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EVALUATION OF CAPACITY BUILDING IN UNCTAD'S TECHNICAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

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Executive summary

This evaluation is a thematic one, dealing exclusively with the capacity building component of UNCTAD’s technical cooperation programmes. No programme is specifically evaluated. Capacity building is understood in this report as “the ability of a technical assistance programme to enable beneficiary countries to perform and sustain targeted functions on their own as a direct result of that programme.” Capacity building performance is assessed along five dimensions: relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; sustainability; and impact. Relevance in capacity building at UNCTAD is well recognized but is also quite vulnerable to capacity gaps that may not have been appropriately considered while implementing programmes. Programme effectiveness varies considerably from one programme to another. Placing the emphasis on activities rather than on outcomes is no substitute for effectiveness. Efficiency does not receive the attention it merits, and the report points to several measures, including costing of activities and greater use of regional expertise and facilities, which could result in better performance in this respect. Sustainability, which is central to capacity building, could be improved through greater attention to the long-term perspective as well as to institution building. Impact has not been adequately assessed in evaluations. As with regard to effectiveness, there is a need at UNCTAD to develop and systematically apply better methodologies for the assessment of impact. Sustained impact should be the overarching goal for all of UNCTAD’s capacity building programmes. UNCTAD’s best capacity building programmes are those that combine substantive and geographic focus, competence at headquarters, an integrated approach, national ownership, institutional building, and a long-term perspective with clear goals. Better coordination among donors and improved management within UNCTAD in both the promotion of its programmes to donors and in coordinating its programmes would result in greater effectiveness and impact. All things considered, the evaluators believe that UNCTAD’s record in capacity building should be viewed positively.
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INTRODUCTION

1. Capacity building is the ultimate objective of development assistance. Programmes aim at transferring required skills and knowledge to developing countries and emerging economies so that they may eventually pursue their social and economic progress unassisted. For that reason, capacity building has always been an implicit concern at UNCTAD, as well as in most other multilateral and bilateral assistance programmes. Capacity building has received greater attention over the last few years, as attested by various resolutions at the General Assembly, at ECOSOC and at UNCTAD X. The UNCTAD X Programme of Action declared that technical cooperation should focus on capacity building to assist developing countries’ integration into the global economy and that UNCTAD’s existing capacity building programmes should be strengthened.¹

A. Scope of the evaluation

2. This evaluation is a thematic one, dealing exclusively with the capacity building component of UNCTAD’s technical cooperation programmes. No specific programme was evaluated. The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the performance of these programmes only so far as capacity building is concerned, to link such performance to underlying explanatory factors, and to make recommendations with a view to improving UNCTAD’s delivery in capacity building in the future. Most technical assistance programmes at UNCTAD may be claimed to be capacity building programmes. Some of them, however, demonstrate a greater capacity building content than others. Out of some 50 programmes listed in the Review of Technical Cooperation Activities of UNCTAD,² about a third of them explicitly claim to perform at least some capacity building activities. The first task of the evaluation team was therefore to look at the content of all technical assistance programmes and to select those that had a clear and substantial capacity building component. As a result of this process, 12 programmes were retained for further analysis, and they are listed in annex I.

B. Delineating the capacity building concept

3. This screening process involved progressively clarifying the concept of capacity building and making it operational for the purpose of the evaluation. The starting point was the description of capacity building proposed in the terms of reference, whereby capacity building refers to activities that encompass “the building of organizational and technical abilities, behaviours, relationships, and values that enable individuals, groups and organizations to enhance their performance effectively to achieve their development objectives over time”. Since this definition is so comprehensive that virtually all technical

¹ Bangkok Plan of Action (TD/386), paras. 164 and 166.
assistance activities would qualify as capacity building, it was necessary to narrow down the concept of capacity building with a view to making it more amenable to this evaluation.

4. It is sometimes claimed that capacity building is a new technical assistance approach radically distinct from the “traditional” trade assistance approach. In fact, technical assistance institutions, whether bilateral or multilateral, have traditionally engaged simultaneously in a mixture of capacity building and non-capacity-building activities. Bilateral programmes were the first to favour the approach, perhaps due to more limited resources, greater public scrutiny on the impact of foreign assistance expenditures and greater autonomy at the decision-making level. For instance, the capacity building concept was already being applied at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) as early as the 1970s. A number of respondents noted that the term was already in use at UNDP in the early 1990s.

5. Although the capacity building concept is now widely used within UNCTAD, it also lends itself to a wide variety of interpretations. For instance, an analysis of UNCTAD’s documents on technical assistance leaves the reader somewhat puzzled by the use of the capacity building terminology. Some programmes claim to be capacity building but are only marginally so, since they are exclusively concerned with the transfer of information. On the contrary, some other programmes are clearly capacity building since they are heavily involved in human resource development but are not yet depicted as such.

6. Interviews both in the field and at UNCTAD also revealed that a large proportion of the respondents had some difficulty explaining what they meant by capacity building. There is probably a bandwagon effect at work, as capacity building has been superimposed on existing programmes. Capacity building is topical, and programmes are more and more likely to be presented as capacity building programmes even when neither their philosophy nor their activity portfolio has evolved over many years.

7. Given the fact that the concept lends itself to various connotations, the evaluation team proceeded by isolating its key dimensions, first on the basis of the documentation that was provided to the team (evaluation reports, project documents and other secondary sources) and then on the basis of interviews conducted in Geneva and in the field. It progressively emerged that the key dimensions of capacity building focused on two central issues: national competences and sustainability. As a result of these investigations, capacity building is understood in this report as:

“The faculty of a technical assistance programme to enable beneficiary countries to perform and sustain targeted functions on their own as a direct result of that programme”

8. Three other non-necessary dimensions related to capacity building also emerged: individual versus institutional capacity; long-term versus short-term orientation; and the

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nature of the technical assistance activities being undertaken. Capacity building activities may be primarily directed either at individuals or at institutions (and sometimes simultaneously at both). Respondents tend to believe that institutional capacity building has a greater capacity building potential than individual capacity building. They also feel that capacity building is more closely associated with long-term rather than short-term projects. Capacity building activities fall into several broad subsets in increasing order of capacity building potential:

(a) Activities devoted primarily to supplying information to individuals or institutions in developing countries (for instance the Trains programme);

(b) Activities related to the provision of advice (as with some components of ASYCUDA);

(c) Training activities (including the training of trainers as in the TrainForTrade and the Commercial Diplomacy programmes);

(d) Networking activities aimed at forging closer relationships between various groups (such as academia, the business community and the public sector, as in JITAP or internationally as in EMPRETEC).

9. Institutional and long-term perspectives are not, however, perceived as necessary conditions for capacity building. For instance, part of the Commercial Diplomacy Programme is both short-term and directed at individuals. It aims inter alia at “enabling trade negotiators and the business community to better participate in trade negotiations, and to increase their negotiating capacity”. It also aims at increasing the national “proposal capacity”.\(^4\) In addition, the fact that it is advice-oriented as well as training-oriented does not limit its capacity building potential. It merely reflects the fact that it is targeted at a limited number of individuals.

C. Assessing the capacity building performance of technical assistance programmes

10. Based on the logical framework approach, capacity building performance may be assessed along five dimensions: relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; sustainability and impact.

11. Relevance refers to the appropriateness of a capacity building activity not only in terms of its national priority but also in relation to capacity gaps. In this report, capacity gaps mean shortcomings that are identified at the needs and assessment stage of an activity and that may limit its relevance if they are not taken care of as the activity is implemented. Most if not all technical assistance programmes are expected to be useful to recipient countries and are therefore claimed to be relevant. However, their relevance is undermined if, for instance, national authorities are not fully supportive of them or are not able to provide the required support, whether material or administrative.

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\(^4\) “Review of technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD” (TD/B/485/Add.1), para. 92.
12. Effectiveness refers to the fact that the objectives defined prior to the implementation of a programme have indeed been achieved. In this regard a clear definition of capacity building objectives is required to assess the effectiveness of a programme properly. As mentioned earlier, the fact that programmes may have taken place as planned and may have been attended by the expected number of participants is no guarantee that such programmes have indeed rendered the institutions or the participants involved able to achieve the task they were supposed to be prepared for by these programmes.

13. Efficiency refers to the input/output ratio and more generally to the cost of a programme in relation to the results attained. Whenever possible efficiency is established through benchmarking with similar programmes. Efficiency may also be assessed by analysing the cost structure of a programme. For instance, a high travel costs/total cost ratio may be indicative of a poor return on investment for capacity building. Other ways to assess efficiency include the analysis of the fixed costs/total cost ratio or the full cost of services provided by a programme to clients. Many evaluation reports are rather short on the topic of efficiency since data are often lacking in this respect.

14. Sustainability refers to the survival potential of programmes once support has been terminated. Sustainability parameters may be defined more precisely depending on the nature of a programme, for instance in terms of financial, networking, managerial, substantive or operational sustainability, as in the case of the EMPRETEC programme. Sustainability may be better assessed a few years after the assistance has ended.

15. Impact refers to the effect of a programme on national social and economic development or in a specific domain such as trade expansion (as in TrainForTrade) or debt management savings (as in DMFAS).

I. ASSESSING PERFORMANCE IN CAPACITY BUILDING

A. Relevance

16. Relevance refers not only to the appropriateness of a capacity building activity in terms of its national priority but also to capacity gaps, as defined in paragraph 11, that limit the relevance of the activity. It is recognized in all evaluation reports that UNCTAD’s technical assistance programmes are relevant to the beneficiaries. If it is not done explicitly, it is at least implied. EMPRETEC, for instance, is considered highly relevant in the evaluation report, so are ASYCUDA and TRAINMAR. Occasionally, however, relevance is not an issue that is addressed. It is presumed but not demonstrated. Interviews in the field confirmed the view that all programmes investigated were considered relevant to the economies of the beneficiary countries.

17. The issue of capacity gaps has a direct bearing on relevance. As a rule, the launching of a programme is conditional on the positive outcome of a needs assessment and a feasibility

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analysis involving at least one mission to the target country prior to the implementation of a programme. It would therefore be expected that the emergence of capacity gaps as country programmes are implemented would be rather low. Since such gaps may render programmes ineffective, it is therefore vital to identify them early on so that they may be adequately dealt with before the programmes start. If they are considerable, programmes should not be launched or they should at least be postponed until the gaps have been resolved. Failure to resolve capacity gaps is likely to result in unattained objectives, impaired effectiveness and sub-optimal if not negative impact.

18. Major capacity gaps are nevertheless observed in close to 40 per cent of all the evaluation reports reviewed. For instance, in the TrainForTrade programme, needs were not properly assessed in three consecutive evaluations, which resulted in some cases in the selection of inappropriate and therefore ineffective partners. In the Trade Point evaluation report, it is noted that a number of States were not able to provide sufficient financial support to Trade Points and that as a result a number of them never became operational.

19. Field interviews, including meetings with UNCTAD staff, confirmed that capacity gaps were the rule rather than the exception. In most cases they could be traced to national authorities not being able to provide the resources they had committed themselves to providing, whether financial or administrative. Another capacity gap that was identified relates to the difficulty of setting up proper coordination processes when several departments are stakeholders in a programme. In one particular case, a capacity gap could be traced to UNCTAD itself as one of its units proved to be unwilling to provide the substantive support required by another unit. A number of country programme failures were linked during the interviews to insufficient support from national authorities.

20. It is comforting to observe that the relevance of UNCTAD’s technical assistance programmes that were investigated in the course of this evaluation was never questioned, whether in general or from the specific capacity building point of view or whether in the evaluation or in the field. ASYCUDA, DMFAS, TrainForTrade, EMPRETEC and Commercial Diplomacy, to name a few programmes, are recognized as innovative and contributing to the economic development of the countries where they were introduced.

21. Since relevance is conditional on the non-existence of capacity gaps, the evaluation team investigated why programmes are undertaken even when such gaps are not addressed before the launching of the programmes. It appears that programme managers are usually quite knowledgeable of the existence of capacity gaps, and do expect downstream difficulties as programmes are implemented. If programmes are implemented regardless of impending difficulties, it is usually because of the combination of three conditions:

(a) Donor pressure. Donors often target specific sectors and countries, and they may want to proceed even if the conclusions of the needs and feasibility
analyses are not positive. This condition is well known. The DAC Guidelines published by the OECD\(^6\) are quite clear on this issue.

(b) **Beneficiary country pressure.** Beneficiary countries may not want to be left out, and in order to win a programme may over-commit themselves.

(c) **Need for funding.** UNCTAD’s programmes are often short of funding, and some may not be able to refuse a project that might allow them to survive.

22. The combination of these conditions may result in a dysfunctional process whereby the conclusions of needs and assessment analyses may be put aside for short-term benefits by all three parties concerned: donors, beneficiaries and UNCTAD’s programme managers.

### B. Effectiveness

23. Effectiveness means that the objectives defined prior to the implementation of a programme have indeed been achieved. A precise definition of capacity building objectives is therefore required to properly assess the effectiveness of a programme. The extent to which UNCTAD’s technical assistance programmes have achieved their objectives may be rated as moderately good. According to the evaluation reports of UNCTAD’s programmes, 60 per cent of these programmes score well or very well. Estimates volunteered by some experts are of the same order, although there are no hard data on trade-related technical assistance programmes in general. According to these experts, roughly 60 per cent of all technical assistance programmes, whether they are capacity building or not, have achieved their objectives. Since capacity building programmes tend to be more demanding than other technical assistance programmes, it is likely that their rate of effectiveness would be somewhat lower.\(^7\) Field trips do not provide any evidence that would modify the overall conclusions reached on the basis of the evaluation reports. Country programmes seldom fail, or failure is seldom acknowledged. Most of the time their effectiveness is limited, and could have been better if some precautions had been taken. The major drivers of success or failure that were identified in the field are the following:

(a) **Capacity gaps.** The effectiveness of capacity building programmes is dependent on adequately dealing with the capacity gaps that were discussed in the previous section;

(b) **Support from UNCTAD.** Effectiveness is also linked to support and skills that may be tapped by programmes at headquarters. For instance, ASYCUDA suffered from poor management policies and procedures in Geneva. In the Trade Point programme, the support provided by the UNCTAD secretariat was

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\(^7\) According to K. L. van Hove and H-B Solignac Lecomte in “Aid for Trade Development: Lessons of Lomé V”, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 10, August 1999, p. 1, “… (A)fter several years experience, donors can report few success stories in their trade-related assistance”. Some of UNCTAD’s technical programmes also had difficulties in identifying success stories when interviewed by the evaluation team.
deemed insufficient. Insufficient internal support was also noted for EMPRETEC.

(c) **Integrated approach.** The ability to provide an integrated and flexible solution to a country’s needs is a factor that contributes highly to the effectiveness of a programme. For instance, the success of the DMFAS programme may be linked to the fact that DMFAS offers, when needed, an integrated set of solutions. Not only does it provide the software and software training, it also provides guidance for establishing appropriate organizational structures as well as staffing and organizational guidance. As needed, it may provide beneficiaries merely with a debt accounting system or with more sophisticated capacity building contributions. These may include advice and expertise for the designing of a debt policy and management strategy. In general, “upstream policy advice”, which is the new emphasis adopted by UNDP in technical assistance programmes, favours the integration of the policy-making authorities in the programme implementation process.

(d) **National ownership.** Field interviews have indicated that involvement by the local partners in the conception and implementation of programmes is a major success factor. The more national actors (government, the private sector and civil society) are involved in a programme, the more likely it is to succeed.

(e) **Institution building.** Respondents in the field expressed greater interest in institution building than in individual capacity building, and even more for a combination of institution building, individual development and process management. This view is shared by the UNDP officers with whom interviews were conducted.

(f) **Long-term perspective.** Success cannot be achieved through short-term projects, especially when capacity gaps have to be mended and national ownership and institution building considerations have to be satisfied. “One-off” operations do not leave much behind and score poorly in terms of capacity building.

(g) **Adequate resources.** Success in capacity building is impaired by lack of adequate resources, both administrative and financial. By comparison with other types of technical assistance, capacity building is resource-intensive. Spreading limited resources over too many projects results in sub-optimal performance.

(h) **Donor coordination.** Field interviews addressed this issue. It was noted than the lack of coordination between donors results in confusion and therefore in sub-optimal performance.

24. Of all the above conditions, the one that requires the most immediate attention from UNCTAD is the issue of capacity gap management. It is the source of ineffectiveness most
often identified by donors, beneficiaries and programme managers. Tackling this problem would benefit from greater convergence of views between these three parties.

25. As was highlighted before, capacity building requires simultaneous actions at the level of individuals, institutions and management processes. It would appear that some of UNCTAD’s programmes are directed too much at individuals and not enough at institutions. Respondents consulted in the field proved to be particularly concerned by this issue. They feel that it is institutions that guarantee the future, and that without proper institutions to harbour them, individuals’ talents are unlikely to be adequately put to use for the benefit of their country.

26. The adoption of a long-term perspective in capacity building is still insufficient at UNCTAD. It would be fair to add that, if capacity building takes time, it also requires focus. Some programmes are still geared far too much to showing results in terms of number of activities performed and number of people benefiting from these activities rather than preparing the individuals and the institution to which they belong to continue to perform after the termination of the programmes. Lack of focus on effectiveness is also evident when programmes with limited resources are spread too thin over too many countries.

C. Efficiency

27. Efficiency refers to the input/output ratio and more generally to the cost of a programme in relation to the results attained. Most evaluation reports claim that appropriate data are not available to assess efficiency in any meaningful manner. The general impression that comes out of these reports is, however, that efficiency is not a major concern and that– if assessed at all – it tends to be rather low. An important reason for this failing is that efficiency goals were rarely identified at the programme design phase. The emphasis in evaluation reports is placed more on the delivery of activities rather than on their costs. Insights on costs are provided only incidentally and impressionistically. In one programme, for instance, it was felt that the contribution to capacity building was not commensurate with the costs involved, but no evidence was provided to support this view. In another, the training of trainers proved to be as expensive as an equivalent programme delivered in a private education institution. On the other hand, the cost of producing an “empreteco” in the EMPRETEC programme was claimed to be rather low, and the TrainForTrade programme appears to have been rather inexpensive to beneficiaries.

28. Field interviews confirmed that efficiency is a performance dimension that is both difficult to assess and perceived as being of secondary importance. The overwhelming concern is delivery of activities regardless of cost. Evaluation reports and evidence gathered in the field point to several conditions that contribute to low programme efficiency:

(a) **Weak and sometimes flawed management of programmes at UNCTAD.** According to several evaluation reports, some programmes are not adequately managed, which results in confusion and inefficiencies;
(b) **Inability to cost services provided by UNCTAD.** Several evaluations have pointed to the need to establish better accounting systems with a view to improving cost control;

(c) **Internal transaction costs at UNCTAD and/or with other contribution institutions.** The more comprehensive a programme the larger the internal transaction costs. JITAP is the foremost example of a programme where the coordination of all the various activities between the three participating agencies over several beneficiary countries is complex and results in delays and increased costs;

(d) **Relying on UNCTAD staff to perform direct training.** In most cases, this is not a cost-effective proposition. External experts are usually less expensive than headquarters staff;

(e) **Capitalising on experts from developing and emerging economies too infrequently.** There is a sizable pool of experts from these countries that has been available for a number of years. They are often perceived in beneficiary countries as more sensitive to development problems than consultants from industrialized countries. Their fees may be up to 20 times less than the fees of some experts from industrialized countries. Programmes such as FRANCODE and TrainForTrade have demonstrated that intraregional and interregional networking may make it possible to tap pools of experts within networks that are both effective and less costly;

(f) **High logistics costs.** Some activities, usually short-term, require considerable shuttling back and forth of speakers, trainers, and participants. In several cases it was noted that up to 80 per cent of total cost was for travel and per diem. Some activities held at high cost in up-market Swiss locations should have been held in cheaper locations more representative of development concerns. Relocation to regional hubs should be promoted, along with greater reliance on distance learning training and conferencing formulae. As a general rule, options that maximize capacity building results over logistics dead weight should be further explored;

(g) **Cost recovery.** Cost recovery is a powerful driver of cost efficiency. Admittedly, it may not be fully applied because many beneficiaries are not able to contribute to the cost of the programmes they benefit from. Yet, the evaluation team’s view is that attempts at cost recovery remain too timid, and that they should be expanded and applied in a progressive manner according to the development level of the beneficiaries;

(h) **Donor failure.** Failure by donors to respect their financial commitment brings uncertainty to programmes, increased expenditures on coordination, and costly discontinuities in programme implementation. JITAP is known to have suffered from donor failure.
29. Efficiency is an indicator of capacity building performance that remains poorly documented, and that does not receive the kind of attention that would be expected in a context of limited funding. Progress is being made regarding accounting practices and transparency but there is still room for laying out clear accounting efficiency standards and benchmarking. Regardless of the difficulties involved in assessing efficiency in capacity building, on the basis of the evidence gathered from the previous programme evaluations and from the interviews conducted in Geneva and in the field, it would appear that efficiency in capacity building tends to be low. This is particularly so when short-term programmes are concerned, when programmes require a high level of coordination, and when UNCTAD personnel are delivering services in the field when consultants could do the work more efficiently.

D. Sustainability

30. Sustainability refers to the survival potential of programmes once support has been terminated. Surprisingly, the issue of sustainability is not addressed in several evaluation reports. Five reports claim limited sustainability: EMPRETEC; Francode, TrainForTrade; Trade Points (with regard to financial sustainability); and TRAINMAR. It is well established in the case of DMFAS and ASYCUDA. Field interviews confirm the overall conclusions reached in the reports. Although sustainability is perceived as a major success indicator in capacity building, it is not achieved as often or in as much depth as the respondents would hope. Since they often equate capacity building with sustainability, they feel that the sustainability of UNCTAD’s programmes needs to be improved in the future. The main factors cited for lack of sustainability are the following:

(a) **Capacity gaps.** Failure to identify capacity gaps early in a programme’s life cycle is major cause of lack of sustainability. For instance, limited resource allocation by beneficiary countries leads to abandoning the programme once support has ended;

(b) **Short-term orientation.** Building capacity, as noted before, takes time, especially when reinforcing of existing institutions is required. Many of UNCTAD’s programmes are more focused on awareness raising. This cannot be considered capacity building. Further, short training programmes are insufficient for enabling individuals to sustain activities on their own.

(c) **Individual rather than institution building.** Both individual and institution building must be pursued for best results. The benefits gained from individualized training are often lost if they are not anchored in an institution. Sustained follow-up to training is a crucial element of success and sustainability. There should be some means of monitoring the contribution of an individual to the growth of national institutions and expertise building.

(d) **Programme management and resource allocation at headquarters.** Insufficient resources, both financial and managerial, at headquarters lead to
inferior performance in the field. Inadequate support in the TrainForTrade programme has in the past resulted in limited sustainability in some countries. Lack of follow-up from headquarters in the case of EMPRETEC and TrainForTrade and lack of planning in the case of the Trade Point programme have similarly led to limited sustainability. In general, it is to be observed that narrowly focussed programmes score better in sustainability than broadly defined programmes.

(e) **Financial sustainability.** Although this is an area of concern, it should not overshadow the more fundamental criterion of substantive sustainability. It has been observed, for instance, that too limited an investment in training, and most notably training of trainers, may result in the progressive erosion and/or disappearance of a programme. Concerns were expressed in this regard in the EMPRETEC evaluation report.

31. It would appear that the objectives pursued by some of UNCTAD’s programmes are often too ambitious, and that resources are spread too thin and over too short a time span to lead to lasting results. Beneficiary country resource commitments are often not sufficient. Programme managers tend to underline lack of funding as the major cause of a mixed record on sustainability. The conclusions of the needs and assessment analyses should be better taken into consideration. Sustainability takes on an interesting twist in the case of DMFAS. To a certain extent, countries are bound to rely on DMFAS for improved versions of the system, which some might fear could lead to dependency. In fact, if some countries may be dependent on DMFAS for new developments, most countries in fact contribute to the improvement of the system in adapting it to their national environment and in proposing new applications, which may be put at the disposal of other countries.

E. Impact

32. It is often stated in evaluation reports that there is considerable difficulty involved in assessing impact. It is usually done on the basis of subjective rather than objective and qualitative rather than quantitative data. Some evaluation reports provide more specific information on impact than others. For instance, the EMPRETEC programme is said to have contributed to the creation of new SMEs and to an increase in sales and exports, and to have resulted in a survival rate of SMEs that is superior to what is usually expected in developing countries. Competition law and policy is credited with the establishment in recent years of effective competition authorities. The ASYCUDA evaluation report indicates improvements as a result of the programme in cargo clearance time, increased revenue, and improved data collection and dissemination.

33. Interviews with programme managers and with respondents in the field also confirmed the difficulty in assessing the impact of a programme. Impact is not seen as a major issue, and effectiveness is considered more important than impact. By and large, impact is difficult to assess not only because of the shortage of relevant data but also because impact indicators have not been specified prior to the implementation of the programme in
beneficiary countries. Impact is closely related to effectiveness. If programme effectiveness is rated low, so should its impact. Paradoxically, there are more programmes that are positively evaluated on impact than on effectiveness. It is puzzling that a programme that has not been effective should be assessed as having had a positive impact on a country’s economy.

34. Surprisingly, programme managers do not appear to be sensitive to the fact that demonstrating the impact of their programme on national economies could be used as a powerful promotional argument to both donors and beneficiary countries.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

35. This evaluation provides an overall assessment of the knowledge and experience UNCTAD has accumulated over the years in capacity building. They are considerable, and could be further enhanced. This report aims at offering suggestions and recommendations on how this could be achieved.

36. The first suggestion the evaluation team wants to make is in fact an admonition: not to turn into capacity building programmes those programmes that do not have a capacity building mandate! Some programmes cannot claim to be capacity building but may nevertheless be useful. So may, for instance, some awareness building and expert advice services or short-term events such as conferences or workshops.

37. With regard to programmes that are legitimately aimed at building capacity, this evaluation demonstrates that UNCTAD’s record could be improved substantially by adhering to stricter standards and practices, which are listed in the recommendations that follow. These recommendations are formulated according to the five dimensions of performance that were adopted in the two previous sections, namely relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact.

A. Promoting relevance in capacity building programmes

38. Two factors have been identified, which have a direct bearing on the relevance of capacity building programmes: capacity gaps and national ownership.

39. Capacity gaps. They are present in practically all the programmes that were analysed. Some respondents argue that they are an unavoidable feature in any development programme. But their effects are so detrimental to projects in terms of both effectiveness and impact that greater attention should be given to them. Many of these gaps could be addressed if they were recognized rather than ignored before programmes are implemented. Although many respondents argue that programmes are demand-driven, there is ample evidence that in fact the pressure on some managers to find means to keep their programme going induces them to be funding-driven rather than demand-driven. This propensity leads to less attention being paid to the results of the needs and assessment analyses and the implementation of projects that should not be initiated under the prevailing conditions. It is therefore recommended that:
Recommendation 1 - Final programme design should more effectively consider capacity gaps identified at the formulation and needs assessment stage. These gaps should be effectively addressed before committing resources to a project, and recognized by both donors and beneficiaries.

40. National ownership. The involvement of national authorities in the design and implementation of programmes results in stronger national commitment to their success and contributes to overcoming obstacles that may arise as these programmes are implemented. It is recommended that:

Recommendation 2 - National ownership should be promoted in all capacity building programmes by turning national stakeholders into active partners in the design and implementation of capacity building programmes.

B. Promoting effectiveness in capacity building programmes

41. Effectiveness in capacity building would be enhanced if programme focus were sharpened, an integrated approach pursued, resource allocation redistributed, and clearer criteria for assessing capacity building performance adopted.

42. Focus. The evaluation team has observed that better performing programmes are programmes with a clear focus in terms of the scope of technical assistance and geographic coverage. Programmes technically focused such as ASYCUDA, ACIS or DMFAS score better in effectiveness than more diversified programmes. Geographic over-extension combined with technical over-diversification leads to decreasing returns as programme managers find difficulty in coping with a geometrically growing degree of complexity. It is therefore recommended that:

Recommendation 3 - Capacity building programmes should be more focused in terms of technical scope and geographical coverage.

43. Integrated approach. Capacity gaps are often obstacles located either upstream or downstream of the activities to be undertaken by capacity building programmes. Adopting an integrated approach provides an opportunity to deal with such obstacles, assuming that the unavoidable transaction costs, implicit in any integrated approach, are effectively controlled. It is recommended that:

Recommendation 4 - An integrated approach should be favoured over the conduct of isolated activities in the design of capacity building programmes.

44. Programme support. Capacity building is resource-intensive. It takes more financial and managerial input than other technical assistance programmes. With regard to funding, this implies that existing financial resources should be concentrated on a more limited number of programmes than is now the case unless the total funding made available by donors for technical assistance is expanded. Programmes that have had their time should be phased out. Programme pruning should be considered, in particular when external evaluations
favour such actions. It has also been observed that some programmes are more effective than others because they benefit from strong substantive backing at headquarters. Well-grounded and well-recognized expertise is indeed a definite success factor that discriminates effectively between UNCTAD’s technical assistance programmes. It is therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 5 - UNCTAD should undertake a thorough examination of its technical assistance programmes to identify its distinctive competences, and redeploy its resources with a view to capitalizing on programmes where its substantive competences are the strongest.**

45. **Assessing capacity building effectiveness.** There is a tendency to equate capacity building effectiveness with activism. However, the number of activities undertaken in a programme or the number of individuals that have benefited from such a programme are at best only proxy measures for effectiveness. To claim, for instance, that a programme has been effective because hundreds of individuals were trained in tens of one-week or two-week training workshops cannot be construed as a demonstration that these people are enabled to perform complex tasks as a result of such short-term programmes. A major reason for the difficulty in assessing effectiveness is that the criteria to be used are not spelled out at the conceptualisation stage of the programmes. It is therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 6 - Criteria and methodology to assess programme effectiveness should be specified when programmes are to be implemented, and they should be spelled out in project documents.**

C. **Improving efficiency in capacity building programmes**

46. Efficiency has not appeared in this investigation as an overwhelming concern in technical assistance at UNCTAD. It is not well documented in evaluation reports and seldom based on commonly accepted accounting procedures. Yet it has its importance for reasons of accountability and because of a legitimate concern for the optimal use of scarce financial resources. Although it would appear that UNCTAD has definitively progressed in this area, respondents have pointed to several ways to further improve efficiency in capacity building such as the systematic costing of activities, the expansion of cost-recovery, lesser reliance on experts from industrialized countries and expanding regional decentralization.

47. **Costing of capacity building activities.** Management depends on basic accounting information in many decision-making situations. Yet external evaluations have often pointed out that such basic information is not available to decision makers. Accounting data is provided almost exclusively for financial control rather than for managerial decision-making. It is not surprising, therefore, that cost efficiency may not be a major concern if costing the services provided is not seen as a priority. It is therefore suggested, as a mean to improve efficiency, that:
Recommendation 7 - Cost accounting procedures should be generalized so that proper costing of capacity building services is possible.

48. **Cost-recovery.** Cost recovery is a controversial issue, since some beneficiaries may find costs difficult to bear. But cost recovery could also be a measure of the value beneficiary countries place on the programme, as well as a means to increase their commitment. It is therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 8 - Cost recovery should, where appropriate, be applied in a progressive manner, taking into account the beneficiaries’ ability to pay for capacity building services.**

49. **Selecting experts.** During the field trips, respondents commented on the high cost of experts. It is felt that consultancy fees are much higher in industrialized countries than in developing countries and emerging economies. Since the gap in the quality of consultancy services has decreased over the years, in many instances due in part to the training provided by UNCTAD and other development assistance agencies, it is more and more appropriate to recruit consultants from developing and emerging economies. Although local authorities sometimes prefer to rely on highly paid consultants from industrialized countries, they also recognize that there are other advantages besides savings in recruiting experts from other parts of the world. It is often felt that they are better attuned to the specificities of developing environments, and are better able to cope with local obstacles. The propensity to use experts from non-industrialized countries is increasing. Such programmes as EMPRETEC, TrainForTrade and Francode have demonstrated that it can be done successfully. Such practices have improved the effectiveness of these programmes and promoted South-South networking. It is therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 9 - Capacity building programmes should increase their reliance on expertise from developing countries and emerging economies.**

50. **Regional decentralization for the conduct of conferences and other short-term events.** Not only does decentralization of such activities favour regional integration through increased networking, it also improves programme effectiveness and contributes to lower operational costs. Some activities like workshop and training programmes absorb a considerable share of budgets, providing substantial benefits to the hospitality sector. In addition, it should also be pointed out that these events are more awareness building than capacity building. It is therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 10 - Conferences and other short-term events should be limited in capacity building programmes. If held at all, they should preferably be organized in the region for the sake of increased efficiency.**

**D. Increasing sustainability in capacity building programmes**

51. Sustainability is at the centre of the capacity building concept. If programmes do not live on on their own once the assistance that initiated them is terminated, this means that the
capacity building goal has not been achieved. Unfortunately, the sustainability goal is too often limited to financial sustainability, whereas in fact substantive sustainability is a more important criterion. For example, it is more important for a training programme to depend on a staff of trainers that maintain a high level of competence over time than to secure revenue through the delivery of substandard training. There is ample evidence, especially from the field, that the two basic requirements for successful substantive capacity building success are a long-term perspective and institutional capacity building.

52. **Long-term perspective.** Too much concern for financial sustainability also tends to shorten the life of the programmes in beneficiary countries. There is, however, one fundamental ingredient in substantive capacity building success: time! Successful capacity building programmes are bound to be medium-term or long-term rather than short-term programmes. The evidence shows that not much may be achieved in capacity building with episodic, short-term activities. They may be valuable in increasing awareness and recognition of some issues – UNCTAD, WTO and ITC have proved to be very expert at this since the end of the Uruguay Round and after Doha - but they only pave the way for more intensive capacity building formulae. It is therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 11 - Long-term goals should be favoured over a short-term perspective in capacity building programmes.**

53. There is, however, the risk that the longer the programme the greater the risk of developing dependency. It is therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 12 - Long-term capacity building programmes should include an exit strategy so that beneficiaries do not fall prey to a dependency syndrome.**

54. **Institutional building.** It is recognized that capacity building involves not only the development of individual skills and knowledge but also the reinforcement of institutions, which harbour these competences and provide an environment conducive to the emergence of a strong multiplier effect. It is also clear that both individual and institutional development must be pursued simultaneously. On average, UNCTAD’s programmes appear to be more geared to building individual rather than institutional competencies, although there are considerable differences from one programme to the other. It is therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 13 - Greater emphasis should be placed in the future on institutional capacity building.**

55. In the course of this evaluation it also appeared that a major ingredient in institutional capacity building was training and more particularly the training of trainers. It was observed that the TrainForTrade formula is unevenly accepted among UNCTAD’s divisions although it has a good reputation in many countries. It would be worthwhile for UNCTAD to reflect on its vast experience in this area, and to consider adopting a harmonized body of training methodologies. It is therefore recommended that:
Recommendation 14 - UNCTAD should conduct a cross-divisional audit of all its training experiences with a view to developing harmonized training of trainers and institutional training support methodologies.

E. Assessing the impact of capacity building programmes

56. It has been observed that the assessment of programme impact is seldom performed. The usual rationalizations are that the programmes are too short to result in a tangible impact, and that the data are just not available to estimate impact. At a time when critical statements on the usefulness of development assistance are frequently volunteered, UNCTAD must deal with this issue more effectively than in the past. It may be legitimate not to expect from short-term projects a tangible impact on economic development or on any large sub-element of economic development. In such cases, performance criteria set out during programme design, and used later at the evaluation stage, should be shifted from the assessment of impact to that of effectiveness.

57. There is considerable danger, however, for programmes that are both capacity building and medium-term or long-term if they are not able to demonstrate that they have produced an impact or claim that it cannot be assessed. It is quite disconcerting, for instance, that a sophisticated medium-term programme heralded as a major capacity building exercise that aims at promoting exports in beneficiary countries does not address the issue of its impact on trade. This problem is similar to the assessment of effectiveness that was alluded to earlier in this report. Both effectiveness and impact are certainly notoriously difficult to ascertain, but failure to address them squarely leads to a misleading over-emphasis on activities. It is recommended therefore that:

Recommendation 15 - Project documents should follow the logical analytical framework and specify the indicators according to which programmes’ impact (and effectiveness as well) will be assessed when they are terminated and/or evaluated.

III. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

58. There are several other issues that have arisen in the course of this investigation which do not fit in well with the recommendations listed in the previous section because they are pertinent not to capacity building per se but to technical assistance in general. Several respondents both in the field and in Geneva felt they should be raised in this report. They have to do with coordination – coordination between donors and coordination at UNCTAD in the promotion of its technical assistance programmes to donors.

59. Donors’ coordination. The complaint from beneficiary countries is that donors do not coordinate their efforts sufficiently. They sometimes compete with each other, and at times hardly know what other donors are doing. This observation applies to both bilateral donors, international organizations, and even within UNCTAD itself. Beneficiaries point out that duplication of efforts, competing demands on requirements for beneficiary Governments,
and outright competition between donors may lead to both inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in capacity building.

60. **Coordination of programme promotion at UNCTAD.** Donors (and to a lesser extent beneficiaries) regret that UNCTAD does not adopt a unified approach in promoting its technical assistance programme. Donors deplore having to spend considerable time and energy assessing the distinctive advantages of UNCTAD’s programmes.

61. Regardless of the quality of its offering, it is sometimes admitted that UNCTAD does not promote itself as forcefully as some other sister organizations nor as well as it deserves. This may also be construed as a complement in disguise.

62. Although the gender issue was addressed in the course of this evaluation and is well received, the evaluation team noted that it is sparsely documented in the evaluation reports, and was raised only selectively during the interviews.

63. All things considered, and even if there is room for improvements, UNCTAD’s record in capacity building should be viewed positively, in particular when one sets aside activities or programmes which should not be claimed to be capacity building and which indeed do not meet capacity building performance criteria.

64. UNCTAD’s best capacity building programmes according to the evidence gathered in the course of this evaluation and based on the views expressed by the respondents that were consulted are programmes that combine focus, substantive competence at headquarters, an integrated approach, national ownership, institution building and a long-term perspective. DMFAS, investment-related programmes, ACIS and ASYCUDA are usually cited among the programmes that best meet these criteria and are considered to be successful.
Annex I

PROGRAMMES RETAINED FOR CAPACITY BUILDING ANALYSIS

- Commercial Diplomacy Programme, including the Francode/AIF programme (2001)
- IIAs - Capacity Building for International Investment Agreements
- ASYCUDA - Automated System for Customs Data (1995)
- Trade Point – Facilitating the Participation of SMEs in International Trade (1998)

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1 The year when the programmes were last evaluated is indicated between parentheses.
Annex II

EVALUATION PROCESS

1. Once the concepts of capacity building and performance were clarified, the next step in the evaluation process was to proceed with a detailed review of all the evaluation reports made available to the evaluation team by the Programme, Planning and Assessment Unit (PPAU). The evaluation team extracted elements that relate to capacity building activities and programme performance. Information gaps were identified and retained for further examination.

2. Semi-structured interviews were then held with programme representatives covering the following topics:

   (a) Identification of key capacity building activities of programmes and (directly or indirectly) clarification of the capacity building concept;

   (b) Discussion of programme capacity building performance along the five dimensions stated earlier, namely relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact;

   (c) Obstacles to capacity building and key success factors.

3. Interviews were conducted with a wide range of beneficiaries and donors based in Geneva. Field missions took place in a selected number of countries allowing for an optimal coverage of UNCTAD’s major capacity building programmes. Countries visited were Romania, Uganda and Viet Nam, which have benefited from many of UNCTAD capacity building programmes.

4. As per the terms of reference, the evaluation team worked independently yet under the methodological guidance of PPAU. The evaluation team expresses its highest appreciation to the PPAU team for its invaluable support, both methodological and logistical.