CHAPTER 1

Migration and structural transformation: The global environment, the policy agenda and conceptual and data issues
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This chapter provides an account of the global environment within which the subsequent analyses are conducted, situates African migration within major trends on the continent and highlights its inclusion in regional integration agendas and multilateral initiatives. It then provides a conceptual framework on the linkages between migration and structural transformation. The economic benefits of migration and the associated free flow of labour have long been showcased by economists, yet there has been minimal work on establishing a theoretical basis between international migration and structural transformation. Finally, the chapter discusses definitional issues and describes the main datasets on which this report’s analyses are based.
Africa’s projected population and urbanization trends

Population

- 1.2 billion in 2017
- 2.5 billion in 2050

Youth population (15–24 years)

- 2.5 billion in 2050

Urbanization rate

- 40% in 2015
- 56% in 2050

Working age population (15–64 years)

- 231 million in 2015
- Forecast to grow +70% or 450 million by 2035

Links to the Sustainable Development Goals:

1. No poverty
2. Good health and well-being
3. Quality education
4. Gender equality
5. Peace and justice, strong institutions
6. Sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth
7. Innovation and infrastructure
8. Clean energy
9. Water and sanitation
10. Affordable and clean energy
11. Health and well-being
12. Peace and justice
13. Partnerships for the goals
Globally, in 2017, there were around 258 million international migrants, approximately 3.4 per cent of the world population (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017a). In 2017, 38 per cent of migration was South–South, and 35 per cent was South–North, or one third. Yet South–North migration attracts the most attention. In contrast, intra-African migration and its economic and trade dimensions have received little attention.

Africa is projected to have the largest population growth of any geographical region by 2050, which will have important consequences for international migration, and major implications for the continent’s economic development. People will move, as they always have done. The question, therefore, is not whether they will move, but to where they will move and under what circumstances and conditions, including in order to unleash their economic potential. To fully tap this potential, stronger efforts are required towards establishing a vision for migration management that best contributes to the continent’s structural transformation.

1.1 Africa and migration in the global environment

African migration patterns do not happen in a vacuum. Rather, they are situated within major trends on the global stage that have also affected the continent, namely climate change, environmental degradation and conflict. This section discusses these trends.

1.1.1 Migration, climate change and environmental degradation

In recent years, the world has witnessed frequent occurrences of weather extremes, from cyclones in the north Atlantic to high-impact hurricanes in the Caribbean and North America, floods in South Asia and severe droughts in Eastern Africa, which have led to famines. Such cases of weather extremes are likely due to climate change, defined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere” (United Nations, 1992), with deleterious impacts on the prospects for peace.

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4 The terms migrant and refugee are often used interchangeably in public discourse, but there is a legal difference between the two (see Glossary, section 1.1.2 and section 1.6).
and sustainable development in many developing countries. For example, Lake Chad, which borders Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria, has lost 95 per cent of its size since 1960. This trend has negatively impacted the livelihoods of millions of people and contributed to acute sociopolitical tensions and conflict in the region, making migration much more likely.

Migration has also been a response to environmental degradation and/or disasters. A distinction can be drawn between migration that occurs in the wake of chronic disasters or environmental degradation and migration that follows sudden onset disasters such as floods and landslides, cyclones, hurricanes and windstorms. The latter – distress-push migration – is often temporary, until conditions improve and enable people to return to their homes.

Environmental hazards usually have more long-term impacts, such as droughts that lead to salinification and the degradation of soil quality. Areas affected by environmental hazards provide fragile ecosystems and economic bases, in particular for communities that depend on agriculture. In areas where agricultural systems are mainly rain-fed, droughts can have a major impact on food production systems and the incidence of famine. Coping strategies include labour migration, often circular, to diversify incomes and reduce dependence on agricultural production. Through remittances, the impact of droughts can be mitigated, with investments into technologies that allow for better coping with degraded soil.

Environmental changes or disasters have also been associated with permanent migration. There have been attempts to relocate populations from areas that are chronically affected by droughts and famines, such as in Ethiopia in the 1980s (Clapham, 1990). Climate and conflict induced food insecurity in developing countries is on the rise; in 2016, globally, 108 million people faced crisis-level food insecurity or worse (Food Security Information Network, 2017). This represents a 35 per cent increase compared with 2015, when almost 80 million people faced such insecurity. In recent years, war, terrorism and conflict has resulted in large numbers of food insecure people in need of urgent assistance in Yemen (17 million), Syria (7 million), South Sudan (4.9 million), northeast Nigeria (4.7 million), Somalia (2.9 million), Burundi (2.3 million) and the Central African Republic (2 million) (Food Security Information Network, 2017). Such conditions have worsened in some countries, with the risk of famine in parts of northeast Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, and can contribute to new, major waves of migration.

Environmental factors that trigger migration are likely to be aggravated by climate change, as climate change is associated with the increased frequency and severity of disasters. For instance, Barrios et al (2006) and Marchiori et al (2012) consider that declines in rainfall or temperature anomalies in sub-Saharan Africa are important factors driving rural–urban migration. Such factors not only induce migration but can also put pressure
on ecosystems in destination locations, while allowing ecosystems of the area of outmigration to recover (see International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2017a).

In Africa, the environmental hazard with the greatest impact, both in terms of the number of people and the share of the total population affected, is drought, affecting between 7 per cent of the population in Northern Africa and 22 per cent in Western Africa (Raleigh et al, 2008, based on the Emergency Events Database). The impact of droughts is seen in all regions in Africa. Floods are also an emergency event that affect each region; the population share affected is 2 per cent or less. Extreme temperatures have a greater impact in Western Africa, with 13 per cent of the population affected, and windstorms have affected 4 per cent of the population in Southern Africa and 3 per cent in Eastern Africa.

Classifying data by income groups shows that the impact of droughts in terms of share of total the population affected is highest in low-income countries. This likely reflects the fact that low-income countries have fewer resources to cope with natural hazards. UNCTAD calculations comparing the occurrence of natural disasters in 1970–2013 with the stock of emigrants find a positive relationship between the two variables, that is, stocks of emigrants find a positive relationship between the two variables, that is, stocks of emigrants are higher in countries that have experienced more natural disasters, with a correlation coefficient of 0.31.

1.1.2 Migration, peace and security

In Africa, political tension, terrorism and war have forced people to move within countries or abroad in search of basic safety and security (Adepoju, 1995; Adepoju, 2008). Conflict-induced displacement includes those who are “forced to flee their homes for one or more of the following reasons and where the State authorities are unable or unwilling to protect them: armed conflict including civil war; generalized violence; and persecution on the grounds of nationality, race, religion, political opinion or social group”. Forced migration also occurs in response to border disputes, which have led to violent conflicts in several countries.

Conflict is thus a driver of migration. Severe conflicts often lead to flows of internally displaced people or refugees, if they flee across borders, yet conflicts can also be a driver of economic migration. This section examines cross-border movements and focuses on migrants and refugees, while recognizing that internally displaced persons outnumber refugees in Africa. Refugee flows are important in terms of their magnitude and recent increases. The evolution of the number of African refugees in 1990–2017, as well as their share of the total international migrant stock, are shown in figure 1. The total number of refugees declined from 5.7 million in 1990 to 2.9 million in 2010, then increased sharply to

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5 Formerly the Human Rights Commission.

6 See http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm.
4.6 million in 2015. Most of these refugees were hosted by countries in Africa. Refugees accounted for 36 per cent of the total international migrant stock in 1990, had declined to 14 per cent by 2010, doubled to 28 per cent in 2015 and declined to 26 per cent in 2017 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017a).

**Figure 1**

African refugees, African refugees hosted in countries in Africa and African refugees as share of international migrant stock

![Graph showing the number of African refugees, African refugees hosted in countries in Africa, and African refugees as share of international migrant stock from 1990 to 2017.](image)

**Sources:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018, Population Statistics database (number of refugees); United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017a (refugees as share of international migrant stock).

**Note:** Data for 2017 on refugees hosted in countries in Africa was unavailable at the time of preparation of this report.

A regional breakdown of refugees from Africa shows that at the start and end of the 1990–2015 period, the dominant source region of refugees was Eastern Africa, and that relatively few refugees originated from Southern Africa. Most refugees moved to countries within the same region.

African migrants account for 10 per cent of the international migrant stock (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017a), yet most fatalities in the
Mediterranean region in 2015 were of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, at 42 per cent of over 1,500 fatalities (IOM, 2017b). Similarly, in 2014–2016, an estimated 3,800 migrants died travelling in Africa and data for the first half of 2017 shows that Northern Africa had 225 recorded deaths (IOM, 2017b). Most incidents occurred along routes from Western Africa and the Horn of Africa towards Egypt and Libya. IOM (2018) notes that human trafficking is also on the increase. In addition, migrants and refugees along Central Mediterranean routes may be exposed to high levels of violence and exploitation and an alleged slave trade in Libya (United Nations News, 2017).

The challenge lies in determining how migration management may be addressed effectively by the African Union and the European Union. In 2016, the European Union initiated a project under an emergency trust fund for Africa of €3.4 billion, aimed at managing migration and addressing the root causes. In the Horn of Africa, for example, there is a package of 10 projects focused on tackling irregular migration and forced displacement, totalling €818.1 million in 2017. Such programmes complement similar efforts in Northern Africa, discussed by European leaders in Malta in 2017 (Reuters, 2017).

Given the interconnectedness between the different drivers of migration, such as conflicts as a consequence of communal competition over scarce environmental resources due to acute droughts or famines, which fuel mass emigration, it is critical for multilateral and integrated policy approaches to be pursued, to address the social and economic challenges with regard to migration and its management.

### 1.2 Situating migration within major trends in Africa

#### 1.2.1 Historical perspectives on migration patterns

Intra-African and extra-continental migration is a phenomenon that dates back to the origins of humankind (Adepoju, 1995; Adepoju, 2008). Historical records from many centuries past show well-established trade routes between Western Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and India, and between either end of the Sahara through the trans-Saharan caravan trade (Afani, 2013).

Patterns of transcontinental migration were fundamentally altered with the advent of European colonialism in the fifteenth century. The extraction of labour, commodities and natural resources helped to build the European and North American economies, while denuding such opportunities for Africa (Meredith, 2014; Pakenham, 1991). The colonial era was designed to meet the labour demands of mining and plantation-based economies, and the control and regulation of human mobility was an essential
element. For example, France introduced various forms of labour conscription in Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as, to varying degrees, in Western Africa. Similarly, the hut tax was a type of taxation introduced by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on a per hut or household basis, mainly in Eastern and Southern Africa, that was variously payable in money, labour, grain or stock. Such economic policies induced indigenous labour to move and work in colonial-owned mines and plantations on the continent.

Cultural affinities and shared languages have always played a key role in movements across borders, in terms of both people and trade. The colonial era demarcation of international borders often disregarded cultural and ethnic affiliations. The movement of people and trade, however, continued in line with traditional groups. For example, undocumented migration between Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania for work on tea, coffee and cotton plantations has taken advantage of common cultural affinities, languages, currencies and shared colonial experiences (Oucho, 1995).

This highlights a path dependency of contemporary migration patterns in Africa due to colonial heritages. Under colonial rule, labour, both skilled and low-skilled, was relocated from one colony to another, establishing migrant labour systems as well as trade patterns that continued beyond the colonial era. The temporary international migration patterns prevalent in Eastern and Southern Africa, whereby workers circulate between their homes and work in mines, has its roots in the colonial era. The underlying factors can be traced to the organization of tasks and living and working conditions prevalent at that time (Adepoju, 2011). The post-colonial improvement of the employment conditions of workers attracted further labour to, for example, mines in Zambia and plantations in Cameroon and Nigeria. Following independence, such migration was institutionalized, and various restrictive practices related to family reunions, residence and contractual labour systems in Eastern and Western Africa ceased, although some such rules continue to be enforced in South Africa. By imposing arbitrary borders, colonial rule modified the frameworks for labour movement on the continent, affecting international migration patterns.

Colonial rule also brought new cultures and languages, which led to longstanding links to the colonial powers that are still apparent in today’s patterns of extra-continental migration. For example, France established labour recruitment schemes in Algeria and Morocco during and after colonial rule (Castles, 2014). Similarly, the United Kingdom recruited labour from colonies, for example for military campaigns (Killingray, 1982). Massey et al (2005) note that, “due to long-established social, cultural and economic ties, citizens of Commonwealth countries have well-established networks that facilitate
further inflows [into the United Kingdom] by lowering costs and risks of migration”. Since the end of colonial rule, new trade and economic ties have been established, and since the late 1980s, “there has been an acceleration and spatial diversification (beyond colonial patterns) of emigration out of Africa to Europe, North America, the Gulf [States] and Asia” (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016).

Chapter 2 shows how the main migration corridors from Africa to outside the continent still reflect colonial ties. Cultural and linguistic ties between sending and receiving countries are also observed in the increasing levels of migration from Egypt and the Sudan to the Middle East. Existing national borders are often porous and fluid in terms of trade and culture, yet colonial boundaries still retain an economic and social presence in contemporary African life.

1.2.2 Demographic change

Population growth is an important aspect of migration dynamics on the continent. The population of Africa in 2017 was 1.2 billion, up from 477 million in 1980, and is forecast to rise to 2.5 billion by 2050. The majority of the world’s population growth will take place in Africa (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017a). Africa has a relatively young population, and the age group of 15–24 years is projected to almost double in size, from 231 million to 461 million in 2015–2050, higher than the increase in both China and India. The working age population of 15–64 years is the group that typically migrates, and Africa’s working age population is forecast to grow by about 70 per cent, or 450 million, in 2015–2035, as is its share of the world total (figure 2). However, given that Africa’s economic growth rates in 2004–2014 were high, at above 5 per cent per year, yet only yielded an average job growth rate of 0.2 per cent per year until 2014, it is unlikely that sufficient jobs will be generated to absorb this additional labour under the current scenario.

However, if this youth bulge is successfully tapped, the continent could reap a demographic dividend and set off on a sustainable path of wealth creation. At present, Africa is at a critical stage of development, in which population growth is high and the nature of the employment challenge, especially in rural areas, is changing. In the past, most new labour market entrants were typically absorbed into low-productivity agriculture. However, as population densities rise, farm sizes decline, and farmers increasingly shift towards the cultivation of more ecologically fragile land, both on-farm incomes and agricultural productivity may remain extremely low. Because of these factors, the rate of urbanization in Africa is
Given such demographic challenges, Africa needs to make significant efforts to generate a sufficient volume of jobs, to provide decent employment into the medium term (UNCTAD, 2012). Progress on this front will be key in influencing future migration patterns. This necessitates addressing some of the negative externalities associated with migration such as brain drain; the outflow of skilled human resources, with critical skills shortages in some sectors, adversely affecting countries of origin (UNCTAD, 2012).

Figure 2
Share of world total of working age population (15–64) by region
(Percentage)

Source: UNCTAD calculations, based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017a.

Africa’s urbanization rate projected to rise from 40% in 2015, to 56% by 2050.
with migration, such as brain drain, or the outflow of skilled human resources, with critical skills shortages in some sectors adversely affecting origin countries.

### 1.3 Migration in policy agendas in Africa and the multilateral policy agenda

#### 1.3.1 Migration and the regional integration agenda in Africa

In 2006, the African Union adopted the Migration Policy Framework for Africa. The Framework provided comprehensive and integrated policy guidelines for the member States of the African Union and regional economic communities, for their consideration in endeavours to promote migration and development and address migration challenges on the continent, such as those related to border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, the human rights of migrants and inter-State cooperation and partnerships.

The African Union engages with regional economic communities in the implementation of commitments, programmes, policies and strategies relating to migration. Africa has cooperated in other migration initiatives such as the migration and mobility strand of the African Union–European Union Partnership and the Africa and Arab partnership strategy.

Following an evaluation of the Migration Policy Framework for Africa in 2016, and recognizing the dynamic nature of migration and the changing migration trends and patterns on the continent, the African Union revised the Framework, to reflect current migration dynamics in Africa to guide member States and regional economic communities in migration management. The revised Framework includes a 10-year (2018–2027) action plan for its implementation, as well as guidelines that address labour migration, diaspora engagement, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration and migration and trade. In addition, the revised Framework recommends strategies for consideration by member States and regional economic communities under each of these pillars. The guidelines also identify cross-cutting issues in migration, including migration and development, migration data and research, the human rights of migrants, migration, poverty and conflict, migration and health, migration and the environment, migration and gender, migration, children, adolescents and youth, migration and the elderly, and inter-State and interregional cooperation.

In their rhetoric, policy and protocol documents, regional economic communities aim to enhance the free movement of persons and labour between their member countries.
1.3.2 Migration and the Sustainable Development Goals

Among the Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 8 on economic growth and decent work explicitly refers to migration, acknowledging the economic value of migrant labour. Target 10.c aims for a reduction in the transaction costs of remittances. In particular, target 10.7 aims to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration, including through the implementation of well-managed migration policies. Terms such as orderly and regular imply that this target is concerned with migration that is regulated and adequately monitored by Governments. The overall objective of Goal 10 is to reduce inequality. However, it will be challenging to assess the extent to which achieving target 10.c contributes to this aim.

The relationship between migration and development does not feature explicitly in the other Goals despite its relevance to several of the Goals. This report focuses on the links between migration and structural transformation and shows that migration can contribute to economic development and, inter alia, the achievement of the Goals. Governments should identify the linkages between migration and different Goals and targets, and recognize “that migrants may be a particularly vulnerable group, who should be considered under the general principle of [the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of] leaving no one behind (Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2017).

Migration can contribute to the achievement of Goal 1, as it can reduce poverty for migrants and their families in origin and destination countries. Migrants and their families benefit from increased income and knowledge, which allows them to make productive investments, meet basic needs and access education and health services, related to the achievement of Goals 1, 3 and 4 (Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2017). Through higher rates of expenditure, consumption and investment in origin countries, migrant households can also help to stimulate higher wages and economic growth (Ratha, Mohapatra and Scheja, 2011; Ratha, Mohapatra, Özden et al, 2011). In destination countries, migrants can fill labour gaps and contribute to services and the fiscal balance through taxes, that is, contribute to the achievement of Goals 1, 8 and 9. Migrants face risks and intensified vulnerabilities throughout the migration process, such as the fact that women migrants working in less-regulated informal sectors are at greater risk of exploitation and abuse, including trafficking (Andall, forthcoming), and that first-generation immigrants are likely to live in urban areas and attend schools with student populations who are, on average, from less advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds (Nicolai et al, 2017). Under Goals 5, 8, 10, 16 and 17, migrants are included among other groups in the targets aimed at
improving access to rights, including gender equality and labour rights, and in data collection. This is an important step. It reminds those engaged in development that the universal human rights of migrants should be recognized. However, ongoing debates on how migration and migrants may contribute to development need to be considered.

1.3.3 The preparatory process for the global compact for migration

The Sustainable Development Goals are an opportunity to frame migration and development relationships between countries as reciprocal and beneficial, under a global framework. The global compact for migration links migration and development and could have major implications for migration policy if approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2018. It represents a unique effort by countries to adopt a common approach to migration challenges, and the Sustainable Development Goals “provide a holistic and comprehensive framework to ground the migration–development nexus” in the global compact for migration (Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2017). The global compact for migration is intended to do the following:

Address all aspects of international migration, including the humanitarian, developmental, human rights-related and other aspects; make an important contribution to global governance and enhance coordination on international migration; present a framework for comprehensive international cooperation on migrants and human mobility; set out a range of actionable commitments, means of implementation and a framework for follow-up and review among Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions; be guided by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda; and be informed by the Declaration of the 2013 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (IOM, 2017c).

In establishing a range of actionable commitments, means of implementation and a framework for follow-up and review among Member States regarding international migration, the global compact for migration should avoid limiting its focus to specific targets on migration and remittances, but instead broaden its scope to encompass all of the Sustainable Development Goals. Its framework should include national, regional and international cooperation, and be locally driven and context specific, to address emerging challenges.

In some destination countries, official development assistance is used as part of a broader strategy to deter migration, yet this is often ineffective, and there is no clear evidence that official development assistance can alter migration patterns (Clemens and Postel, 2017). The sectoral distribution of official development assistance to origin countries
does not significantly differ from its distribution in other countries, and its capacity to deter
migration is therefore likely limited. Donors could potentially achieve greater impact by
leveraging official development assistance to shape migration for the mutual benefit of
both origin and destination countries (Clemens and Postel, 2017). Official development
assistance could be an important instrument of longer term migration management if
channelled into supporting structural transformation in Africa, especially in infrastructure
and the manufacturing, transportation and electricity supply sectors. Targeting official
development assistance and investments towards the most potentially productive sectors,
such as agriculture, to raise quality standards and productivity through technical assistance,
in addition to promoting rural non-farm economic development, may yield results that could
generate the best return in terms of jobs and investment in origin and destination countries,
given that the need for work is a key driver of migration.

The global compact for migration offers the potential for a multilateral approach to
addressing the international and interconnected migration challenges faced by many
countries. The consultation process highlights “the need for a fresh narrative that goes
beyond the negative connotations and perceptions that are present in both migration
and development debates”, and the migration and development discourse under the
global compact for migration should focus more on innovation, investment and inclusion
(Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2017).

1.4 Assessing migration and structural
transformation in Africa

1.4.1 Economic development as at 2017

When considered with the major demographic changes detailed in section 1.2.2,
contemporary trends in economic development in Africa present a disquieting context
and underline the primacy of setting the continent on a sustainable path of structural
transformation. The real gross domestic product (GDP) of Africa grew by 1.8 per cent
in 2016, lower by 1.5 percentage points than in 2015. In 2010–2016, there was a
general slowdown in global economic growth. Since the global financial crisis, austerity
measures introduced at the time have compounded the situation, hitting the poorest
developing countries hardest. Preliminary forecasts for GDP growth in 2017 were more
positive, suggesting growth of 3.3 per cent. However, GDP per capita growth declined
by -0.7 per cent in 2016 and rose by only 0.4 per cent in 2017, therefore having a limited
impact on poverty reduction.
An analysis of real GDP growth rates by region and regional economic community shows that the performance of Western Africa and ECOWAS has negatively impacted the overall performance of the continent. Growth is forecast to rise in 2018, but is likely to remain well below the levels in 2002–2008 of 6.2 per cent per annum. Given the high level of dependence in Africa on external economic conditions, energy-exporting countries have been particularly impacted by the global financial crisis. Since 2015, Africa’s growth prospects have been affected by multiple external shocks. For example, in recent years, oil-exporting countries such as Angola and Nigeria have moved into a recession because of lower oil prices. Similarly, mineral exporting countries such as South Africa have been impacted by a general slowdown in emerging economies, in particular in China. Regions specializing in the export of manufactures and services, such as EAC, have fared better than mineral and oil-exporting regions. The former regions have experienced less fluctuation in real growth rates, suggesting that more diversified economies were less affected by the general slowdown in global economic growth.

Since 2016, improving global conditions, particularly slowly rising commodity prices, have helped curtail current account deficits. In 2017, there was a resumption of growth in capital inflows, in particular foreign direct investment, which helped to finance current account deficits and cushion foreign reserves (World Bank and Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, 2017a). Headline inflation also slowed in the region in 2017. However, fiscal deficits remain high.

1.4.2 Exploring the links between migration and structural transformation

The literature on migration and structural transformation

Outlining a conceptual framework on migration and structural transformation in Africa is a challenge as much of the research on migration focuses on patterns of migration and the direction of flows, origin countries and the use and adaptation of immigrant labour. As at the time of preparation of this report, there was no established theory of migration that encapsulates structural transformation. This section reviews definitions of structural transformation and discusses existing theories of migration and how its patterns relate to structural transformation.

From a macroeconomic perspective, although each economy has a distinct growth path, the most common feature is that, as economic growth takes place, labour moves out of the agriculture sector towards the manufacturing and services sectors, leading to higher levels of urbanization and internal migration. There are several definitions of structural transformation, mostly centred around variations of this phenomenon. Traditional views of structural transformation are defined as a reallocation of production factors across agriculture, manufacturing and services that underpin economic growth (Kuznets, 1973; Lewis, 1954).
A normative perspective of structural transformation often emphasizes desirability in the direction of change and can be defined as the ability of an economy to continually generate new dynamic activities characterized by higher productivity and increasing returns to scale.

Most recent literature considers structural transformation as a reallocation of resources from lower to higher productivity activities, both between and within sectors (McMillan et al, 2014). Consequently, structural transformation can generate both static gains (increased economy-wide labour productivity as workers move to more productive sectors) and dynamic gains (positive externalities due to workforce skill upgrading and enhanced technological capabilities), thus simultaneously generating productivity growth within sectors and shifts of labour from lower to higher productivity sectors. In addition, Taylor and Martin (2001) state that rural–urban migration is a necessary component of the economic development process, because the migration of labour out of the agriculture sector has been a feature of the growth path of most developed countries.

Massey et al (1993) and Todaro and Smith (2015) state that most theoretical approaches to migration offer different but complementary hypotheses. However, the neoclassical theory of migration remains dominant, underpinned by assumptions of migration driven by rational economic considerations and financial decisions (Todaro and Smith, 2015). Others, such as Arango (2000) and Gheasi and Nijkamp (2017), question this on empirical and theoretical grounds. There is a complexity of flows encompassing labour shifts from industrializing to developed economies as a function of more affordable and accessible information and communications technologies, transportation, migrant networks and government policies, in an era of rising globalization and, in Africa, deeper regional integration. Moreover, as the costs of migration are often high, it is not the poorest persons who migrate nor the poorest countries that send the most labour abroad (De Haas, 2008; Flahaux and De Haas, 2016; Massey et al, 2005). In some neoclassical models of migration, movement is determined by expected earnings, not necessarily actual earnings, weighted by the probability of employment (Fouarge and Ester, 2007).

A variant of the neoclassical theory is the push–pull dichotomy that emphasizes the economic context of migration, with push factors typically being poverty, unemployment and inequality and pull factors being potential for employment, greater wealth and political stability. It is argued that more rapid economic growth in the origin country reduces the observed rate of outmigration; a hypothesis termed the migration hump (Martin and Taylor, 1996). In addition, the higher the gap between the real wage at home and abroad, the greater the rate of emigration. De Haas (2011) states that migration is a function of people’s aspirations and capabilities to migrate, and emphasizes that people only migrate when they have the ambitions and resources to make it happen, a factor that is ignored in push–pull models.
Historical structuralist approaches to migration link the determinants of migration to structural transformation in world markets, and migration is considered a function of globalization, regional integration, economic interdependence and new forms of production (Silver, 2003; Skeldon, 1997; Wallerstein, 1974). Structuralist theories consider capital and labour mobility as related, whereby the rising expansion of export-led agriculture and manufacturing is linked to foreign direct investment flows from the North, which contributes to the disruption of traditional occupational and social structures and drives both intraregional migration in Africa and extra-continental migration. The structural framework has been criticized as being too deterministic, as migration is assumed to be the result of broader structural processes (De Haas, 2011; Favell, 2008; Gheasi and Nijkamp, 2017). However, within this analytical framework, it may be argued that if migration reflects international trade in labour, it is as likely that international linkages such as trade, tourism and foreign direct investment are affected by migration (Gheasi et al, 2011; Gheasi et al, 2013; Gheasi and Nijkamp, 2017).

The new economics of migration literature shift the focus of analysis to household responses to income and livelihood risks and various market failures, that is, in labour, insurance and credit markets. Given that market failures are common in developing countries, migration is thus a response to the absence of market institutions and the need to diversify sources of household income, to reduce livelihood risks. The benefits for sending countries from income diversification provide a first theoretical justification for expecting a link between migration and structural transformation. Remittances play an important role in this process (Massey et al, 1993; Taylor and Martin, 2001).

Many studies of South–North migration are rooted in neoclassical frameworks of migration, which propose wage differentials as the key determinant of migration (Hicks, 1932; Lewis, 1954). Many of the theories of migration discussed in this section focus primarily on internal migration. Although wage and income differentials play a role in influencing the decisions of migrants, it is unlikely that this proposition adequately accounts for most migration, especially when migration occurs between countries with similar living standards and wage differentials. While recognizing the importance of the wage differential theory, this report advocates a broader approach that recognizes the importance of household, country and region-specific characteristics. In outlining the conceptual framework underpinning the report, it is useful to situate it in recent migration theory.

**Conceptual framework of this report**

In this report, migration is broadly conceptualized as a function of the capabilities and aspirations of migrants and, on a macrolevel, the opportunities available, rather than simply income differentials. Migration is the result of a complex interaction of choices
made by people located within social contexts that vary across time and space. Government policies and historical, structural, economic and environmental constraints can also impact the decision-making of potential migrants. Similarly, the availability of decent jobs and accessible health and education services may also be passive drivers of intra-African and extra-continental migration.

The movement of migrants is governed by mainly structural and institutional factors in origin countries, subject to household and community circumstances. The decisions of migrants are also affected by broader trends in national and international political economies. The link between structural transformation and rising international migration may therefore be conceived as how microlevel action is linked to macrolevel structures and vice versa (Coleman, 1990). Hypothetically, although in a simplified form, the social condition, or lack of rural economic development opportunities (macrolevel), often leads to high levels of rural underemployment and poverty among persons (microlevel), which leads to a decision to migrate from a rural to an urban setting or to an international location (microlevel), often resulting in structural transformation given the resulting shifts of labour from agriculture to the manufacturing and services sectors (macrolevel).

This report focuses on intra-African migration. Figure 3 shows the key features of the contextual analysis and the interrelationship between migration and structural transformation at the different levels of aggregation analysed in this report. The boxes are best seen as examples of where, in terms of level of impact, different factors might have an initial first-round impact on migration and, possibly, structural transformation. Different potential entry points for external factors that influence migration are also shown in figure 3. However, the impact of such policies, shocks or trends are likely to be felt directly or indirectly at several or all scales through microlevel–macrolevel linkages. The impact of some factors is specific, as they have an immediate or first-round effect on one aspect of the economy. An idiosyncratic shock at the personal or household level, such as the accidental death of an earner, is one example, whereby the first-round effect may be specific to the household in question, but subsequent effects may be more generalized if, for example, the person who died was a teacher at a nearby school. Idiosyncratic first-round effects may be contrasted with more widespread effects that may arise, for example from a nationwide or regional drought, leading to mass migration. Similarly, if a rural infrastructure development policy, for example, results in the rapid expansion of a road network in a particular region with a social and cultural context in which one gender is by tradition or culture more geographically mobile than the other, such changes might exacerbate gender-related disparities in access to resources and ability to migrate, thereby affecting the development of the local economy in a particular
area. The reality of complex microlevel–macrolevel linkages and migration impacts pose challenges for empirical investigation and policy-oriented research.

**Figure 3**

Conceptual framework of migration and structural transformation

Source: UNCTAD.

The impacts of migration on structural transformation are varied, highlighting the important role played by investment and trade policies allied to the necessity of building productive capacities. Any attempt to improve understanding of how migration can contribute to poverty alleviation and structural transformation, or vice versa, needs to take on board this complexity. If migration reflects international trade in labour, it is as likely that international linkages such as trade, tourism and foreign direct investment are affected by migration (see section 1.4.2). The key economic and trade channels through which international migration impacts on socioeconomic development in sending and receiving countries are discussed in section 1.5.
1.5 Migration, trade and structural transformation in Africa: The evidence

Considering the drive towards regional integration in Africa and the policy agenda described in section 1.3.1, this section highlights the economic and trade channels through which migration may be positively associated with structural transformation. These insights form the basis of the empirical analysis of the linkages between migration and structural transformation in chapter 4.

1.5.1 Economic and trade channels

There are economic and trade channels through which international migration impacts on socioeconomic development in sending and receiving countries. The ensuing ripple effects of migration on labour movements across sectors and on productivity gains could benefit receiving countries. Similarly, emigration may benefit sending countries through improvements in their socioeconomic indicators. Such improvements may in turn constitute the foundations for structural transformation.

Interest in understanding migration patterns and how they relate to development was restricted for many years to analyses of rural–urban migration and its role in structural transformation (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1969). This line of argument offers glimpses into how international migration affects structural transformation. Lewis’s dual-sector model postulates that urbanization in a developing economy is accompanied by constant costs of goods produced in cities and the arrival of a continuous supply of low-cost rural labour to towns and cities. This cost differential gradually ends with the shortage of cheap sources of rural labour, leading to what is called the Lewis turning point. Identifying locations where there may be scope for international migration to fill the gap left by low-cost rural labour in some countries can play a key role in shaping the new generation of migration policies in Africa.

With regard to international migration, the analytical focus of proponents of the free flow of labour is generally on demonstrating the positive impact of the influx of foreign migrant workers on a receiving economy. Many analyses of the economic impact of migration, stating that border controls are analogous to trade barriers, show that increased migration would increase the global GDP far more than trade liberalization. Earlier analyses were based on the traditional assumption of neoclassical economic and trade models, in which all productive resources were fixed in quantity and constant in quality across nations. Additional assumptions included that of full employment in all regions of the world. Using these assumptions as a point of departure, the models
questioned what would happen if workers migrated from lower to higher wage countries, and findings showed that global GDP would more than double (Clemens, 2011; Hamilton and Whalley, 1984).

More recent pro-migration arguments focus on demonstrating the cost effectiveness of the free flow of labour for destination countries. Labour liberalization is seen as the last frontier of globalization. A growing body of work argues that dismantling labour market segmentations internationally would be wealth generating and pro-poor and lead to more egalitarian distributional outcomes (Anderson and Winters, 2008; Clemens, 2014; Pritchett and Smith, 2016). Numerical simulations of the benefits of migration indicate that the gains from increased migration exceed those from trade reform under the Doha Development Round in the early years, but may be similar to the comparative static gains from the Round over the long term if the latter excludes provisions for the greater temporary migration of labour (Anderson and Winters, 2008). Estimates show a win-win scenario for both sending and receiving countries. The global net benefit of the increased flow of migrants in 2001–2025 is calculated to be about $13 trillion at a higher discount rate and $38 trillion at a lower discount rate in present value terms. For sending countries in the developing world, migrant families accrue benefits from migration that greatly exceed the costs (Anderson and Winters, 2008).

In advanced economies, the predicted positive impact of international immigration is apparent in the greater share of working-age people in the total population, as well as in productivity enhancements derived from both skilled and low-skilled migrants. Proponents of migration generally agree on its overall positive impact, yet the intertemporal distribution of its effects has been shown to be varied. On the one hand, highly skilled migrants contribute through transfers of knowledge and know-how to local employees. On the other hand, low-skilled migrants fill occupations neglected by citizens, allowing the latter to move to higher-skilled jobs. The ensuing rise in employment levels is generally predicted to have a depressing effect on wages in the medium term, and to result in increased GDP in the long term. Assuming that overall conditions remain constant in the receiving economy, lower wages should lead to the increased profitability of capital. Combined with a parallel increase in GDP growth, the rise in profitability stimulates investment and raises demand. As higher demand for labour follows, there may, in some circumstances, be a subsequent upward adjustment of wages to pre-immigration levels (Ortega and Peri, 2009; Ortega and Peri, 2014). Although analytical studies on the labour market impact of immigration agree on the impact on employment and on GDP, there is also evidence that this does not necessarily affect average wages or labour productivity (Ortega and Peri, 2009). In sending countries, the benefits of
remittances are numerous and include greater incentives for private investment in education and the productive sector (see chapter 5).

There is evidence that countries tend to trade and invest more with countries from which they have received migrants (Dolman, 2008). The literature has addressed whether trade and migration are substitutes or complementary (Egger et al, 2012). If they were substitutes, higher levels of migration would lead to reduced trade, and if they were complements, higher levels of migration would spur trade through network effects or higher incomes. The standard theory is that labour is transferred across borders either directly in the form of migration or through the trade of labour-intensive goods. Trade liberalization thus decreases the need for migration, and stimulates trade and favours a convergence in factor prices that reduces incentives to migrate. Migration and trade can also work as complements, as trade is likely to increase with higher factor mobility (Ethier, 1995; Markusen, 1983). In addition, pro-trade effects are channelled through factors that include the dissemination of the preferences of migrants for goods from origin countries, the removal of informational barriers between origin and destination countries and improvements in the facilitation of contract enforcement in weak institutional environments (Greif, 1993; Rauch and Casella, 2003). The net effect depends on whether the trade creation effect dominates over the trade diversion impact in trade with the rest of the world. Generally, when countries trade more, improvements in productivity and living standards tend to follow (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Redding and Venables, 2004; Romalis, 2007).

1.5.2 Brain drain and brain gain: The debate

Although there is economic evidence of the welfare-enhancing effect of the liberalization of labour, detractors of migration emphasize both the dampening effect on wage differentials in destination countries and the impact of what has become known as brain drain in origin countries. With regard to the latter, it has been argued that migration has a strong education-related selection bias, whereby more educated people are more able to move, leading to the brain drain phenomenon. As a result, developing countries are perceived to be suffering from the loss of their most educated and skilled labour (see, for example, Collier, 2013, on Haiti).

However, brain drain in origin countries may have the effect of stimulating investment in education and boosting domestic skills development (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). Thus, emigration prospects may increase incentives for investing in education, supported by empirical evidence at the cross-country level and at the bilateral level (Beine et al, 2016; Dinkelman and Mariotti, 2016).
1.6 Analysing migration: Definitional and data issues

1.6.1 Navigating definitions

This report focuses on migrants, not on refugees. The precise definition of a migrant is not an uncontroversial or straightforward issue, and influences the generation and empirical use of migration data. How migration is defined and classified and the consistency of use affects data, including measures of migrant stocks and flows. Different definitions can generate diverging estimates of net migration flows.

This report uses a working definition of migrant that identifies both a spatial and a temporal dimension (see Glossary). However, this report extends this definition, and identifies persons as migrants if they have moved away from their community, usually defined as their village, for a period of at least three months, for purposes that may include work, education and family reasons. By using a relatively generous definition of the types of mobilities that may be defined as migration – a short period, over a short distance and for multiple possible purposes – researchers have the chance to explore a greater diversity of migration and mobility patterns, including short-term seasonal migration to neighbouring districts and long-term migration to international destinations. Migrants are defined as internal if they remain within the borders of the country in which their household of origin is located and international if they relocate to another country.7

1.6.2 Migration measurement issues

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development enshrined a clear focus on integrating international migration within global development policy, to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration, with the protection of human rights. Achieving target 17.18 (“By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national

7 International long-term migrants are persons who move to a country other than that of their usual residence for a period of at least one year, so that the destination country effectively becomes their country of usual residence. International short-term migrants are persons who move to a country other than that of their usual residence for a period of at least three months but less than one year, except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1998). The duration that identifies short-term and long-term migrants varies between countries.
contexts”), including with regard to migratory status, could provide for progress in research and policy analysis hindered by the lack of high-quality data. The main data sources for the study of international migration include decennial population and household censuses, population registers, residence permit statistics and labour and household surveys. As they provide a comprehensive source of internationally comparable information, national census data are a particularly important source of statistics for achieving target 17.18 and disaggregating the targets for the other Sustainable Development Goals by migration status. This section focuses on the potential of aggregated national decennial and household-level migration data to aid in-depth research and policy analyses of the multifaceted nature of international migration, both within and from Africa.

Studies of international migration often stress that there are major gaps in migration data collection and analysis in Africa. This report uses a compilation of international, mesolevel and household-level datasets to conduct its analyses.

**International migration datasets**

The data on migration and remittance variables presented in this report are the latest available as at December 2017. UNCTADstat database classifications include 54 countries in Africa. Given the availability of data, this report presents the most recent migrant stocks in 2017, refugee numbers for 2015–2016 and remittance inflows for 2016–2017. However, there are some drawbacks in using international migration and remittance data, as much data are often absent or lacking in cross-country comparability owing to the use of different definitions and inconsistent collection and collation. Collecting data on irregular flows of migrants in Africa is a considerable challenge. Given that such flows are probably substantial on the continent, intra-African migration is likely to be highly underestimated.

The only two databases that report on bilateral migration data that allow for a determination of intra-African migrant stocks are the Global Bilateral Migration database of the World Bank and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs international migrant stock dataset for 2017 by origin and destination country (table 1). There are definitional differences concerning migrants and refugees between these two databases, although the primary source of the raw data is the Global Migration database of the United Nations Population Division, created through collaborations with the United Nations Statistics Division, the World Bank and the University of Sussex. To address

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8 The Global Bilateral Migration database should not be confused with the trends in international migrant stock dataset also reported in the World Bank database, which lists aggregate migrant stocks for each destination country in the world at five-year intervals.
the different treatment of refugees, this report also notes the recent data on refugees, including on refugee-like situations, from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Table 1
Data sources and census details and years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 2017</th>
<th>YEAR OF CENSUS IN WORLD BANK GLOBAL BILATERAL MIGRATION DATABASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Foreign born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
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### Table 1
Data sources and census details and years (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Definition of Migrant in Census</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Coverage in Database (Percentage)*</th>
<th>Year of Census</th>
<th>Year of Census</th>
<th>Year of Census</th>
<th>Year of Census</th>
<th>Year of Census</th>
<th>Year of Census</th>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>5.66</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>15.09</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>B R</td>
<td>15.09</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>B</td>
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<td>- - - 1991 2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>B R</td>
<td>24.53</td>
<td>- - 1977 -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1993 2001</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>C R</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1991 2002</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>- - - 1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1991 1997</td>
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<td>B R</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>1984 1994</td>
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<td>1991 2002</td>
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<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The data coverage in percentage refers to the number of observations for each country as a share of the total database.

Sources: UNCTAD estimates, based on Özden et al, 2011 and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017a.

Notes: B, estimates derived from data on foreign-born populations; C, estimates derived from data on foreign citizens, also called foreigners; R, number of refugees or persons in refugee-like situations, as reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, added to estimates; I, estimates imputed, as no data are available on international migrants for the country or area concerned.
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs dataset is the primary source of information on international migrant stocks in 1990–2017. It uses population censuses from various sources and provides data on international migrant stocks by origin and destination. In the censuses, migrants may be defined by foreign birth, foreign citizenship or movement into a new country for a temporary stay or long-term settlement. Some analyses of the impact of migration include in the migrant population children born in a destination country whose parents are foreign-born or foreign nationals. The dataset definition of a migrant is equated with either foreign-born or foreign citizens. If data on place of birth are available, they are generally given precedence. However, there is considerable variation in how destination countries collect, record and disseminate immigration data. It is often not possible to conduct a meaningful comparison of destination country records over time. During census collection in 2010, only 19 of the 149 countries for which data are available in the United Nations Statistics Division census database collected data on the period of return of native-born populations, and most of these countries were in the Caribbean, Europe and North America (Juran and Snow, 2016). Sources of migration data by level of aggregation are shown in table 2.

Refugees with legal status are counted in a population census and treated as migrants in many developed countries. However, in countries in which refugees live in camps, they are unlikely to be counted in censuses. In the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs international migrant stock dataset for 2017, in order to obtain a common definition of international migrants, refugee numbers, including those in refugee-like situations, from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East are added to the international migrant stocks of all developing countries deemed to have not included refugees in reported statistics. In developed countries, where refugees and recognized asylum seekers are routinely included, no adjustment has been made. Of the 3,500 sources detailed in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs dataset for 2017, 1,107 are suitable for analysis, once repeated censuses have been removed or combined (see table 1). There are discrepancies in the reporting of migration data, such as

9 Populations of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees include refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, including those protected and/or assisted by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, returned refugees, returned internally displaced persons, stateless persons and others of concern. Since 2007, persons in a refugee-like situation, most of whom were previously included under others of concern, have also been included. This subcategory is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons outside their country or territory of origin who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.
the number of immigrants reported in one country differing from the number of emigrants reported in the sending country, which arise because of differences in definition and reporting time. An important difference between the Global Bilateral Migration database and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs dataset is in the treatment of refugees. The estimated number of refugees has been subtracted from the database whenever it is drawn upon the dataset (Özden et al, 2011).

### Table 2

**Sources of migration data by level of aggregation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION DATASETS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN AFRICA COVERED</th>
<th>TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>AGGREGATION LEVEL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>54</td>
<td>2010 and 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs international migrant stock by origin and destination</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs migration profiles: Common set of indicators</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1990, 2000 and 2013</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Household-level datasets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University of Sussex</th>
<th>Migrating Out of Poverty quantitative household surveys</th>
<th>2013 and 2015</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Africa Migration Project household surveys</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017a; University of Sussex, 2018; World Bank, 2013; World Bank Global Bilateral Migration database.
Household datasets and mesolevel data

This report utilizes data from two household-level surveys to explore the determinants and drivers of migration, whether domestic or international (see table 2).

First, the Africa Migration Project conducted by the World Bank in 2009, which consisted of household surveys of migrants in six countries, namely Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda, with the aim of providing a better understanding of migrant characteristics in sending and receiving countries (World Bank, 2013). The results from Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda are representative of each country; the results from Burkina Faso, of the 10 most important provinces for migration; the results from Kenya, of 17 districts with the largest concentration of migrant households; and the results from South Africa, of the Limpopo–Gauteng migration corridor in particular (World Bank, 2013).

Second, the Migrating Out of Poverty quantitative household surveys, which consisted of surveys in Ghana in 2013,10 in Ethiopia in 2014 and in Zimbabwe in 2015, collected with funding from the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom by researchers at the Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex; the University of Ghana; the African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand; and the Centre of Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe. The surveys were of rural households in the sending regions of each country, and cannot be considered nationally representative. However, the sample of migrants was randomly selected and relatively large and can therefore provide useful insights into migrant decision-making and comparisons between migrants and non-migrants, as well as a detailed exploration of gender-related differences. The surveys were designed to incorporate larger subsamples of households with current migrants than are typically available in existing surveys, and used a comparable and detailed questionnaire designed to capture the complexity of migration patterns and behaviour and to adopt a common definition of migration that captured a wide range of migration patterns. This comparability in approach gives an opportunity to explore the diversity of migration patterns, both internal and international, beyond the orders of an origin country, including to neighbouring countries, other countries in Africa and other international destinations, as well as the reliance of households on migration to generate income and support livelihoods and the depth of relationships between migrants and families in origin countries.

10 The survey in Ghana captured few international migrants; as the surveys focused only on internal migration, they were designed to only capture households with internal migrants. Some households reported that some of their members were international migrants. The second survey of households in 2015 did not have a strategy to replace households that had moved or dropped out of the sample for other reasons.
In addition to these primary data sources, this report also uses various secondary data sources to inform its analyses of opportunities in the leading sectors on the continent.

1.7 Conclusions

This chapter provides the background within which this report’s analyses of migration and structural transformation are situated. It sets out the theoretical underpinnings and conceptual frameworks that inform the analyses in the following chapters. Appropriate consideration should be given to the complexity of the multidirectional relationships and interactions between migration and the factors associated with structural transformation.