
Capital Account Regulations and Trade and Investment Treaties

Existing Trans-Pacific Partnership Country Agreements and Options for Reform

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32 Existing Agreements Between TPP Countries

(solid line = BIT, dashed line = FTA)



Spectrum of Approaches to Capital Account Regulations



1. Capital controls are prohibited, with <u>no</u> <u>exceptions for crises</u>. Extremely <u>broad</u> <u>coverage</u>, including derivatives and other portfolio investments.

Agreements between TPP countries: 0

Other: 2012 U.S. Model BIT, CAFTA-DR

2. Capital controls are prohibited, but there are <u>special dispute procedures</u> related to certain types of controls. These include an extended "cooling off period" and some limits on compensation.

Agreements between TPP countries: 3 (U.S. FTAs with Singapore, Chile, Peru)

3. Capital controls are prohibited, but there is a <u>safeguard</u> for times of crisis.

Agreements between TPP countries: 18

- Standard in agreements among Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam.
- No safeguards in U.S. FTAs and BITs since the 1994 NAFTA.

4. Capital controls are prohibited, but there is <u>no investor-state</u> dispute settlement.

Agreements between TPP countries: 3 (Australia FTAs with New Zealand,* Malaysia,* and the United States.

*also include a safeguard

5. Capital account liberalization is encouraged, but the agreement <u>defers to national laws</u> and regulations.

Agreements between TPP countries: 12

(Malaysia BITs with Chile, Peru, and Vietnam; Singapore BITs with Peru and Vietnam; Chile BITs with New Zealand, Peru, and Vietnam; Australia-Chile FTA; Australia-Vietnam BIT; Canada-Chile and Japan-Chile BITs.)

Other: Brunei-China BIT

6. No rules on capital controls.

Agreements between TPP countries: 0

Other: China-Germany BIT, US-Israel FTA

Hot Money a Hot Issue in TPP



Leaked Investment Chapter Draft Shows Resistance to U.S. Model

Relevant Provisions in the Draft:

1.A balance of payments safeguard

2.An <u>exemption for Chile</u>'s capital account regulations

3.Allows governments to require <u>domestic review</u> before claims go to international tribunals

4.An exemption for Australia from <u>investor-state</u> <u>dispute settlement</u>

-- ALL ARE IN BRACKETS, MEANING NO CONSENSUS --

Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner:

We will "seek to preserve" the U.S. framework. **Geithner argument #1:** U.S. model offers "adequate flexibility" through prudential measures exception.

- Like GATS, this exception includes language many legal experts say is "self-canceling."
- Beyond GATS, this defines "prudential" as pertaining to the safety of <u>individual</u> financial institutions (and allows investor-state claims).
- Geithner also said "<u>non-discriminatory</u> tax measures affecting capital <u>inflows</u>" are permitted. But many such controls are on basis of residency.

Geithner argument #2: Governments have sufficient alternative tools

- 1. Fiscal policy measures
- 2. Monetary policy measures
- 3. Exchange rate adjustment
- 4. Non-discriminatory prudential measures, such as bank reserve or capital requirements
- 5. Limitations on exposure to exchange rate risk

The IMF and others have concluded that in some circumstances these remedies alone are ineffective and capital controls are a necessary option.

Reform options:

- 1. <u>Exclude capital controls</u>, given ongoing international debate.
- 2. Remove investor-state dispute settlement.
- Expand <u>prudential measures exception</u> to cover "macroprudential" measures and remove "selfcanceling" language.
- Strong balance of payments <u>safeguard</u> (no "necessity test" and allow for the need for longerterm measures that may have discriminatory impacts).

For a detailed paper based on this presentation, see: http://bit.ly/1hfl9L6