

# Under African skies – mining TNCs in Africa and the Sustainable Development Goals

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Interaction between transnational mining companies (mining TNCs), governments, mining industry bodies and local communities is critical to advancing several of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Mining TNCs may be leaders or conspicuous laggards in this regard. Some larger mining companies have made significant corporate social responsibility (CSR) progress and implemented effective sustainable development, thereby boosting their legitimacy. Individually, some African countries have established global, standard, mining codes of conduct; collectively, African governments are organizing to establish regional licensing standards, CSR guidelines and codes of conduct such as the Africa Mining Vision. Comparing two mining TNCs cases, we illustrate paths of progress and problems and predict their directions in Africa. Although we expect the United Nations Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative to remain the main vehicles and provide benchmarks that move the mining industry towards achieving the SDGs, these vehicles need to be expanded to include targets that currently are only implicit, such as gender equality and sustainable community development.

Key words: corporate social responsibility, Sustainable Development Goals, mining industry, business ethics, Africa, communities as stakeholders.

## 1. Mining and the social license to operate

Mining jobs are “dangerous, dirty and difficult” (the 3Ds).<sup>1</sup> Labour-intensive but often higher-paying than similarly skilled jobs, the 3Ds often connote fraught labour-management relations and sometimes labour strife (Lynch, 2004; Muthuri, Moon and

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<sup>1</sup> “Dangerous, dirty and difficult” is an English translation of the Japanese phrase *kitanai* [汚い: dirty, grubby, messy], *kiken* [危険: hazardous, dangerous], *kitsui* [きつい: intense or tight, and so demanding]. The 3 Ks [三K] have become the 3 Ds.

Idemudia, 2012; Newenham-Kahindi, 2011). As such, mining presents challenges for corporate-community relations in terms of sustainability, socially responsible behaviour and public policy. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, see table 1), officially came into force at the beginning of 2016. The SDGs are expected to become a cornerstone for mining TNCs seeking to achieve corporate legitimacy with communities. This short essay looks at mining TNCs' legitimacy under African skies by outlining how two mining TNCs respond to three specific SDGs: Goal 5, "achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls"; Goal 8, promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth; full and productive employment; and decent work for all; and Goal 16, "promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels".

Empowering local community members and promoting the SDGs is not only the just and equitable path, but also the better business development path. In their analysis of the costs of community conflict to extractive-industry TNCs, Rachel Davis and Daniel Franks (2014) reported that not only do costs related to the loss of business opportunities increase, but also delays, staff time wasted, and reputational costs are negatively impacted. Reputational costs are reflected in increased financing costs as well as weakened government relationships. Ernst & Young's (2015) influential survey of investment managers found that institutional investors' attention to environmental, social and governance analyses had rapidly increased over the level of their previous year's survey. Roughly 60 per cent of 200 investment firms surveyed said non-financial data was important to their investment decisions. Other bankers and financiers watch mining TNCs' commitment to sustainable development, and vote with their capital.<sup>2</sup> Disruption of business operations and lack of access to capital may result from a decline in the legitimacy of a TNC (Stevens and Newenham-Kahindi, 2017). For mining TNCs particularly, legitimacy is also conferred through local community legitimacy (Muthuri et al., 2012; Newenham-Kahindi, 2011), which includes monitoring other communities' responses (Hilson and Murck, 2000, Selmier, 2015).

The very nature of mining creates challenges for mining TNCs in advancing the SDGs and closely related extant initiatives such as the United Nations Global Compact (see table 2) and the Global Reporting Initiative. But these same challenges make mining TNCs excellent candidates for catalyzing large, positive impacts on these initiatives. What are these challenges? Aside from the 3Ds and requirements for large labour forces, many sites in developed countries were partially or fully exploited during the

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<sup>2</sup> In fact, all mining TNCs operating in Tanzania are now required to list their shares on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange. Similar to what has happened in some other African countries, Tanzania passed a new Finance Bill Act [in 2016] which demands that all mining TNCs to significantly contribute to sustainable development as well as allow local Tanzanian investors access through local listings to buy shares. There are currently over 200 foreign mining TNCs in Tanzania.

**Table 1. United Nations Sustainable Development Goals**

Goal 1	End poverty in all its forms everywhere
Goal 2	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture
Goal 3	Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
Goal 4	Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education, and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
Goal 5	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
Goal 6	Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
Goal 7	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
Goal 8	Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
Goal 9	Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation
Goal 10	Reduce inequality within and among countries
Goal 11	Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
Goal 12	Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
Goal 13	Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts*
Goal 14	Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
Goal 15	Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
Goal 16	Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
Goal 17	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

Source: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf>.

process of these countries becoming “developed”, and so extensive investments have shifted towards the developing world. More-remote investments increase the inherent risks. Some of these projects are in conflict-prone countries with less-robust legal institutions, and some mining and extractive TNCs have been discovered engaging in corrupt practices (Davis and Franks, 2014; Muthuri et al., 2012). Mining sites require enormous capital investment, usually with very long payback periods, owing in part to more-complex production cycles and ever-lengthening logistics chains. And lastly, “mining is both environmentally and socially intrusive and extensive” (Selmier, 2015: 87; also see Coulson, 2012; Hilson and Murck, 2000; Kemp and Owen, 2013; Lynch, 2004). These challenges have a direct link to many or all of the SDGs and the UN Global Compact principles, as detailed in table 3.

These challenges – especially the last one – have led to mining scholars’ arguments that mining requires a “social license to operate”, which involves not only efforts to do minimal environmental and social harm (Owen and Kemp, 2013; Prno and

**Table 2. United Nations Global Compact, Ten Principles****Human Rights**

- Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and  
 Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.

**Labour**

- Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  
 Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;  
 Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and  
 Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

**Environment**

- Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;  
 Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and  
 Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.

**Anti-Corruption**

- Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.

Source: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGc/TheTenprinciples/index.html>.

Slocombe, 2012), but also to help affected communities achieve sustainable development (Hilson and Murck, 2000; ICMM, 2013, 2014). With the acceptance of the industry-leading International Council for Mining and Minerals (ICMM, 2013, 2014), this view has become a standard of conduct, one to which mining companies are expected to bind themselves in implicit, and sometimes explicit, social contracts with local communities.

Many mining TNC executives have been aware that this “social license” is also at the core of their TNC’s legitimacy. In an interview with Hevina Dashwood in August 2002 (2014: 570), one executive noted:

*Mining companies are now expected to justify their activities, not just on economic grounds, but on social and environmental grounds . . . [S]ince most governments had adopted sustainable development as a key part of their national agenda, the mining industry must talk the language of the audiences it must convince.*

Frameworks to measure progress have been established (Global Reporting Initiative, 2017; ICMM, 2014). Although frameworks such as the United Nations Global Compact provide checklists (the Ten Principles), the Compact was originally conceived as a forum for dialogue (Williams, 2004; Ruggie, 2008), not as a program to assign and account for progress in sustainable development. Rather, “institutional learning, cultivation and dissemination of best governance practices” were the targets (Oshionebo, 2007: 16; also see Kell and Ruggie, 1999).

**Table 3. Links between Challenges for Mining CSR, the UN Global Compact Principles and the Sustainable Development Goals**

	<b>Factor</b>	<b>Link to UN Global Compact Principle[s]</b>	<b>Link to Sustainable Development Goals</b>	<b>Notes</b>
1	Labour-intensive	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 16, 17	Labour conditions require special consideration of miners and their communities.
2	Very dangerous work	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	3, 5, 8, 16 17	
3	Remote environments	7, 8, 9, 10	8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17	Combination of large investment in remote, often less-institutionally-developed areas encourages cutting costs; some mining TNCs choose to do this through corrupt practices.
4	Enormous capital investment	All, especially 10	All, especially 1, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 13, 15, 16, 17	
5	Weak rule of law with corrupt mining ethical practices	All, especially 1, 2, 6, 8, 10	All, especially 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12 13, 16, 17	
6	Complex production and logistics chains	2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10	6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 15, 16, 17	
7	Long payback horizons	All, directly or indirectly	All, directly or indirectly	Combination of complexity, investment risk and the social and environmental effect on all stakeholder communities necessitates open, honest communication and extensive, ongoing social and environmental impact studies before, during and after a mining project.
8	Environmentally and socially intrusive and extensive	All	All	

*Source:* This table has been modified and expanded from Selmier (2015: 88). Authors' conception based on Coulson, (2012), Dashwood (2012, 2014); Hilson and Murck (2000); ICMM (2013); Lynch (2004); Owen and Kemp (2013); Prno and Slocombe (2012); Selmier (2015); Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh (2015); Visser (2007).

Such dialogic methods require institutions with teeth to push their programs forward. Building upon the foundation of TNCs' considerable political authority (Kobrin, 2009) and the industry's ethical stance, it is reasonable to expect them to uphold and even reinforce the SDGs (Oshionebo, 2007; Kobrin, 2009; Ruggie, 2016). The SDGs provide impetus and, by their very name, goals; the Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative provide the vehicles to achieve them.

## 2. Linking CSR and the SDGs: two cases in Africa

For mining, these institutional frameworks are deepened through industry organizations and through national and regional policies, such as mining codes. For instance, the top industry association in global mining, the ICMM, has promoted an environmentally and socially responsible mining approach that embraces sustainable

development (ICMM, 2013; 2014). This approach explicitly includes the Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative (Dashwood, 2014; ICMM, 2014) and requires consideration of local norms and local stakeholders' expectations (Besada and Martin, 2015; ICMM, 2013; Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015). In the context of African governments, mining codes have embedded local stakeholder expectations and also explicitly referred to the Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative (Dupuy, 2014; Pedro, 2016).

Responding to ICMM guidelines, the advice of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and governmental policies and their ease of execution, mining TNCs have come to invest in a similar menu of philanthropic projects and to report on their CSR projects in very similar ways (Dashwood, 2014; Hilson and Murck, 2000; Prno and Slocombe, 2012; Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015). Operating under advice from the United Nations and with explicit guidance from the ICMM to report under Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (Dashwood, 2014; Ruggie, 2008; Williams, 2014: 244), mining TNCs have even reverse-engineered CSR activities that meet these guidelines.

In the process of reverse-engineering, some TNCs have taken on board the needs of local communities and attempted to improve sustainable economic growth, develop more robust institutional foundations and support gender equality (Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, *forthcoming*). Others have simply paid lip service to UN calls for sustainable development and goals of CSR (Kemp and Owen, 2013; Oshionebo, 2007; Visser, 2007). Berliner and Prakash (2015) and others describe this as “bluwashing” – the attempt to cover a TNC in the colours of the UN flag. A mining TNC senior manager operating in East Africa claimed, “we... implement best corporate social responsibility practices that are acceptable to the company, local communities and the UN Global Compact” in interviews detailed in Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh (2015: 166). Not only were these claims not corroborated by local community leaders and other local stakeholders affected by their actions, resulting in contention and conflict, but the mining TNC has come under considerable global criticism (Newenham-Kahindi, 2011; Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015).

Our research in East and Central Africa has documented a range of mining TNC cases (Newenham-Kahindi, 2011; Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, *forthcoming*; Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015). This ongoing research began in 2008 and has involved interviewing representatives of roughly 150 large mining TNCs operating in East (Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi) and Central (Democratic Republic of Congo) Africa, including all major foreign mining TNCs operating in East Africa.<sup>3</sup> Commonality across this sample is provided by listing on major international

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<sup>3</sup> This research has been conducted and overseen by Professor Aloysius Newenham-Kahindi.

stock exchanges; professed commitments to sustainable social, economic and environmental goals; and public disclosure of each mining TNC's CSR-linked programs. All told, we conducted over 1,000 semi-structured interviews involving TNC expatriates and representatives, NGO officials (local and international ones) and local stakeholders in the form of focus groups, wherein all interviewees were permitted to choose their preferred languages. In addition, we used observations from focus groups, interviews and archival materials. We took field notes in the form of a daily diary documenting aspects of the interviews and other pertinent observations. Observations provided a collective trail of sense-making and sense-giving processes, thus allowing us to bridge theory and data (Ragin, 1994). All the interview participants were assured of confidentiality, and we took responsibility for translating their comments into English.<sup>4</sup>

From this universe we have selected two cases that provide archetypal ends of the spectrum and help to illustrate progress towards the three SDGs (Goals 5, 8 and 16). Our first case involves 27 interviews between 2013 and 2014, and our second case involved 47 interviews from 2008 until 2016. Selection on the dependent variable – success with progress towards the three SDGs – is naturally biased, but our selection is quite consistent with results gleaned from our extended research, to which we refer interested readers.

### *2.1. AngloGold*

AngloGold Ashanti, a South African and Ghanaian joint venture conglomerate working in partnership with the state-owned mining firm Gécamines, has been operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo – a country characterized as a conflict zone for the last two decades (UN, 2008). Rich in extractive natural resources, the country hosts over 100 international TNCs operating in mining activities, mainly in the eastern provinces of Katanga, North and South Kivu, and Ituri (IRC, 2007). Whereas other mining TNCs operating in the country have relied on NGOs to address community development, AngloGold Ashanti understood that, in order to help achieve enduring sustainable development, local communities need empowerment and accountability in decision-making. Hence, AngloGold Ashanti directly engaged in partnership with communities near the Kibali and Mongwalu mines in the eastern part of the country.

Microsaving programs empower local entrepreneurs by developing self-initiated entrepreneurial activities, especially among the youth and women. Women's groups

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<sup>4</sup> A more complete description of our research methodologies may be found in Selmier et al. (2015: 161–165) and in Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens (forthcoming), which triangulate primary data with available secondary data and have controlled for biases in data by using a peer debriefing report and any available information validation system to seek accuracy, credibility and validation of the data.

then engage in trade and coaching skills, and help protect their community wealth through activities such as food security preservation and promoting local knowledge to satisfy local needs in employment and education. Such groups mobilize communities against violence from warlord factions. A leader of women's groups that have developed microsaving projects in food security and household support in the Kibali communities stated:

*Wars have had destroyed our life and future. NGOs came and simply gave us hand-outs, and when they left our place without a notice or simply their contract expired or it was too dangerous, we were devastated! We have a firm [AngloGold Ashanti] that speaks our feelings, desires, our abilities ... this is what we longed for!*

Similar sentiments were expressed by the leader of a group of women's microsaving cooperatives in Mongbwalu communities:

*[AngloGold Ashanti] came and did not waste time to make a difference with communities. It gave priority [directly] to the very communities living here in terms of employment and other humanitarian supports... More surprising, it engaged women – a task normally done by NGOs. As one of the many women microsaving groups, we have taken accountability in our saving schemes, ranging from using our microsaving to building houses to sending our children to schools.*

These two excerpts were among the many illustrations of an exemplary TNC striving to engage with communities in a fragile environment. Aware of the danger of operating in a country riddled by warlords and communal conflicts, AngloGold Ashanti chose a very different path from the typical TNC. Since 2010, AngloGold Ashanti has engaged directly with community stakeholders to promote sustainable development through local entrepreneurship. In our broader research data (Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, forthcoming), we found that other TNCs in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo relied on NGOs and ended up having a limited sustainable development impact on communities. In both Kibali and Mongbwalu, AngloGold Ashanti helped to transform the livelihood of women, youth and communities through a mix of mutual learning about all parties' positions and goals, co-creative engagement, and support and capacity empowerment.

## **2.2. Acacia**

Acacia has been one of the largest gold mining TNCs operating in Tanzania since the 2000s. Tanzania is recognized as one of the more peaceful countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and so would be expected to be a less conflict-prone place in which to operate. Like other mining TNCs, Acacia has followed a more traveled, traditional path, emphasizing philanthropy to support communities through building schools and hospitals and engaging in other humanitarian efforts.



Our study began in 2008, focusing on one of Acacia's larger mining sites in the North Mara region. Since inception, the company has faced significant community challenges, violence and vandalism (Newenham-Kahindi, 2011; Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, forthcoming). Often it has used specialized security forces or state police known as the Field Force Unit, whose very name in Swahili hints at the level of local distrust and potential violence: *Fanya Fujo Uone*, which translates as “disobedience will be met with extreme force”. Our research finds that Acacia has used Tanzanian employees who are mostly educated in the capital, Dar es Salaam – and so do not come from North Mara – to represent the company on various issues such as managing employees and handling conflicts with communities. Use of non-local employees, who often do not speak the local languages, has led to community resentment and communication problems (Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015; Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, forthcoming).

Our analysis suggests that Acacia remains uncommitted to engaging with communities beyond its traditional humanitarian practices (Newenham-Kahindi, 2011; Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, forthcoming; Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015). As Kemp and Owen (2013) put it, this exemplifies mining TNCs that see CSR as core to business but not “core business”. That is to say, global recognition is sought for supporting sustainable development, but true commitment to sustainable development seems lacking. True commitment means a mining TNC needs to “engage local stakeholders as its primary ‘customers’ (i.e., peace through commerce) in a way that appeals to their social needs... [and] must recognize the reciprocal connection between poverty and violent conflict” (Newenham-Kahindi, 2011: 275).

Based on our interviews with community leaders, NGOs, government officials and mining TNC managers, we believe that true commitment will come only when mining TNCs such as Acacia understand the world view of community members in the region, who are predominantly pastoralists and small-scale farmers who have lost their ancestral land but received limited compensation. To achieve sustainable development, these pastoralists need to have their voices heard and to be empowered so that they become part of the solution. Instead, Acacia is relying on a few employees who do not come from the region to represent the company in community conflict issues rather than engaging in dialogue with the local affected communities who know what is required to achieve local sustainable development. The use of the Field Force Unit has not eased the situation. In local interviews with affected community leaders, NGOs and some government officials responsible for development, it has been frequently suggested that Acacia should invest in projects that address specific local needs and solutions such as microsaving and microcredit cooperative initiatives for youth and women, and jobs for community members.

These two comparative cases provide a strong contrast. AngloAshanti Gold might be termed “right engagement but in an unstable and fragile environment”, while Acacia may be termed “weak engagement yet in a stable and peaceful environment.” Most

mining TNCs' engagement with stakeholders on sustainable development tends to focus on "stable" environments. Especially when operating in violent, unstable and fragile states, mining TNCs have often used NGOs as intermediaries to address social issues with community stakeholders (Muthuri et al., 2012; Newenham-Kahindi, 2011).

Table 4 compares the two companies' actions across the three SDGs. Whereas AngloAshanti Gold was deliberative, targeted and purposeful, Acacia seems not to have considered specific or even overall community concerns and to have pursued scattered and indirect approaches that heightened rather than alleviated violence.

Visser (2007: 31) posed two simple questions that are critical to relationships between mining TNCs and the sustainable development of affected African communities: "corporate social responsibility according to what (or whose) definition? And is it a definition that is relevant to the context?" Socially responsible mining TNCs provide opportunities and empower community members. To advance this, mining TNCs must recognize that they are community members as well. A Tanzanian miner living in local community explained: "Working in a Chinese [mining TNC] you feel like a family. They value work participation, consensus and employees' well-being" (quoted in Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015: 171), and Tanzanian government officials stated in interviews that mining TNCs' reputations with communities would be considered when granting new mining licenses.

**Table 4. Comparing AngloGold Ashanti and Acacia on Three Sustainable Development Goals**

Sustainable Development Goal		AngloGold Ashanti	Acacia
5	gender equality and empowerment	Directly addressing through women's groups' programs	No apparent attempt to address; indirectly addressing communal issues through the use of educated intermediaries from outside local area
8	sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth	Improved local entrepreneurs' business among the most vulnerable (e.g. women) through targeted programs and financing	Randomly selected groups of entrepreneurs who benefited from the firm's philanthropic donations
16	peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development ... access to justice ... effective, accountable and inclusive institutions	Direct engagement allowed access to management: "working side by side with community leaders and elders to find solutions to communities", according to local community leader	Indirect engagement, used educated intermediaries as representatives of the firm towards engaging local pastoralists' problems. Often relied on the police force unit called Fanya Fujo Uone to quash local pastoralists' protests.

Source: Authors' conception based on Newenham-Kahindi, 2011; Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, forthcoming; Selmier, 2015; Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015.

### 3. Catalyzing progress towards the SDGs through African stakeholders' efforts

Many African countries have implemented specific community development laws which require social and economic development into mining codes and regulations (Campbell, 2009; Dupuy, 2014). The growing list of community development stipulations impels mining TNCs towards sustainable development, while the gradual knitting together of pan-African mining governance demands progress towards the SDGs. Besada and Martin (2015) argue that this shift towards promulgating mining codes with explicit sustainability targets represents Africa's fourth generation of mining codes (see also Campbell, 2009; Dashwood, 2014; Hilson and Murck, 2000). African country-level mining codes have progressed from (a) simple liberalization (first generation, early 1980s); to (b) recognition, without requirement, of social and environmental concerns linked to mining (second generation, mid-1990s); to (c) mining codes that encouraged investment with benefits for local stakeholders and stricter social and environmental impacts (third generation, turn-of-century); and to (d) a pan-African unified approach characterized as "strength in numbers"... [in which] legal harmonization efforts have been noted throughout the continent, including increased monitoring mechanisms, frameworks for improved administrative systems, and single points of contact for licensing and regulatory approvals" (Besada and Martin, 2015: 276).

The establishment of an African Mining Vision by the African Union in 2009 created a common framework across Africa to share information on mining TNCs' overall performance and efficacy of CSR activity, and results have been tied to CSR efficiency and environmental sustainability in many African countries (Besada and Martin, 2015; Dashwood, 2012; Pedro, 2016). Influenced in part by fourth generation-style codes in Africa, similar mining codes are being implemented elsewhere in the world (Hilson and Murck, 2000; Katz-Lavigne, 2017; Prno and Slocombe, 2012). Antonio Pedro (2015: 20) has called for a Country Mining Vision that

*addresses the two structural imperatives... the need to eliminate silos and the balkanisation of government functions in managing the extractive sector and improve inter-departmental coordination, and the necessity to bring different stakeholders together to engage in collective action... and create a 'movement for change' at national level built on a shared vision and common purpose.*

While there remains a gap between implementation, adherence and enforcement in some host countries, permitting and access to new mining sites are increasingly tied to sustainable development in many African countries and elsewhere (Besada and Martin, 2015; Hilson and Murck, 2000; Prno and Slocombe, 2012). For instance, Tanzania banned gangue exports effective 1 March 2017. Gangue – unprocessed

mineral-laden sand and rock pulled out of mines – must now be processed and smelted within Tanzanian borders rather than trucked or airlifted out in raw form (Ibengwe and Malanga, 2016). Although some mining TNCs – notably Acacia – are resisting (Ibengwe and Malanga, 2016; Mirondo, 2017), Tanzania will likely benefit by capturing more value added activities such as more jobs, investment in smelters and ancillary services attached to this key stage in the mining supply chain.

#### 4. Closing Thoughts

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015: 3) provides a “plan of action for people, planet and prosperity,” laying out the 17 SDGs and carefully parsing these into 169 targets. The UN Global Compact provides an important link in that chain in which the UN has recognized the value and diversity of local communities’ cultures, languages and social orders, and their traditional stewardship of the lands on which they live (Ruggie, 2016; UN, 2004; 2013). The Compact is transforming from a measuring stick into a set of defined policies and frameworks which make possible “turn[ing] the global goals [SDGs] into local business. The UN Global Compact is committed to be a leading catalyst of that transformation” (UNGC-2).

To help achieve the three SDGs mentioned, mining TNCs, when they engage with local African communities, must be able to catalyse progress towards them. Mining TNCs will need to work with four broad groups of stakeholders: governments, other businesses, their miners and the communities where mining takes place (Dashwood, 2014; Hilson and Murck, 2000; Muthuri et al, 2012). As illustrated by AngloGold Ashanti, mining TNC success will be measured first and foremost by the methods with which it catalyses the achievement of the SDGs in affected communities where the mining takes place, requiring success at the local business level.

Three issues remain, though, which necessitate further research and learning from those TNCs which have proven successful. First, local complexities necessitate local solutions; local solutions will involve members of local communities. Newenham-Kahindi and Stevens, (forthcoming; also see Selmier, Newenham-Kahindi and Oh, 2015) find that having locals acting as employees or moderators enables TNCs to establish legitimacy across communities. Local employees (either pastoralists or small farmers) can help both communities and TNCs adapt and change. That is, communities see the role of new SDG programs and how they are integrated into their changing way of life, and TNCs come to realize the SDGs are “core business” (Kemp and Owen, 2013). Such studies should be expanded across other mining areas.

Second, institutional frameworks often lack teeth, as noted by Berliner and Prakash (2015), Oshionebo (2007) and Pedro (2016). Analyzing how teeth can be added to

the SDGs – for example, by restricting access to mining sites, capital, labour and other levers of legitimacy when SDGs are not met – will provide incentives for TNCs. Mining TNCs require specific guidelines in order to frame and implement their CSR efforts to achieve targeted SDGs.

Third, it became apparent in our research that TNC transparency helped their legitimacy and even improved business operations. If demands for information are not met, then TNCs are punished or shunned by many governments (Besada and Martin, 2015; Katz-Lavigne, 2017), local communities (Kemp and Owen, 2013; Muthuri et al, 2012), investors (Davis and Franks, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2015) and other affected stakeholder groups. The efficacy of TNC information delivery and the channels through which it must be delivered therefore deserve additional research efforts.

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