

Global Services Forum

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Knowledge-based services for sustainable development

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Session A

presentation by

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Mend It, Don't End It: The Case for Upgrading the G20's Pledge on Protectionism

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Johannes Schwarzer Twitter: @schwayo Global Services Forum, 14. September 2018 Buenos Aires



"We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of financial uncertainty."


First G20 Leaders Summit Declaration, November 2008

"We will not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras."

Second G20 Leaders Summit Declaration, London, April 2009



The origins of the G20 Pledge



B. Eichengreen, D.A. Irwin / J. Int. Econ. 38 (1995) 1-24


Fig. 1. The contracting spiral of world trade, month by month, January 1929-June 1933 (in millions of U.S. (gold) dollars).



Exercise in Transparency: Monitoring of Protectionism

Official Monitoring

Source: WTO Report on G20 Trade Measures (2018)






The Great Divide: Monitoring of Protectionism

Unofficial Monitoring

Source: Global Trade Alert

Figure 1. Persistent monitoring of protectionism matters—evidence suggests that each quarter G20 members implement new 200-250 distortions to global commerce.



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
The Great Divide: Monitoring of Protectionism

How to explain these differences?

- WTO headline number only focus on narrow range of traditional import and export barriers (1930s focus)
- Subsidies reporting is not part of headline numbers and has been dropped in 2017 due to lack of reporting by G20 members
- Trade remedies are not being counted for headline numbers
- No updating of totals as new information becomes available




Not your grandparents' protectionism!





Not your grandparents' protectionism!





... and services?

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The GTA database




Figure 13.3: The incidence of services measures in total number of GTA policy instruments post-2009, in percent

Bailout (capital injection or equity participation) Trade finance Tax or social insurance relief State Ioan Loan guarantee Other

Figure 13.4: The most frequent protectionist measures worldwide affecting

services

Source: Global Trade Alert database, accessed online at http://www.globaltradealert.org, March 2018.

9.1%

9.8%

- Low overall occurence of services measures in GTA database
- Share of restrictive measures higher than that of liberalizing

- Fiscal measures of GTA database nice complement to existing STRI databases
- Subsidies have free pass in GATS and most FTAs!




9.9%

Source: Cernat, 2018

The GTA database

Figure 13.6: Top 20 countries affected by post-crisis services restrictions worldwide



Source: Global Trade Alert database, accessed online at http://www.globaltradealert.org, March 2018.

Source: Cernat, 2018




The OECD database

Cumulative impact of policy changes 2014-2017

Cumulative trade liberalisations (2014 to 2017) Cumulative trade restrictions (2014 to 2017) 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1 -1.2 Legal services Motion pictures Telecommunications Computer services Broadcasting Rail freight transport Road freight transport Maritime transport Insurance Accounting services Engineering services Construction Architecture services Sound recording Freight forwarding Cargo-handling Courier services Custom brokerage Storage and warehousing Air transport Distribution services Commercial banking Digital network Transport and distribution supply chain Market bridging and Physical supporting services infrastructure services




Services increasingly popular with FTAs



Source: Desta Project



Does GATS make services trade freer?






OECD, 2017

Do other FTAs make services trade freer?

Services Trade Restrictiveness Indices for TPP Countries Doha Offers, TPP Commitments and Applied Policy



Gootiz and Mattoo, 2016



Massive gains?

Expected Gains from TiSA

	low skilled		medium s	killed	high skilled		
	experim ent A	experim ent B	experim ent A	experim ent B	experim ent A	experim ent B	
Agriculture,							
Forestry, Fish	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Other primary	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Processed Food	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Textiles, Clothing and Leather	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Oil, Gas, Coal	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Chemicals,	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Petrochems	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Electronic							
Equipment	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Other machinery	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Metals	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Motor Vehicles	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Other Transport Equipment	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Lumber, Wood, Paper	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Other Manufactures	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Water Transport	-0.3	-0.5	-0.3	-0.5	-0.3	-0.5	
Air Transport	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Other Transport	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	
Communications	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	low skilled		medium s	killed	high skilled		
Finance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Insurance	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	
Business, professional							
services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
ICT services	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	
Construction	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Personal Services	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	
Public Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Displacement index	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	

EU Commission, 2017



• G20 Leaders should adopt text that condemns any discriminatory policy intervention, unless a widely-accepted exception is invoked that is justified by evidence, least distortive, implemented only after completing established procedures, and subject to timely review.

• G20 Leaders should also adopt text calling on relevant international organisations to redouble their monitoring efforts by expanding their scope in line with this principle-based approach and by ramping up their coverage of the services and intangible economies.



Annex I

UN	Class of	Percentage of G20 exports facing given trade distortion in overseas markets in given year									
MAST chapter	discriminatory policy instrument	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	20-Mar-18
	All	40.72%	57.06%	59.96%	65.07%	68.36%	74.73%	78.32%	79.85%	80.55%	80.71%
P7	Export subsidies	34.87%	50.14%	53.66%	59.80%	62.55%	68.43%	73.01%	74.89%	75.49%	75.43%
L	Subsidies (excluding P7 and P8)	5.43%	8.24%	9.69%	11.89%	13.35%	14.84%	15.60%	16.93%	18.09%	18.79%
P8	Export credits	2.39%	3.06%	2.80%	3.01%	14.64%	4.94%	12.38%	15.68%	15.60%	15.63%
	Import tariff increases	0.62%	1.32%	1.23%	1.55%	3.22%	6.54%	6.96%	7.32%	8.39%	8.71%
м	Government procurement	0.65%	1.33%	1.40%	2.05%	2.63%	2.99%	3.49%	3.54%	3.71%	3.83%
E	Non-automatic licensing, quotas	0.63%	0.59%	2.17%	2.56%	2.99%	2.83%	3.06%	3.12%	3.29%	3.51%
	Instrument unclear	0.06%	0.31%	0.39%	0.47%	0.74%	1.62%	3.24%	3.28%	3.33%	3.41%
I	Trade-related investment measures	0.23%	0.77%	0.82%	0.91%	0.93%	1.33%	1.86%	2.34%	2.37%	2.34%
D	Contingent trade protection	0.20%	0.48%	0.70%	0.84%	0.96%	1.06%	1.12%	1.42%	1.60%	1.91%
F	Price control measures	0.43%	0.43%	0.48%	0.54%	0.55%	0.76%	1.07%	1.15%	1.23%	1.23%
G	Finance measures	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%	0.05%	0.05%	0.05%

