programme Coordination Unit.** This would mean an entity which does not have any direct role in implementation of activities in the countries, except as a facilitator between agencies and beneficiaries. Its principal functions during implementation would be to: compile aggregate work plans and budgets, monitor delivery of activities and trouble shoot in exigencies in the field missions, undertake monitoring, and reporting to the governance structures. The detailing of content and delivery of individual modules would be the direct responsibility of the three agencies, although the calendar for joint activities would be decided with the Coordination unit. For such a structure to deliver JITAP III, the Coordination unit needs to have at least one desk officer per 6-8 countries for effective coordination with focal points in the countries and at the three agencies. There will also be a need for a suitably sized staff unit to handle contracting and communications for the Coordinator. This option would mean a substantial strengthening of the implementation and monitoring at the Implementing agencies. This arrangement is sketched in Figure 4.

242. **B. Programme Implementation Unit / Management Unit.** The other option is to convert the present structure into a delegated implementation unit, with full responsibilities of overseeing the delivery of the programme in the field, including coordination of inputs from the agencies. With delegated implementation responsibility, coordination would be an internal function of the unit, with regular reporting functions to the agencies and governing structures, although it should use primarily the internal capacities of the agencies for implementation, but not only. Key decisions, such as budgets and resource allocations, country implementation plans, etc. would need approval by the JSM/SL. In such a structure, the Implementation Unit will be headed by a Programme Director or a Chief Executive. Ideally, all agencies should depute their existing focal point supports into the Implementation Unit, with responsibility for following up and delivering their respective modules in conjunction with the respective divisions of the agencies. This arrangement is sketched in Figure 5.

243. JITAP should incorporate an ‘explicit majority’ principle on core issues such as programme content design and delivery mechanisms, rather than forcing ‘consensus’ which does not ultimately result in ownership. Where inter-agency consensus does not prevail, decisions should be referred to majority vote at a committee of seven, including perhaps 2 donor representatives and 2 beneficiary representatives, although this doesn’t seem to be necessary, given the degree of specialization of JITAP activities. Such association would be useful however for merits of synergy between JITAP and other TRTA, such as the IF. As much

as possible, this should be undertaken electronically (e-poll) instead of creating an additional formal structure.

244. Financial administration of the programme needs to be improved in the interests of transparency, and specifically, budget deviations should be reported immediately along with due justification and not subjected to *post facto* regularization without due analysis of the causes for deviations. The JSM meetings should include stock taking of expenditures and call for Financial Summaries as a formal item of the agenda.

245. The relationship between JITAP and the Enhanced IF would need to be cemented through the explicit mention in the Final documents of JITAP III and the Enhanced IF of:

- Formal recognition of JITAP as a trade capacity delivery mechanism under the Enhanced IF; and
- Formal Adoption of Inter-Programme Coordination between the IF Working Group and JITAP Joint Steering Mechanism at the Technical Levels in Geneva.

The Joint Steering Mechanism and the IF Secretariat should meet at least once in 6 months to exchange work plans for countries. At the very minimum, activity plans can be exchanged through emails, and clarifications or requests for coordination be expressed for sequencing of specific activities such as the DTIS, sector strategy formulation, etc, in the same countries.

Figure 4. OPTION 1. PROPOSED – PROGRAMME COORDINATION UNIT




Figure 5. OPTION 2. PROPOSED – PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION UNIT

