# Illicit Trade and Illicit Financial Flows

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#### Kathy Nicolaou-Manias Independent Consultant (UNECA on SDG 16.4b) and IFF Technical Advisor





The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNCTAD

#### **Overview of the Presentation**







- Dev Kar, lead economist at *Global Financial Integrity (GFI)*, defines IFF or illicit money as "money that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilised. Somewhere at its origin, movement, or use, the money broke laws and hence it is considered illicit."
- UNDP, definition: "include, but are not limited to, cross-border transfers of the proceeds of tax evasion, corruption, trade in contraband goods, and criminal activities such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting."

## New Approach to Defining/Categorising IFFs for SDG Indicator 16.4.1

Components of IFFs for SDG Indicator 16.4.1.						
Illicit Trade Components						
Tax and Commercial Practices	Illegal Markets	Theft-type and Terrorism	Corruption			
Includes both illegal practices such as tariff, duty and revenue offences, tax evasion, corporate offences and market manipulation, but also practices that are legal but may be considered illicit.	Domestic & international trade in <b>illicit goods &amp; services;</b> often involve a degree of criminal organization and are aimed at <b>creating profit</b> . They include any type of <b>trafficking in goods</b> such as drugs, firearms, or services such as smuggling of migrants	Forced, involuntary and illicit transfer of economic resources between 2 actors (e.g. theft, embezzlement, fraud). Terrorism financing, and all other financial flows of either licit /illicit origin used to fund illegal activities – are illicit, voluntary transfers of funds between 2 actors.	Misuse of a public or private position for direct or indirect personal gain. UNCAC provides a list of acts considered as corruption including bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence, etc.			



#### Illicit Trade is on the real side of the economy and the IFF on the monetary side





#### Illicit Trade and IFFs are often two sides of the same coin/transaction

**Productive/Real Economy (Economic** Activity i.e. Goods and Services)



illicit narcotics are seized by only 1% of the financial flows

(Financial Flow)



# Some ideas where

	Illicit Financial Flows	Transfer Pricing	Trade Pricing	Trade Based Money Laundering	
	\$		\$	<b>CO</b>	
Concept	Economic (Financial/FDI)	Accounting and Tax	Economic (Trade)	Law Enforcement (Financial crimes)	
Origins	<ul> <li>Theory on Capital Flight</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Accounting</li> <li>Payments / Transactions between related entities</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Direction of Trade Statistics</li> <li>General Agreements on Trade</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Organised Crime</li> <li>Trans-national Crime</li> <li>Bootlegging</li> </ul>	
Status	<ul> <li>Legal (ito Excon)</li> <li>Immoral/Illicit</li> <li>Illegal</li> </ul>	• Legal Abusive form (mispricing) = Illegal	<ul> <li>Legal</li> <li>Trade mispricing <ul> <li>illicit/illegal</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	• Illegal	



#### Illicit Trade in South Africa – Prevalent Sectors (1)

#### Illicit Drugs

# Anti-piracy using the blockchain

Custos combines patented blockchain technology with forensic watermarking to keep media files secure and unshared both online and offline, and to detect content leaks when they happen.



illegally as Falkland calamari











#### Illicit Trade in South Africa – Prevalent Sectors (2)

#### Forestry



- Illegal logging is an issue for the Department of Agriculture with hotspots identified.
- Not quantified.

#### Pharmaceuticals



• TM Est. \$61,2m outflow (2013). FIC and SARS adjusted estimate

#### Pesticides



• TM Est. \$300m (2013) FIC and SARS adjusted estimated



#### Precious metals and gems

• TM Est. \$5,2bn outflow (2013). FIC and SARS adjusted estimate







#### Illicit Trade in South Africa – Prevalent Sectors (3)

#### Trafficking in Persons



- Not estimated.
- Seen as low risk ...
- Clothing manufacturing ILO SCORE study identified forced labourers being trafficked to work in Chinese sweat-shops

#### Wildlife



- Illicit rhino horn est. at \$785m (2013).
- Or \$795m including environmental lost opportunity cost



### Miscellaneous (commodities not specified elsewhere)

- TM Est. \$33bn outflow (2013) or 75% of Trade Mis-invoicing FIC and SARS adjusted estimate
- Non-monetised gold to China via Hong Kong









#### **Illicit Trade in South Africa – Measuring the Illicit Economy, Illicit Trade and IFFs**

Total Economy (IE &Formal)	<ul> <li>Total Economy = IE + Formal Economy</li> <li>Conservative CDA estimate of the illegal economy</li> <li>MIMIC estimate includes illegal and informal)</li> <li>Illicit Economy:</li> </ul>
Illicit Economy (IE)	<ul> <li>CDA (conservative: Illegal)</li> <li>MIMIC (includes illegal and informal). *The WB Columbian Money and Asset Laundering Model estimates the shadow economy</li> </ul>
Capital Flight (Hot Money: Volatility)	<ul> <li>Hot Money (Capital Flight = Licit + Illicit)</li> <li>Capital outflow using the Balance of Payments data</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Illicit Financial Flows</li> <li>The GFI approach includes Hot Money plus Trade Mispricing</li> </ul>
IFFs Trade Mispricing (Tax evasion)	<ul> <li>Trade Mispricing</li> <li>GFI focuses on 35 developed countries plus estimate for ROW trade mispricing</li> <li>FIC estimates trade mispricing for all countries due to large role for China. Add Attractiveness weights to explain direction of trade between developing countries (Trade Based Money Laundering)</li> </ul>
ML (Crime) Criminal Activity (Narcotics)	Money Laundering (Gravity Model) estimates the proceeds of crime and the ML destinations (Threat and risk model). Updated the model with narcotics and trade. *Columbian Money Asset Laundering Model (WB)
	Criminal Activity: Narcotics, wildlife crime, illicit mining

#### **Cross-border Challenges, Measurement and Curbing Illicit Trade and IFFs**

Only as good as the weakest link, your neighbouring country

Manguzi protesters demand action over cross border crime at Kozi Bay (South Africa and Mozambique border



#### **Measurement and Curbing Illicit Trade and IFFs**

#### Criteria to measure commercial tax malpractices – UNECA approach



#### **Measurement and Curbing Illicit Trade and IFFs**

#### Measuring a hidden phenomenon (UNECA): current capabilities in Africa



#### Measurement and Curbing Illicit Trade and IFFs



#### Data anomalies and data challenges

- **Mapping:** Linking standardised (or harmonised) national I-O tables to international bilateral trade matrices is problematic, resulting in classification anomalies.
- **Coverage** of data is not complete in all countries, some developing countries do not report and mirror data is used. Quarterly data updates result in analysis inconsistencies
- **Reporting:** Exporters and importers may report the same trade differently due to various factors e.g. (import cost, insurance and freight), timing, FOB, inclusion and exclusion of some commodities, etc...
- UNCOMTRADE reporting standards: creates variances in reporting as some countries use General method, other use Special, some apply strict rules others not
- UNCOMTRADE AND IMF DOTS Source and destinations countries: Reported trade is affected by transit destinations and reporting anomalies of source and destination countries. This results in incorrect statements of the variances (Up/down)
- Services: Missing traded services hence the need to include the Hot Money analysis.
- Clandestine Activities: Measuring illicit financial flows/TBML is difficult at the macro level since proxies need to be used to estimate clandestine activities not reported

#### **Policy Actions to Curb IFFs**

#### Multi-disciplinary approach is the key

- Addressing the data is the first critical step... large variations in the results are problematic
- Enforcing WCO's Unique Consignment Reference is CRITICAL
- Introducing a Benchmark pricing tool (e.g. GFTrade) to be incorporated into customs risk engine to red flag suspicious
- Enforce **bilateral exchange of customs information** and introduce similar oversight and reporting structures as in the tax arena
- Social Network Analysis and black-listing of perpetrating enablers (from actual cases) – shipping companies, logistics companies, bankers, lawyers, accountants, auditors, etc.
- Cooperation and coordination between (domestic and international) authorities
  - ✓ Tax authorities
  - ✓ Customs authorities
  - ✓ Central banks
  - ✓ FIU's
  - ✓ LEAs and Judiciary



#### **Policy Actions to Curb IFFs**

#### Multi-disciplinary approach is the key

- Risk assessments critical and typology studies to flag risky perpetrators.
- Fundamental for FIUs to analyse trade data (at customs/granular level) for TBML
- Training and capacity building on IFFs, illicit trade, tax and commercial malpractices and TBML
- Standard ML transparency toolkit applies (KYC, ECDD, CbC reporting, Beneficial ownership,...)
- Big data analysis and the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning is critical
- Identify enablers/perpetrators (REGISTRY) and redline all their activities.



#### **Policy Actions to Curb IFFs**



#### Multi-disciplinary approach is the key

	Comparison between Abusive Transfer Pricing and Trade Mispricing				
		Abusive Transfer Pricing		Trade Mispricing/Mis-invoicing/TBML	
Policy Tools – General and Specific	•	Automatic Exchange of Tax Information DTAs Beneficial Ownership Demand Resource Mobilsation; Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (including Country-by-Country Reporting); and	•	Automatic exchange of customs information; GATT Beneficial Ownership Improved vetting and controls at customs authorities; Benchmark pricing tools in customs risk engine (i.e. the GFI TM online-real-time tool); and Enforcement of Unique Consignment Reference to track consignments	

