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**Chapter 6**



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## Chapter 6

# TRADE AND TRANSPORT EFFICIENCY

*This chapter provides information on recent developments in the fields of transport, trade facilitation and multimodal transport, along with information on the status of the main maritime conventions.*

### A. NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE FACILITATION AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Long waiting times at border crossings and ports, inappropriate fees and formalities, and unclear trade and transport rules and regulations can all become serious obstacles to trade and thereby adversely affect investment and job creation. Developing countries depend on effective trade facilitation for their development process. They will benefit from the “new geography of trade” (increased exports of manufactured goods and more South-South trade) only if their imports and exports are not confronted with excessive transaction costs, uncertainty and delays.

Negotiations on trade facilitation were covered in the 1 August 2004 Decision of the WTO’s General Council,

the so-called July package. WTO Members have since then started negotiations that focus on improving GATT 1994 Articles V, VIII and X, which deal respectively with “Freedom of Transit”, “Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation”, and the “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”.

The inclusion of trade facilitation in the WTO negotiating agenda reflects trends in international trade and the resulting requirements for effective global supply chains. Globalized production processes go hand in hand with growing intra-company trade as well as trade in components and unfinished products. Countries with inadequate trade and transport facilitation will not attract the investment required to participate in this process. The changing production and trade patterns would not be possible without enhanced transport and logistics services, and the latter in turn would not



*Average waiting times of two weeks at some borders between LDCs are a serious obstacle to the countries’ competitiveness and their participation in globalized production and international trade.*

be possible without trade and transport facilitation. Containerization, for example, significantly facilitates multimodal door-to-door transport services. Since 1985, global port container moves have increased sevenfold, yet many landlocked LDCs are still served mostly by non-containerized transport services. This situation is at least partly the consequence of high risks, red tape and costs involved in transit trade.

Another important trend is the increase of the share of transport in international logistics expenditures, whereas the share of inventory holding is declining. This trend goes hand in hand with faster, more frequent and more reliable transport services. Lengthy customs and other procedures at border crossings and ports, on the other hand, lead to involuntary expensive inventory holding, effectively preventing any trade or foreign direct investment that would require just-in-time deliveries of unfinished goods or components.

The negotiations on trade facilitation at the WTO take place within the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation (NGTF). The NGTF started its work towards the end of 2004, and since then has met at regular intervals of between one and two months. Over 50 documents were tabled by WTO member countries by mid-2005, most of them containing proposals on a wide range of trade facilitation issues. Specific topics covered include, for example, the publication of trade regulations, fees, clearance and release of goods, reduction and simplification of formalities, and use of existing international standards.

Some of the tabled proposals also refer to Annex D of the WTO July package. Annex D establishes links and conditions with regard to the identification of the needs and priorities of Members as well as technical assistance and capacity-building. These elements are interrelated, while at the same time being linked to special and differential treatment. In particular, Annex D stipulates that the scope of the commitments resulting from the WTO negotiations must be commensurate with the implementation capacity of developing and least developed countries. It further states that the capacity for implementation of the new commitments will, particularly in the case of developing and least developed countries, be determined in accordance with their trade facilitation needs and priorities. Finally, technical assistance and capacity-building should help developing and least developed countries to implement the commitments resulting from the negotiations. Several of the proposals tabled at the

NGTF suggest that these elements of Annex D should be dealt with in parallel with the process of clarification and improvement of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994, as they can make a significant contribution to the progress of the negotiations.

The inclusion of trade facilitation in the WTO negotiations has pushed the issue further to the forefront of the development agenda of most developing countries. This has resulted in growing awareness and capacity-building activities in this area. Several countries have created new trade and transport facilitation committees; numerous national, regional and international workshops are being held; and new research on trade and transport facilitation is being published. Many of these activities have been made possible as a consequence of increased funding from donors and international financial institutions to support trade and transport facilitation. UNCTAD in particular has initiated a trust fund to help Geneva- and capital-based negotiators from developing and least developed countries to better understand the possible scope and implications of the negotiated trade facilitation measures. The trust fund aims at assisting developing-country WTO Members in analysing the issues at stake, defining their position regarding the treatment of trade facilitation within the context of WTO negotiations on trade facilitation, and formulating modalities for effective implementation of the negotiated commitments. The activities of the major international players in the area of trade and transport facilitation are coordinated through established mechanisms, including the Global Facilitation Partnership<sup>4</sup> and UN inter-agency arrangements.

## **B. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE ISPS CODE**

Internationally, one of the most important recent developments in the field of maritime security was the entry into force, on 1 July 2004, of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).<sup>5</sup> In

<sup>4</sup> See [www.gfptt.org](http://www.gfptt.org).

<sup>5</sup> For the complete text of the ISPS Code, see SOLAS/CONF.5/34, Annex 1. See also *The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code*, 2003 Edition, ISBN 92-801-5149-5. For further information, see the IMO website ([www.imo.org](http://www.imo.org)). Please note that all ISPS-related circulars issued by the IMO are available on the website under “legal”, “maritime security”.

December 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) had adopted the ISPS Code as part of an additional chapter<sup>6</sup> to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS). The Code, together with a number of other amendments to SOLAS,<sup>7</sup> provides a new comprehensive security regime for international shipping.<sup>8</sup> It applies to all cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage or above, passenger vessels, mobile offshore drilling units and port facilities serving such ships engaged in international voyages.<sup>9</sup> Part (A) of the Code establishes a list of mandatory requirements, and Part (B) provides recommendations on how to fulfill each of the requirements set out in Part (A).

The new security regime imposes a wide range of responsibilities on governments, port facilities and ship-owning and -operating companies. These responsibilities were described in some detail and with appropriate references to the respective provisions of the Code in an earlier UNCTAD report.<sup>10</sup> However, for ease of reference, the main obligations are briefly summarized here.

#### *Responsibilities of Contracting Governments*

The principal responsibility of Contracting States under SOLAS chapter XI-2 and Part (A) of the Code is to determine and set security levels. Responsibilities also include, *inter alia*:

- approval of *Ship Security Plans*
- issuance of *International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)* after *verification*
- carrying out and approval of *Port Facility Security Assessments*
- approval of *Port Facility Security Plans*
- *determination of port facilities* which need to designate a *Port Facility Security Officer*
- exercise of *control and compliance measures*.

Governments may delegate certain responsibilities to Recognized Security Organizations (RSO) outside Government.

#### *Responsibilities of vessel-owning and/or -operating companies*

Vessel-owning and/or -operating companies have a number of responsibilities, chief among which is to ensure that each vessel a company operates obtains an *International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC)* from the administration of a flag state or an appropriate RSO, such as a classification society. In order to obtain an ISSC, the following measures must be taken:

- designation of a *Company Security Officer (CSO)*
- carrying out *Ship Security Assessments (SSA)* and development of *Ship Security Plans (SSP)*
- designation of a *Ship Security Officer (SSO)*
- training, drills and exercises

A number of special mandatory requirements in SOLAS chapters V, X-1 and X-2 apply to ships and create additional responsibilities for vessel-owning companies and for Governments. These include in particular the following:

- *Automatic Identification System (AIS)*
- *Ship Identification Number (SIN)*
- *Ship Security Alert System (SSAS)*
- *Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR)*

#### *Responsibilities of port facilities*

Depending on size, there may be, within the legal and administrative limits of any individual port, several or even a considerable number of port facilities for the purposes of the ISPS Code.

- *Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP)*: based on the *Port Facility Security Assessment* carried out and, upon completion, approved by the relevant national Government, a *Port Facility Security Plan* needs to be developed.
- *Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO)*: For each port facility, a Security Officer must be designated.
- Training drills and exercises

Both Governments and industry faced the challenging task of implementing the various new security

<sup>6</sup> Chapter XI-2 on “Special measures to enhance maritime security”.

<sup>7</sup> Chapters V and XI of the annex to SOLAS were amended, the latter chapter being renumbered as chapter XI-1.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. ISPS Code (A), Art. 1.2.

<sup>9</sup> See SOLAS, chapter XI-2/2 and ISPS Code (A), Art. 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Container Security: Major Initiatives and Related International Developments*, UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/1, paras. 80–86 (www.unctad.org).



requirements within a short timeframe, by 1 July 2004. Full and complete compliance by that date was crucial, as the repercussions of non-compliance could be severe.<sup>11</sup> Efforts to ensure compliance intensified in the weeks and days prior to the deadline date, and continued in the period immediately afterwards. Despite the initially slow progress in implementation of the ISPS Code, figures provided by IMO member Governments indicate that by 1 July 2004, more than 86 per cent of ships and 69 per cent of declared port facilities had security plans approved.<sup>12</sup> By August 2004, the IMO reported that 89.5 per cent of over 9,000 declared port facilities had had their Port Facility Security Plans approved and “well beyond 90 per cent” of all ships had been issued International Ship Security Certificates, which indicated that almost complete compliance with the new IMO security measures was being achieved. However, according to the IMO, the picture was uneven, with “regional pockets in which progress had not been as rapid as might be hoped”. Africa and the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were described as being slow in implementing the new ISPS security rules.<sup>13</sup>

According to the IMO, national authorities as well as any relevant industries displayed a pragmatic and reasonable attitude towards parties responsible for the implementation of the new security measures in the weeks following the 1 July deadline. No major disruptions to global trade were reported as a result of non-compliance, and, in particular, a responsible attitude was displayed in cases where administrative bottlenecks were to be blamed for any identifiable shortcomings. Nevertheless, there were some reports of ships being detained, cautioned or turned away.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> For further details on control and compliance measures, see UNCTAD report *Container Security: Major Initiatives and Related International Developments*, UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/1, para. 85 (www.unctad.org).

<sup>12</sup> See Press Briefing of 1 July 2004, *Secretary-General Mitropoulos pays tribute to the efforts made to implement the ISPS Code* (www.imo.org).

<sup>13</sup> See Press Briefing of 6 August 2004, *Security compliance shows continuous improving* (www.imo.org). Regarding ISPS Code compliance by IAPH Member Ports, see the IAPH website (www.iaphworldports.org).

<sup>14</sup> See *Measures to Enhance Maritime Security; Progress Report on the Implementation of the Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security Detailed in SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code*, MSC 79/5/1, 24 September 2004, paras. 6, 7 (www.imo.org).

Overall, it appears that the challenge of ensuring compliance with a wide range of requirements and within a tight timeframe has been remarkably well met by Governments and industry alike. However, it needs to be emphasized that the challenge remains, both for Governments and industry, of maintaining substantive compliance with the new international security regime. The ISPS Code is far-reaching, and the scope of the relevant security requirements is wide. In addition to ensuring compliance with the relevant formal requirements of the Code,<sup>15</sup> both Governments and industry are under a continuous obligation to conduct risk assessments and to ensure that effective and appropriate responses to the identified level of risk are taken.

A number of guidance circulars relating to the implementation of the ISPS Code have been issued by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO. These include in particular the following:

- MSC Circular 1111<sup>16</sup> deals in some detail with the security measures and procedures to be applied at the ship/port interface when either the ship or the port facility do not comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and of the ISPS Code.<sup>17</sup> An Annex provides detailed “*Interim Guidance on Control and Compliance measures to Enhance Maritime Security*”.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Note, for instance, a survey on ISPS Code implementation carried out by the European Seaports Organisation (ESPO), which draws attention to the fact that some ships appear to be presenting tonnage certificates of below 500 GT, issued under pre-1969 Tonnage Measurement Rules, and are thus exempt from the ISPS Code requirements. See *ESPO Survey of implementation of ISPS Code/EU Regulation in EU Ports*, of 8 March 2005 (www.espo.be).

<sup>16</sup> See *Guidance relating to the Implementation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code* MSC/Circ. 1111, of 7 June 2004. The guidelines also provide recommendations for ships calling at the port of a State that is not a Contracting Government and remind all parties that the requirement for ships to keep records of their last 10 calls at port facilities applies only to calls made on or after 1 July 2004.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. Annex 1. The Guidance also addresses the position of ship construction, conversion and repair yards and deals with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, when a ship interfaces with a floating production, storage and offloading unit (FPSO) or a floating storage unit (FSU).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Annex 2.

- MSC Circular 1130<sup>19</sup> contains guidance on security-related information, which must be supplied or may be requested prior to entry of a ship into port.
- MSC Circular 1132<sup>20</sup> provides guidance on a variety of matters, in particular the setting of and response to security levels, the practice of requiring and responding to requests for a declaration of security and matters relevant to access and boarding procedures.
- MSC Circular 1131<sup>21</sup> provides *Interim guidance on Voluntary Self-Assessment by SOLAS Contracting Governments and by Port Facilities*. The guidance contains a questionnaire to allow Governments to assess the effectiveness with which obligations in respect of port facilities are and continue to be fulfilled.

In order to effectively implement the wide range of ISPS Code security requirements, Governments and industry incur significant costs. Attempts have been made to assess the approximate costs involved, both globally and at the national level, but no comprehensive assessment has been published since the ISPS Code entered into force. How costs should be distributed, between Governments and industry and among different parties within the affected industries, remains a matter of debate.

As concerns cost sharing between parties within the affected industries, so far there is a clear trend, particularly among port authorities and terminal operators but also among ship-owning or -operating companies, to pass on

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. Annex 1. The Guidance also addresses the position of ship construction, conversion and repair yards and deals with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, when a ship interfaces with a floating production, storage and offloading unit (FPSO) or a floating storage unit (FSU).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Annex 2.

<sup>19</sup> MSC/Circ.1130, of 14 December 2004, *Guidance to Masters, Companies and Duly Authorized Officers on the Requirements Relating to the Submission of Security-Related Information Prior to the Entry of a Ship into Port* (www.imo.org).

<sup>20</sup> MSC/Circ.1132, of 14 December 2004, *Guidance relating to the Implementation of Solas Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code*, (www.imo.org).

<sup>21</sup> See *Interim guidance on voluntary self-assessment by SOLAS Contracting Governments and by port facilities*, MSC/Circ.1131, of 14 December 2004.

the extra costs associated with the new security regime to their customers through the imposition of security fees and charges. While increasingly common, the practice is not yet uniform, and there seem to be considerable variations in the level of charges. While generally accepting the need to recover security costs, shippers are faced with charging practices of both ports and shipping lines that lack transparency and add to transaction costs, particularly for developing-country traders.

For instance,<sup>22</sup> terminal security fees quoted for continental European ports range from around €2 per container (import and export container, excluding transshipment) for Oslo to around €5 for several Spanish ports, €8 for most Italian ports, €8.50 for Rotterdam and €9 for Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Le Havre, Antwerp and Zeebrugge. Charges quoted for UK ports range, for export containers, from £4.75 in Thamesport to £7.50 in Felixstowe and, for import containers, from £5.50 in Southampton to £10.50 in Felixstowe. Similar variations may be observed in other parts of the world.<sup>23</sup>

Security charges introduced by some container lines also vary, albeit to a lesser extent. For instance, the Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) announced in August 2004<sup>24</sup> that its members would charge €5 for containers “moved to or from ports in the North Continent of Europe, Scandinavia, the Baltic and the Mediterranean”, £1.50 for movements to and from the UK ports of Tilbury, Felixstowe, Southampton and Thamesport (where lines recover the security charge from shippers/consignees), and £3.50 for movements to and from other UK ports. Hapag-Lloyd Container Line charges a “carrier security fee” of \$6 per container,<sup>25</sup> and P&O Nedlloyd announced in December 2004 that it would charge a \$6 carrier security charge on all containers handled by the line from 1 January 2005.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>22</sup> The information in the text is taken from a table compiled by Hapag-Lloyd Container Line providing details of ‘Terminal Security Fees’ applicable in various European, Australian, US, South American and New Zealand ports (www.hlcl.com). An informative and useful summary of port security fees and charges assessed by North American port authorities and terminal operators has been published by the American Association of Port Authorities (www.aapa-ports.org).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> See announcement of 13.8.2004 (www.fefclondon.com)

<sup>25</sup> See www.hlcl.com.

<sup>26</sup> See www.ponl.com.

Table 44

**World container fleet***(in thousand TEUs)*

End of the year	World fleet	Lessors fleet	Sea carrier fleet
2001	15 455	6 895	8 560
2002	16 405	7 465	8 940
2003	17 925	8 240	9 685
2004	19 310	8 830	10 480

Source: *Containerisation International*, various issues.

### C. PRODUCTION AND LEASING OF CONTAINERS

Over the past three years, the container fleet expanded at an average rate of 7.7 per cent (see table 44), from 15.45 million TEUs at the end of 2001 to 19.31 million TEUs at the end of 2004. The rate of expansion was particularly high during 2003, when it reached an impressive 9.27 per cent, and slowed down during 2004 to 7.73 per cent. Fleet ownership is broadly equally split between container lessors and sea carriers. At the end of 2004, the container fleet owned by lessors was slightly above 8.8 million TEUs, which represented about 45 per cent of the world fleet.

During 2002 and 2003, lessors increased the size of their container fleets at a rate faster than that of sea carriers. During 2004, however, lessors were more cautious buyers of new boxes than sea carriers, increasing their fleets by 7.2 per cent to 8.83 million TEUs, while sea carriers expanded theirs by 8.2 per cent to 10.5 million TEUs.

Box prices partly explain the paucity of procurement of new boxes by lessors. The price of dry freight containers increased by over 50 per cent during 2004 owing to increases in the prices of steel and timber (see figure 9). In the previous year, container production had increased by 40 per cent, depleting manufacturers' stocks, and procurement of materials was made at higher prices. The price of Corten-steel, a basic material for box manufacturing, rose from \$410 per ton at the end of 2003 to more than \$550 per ton in mid-2004. Timber plywood for box flooring increased from \$450 at the end of 2003 to over \$600 per cubic metre by September 2004. During the same period, the prices of other items, such as corner

castings and locks, rose by double-digit figures. As a result, the price of a new general-purpose 20-foot dry freight container increased in one year from \$1,350 to over \$2,000 by mid-2004 and to \$2,200 by early 2005. This price increase is the highest since 1995. During the same period, the price of a 40-foot high cube box increased from \$2,200 to \$3,300. A 40-foot high cube reefer container fetched \$19,000 by the end of 2004. The delivery of new container ships made sea carriers continue their box procurement, even at higher prices.

Container production increased by 20.8 per cent in 2004 (see table 45) and was concentrated in China. Of the 2.9 million TEUs manufactured in 2004, over 95 per cent of the dry freight boxes and almost 90 per cent of the reefer containers were produced in China. A slow concentration process is occurring among these manufacturers, whose numbers have fallen from over 30 a decade ago to about a half-dozen today. Two major producers are CIMC and Singama, which respectively account for about 50 per cent and 20 per cent of world production. Part of the latter's production is made in Indonesia.

Lease rates for containers were also up during 2004. At the end of 2004, rates for 20-foot general-purpose boxes were \$0.86 per day, similar to the level reached in 1998 but \$0.20 per day more than the levels of the previous two years. In early 2005 the lease rates for this type of box reached \$0.92 per day.

Security concerns have led to testing of "smart" containers, which use embedded sensors to record any tampering with them or their contents. Eighteen Tamper Evident Secure Containers (TESC) were tested during the last quarter of 2004 between Hong Kong (China) and

Figure 9  
**Evolution of prices for new containers**  
*(in US dollars)*




Table 45  
**Container production**  
*(in thousand TEUs)*

Container types	Production 2003	Production 2004
Dry freight	2 170	2 630
Integral reefer	132	150
Tank containers	12	20
Regional types	85	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 400</b>	<b>2 900</b>

Long Beach, with satisfactory results. These containers have a device integrated into the doorframe and use public wireless communication readers to transmit encrypted data to authorized parties. Another system, the RAEWatch, being tested by Matson on the domestic Oakland-Honolulu route, provides similar service.

#### **D. INLAND TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENTS**

The increase of trade volumes during 2004 highlighted the challenges faced by rail transport companies in North America and Western Europe. Six companies

in North America reported combined net income of \$3.4 billion for 2004, with individual results all positive and fluctuating between \$0.1 billion and \$1.2 billion. These results reflected increases in traffic volume of about 10.4 per cent and revenue increases resulting from rate increases. The latter was facilitated by increased rates charged by trucking companies facing increased demand, high fuel costs and a lack of qualified drivers. The investment capacity of railroads, however, was still limited by modest returns on infrastructure, costing about \$2.5 million per mile and the companies therefore focused on operational measures such as increased train speed and improved frequency. In Western Europe,



rail competitiveness got a boost when the European Commission nominated a senior official to monitor the interoperability of European networks, including with those of neighbouring countries, and five rail carriers set up a rail freight alliance to supply one-window pan-European services to customers. Operators of Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic launched the European Bulls Alliance in Rotterdam in early 2005.

Important rail developments were started in China. Double-stack container train services between Shanghai and Beijing were launched in April 2004. These services use Chinese-standard equipment to carry 40-foot boxes with a transit time of 38 hours. Service started with three trains per week running in each direction and market share being modest. Also by mid-2004, construction started on the first container distribution centre in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province (in south-west China). The centre will cost around \$60 million and will be operational in two years to handle 300,000 TEUs of containers. Large-scale modernization seems to be underway, with three suppliers of rail equipment from Canada, France and Japan having contracts worth \$885 million to modernize more than 2,000 kilometres of railways. Plans include the construction of a network of 18 container distribution centres by the end of this decade. These centres will link major coastal and inland cities with double-stack rail container services.

Other rail developments focused on Mozambique and Saudi Arabia. The rehabilitation of the Nacala Corridor linking the port of Nacala (Mozambique) with landlocked Malawi was completed at a cost of \$30 million, and upgrading of one 77-kilometre section

started during the year. Also in 2004, the Saudi Railways Organization announced the opening of a rail bridge on the Arabian peninsula that will link the port of Yambu, on the Red Sea, with Daman, on the Persian Gulf.

Pricing of rail services caused concern in the Russian Federation and in India. The proposed 12.5 per cent increase in tariffs for domestic and port-connected routes proposed by Russian Rail was said to hamper the competitiveness of Russian ports, since rail tariffs for export and import traffic across land borders were not affected by the proposal. Sea carriers and shippers were opposing the “telescopic intermodal rates” proposed by the Indian rail operator Concor (Container Corporation of India), whereby rates decrease with distance. They argued that complicated calculations using “distance slabs” were causing uncertainty for users.

## E. STATUS OF CONVENTIONS

There are a number of international conventions affecting the commercial and technical activities of maritime transport. Box 3 gives the status of international maritime conventions adopted under the auspices of UNCTAD as of 21 July 2005. Comprehensive and updated information about these and other relevant conventions is available on the United Nations website at [www.un.org/law](http://www.un.org/law). This site also provides links to, *inter alia*, the following organizations’ sites, which contain information on the conventions adopted under the auspices of each organization: the International Maritime Organization ([www.imo.org/home.html](http://www.imo.org/home.html)), the International Labour Organization ([www.ilo.org](http://www.ilo.org)) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ([www.uncitral.org](http://www.uncitral.org)).

<b>Box 3</b>		
<b>Contracting States parties to selected conventions on maritime transport as of 21 July 2005</b>		
<b>Title of convention</b>	<b>Date of entry into force or conditions for entry into force</b>	<b>Contracting States</b>
<b>United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974</b>	Entered into force 6 October 1983	Algeria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Congo (Republic of the), Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia (78)
<b>United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (Hamburg Rules)</b>	Entered into force 1 November 1992	Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Georgia, Guinea, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Paraguay, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia (30)
<b>International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1993</b>	Entered into force 5 September 2004	Ecuador, Estonia, Monaco, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Spain, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Ukraine, Vanuatu (11)
<b>United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 1980</b>	Not yet in force — requires 30 contracting parties	Burundi, Chile, Georgia, Lebanon, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia (10)
<b>United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1986</b>	Not yet in force — requires 40 contracting parties with at least 25 per cent of the world's tonnage as per annex III to the Convention	Albania, Bulgaria, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Oman, Syrian Arab Republic (13)
<b>International Convention on Arrest of Ships, 1999</b>	Not yet in force — requires 10 contracting parties	Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic (7)

Source: For official status information, see [www.un.org/law/](http://www.un.org/law/).

