



Impact of Cartels on the Poor Competition Law, Poverty Reduction and India

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Introduction

- Economists have long extolled the virtues of competition
- Many imperfections of the competitive process
- Competition law an instrument for designing corrections to an otherwise beneficial competitive environment
- Reconciliation between development economics and competition economics
- \checkmark moved away from the trite debate of state vs. markets
- \checkmark micro-foundations of growth
- \checkmark focus on institutions
- \checkmark emphasis on empirical evidence

Introduction

- Commission on Growth and Development (2008)
- \checkmark importance of markets for development process
- ✓ market fundamentalism vs. institutional fundamentalism
- For benefits of liberalization
- \checkmark an appropriate regulatory framework
- ✓ private barriers may simply substitute governmental barriers to trade
- \checkmark prevent improvements in social welfare
- Socio-economic ideology (competition culture) determines to a large extent the success or failure of a competition law
- ✓ so much can be gained if modicum of competitive neutrality in public policy (agriculture, sale of natural resources)


Competition Law and poverty reduction

- Standard microeconomic perspective, the effect of competition on poor consumers is straightforward (Competition → Growth → Poverty Reduction)
- Where can competition have direct effect on the poor?
- ✓ agriculture markets (poor as consumers of essential goods and services)
- ✓ petroleum products (inflationary impact)
- \checkmark poor as small business owners and workers
- Indirect effects
- Releasing of resources for development (Opportunity cost of anticompetitive practices in procurement)
- ✓ Ending collusion and making e contractors compete
- ✓ lower costs, putting the savings back into the government's budget

Evidence from India


India: Following Product Market Reforms, Growth has Accelerated

Growth in GDP and Per-capita GDP at Factor Cost




Poverty has Fallen but Slowly

Declining poverty ratio for all social groups




Major Anomaly: Stagnant Share of Manufacturing in the GDP



Slow Transition of Workforce out of Agriculture

Slow transition of rural agricultural workforce




Public procurement \rightarrow Cartels \rightarrow Fiscal Deficit \rightarrow Inflation \rightarrow Poor

- PP accounts for 30% of GDP in India.
- Major departments like Defence, Railway, Power and Telecom, Aviation spend about 50% of their budget on procurement
- Higher than the expenditure of most of the State Governments
- Around 26% of the Union Budget allocated for health is devoted to procurement
- Fiscal Costs due to anti-competitive conduct
- Fiscal costs of PPP projects (as public is a partner and one has to limit the possibility of expropriation by the private entity- Role of competition law, off-budget, pre-empt future budgetary resources)

Fiscal Deficit over the years

	2010-11 Actuals	2011-12 BE	2011-12 RE	2012-13 BE
Fiscal Deficit	373591	412817	521980	513590
	(4.9)	(4.6)	(5.9)	(5.1)



Role of CCI

- Enforcement measures Penalise Bid-rigging
- ✓ Section 3(3) of the Act
- Advocacy measures
- ✓ enable Ministries/Departments to identify manipulative bidding
- \checkmark for better tender designs and tender specifications
- Under the ambit of section 2(h), government ministries and departments engaged in commercial activities in any manner are covered (exception sovereign functions of Govt. Ministries/Departments, Defence, Space, Atomic Energy, Currency).

Cartel Cases

- Suo-moto Case No. 03 of 2011 (LPG Gas Cylinder Manufactures)
- ✓ Violation of Sec 3(3) of the Act for bid rigging against 48 bidders for colluding and quoting identical prices for supplying of LPG Cylinders to IOCL; penalty of USD 27.7 million @ 7% on the average turnover of these companies
- Case No. 43 of 2010 (A Foundation of Common Cause & People Awareness, ND vs PES Installations Pvt. Ltd. (PES) & Ors
- ✓ MDD, MPS and PED acted in concert bid for supplying of products to the Sports Injury Centre of Safdarjung Hospital which caused a major loss to the government exchequer and hence was a violation of Sec 3(3)(d) of the Act. and decided to impose a penalty on all the 3 firms @ 5% of the average turnover for 3 years

Cartel Cases

- Case no. MRTP Case No. C-127/2009/DGIR4/28 (Varca Druggist & Chemist and others vs Chemists and Druggists Association, Goa) and several other
- ✓ limited number of stockists
- ✓ control the supply of drugs in the markets in violation u/s 3(3)(b)
- ✓ Not permitted to make direct supplies to doctors, nursing homes, chemists etc.
- ✓ Pharma companies and wholesalers are restricted from supply of drugs to retailers who are not the members of association
- \checkmark Fixation of trade margins to wholesalers and retailers
- \checkmark not permitting discounts to retail consumers
- ✓ Capping of cash discount available to retailer

Cartel Cases

- Case No. 29 of 2010 (Builders Association of India vs Cement Manufacturers Association and 10 cement manufacturers)
- \checkmark all cement manufacturer firms not utilising their full capacity
- ✓ prices of all companies moved in the same manner and prices rose faster than the input cost in five different zones
- \checkmark price fixing
- ✓ guilty for violation of Sec 3(3)(a) and sec 3(3)(b) of the Act
- \checkmark imposed a penalty of USD 1.1 billion

Agriculture Markets

- Suo-motu case no.01/2011 regarding the price rise of onion
- Application of competition law in agricultural markets
- \checkmark credit inter-linkages between farmers and traders
- \checkmark change the competitive price discovery at the mandi-level
- Social networks (and possible collusion)
- \checkmark between traders and truckers
- \checkmark impact the onward transmission of prices and price formation
- \checkmark broader analysis of the supply chain
- ✓ possible nexus between traders and truckers in order to explain possible instances of hoarding

Conclusions

- As UNCTAD recognizes...
- $\checkmark\,$ competition policies are essential for development
- \checkmark competition law is only one of the areas of these policies
- \checkmark broad spectrum of measures and instruments
- \checkmark to permeate all policies
- ✓ continuous conversation between competition scholars and development economists
- ✓ in as much as possible antitrust (competition) law and economics from the macro-economic level should converge
- An institutional infrastructure to meet this new development paradigm

Conclusions

- Limits to Competition \rightarrow Growth \rightarrow Poverty Reduction
- ✓ competition policies in the presence of factor market imperfections (land, labor, credit) need not improve welfare (Bardhan)
- \checkmark directly effect the livelihoods
- Competition and growth can deliver
- Reforms in the governance structure
- ✓ delivery of basic social and infrastructural services for the poor in large parts of the country (in education, health, drinking water, irrigation, etc.)
- Social contract which has a package of pro- market reform and pro poor measures