



Report on global competition issues of digital markets and ecosystems

I. Background

At the twenty-second session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy¹, held from 3 to 5 July 2024 in Geneva, UNCTAD was requested to compile and report on work addressing global competition issues in digital markets and ecosystems.² Accordingly, this report was prepared by the Competition and Consumer Policies Branch to provide the latest updates since early 2024, categorized into legislative measures, soft law approaches and enforcement actions in the digital economy.

II. New legislation and legal amendments relevant to digital platforms and competition

Since early 2024, several jurisdictions have introduced new *ex-ante* legislation targeting digital platforms, following the European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA). These *ex-ante* regimes aim to impose upfront obligations on firms with significant market power to prevent anti-competitive conduct, rather than relying solely on *ex-post* competition enforcement mechanisms. These include the long-discussed United Kingdom's (UK) Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCC Act), which empowers Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to designate certain tech companies with "strategic market status" and to set tailored "conduct requirements" for these designated companies.³ Japan introduced Smartphone Software Competition Promotion Act, building on an earlier Act on Improving transparency and fairness of digital platforms, with a more targeted focus on promoting competition in mobile operating systems and app distribution.⁴

As for amendments to their existing competition frameworks, in 2024, Denmark enacted amendments to its Competition Act, introducing a discretionary call-in option for transactions below thresholds,⁵ and China amended its judicial interpretation to tackle issues arising in the

¹ <https://unctad.org/meeting/intergovernmental-group-experts-competition-law-and-policy-twenty-second-session>.

² https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ciclpd77_en.pdf.

³ <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how-the-uks-digital-markets-competition-regime-works>.

⁴ <https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2024/June/240612.html>.

⁵ <https://kfst.dk/pressemeddelelser/kfst/2024/20240701-aendret-konkurrencelov-traeder-i-kraft>; and <https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2024/638>.

digital economy.⁶ Australia,⁷ Kazakhstan⁸ and Russian Federation⁹ are planning to adjust their legislations to address competition issues in the digital platform sector. In contrast, in September 2024, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) decided not to pursue *ex-ante* regulations after nearly four years of effort, opting instead to revise existing laws to address issues in the digital platform sector.¹⁰

III. Soft law approaches relevant to digital platforms and competition

A. Guidelines

In 2024, Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) of Brazil and the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) of China released guidelines addressing merger reviews. Both provide partial coverage of digital market concerns, with CADE focusing on non-horizontal effects¹¹ and SAMR on horizontal mergers.¹² The Philippine Competition Commission¹³ and the Republic of Korea¹⁴ updated merger control guidelines to address digital market changes. Similarly, the Egyptian Competition Authority released three guidelines that address the impact of competition in the digital economy.¹⁵

B. Market studies and advocacy

⁶ On June 24, 2024, the Supreme People's Court of China issued a new judicial interpretation on civil litigation against monopolies, substantially modifying its 2012 version. It addresses issues such as defining relevant product markets in the platform economy, algorithmic collusion, platform most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses, and platform openness. <https://ipc.court.gov.cn/zh-cn/news/view-3112.html>.

⁷ Australia has proposed a new digital competition regime to establish key principles, designate specific digital platform entities, and create a framework for detailed service-level obligations. <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-welcomes-consultation-on-new-digital-competition-regime>.

⁸ On March 17, 2025, Kazakhstan presented the draft law "On Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Competition Issues." One of the key areas focuses on establishing new criteria for determining market dominance to better address the impact of digital economies. <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/zk/press/news/details/959474?lang=kk>.

⁹ In December 2024, an amendment to the law "On Protection of Competition" was proposed, focusing on utilizing artificial intelligence and big data analytics to detect signs of anti-competitive behavior. <https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/advances-bill-to-strengthen-antitrust-enforcement-through-ai/>.

¹⁰ <https://www.ftc.go.kr/www/selectBbsNttView.do?pageUnit=10&pageIndex=3&searchCnd=all&searchKrdw=%ED%94%8C%EB%9E%AB%ED%8F%BC&key=12&bordCd=3&searchCtgr=01,02&nttSn=43580>.

¹¹ <https://cdn.cade.gov.br/Portal/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/guias-do-cade/V+/%20Guia%20in%20English%20-%20Final%20version%202.pdf>.

¹² https://www.samr.gov.cn/zw/zfxgk/fdzdgknr/fldzfes/art/2024/art_635d601b816e412e88265f83d4f6794d.html.

¹³ <https://phcc.gov.ph/file-manager/file-manager/POST/S/PCC-Guidelines-on-Merger-Remedies-01July2024.pdf>.

¹⁴ <https://www.leeko.com/leenko/news/newsLetterView.do?lang=KR&newsLetterNo=2102>.

¹⁵ The updated guidelines are: ECA Guidelines on the Assessment of Vertical Agreements, ECA Guidelines on Definition of a Relevant Market and ECA Guidelines on the Assessment of a Dominance Position. <https://eca.org.eg/getattachment/75f52f67-1f6d-4b75-ab35-ef261b26cc17/ECA-Guidelines-on-the-assessment-of-Vertical-Agreements.pdf>; <https://eca.org.eg/getattachment/b4063e1e-3a19-4ecf-825f-30a3ccb18576/Market-Definition-Guidelines.pdf>; and <https://eca.org.eg/getattachment/1dfd779e-3227-42eb-820a-7f6834698404/Dominance-Guidelines.pdf>.

Competition authorities are actively identifying competition issues in digital markets through market studies: Pakistan launched a competition assessment of digital markets and services¹⁶; the Philippines conducted a market study to build domestic capabilities for tackling digital market competition¹⁷, the Republic of Korea studied the e-commerce sector, noting intense competition and margin pressures;¹⁸ India launched a market study on “Artificial Intelligence and Competition”;¹⁹ and Slovenia found high market concentration in digital food delivery platforms.²⁰ Japan conducted studies on connected TV and video streaming services, as well as ride-hailing apps.²¹ The UK found that the competition in its cloud services market is not working as well as it could be.²² Moreover, in its Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry, South Africa concluded that Google’s monopoly in the search platform market has adverse effects on competition.²³

Meanwhile, the EU, UK CMA, United States (US) Department of Justice (DOJ) and US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued Joint statement issued to convey their commitment to ensuring “fair, open, and competitive markets in the evolving field of generative AI”, to set out shared principles for protecting competition in the AI ecosystem.²⁴ It was released in response to the rapid development of AI, outlining shared principles to protect competition and consumers. Similarly, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) came together to issue a joint declaration on competition in digital markets.²⁵

In addition to market studies, in 2024, competition authorities around the world released reports on digital platforms, to raise awareness of emerging competition concerns, inform policy debates, and clarify enforcement priorities. These initiatives included Australia's ninth interim report for the Digital Platform Services Inquiry,²⁶ Brazil's report on "Control of Data,

¹⁶ <https://appadminccp.cc.gov.pk/NewsCoverages/eba8f82e8842b26cf2fc0357e7ebae54.pdf>.

¹⁷ <https://www.phcc.gov.ph/resource-details/new-pcc-study-scopes-potential-competition-concerns-and-regulatory-solutions-in-digital-advertising>.

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<https://www.ftc.go.kr/www/selectBbsNttView.do?pageUnit=10&pageIndex=10&searchCnd=all&key=12&bordCd=3&searchCtgy=01,02&nttSn=43748>.

¹⁹ <https://www.cci.gov.in/economics-research/market-studies/details/45/0>.

²⁰ <https://www.varstvo-konkurence.si/informacije/novica/raziskava-trga-dostave-hrane-preko-digitalnih-platform-v-republiki-sloveniji/>.

²¹ <https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2024/March/240306.html>; and

<https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2025/April/250423.html>.

²² <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-independent-inquiry-group-publishes-provisional-findings-in-cloud-services-market-investigation>.

²³ <https://www.compcom.co.za/mdpmi/>.

²⁴ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-statement-on-competition-in-generative-ai-foundation-models-and-ai-products>.

²⁵ <https://fas.gov.ru/news/33633>.

²⁶ <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/google%E2%80%99s-dominance-in-general-search-yet-to-be-disrupted>.

Market Power and Potential Competition in Merger Reviews,"²⁷ Japan's exploration of competition concerns in generative AI, addressing issues such as data hoarding and algorithmic collusion,²⁸ and the Republic of Korea's publication on "Generative AI and Competition policy report".²⁹ Additionally, competition authorities from developing countries like Angola and Armenia hosted knowledge-sharing activities focused on the digital economy, such as session on e-payments³⁰ and expert roundtable on digital market regulation.³¹

IV. Enforcement actions relevant to digital platforms and competition

From April 2024 through May 2025, competition authorities around the world have launched or concluded cases on competition infringements in digital markets. Competition authorities globally have been taking actions against big tech. Notable examples include global cases or investigations involving against Apple, Booking.com, Google, and Meta (Facebook). Critically, many of these cases address the same or similar competition concerns, including: abuse of dominant position, price-fixing, self-preferencing³², along with tying and bundling³³.

Table 1. Enforcement actions by competition authorities from April 2024 through May 2025

Company name	Competition authorities which launched or concluded enforcement actions against Apple, Booking.com, Google, and Meta (Facebook) between April 2024 through May 2025
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²⁷ <https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/cade-releases-report-on-control-of-data-and-competition-in-merger-reviews>.

²⁸ https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/about_jftc/index_3_241002.html.

²⁹ <https://repokr.github.io/doc/GenAI2024.pdf>.

³⁰ <https://arc.minfin.gov.ao/PortalARC/#!/sala-de-imprensa/noticias/13634/sistemas-de-pagamentos-eletronicos-como-factor-de-competitividade-norteiam-abordagens-no-ondjango-da-arc>.

³¹ <https://cldp.doc.gov/programs/cldp-in-action/competition-in-armenian-digital-markets-gap-analysis-report-and-roundtable>.

³² Self-preferencing is actions taken by a government, business, or person to favor their own products or services over competitors for economic gain.

³³ Tying and bundling is when a buyer purchases one product and then must purchase an additional product to make the first product work, or two or more goods are sold together for a single price.

Apple	Australia ³⁴ , Brazil ³⁵ , EU ³⁶ , France ³⁷ , Russian Federation ³⁸ , Spain ³⁹ , Türkiye ⁴⁰ , and UK. ⁴¹
Booking.com	EU, ⁴² Italy ⁴³ , and Spain. ⁴⁴

³⁴ The ACCC investigated Apple's refusal to grant its rivals access to its near field communication technology as an abuse of dominant position. <https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/digital-markets-guide/fourth-edition/article/australia-acc-continues-focus-digital-platforms-amid-key-legislative-reform-proposals>.

³⁵ CADE has been investigating Apple for an alleged abuse of its dominant position by requiring developers to use its payment system. While the investigation is ongoing, a federal judge has issued a preliminary order that Apple must allow the use of other payment platforms or risk a fine for each day this access is denied. <https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/cade-issues-interim-measure-against-apple>.

³⁶ The EU investigated Apple's refusal to grant its rivals access to its near field communication technology as an abuse of dominant position. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3706.

³⁷ The Autorité de la Concurrence fined Apple for abusing its dominant position through its App Tracking Transparency which creates excessive pop-ups about managing data while also harming smaller companies who rely on that data. <https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/article/targeted-advertising-autorite-de-la-concurrence-imposes-fine-eu150000000-apple>.

³⁸ The Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation found that Apple had violated competition rules through restricting its use of near field communication technologies and by blocking Russian iOS users from using banking services as well as being able to make payments. <https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/russias-fas-suspects-apple-of-violating-antitrust-rules>.

³⁹ In July 2024, the Spanish National Markets and Competition Commission (NMCC) investigated Apple's anticompetitive practices by imposing unfair commercial terms on developers using the Apple App Store to distribute applications. https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/editor_contenidos/Notas%20de%20prensa/2024/20240724_NP_Apple_App_Store_eng.pdf.

⁴⁰ The Turkish Competition Authority is investigating if Apple has violated competition laws by restricting the use of other payment platforms in the iOS system. <https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr/Guncel/apple-inc-ve-apple-teknoloji-ve-satis-li-013f35240324ef1193cb0050568585c9>. In May 2025, the authority investigated Apple's determination of the resale prices of its products, its coordination of repurchase prices, and its exchange of competition-sensitive data. <https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr/Guncel/apple-teknoloji-ve-satis-limited-sirketi-f613be9cd22ff01193df0050568549fa>.

⁴¹ The CMA is investigating if Apple has abused its dominant position to engage in price fixing and under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, if Apple has "strategic market status" <https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/turkey-opens-investigation-into-apple-and-resellers-over-alleged-price-fixing/> and <https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-apple-appstore>.

⁴² In September 2024, the EU issued a preliminary order that Booking.com had violated EU competition rules. Notably, the European Court of Justice found that Booking.com's price parity clauses harmed competition across hotel accommodation platforms. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62023CJ0264>.

⁴³ In December 2024, the Italian Competition Authority closed its investigation into Booking.com for alleged abuse of its dominant position. Booking.com has promised to follow several commitments to ensure anticompetitive concerns are not raised in the future. <https://competitionlawinsights.twobirds.com/post/102jto8/italian-competition-authority-accepts-booking-com-commitments-in-abuse-of-dominan>.

⁴⁴ In July 2024, the NMCC fined Booking.com for abusing its dominant position. However, in March 2025, Spain's National Court temporarily suspended this fine. <https://euroweeklynews.com/2025/03/09/spains-e413m-fine-against-booking-com-suspended/>.

Google	Australia ⁴⁵ , Canada ⁴⁶ , China ⁴⁷ , Czechia ⁴⁸ , EU ⁴⁹ , Germany ⁵⁰ , Hungary ⁵¹ , India ⁵² , Indonesia ⁵³ , Japan ⁵⁴ , Republic of Korea ⁵⁵ , Türkiye ⁵⁶ , UK ⁵⁷ , and US. ⁵⁸
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⁴⁵ In August 2024, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) announced to conduct further investigation into Google's search services over alleged abuse of market power regarding pre-installed search engines on Android devices. <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-accepts-undertaking-from-tpg-in-ongoing-investigation-into-googles-search-services>.

⁴⁶ In November 2024, the Competition Bureau of Canada sued Google for abusing its dominance in online advertising by unlawfully tying ad tech tools, giving them preferential inventory access, and setting favourable terms. <https://www.canada.ca/en/competition-bureau/news/2024/11/competition-bureau-sues-google-for-anti-competitive-conduct-in-online-advertising-in-canada.html>.

⁴⁷ In February 2025, SAMR (China) opened an investigation into Google for its potential anticompetitive conduct. https://www.samr.gov.cn/xw/zj/art/2025/art_396a9ab3aa6d4c4bbd40833815afd245.html.

⁴⁸ The Czech Office for the Protection of Competition is investigating Google's alleged abuse of a dominant position in related to excluding certain goods from the Google Merchant Centre, which is a prerequisite to use Google's ad services. <https://uohs.gov.cz/en/information-centre/press-releases/competition/4088-google-made-changes-to-one-of-its-services-in-reaction-to-the-investigation-of-the-office.html>.

⁴⁹ The EU found that Google had abused its dominant position by engaging in self-preferencing. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62022CJ0048> and <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62023CJ0233>.

⁵⁰ In April 2025, the Bundeskartellamt issued its final decision and accepted Alphabet Inc.'s (Google's) commitments. <https://digitalpolicyalert.org/event/29016-bundeskartellamt-issued-ruling-in-its-investigation-into-google-over-its-anticompetitive-practices-in-connection-with-google-map-services-b7-2522-gmp>.

⁵¹ In January 2025, the Hungarian Competition Authority closed its over 3-year investigation into Google's song lyrics card service, concluding that Google did not abuse its dominant position in the relevant market. <https://www.gvh.hu/sajtoszoba/sajtokozlemenyek/2025-os-sajtokozlemenyek/lezarta-a-google-vizsgalat-a-gvh>.

⁵² In June 2024, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) dismissed a complaint against Google for abusing its dominant position by favouring Truecaller due to a lack of evidence. <https://www.cci.gov.in/antitrust/orders/details/1118/0>; In April 2025, CCI adopted an order approving Google's settlement proposal on the alleged abuse of dominance concerning Android televisions. <https://www.cci.gov.in/antitrust/orders/details/1182/0>.

⁵³ The Indonesian Competition Commission (KPPU) determined that Google abused its dominant position by threatening to remove app developers from its Google Play store if they did not use its Google Pay services. <https://eng.kppu.go.id/google-found-in-violation-kppu-imposes-fine-of-idr-202-5-billion/>.

⁵⁴ In April 2025, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) issued a cease and desist order to Google, requiring it to stop imposing restrictive terms under its Mobile Application Distribution Agreements and Revenue Share Agreements. <https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2025/April/250415.html>.

⁵⁵ In May 2025, the KFTC initiated the consent decision procedure after assessing the Google's proposal to address competition concerns in Google music. <https://www.ftc.go.kr/www/selectBbsNttView.do?pageUnit=10&pageIndex=1&searchCnd=all&key=12&bordCd=3&searchCtgr=01,02&nttSn=46106>.

⁵⁶ The Turkish Competition Authority found that Google had abused its dominant market position by engaging in self-preferencing. <https://www.concurrences.com/en/bulletin/news-issues/december-2024/the-turkish-competition-authority-imposes-a-record-fine-on-a-big-tech-company>.

⁵⁷ The CMA determined that Google violated its dominant position regarding their mobile ecosystems, which includes operating systems, app stores and browsers that operate on mobile devices for suspected abuse of a dominant position. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6731ffb00d90ee304badaff/CMA_s_Q2_to_Q3_2024_report.pdf.

⁵⁸ In April 2025, a US District Court determined that Google engaged in anticompetitive acts, including tying publisher ad server and ad exchange and imposing anticompetitive policies on its customers and eliminating desirable product features. <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.vaed.533508/gov.uscourts.vaed.533508.1410.0.pdf>.

Meta (Facebook)	EU ⁵⁹ , Germany ⁶⁰ , India ⁶¹ , Nigeria ⁶² , Poland ⁶³ , and Türkiye. ⁶⁴
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Other notable enforcement actions by competition authorities around the world include investigations or decisions against Amazon⁶⁵, Microsoft⁶⁶ and Dell⁶⁷, as well as cases involving digital marketing companies⁶⁸, digital payment market⁶⁹, E-commerce platforms⁷⁰, food

⁵⁹ In March 2025, the EU published a decision on Meta for abusing its dominant position through tying and using competitors' advertising data.

https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202513/AT_40684_10582539_13405_4.pdf. Additionally, the EU also fined Meta for tying a classified ad service on Facebook Marketplace to Facebook.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_24_5801.

⁶⁰ The Bundeskartellamt found that Meta (Facebook) had abused its dominant position by sharing user data, without consent, throughout its numerous companies. <https://www.hausfeld.com/nl-be/what-we-think/competition-bulletin/data-exploiting-as-an-abuse-of-dominance-the-german-facebook-decision/#:~:text=The%20FCO's%20February%206th%20decision,German%20market%20for%20social%20networks>.

⁶¹ The CCI determined that Meta (Facebook) abused its dominant position by failing to ask for user consent before sharing user data across its companies.

<https://www.cci.gov.in/images/antitrustorder/en/order1732001619.pdf>.

⁶² In July 2024, the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission fined WhatsApp and its parent company Meta (Facebook) for violating competition laws by sharing consumer data without consent across its companies. <https://africanantitrust.com/2025/04/29/nigeria-flexes-regulatory-muscle-tribunal-upholds-220-million-fine-against-whatsapp-and-meta-over-data-discrimination-practices/>.

⁶³ The Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) launched a preliminary investigation into Meta for violation of competition laws, specifically into whether a new format for presenting articles on Meta diminishes competition. As of May 2025, this investigation is ongoing. <https://uokik.gov.pl/en/meta-preliminary-investigation>.

⁶⁴ In November 2024, the Turkish Competition Authority concluded its investigation into Meta and accepted Meta's commitments to address concerns raised in the investigation related to data integration practices between Threads and Instagram. <https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Dosya/meta-duyuru-metni-20241205141336007.pdf>.

⁶⁵ In November 2024, the JFTC launched an investigation into restrictive practices, including requiring sellers to set "competitive prices" to qualify for the "Recommended Listings" feature and pressing them to use the "Fulfillment by Amazon" (FBA) service. <https://www.jftc.go.jp/soudan/jyohoteikyo/1204.html>.

⁶⁶ The EU issued a preliminary ruling in its investigation into Microsoft, finding that Microsoft breached EU antitrust rules. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3446.

⁶⁷ In October 2024, the President of UOKiK mandated Dell to revise its sales practices after finding that its transaction registration system potentially restricted competition by limiting customers' access to competitive offers. <https://uokik.gov.pl/en/president-of-uokik-obligated-dell-to-change-its-practices>.

⁶⁸ In October 2024, the Turkish Competition Authority announced an investigation into Yek Teknoloji, a content services provider for its potential exclusionary practices in TV series content services via YouTube. <https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/en/Guncel/investigation-launched-on-med-yapim-tele-01b870fcf591ef1193d20050568585c9>.

⁶⁹ In October 2024, the Moroccan Competition Council concluded its investigation into the Interbank Monetary Center (CMI) and the practices within the electronic card payment market and accepted commitments from CMI and its shareholder banks. <https://conseil-concurrence.ma/communique-du-conseil-de-la-concurrence-13/>.

⁷⁰ In May 2024, the KPPU opened an investigation into Lazada's discriminatory practices. https://kppu.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Siaran-Pers-No.-38_KPPU-PR_V_2024.pdf. Simultaneously, the KPPU conducted investigation against Shopee due to its discriminatory algorithm settings and courier selection practice. The investigation closed in November 2024 after the KPPU confirmed Shopee's commitments. https://kppu.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Siaran-Pers-No.-95_KPPU-PR_XI_2024.pdf.

delivery platforms⁷¹, ride-hailing platforms⁷², video game platforms⁷³, and an online hotel and accommodation service platform that used Mastercard Europe.⁷⁴ These actions have resulted from competition concerns, including abuse of dominant position (such as tying and bundling, self-preferencing, and algorithmic discrimination), cartel conduct (such as market allocation, information exchange, and no-poach agreements), and risks addressed through merger control.

V. Conclusion

Competition authorities, not only advanced ones but also smaller and younger ones of developing countries, are increasingly active in addressing the platform economy, enforcing competition law using existing legal frameworks, while also introducing legislative amendments, publishing guidelines and reports, and engaging in knowledge-sharing initiatives. While there is a growing trend toward introducing platform-specific regulation, such measures are not a “one-size-fits-all solution”. We observe alternative or complementary approaches including amending existing competition laws, leveraging soft law instruments, or combining multiple tools. The most suitable approach will ultimately depend on each jurisdiction’s legal tradition, institutional capacity, policy priorities, and enforcement culture.

⁷¹ Enforcement actions taken by the EU (fining Delivery Hero and Glovo for violating sharing the allocation of geographic markets, sharing commercially sensitive information and utilizing no poach agreements) and Taiwan Province of China (preventing a merger between Uber and Foodpanda). https://europa.eu/newsroom/ecpc-failover/pdf/ip-25-1356_en.pdf; and <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/business/taiwan-blocks-uber-foodpanda-merger-monopoly-4825661>.

⁷² Enforcement actions taken by the SAMR (determination that Didi did not abuse its market dominance in the ride sharing industry), Supreme People’s Court, Final Civil Judgment No. 452 (2024); and the KFTC (investigation into Kakao Mobility for abuse of dominant position in the ride sharing industry). <https://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/downloadBbsFile.do?atchmnfNo=17438>.

⁷³ In May 2024, the UOKiK launched a preliminary investigation against video game provider platforms such as the PlayStation Store and Steam. <https://uokik.gov.pl/en/video-game-market-preliminary-investigation>.

⁷⁴ Investigation by the Georgian Competition and Consumer Agency into Tneti Ltd. and Mastercard Europe found no restrictive agreements in violation of Georgian competition law. https://gcca.gov.ge/index.php?m=328&cat_id=76&lng=eng.