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**Trade and Development Board**  
**Working Party on the Strategic Framework and**  
**the Programme Budget**  
**Sixty-eighth session**  
Geneva, 3–5 September 2014  
Item 4 (b) of the provisional agenda

## **External evaluation of UNCTAD subprogramme 2: Investment and enterprise**

### **Supporting materials<sup>1</sup>**

#### *Executive summary*

This document contains supporting materials to the external evaluation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) subprogramme 2: Investment and enterprise.

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<sup>1</sup> This evaluation was prepared by an independent evaluation team: Mr. Thierry Noyelle and Mr. Achim Engelhardt, with Mr. Jüri Seilenthal and Ms. Preeti Rahman. The related main report can be found in document TD/B/WP/264.

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## Annex I

### Evaluation criteria and main questions

#### A. Relevance

1. How useful are the services provided by subprogramme 2 on investment and enterprise (SP2)?
2. To what extent is SP2 meeting the needs of its constituencies, in particular African countries and the least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries, small island developing States and other structurally vulnerable economies?
3. What is UNCTAD's role, strengths and weaknesses, in comparison to other development actors, in the specific substantive areas of SP2?
4. What would have happened to beneficiaries without support from SP2?
5. To what extent is SP2 supportive of internationally agreed development goals such as the Millennium Development Goals?

#### B. Impact

1. To what extent does SP2 contribute to the objective of strengthened capacities to effectively ensure development gains from increased investment flows, enhanced competitiveness and increased productive capacities?
2. To what extent do SP2 activities have a positive impact on job development?
3. What indications are there of the actual (or potential) impact of SP2, in particular at the national level?
4. How are expected outcomes and impacts identified? How are they monitored?
5. How are risks and risk mitigation factored into the operation of SP2?
6. Would beneficiaries have been worse off without support in the areas of expertise of SP2?

#### C. Effectiveness

1. To what extent is SP2 effective in achieving the planned outcomes (expected accomplishments) suggested in the United Nations Strategic Framework?
2. What challenges and constraints are encountered during implementation?
3. What programme management and delivery best practices may be singled out?

#### D. Efficiency

1. How efficiently are human and financial resources used to achieve programme outcomes?

2. To what extent does SP2 make use of enhanced information technology tools and networking?
3. To what extent does SP2 make use of synergies among Division on Investment and Enterprise (DIAE) branches?
4. To what extent does DIAE help beneficiaries identify synergies between SP2 and other UNCTAD subprogrammes?
5. To what extent do SP2 and other development organizations coordinate support?

## **E. Sustainability**

1. To what extent does SP2 lead to changes in beneficiaries' understanding of key investment and enterprise development policy issues, through its research, consensus-building or technical cooperation?
2. To what extent do such changes lead to lasting, sustainable reforms among beneficiaries?
3. To what extent are national institutions able to sustain technically and financially the assistance they receive?
4. To what extent are conditions specific to LDCs, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States and other vulnerable economies taken into account to ensure maximum sustainability?

## **F. Cross-cutting issues (gender equity and sustainable environment)**

1. To what extent does SP2 incorporate dimensions of gender equity and women's empowerment in its work and technical support?
2. To what extent does SP2 have a measurable impact on gender equity and women's empowerment?
3. To what extent does SP2 incorporate dimensions of the green economy/environmental sustainability into its work and technical support?
4. To what extent does SP2 have a measurable impact on the green economy/environmental sustainability?

## Annex II

### Individuals interviewed or surveyed

#### UNCTAD secretariat

##### *Division on Investment and Enterprise*

Mr. James Zhan, Director,  
Mr. Alexandre Dabbou, Office of the Director

##### **Investment Trends and Issues Branch**

Mr. Masataka Fujita, Chief, Investment Trends and Issues Branch  
Mr. Astrit Sulstarova, Trends and Data Section  
Mr. Hafiz Mirza, Investment Issues Section

##### **Investment Policies Branch**

Mr. Joerg Weber, Chief, Investment Policies Branch  
Mr. Joachim Karl, Policy Research Section  
Ms. Elisabeth Tuerk, International Investment Agreements Section  
Mr. Ventzislav Kotetzov, Consultant on international investment agreements (IIAs)  
Ms. Natalia Guerra, International Investment Agreements Section  
Ms. Chantal Dupasquier, Investment Policy Review Section

##### **Investment Capacity-Building Branch**

Mr. Paul Wessendorp, Investment Promotion Section  
Mr. Richard Bolwijn, Business Facilitation Section  
Mr. Frank Grozel, Business Facilitation Section  
Mr. Julien Bornon, Business Facilitation Section  
Ms. Bitia Mortazavi, Business Facilitation Section  
Mr. Kiyoshi Adachi, Intellectual Property Unit

##### **Enterprise Branch**

Ms. Tatiana Krylova, Chief, Enterprise Branch  
Ms. Fiorina Mugione, Entrepreneurship Section  
Mr. Lorenzo Tosina, Entrepreneurship Section  
Ms. Fulvia Farinelli, Entrepreneurship Section  
Mr. Till Leopold, Entrepreneurship Section  
Mr. Jean-Francois Baylocq, Accounting and Corporate Governance Section  
Mr. Dezider Stefunko, Insurance Unit

##### *Other divisions*

Ms. Yuen Ching Ho, Chief, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit, Office of the Secretary-General  
Mr. Daniel Chen, Associate Programme Officer, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit, Office of the Secretary-General  
Ms. Manuela Tortora, Chief, Technical Cooperation Service  
Mr. Miguel Bautista, Chief, Group Liaison Unit, Intergovernmental Support Service  
Mr. Guillermo Valles, Director, Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities  
Mr. Richard Kozul-Wright, Director, Division on Globalization and Development Strategies

Mr. Taffere Tesfachew, Director, Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes

Ms. Christiane Stepanek-Allen, Chief, Communication, Information and Outreach Section, Office of the Secretary-General

#### **Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Lusaka)**

Mr. Thierry Mutombo Kalonji, Director, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development Division (IIAs)

Mr. Themba Munalula, Chief, Statistics Unit, Division of Trade, Customs and Monetary Affairs (statistics and annual COMESA Investment Report)

#### **Dominican Republic**

Mr. Ignacio A. Mendez Fernandez, Vice-Minister for the Creation of Small and Medium Enterprises, Ministry of Industry and Commerce

Mr. José Miguel Checo, Director Entrepreneurship, Ministry of Industry and Commerce

Ms. Aguié Lendor, former Director, Legal Affairs, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana

Mr. Jean Alain Rodríguez, Secretary of State, Executive Director, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana

Ms. Carolina Pérez, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Market Intelligence Deputy Manager, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana

Mr. Carlos Pared Vidal, Deputy Director, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana

Mr. Yeli Martínez Oller, Specialist in commerce and investment policies, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana

Mr. José Frank Cuello, Instituto Tecnológico de las Américas/Centro Empretec

Ms. Xiomara Frías, Empretec Master Trainer

#### **Guatemala**

Mr. Saúl Morales, Consultant, Asociación de Gerentes de Guatemala

Ms. Heidy W. Garrido, Manager, Centro de Desarrollo Empresarial, Asociación de Gerentes de Guatemala

Ms. Brenda Manola Castañeda, Invest in Guatemala

Ms. Claudia Cáceres, Director, Investment Unit, Programa Nacional de Competitividad

#### **Zambia**

Mr. Zondo Chulu, Business Linkage Officer, Empretec Zambia, Zambia Development Agency

Mr. Mukula Makasa, Director, Enterprise Development and Empretec Zambia, Zambia Development Agency

Mr. Innocent Melu, Manager, Enterprise Development and Empretec Zambia, Zambia Development Agency

Mr. Gabriel Musentekwa, Manager, Aftercare Services, Empretec Zambia, Zambia Development Agency

Mr. Mulimkiba, Director of Industry, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (Investment Policy Review (IPR))

Mr. Boniface Kunda, Chief Economist, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (IIAs)

Ms. Banji Ng'andu, Economist, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (IIAs)

Ms. Naomi Linitini, International Labour Organization (ILO), Broad-based Work and Employment Programme and Green Jobs Programme (Empretec)

#### **International investment agreements questionnaire**

Mr. Boniface Kunda, Chief Economist, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Zambia

Ms. Banji Ng'andu, Economist, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Zambia

Mr. Thierry Mutombo Kalonji, Director, COMESA, Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development Division

Mr. Ajuma Patience Okala, Legal Adviser, Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, Nigeria  
Mr. Edwini Kessie, Chief Trade Adviser, Office of the Chief Trade Adviser/OCTAPIC  
Mr. Guillermo Malpica Soto, Director General for Negotiations, Secretaría de Economía, Mexico  
Ms. Mónica López Rincón, Director of International Trade in Services and Investment, Secretaría de Economía, Mexico  
Ms. Champika Malalgoda, Director Research and Policy Analysis, Board of Investment, Sri Lanka  
Mr. Moataz Hussein, General Authority on Investment, Egypt  
Ms. Sakura Ozaki, Programme Director, Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation  
Mr. Pilanya Niyonthai, Head, Bilateral Unit, Direction of International Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand  
Mr. Muhammad De Gama, Director, Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa

**Investment Policy Review questionnaire**

Mr. Mulimkiba, Director of Industry, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Zambia  
Ms. Alimaa Batchuluun, Mongolia Investment Promotion Agency, Mongolia  
Mr. James W. Musau, Senior Officer Research, Policy and Planning, Kenya Investment Authority, Kenya  
Ms. Marethabile Nkoe, Ministry of Trade, Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing, Lesotho  
Ms. Brenda Manola Castañeda, Invest in Guatemala, Guatemala  
Ms. Agüie Lendor, former Director, Legal Affairs, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana  
Mr. Jean Alain Rodríguez, Secretary of State, Executive Director, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana  
Ms. Carolina Pérez, FDI Market Intelligence Deputy Manager, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana  
Mr. Carlos Pared Vidal, Deputy Director, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana  
Mr. Yeli Martínez Oller, Specialist in commerce and investment policies, Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana  
Ms. Adriana Vargas Saldarriaga, Director, Dirección de Inversión Extranjera, Servicios y Propiedad Intelectual, Colombia

**Empretec questionnaire**

Mr. Zondo Chulu, Business Linkages Officer, Zambia  
Mr. Mukula Makasa, Director, Enterprise Development and Empretec Zambia, Zambia Development Agency, Zambia  
Mr. Innocent Melu, Manager, Enterprise Development and Empretec Zambia, Zambia Development Agency, Zambia  
Mr. Gabriel Musentekwa, Manager, Aftercare Services, Empretec Zambia, Zambia Development Agency, Zambia  
Ms. Naomi Linitini, ILO, Broad-based Work and Employment Programme and Green Jobs Programme, Zambia  
Mr. Solomon Wole, Enterprise Centre Ethiopia, Ethiopia  
Mr. Charles Ocici, Chief Executive Officer, Enterprise Uganda  
Mr. Nana Tweneboa-Boateng, Director, Empretec Enterprise Ghana, Ghana  
Ms. Alesandra Cunha, Manager, Brazilian Support Service for Microenterprises and Small Enterprises (Sebrae), Brazil  
Mr. Nayef Stetieh, President, Business Development Centre, Jordan  
Mr. Ghaleb M. Hijazi, Director of Entrepreneurship and Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Support, Business Development Centre, Jordan  
Mr. Ricardo Finkelsztein, Director, Fundación Empretec, Argentina

Mr. José Frank Cuello, Instituto Tecnológico de las Américas/Centro Empretec, Dominican Republic

**E-regulations questionnaire**

Ms. Zeinabou Keita, Director, Single Window for Enterprise Creation, Agence pour la Promotion des Investissements, Mali

Mr. Maurice Potcho, Director, Guichet Unique et des Relations Publiques, Société d'Administration des Zones Franches, Togo

Ms. Silvia Campos de Machuca, Chief, Unit for Economic and Social Analysis, Technical Secretariat for the Presidency, El Salvador

Mr. Victor Matassi, Secretary Responsible for Modernization, City Hall, Lomas de Zamora, Argentina

Ms. Bénédicte Houetchenou, Coordinator, Ministry for Public Reform and Privatization, Benin

Ms. Marie Therese Bireng, Coordinator, Ministry for Small and Medium Enterprises, Social Economy and Handicraft, Cameroon

Ms. Vivian Kayitesi, Head, Investment Promotion and Implementation, Rwanda Development Board, Rwanda

Ms. Juliet Kairuki, Executive Director, Tanzania Investment Centre, United Republic of Tanzania

Ms. Claudia Cáceres, Director, Investment Unit, Programa Nacional de Competitividad, Guatemala

**Empretec questionnaire**

Neptune Investment and Construction Ltd., Zambia

Glymo Enterprise, Zambia

Ken Line Ltd., Zambia

Angel Bites Ltd., Zambia

Mr. José Herrera, Manager, Fundación Emprende, Guatemala

Ms. Gladis and Mr. Francisco Río, Proprietors, Patulul Suchitepéquez Fast Food Restaurant, Guatemala

Ms. Ligia Soto, Proprietor, Youth Entrepreneurs, Guatemala

Mr. Esteban Román Matos, Member, Asociación de Caficultores y Agricultores, Dominican Republic

Mr. Luis Clever Ramírez, Member, Cooperativa de Servicios Múltiples, San Rafael Inc., Dominican Republic

Ms. Zenaida Geraldo Silvestre, Member, Asociación de Desarrollo Comunitario Villalpando, Dominican Republic

Ms. Ana Celia Encarnación Batista, Member, Asociación Club de Madres el Desarrollo de las Guanábanas, Dominican Republic

Ms. Leonor De León, Member, Federación Campesinos Independientes Mamá Tingó, Dominican Republic

Mr. Rufino L. Díaz, Proprietor, Perpetual Education Fund, Dominican Republic

Ms. Delci Pequero, Proprietor, Siglo XVI, Dominican Republic

Ms. Ruth Báez, Proprietor, Centro de Negocios Clever, Dominican Republic

Ms. Ana Cecilia Álvarez, Proprietor, Proindustria, Dominican Republic

Ms. Ivonne Calderón, Proprietor, Moments, Dominican Republic

Ms. Emma C. Fernández, Proprietor, Centro de Recursos de Transición, Dominican Republic

Ms. Ivette Cáceres, Proprietor, Instituto Brain, Dominican Republic

Ms. Augie Lendor, Proprietor, Consultancy firm, Dominican Republic

## Tables

Table 1  
International investment agreements, technical assistance as of April 2014

Year		2014 (first 4 months)	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	Total 2010– 2013
Research/policy analysis	Total number of publications	3	14	18	15	10	11	57
	Publications prepared for regional compacts <sup>a</sup>	-	4	5	4	3	2	16
	Number of hits/visits to Investment Policy Hub <sup>b</sup>	11 285	29 059	7 117	—	—	—	—
	Number of downloads, of IIA-related publications <sup>c</sup>	19 785	60 236	25 597	—	—	—	—
Consensus-building	Number of intergovernmental events <sup>d</sup>	1	13	11	8	7	7	39
	Number of other consensus-building events <sup>e</sup>	4	18	29	17	11	27	75
Technical support: Number of countries or regional organizations receiving support	Number of national and regional training workshops	-	12	10	11	8	14	41
	Technical review of draft documents prepared by beneficiaries	1	6	5	5	9	10	25
Bilateral IIAs (bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements) concluded by all countries <sup>f</sup>	Total	—	33	24	44	54	92	155
	Available text	—	14	14	27	26	39	81
	with liberalization features	—	8	4	10	6	5	28
	with sustainable development features <sup>g</sup>	—	11	10	13	13	14	47



Regional IIAs (plurilateral free trade agreements or other related agreements) concluded by regional compacts <sup>f</sup>	Total	1	3	6	5	3	10	17
	Available text	1	2	4	3	3	10	12
	with liberalization features	1	1	3	2	2	5	8
	with sustainable development features <sup>g</sup>	1	1	3	2	3	5	9
Bilateral IIAs (bilateral investment treaties or free trade agreements) concluded by Group of 20 countries <sup>f</sup>	Total	1	20	15	23	21	44	79
	Available text	1	7	13	14	14	28	48
	with liberalization features	1	4	7	8	5	9	24
	with sustainable development features <sup>g</sup>	1	6	11	10	7	13	34

*Note:* Dark highlights indicate UNCTAD technical assistance provided in 2010–2013; light highlights indicate outcomes.

<sup>a</sup> Includes regional integration organizations, Group of Eight, Group of 20.

<sup>b</sup> Launched 23 October 2012.

<sup>c</sup> Statistics for new UNCTAD website became available in March 2012 when the website was launched. Downloads include IIA issues notes, Group of 20 reports, “Pink Series” publications on IIAs and the Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development.

<sup>d</sup> Includes intergovernmental events organized by UNCTAD and those organized by others to which UNCTAD contributed.

<sup>e</sup> Includes events organized by others, including academic events, in which UNCTAD participated.

<sup>f</sup> Concluded IIAs include signed agreements that may or may not be in force.

<sup>g</sup> Sustainable development features may include all or any one of the following: (a) Reference to the protection of health and safety, labour rights, environment or sustainable development in the treaty preamble; (b) general exception e.g. for the protection of human, animal or plant life, or health, or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; (c) explicit recognition that parties shall not relax health safety or environmental standards to attract investment; (d) promotion of corporate social responsibility standards by incorporating a separate provision into the IIA or as a general reference in the treaty preamble. All of these elements correspond to policy options featured in the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, set out in chapter IV of the *World Investment Report 2012*.

Table 2  
Investment Policy Reviews as of 2014

<i>Country (total: 36)</i>	<i>Year IPR conducted</i>	<i>Years of consensus- building events: National workshops, cabinet and official briefings, intergovernmental presentations*</i>	<i>Years of follow-up technical assistance received from UNCTAD**</i>	<i>Year IPR implementation report prepared</i>	<i>Total legal, regulatory and institutional reforms targeted in IPR</i>	<i>Legal, regulatory, institutional reforms completed or substantially implemented as of implementation report (%)</i>
Algeria	2003	2003, 2004	2005, 2006			
Bangladesh	2012	2013, 2014	2012			
Belarus	2009	2008, 2009, 2010	2009, 2012			
Benin	2004	2004, 2004	2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011			
Botswana	2003	2002, 2002	2005, 2012			
Burkina Faso	2009	2009, 2009	2009, 2010, 2011, 2012			
Burundi	2010	2009, 2010	2009, 2010, 2012			
Colombia	2006	2005, 2006	2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013	2013	26	61.5
Djibouti	2011	2013, 2013	2013			
Dominican Republic	2009	2007, 2009	2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013			
Ecuador	2001	2001	2002, 2003			
Egypt	1999	1999	2005, 2012, 2013	2005	22	40.9
El Salvador	2010	2010, 2010	2012, 2013			
Ethiopia	2002	2001	2004, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012	2010	31	25.8
Ghana	2003	2002	2006, 2007, 2008, 2009	2008	30	20.0
Guatemala	2010	2010, 2010, 2011	2010, 2011, 2012, 2013			
Kenya	2005	2005	2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2012	2012	60	35.0
Lesotho	2003	2003, 2013	2005, 2006, 2012, 2013	2013	23	30.4
Mauritania	2009	2008				

Mauritius	2001	2001	2002			
Morocco	2007	2006, 2007	2007, 2008, 2009, 2010			
Mongolia	2011	2013, 2013, 2014	2012			
Mozambique	2011	2011, 2013	2011, 2012			
Nepal	2003	2003	2003			
Nigeria	2009	2008, 2009	2006, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2013			
Peru	2000	2001	2005, 2006, 2012			
Republic of Moldova	2011	2012, 2014				
Rwanda	2006	2005, 2007, 2006	2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	2011	15	80.0
Sierra Leone	2010	2009, 2010	2009, 2010			
Sri Lanka	2004	2004	2005, 2006			
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	2011	2010	2011, 2012, 2013			
Uganda	2000	1999	2005, 2007, 2011, 2012	2006	21	33.3
United Republic of Tanzania	2002	2002	2003, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012	2010	57	26.3
Uzbekistan	1999	1999				
Viet Nam	2008	2007, 2009	2010, 2011			
Zambia	2006	2006, 2007	2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012	2013	27	44.4

<b>Totals for 2010–2013</b>	<b>Number of IPRs</b>	<b>Number of consensus-building events</b>	<b>Number of follow-up technical assistance activities by UNCTAD</b>	<b>Number of implementation reports</b>
	10	21	54	7

*Note:* Dark highlights indicate UNCTAD technical assistance provided in 2010–2013; light highlights indicate outcomes.

\* The first two types of events describe national events; the last one, international events. Duplicate years indicate two different types of events during same year. National briefings included Cabinet briefings for instance in Guatemala, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda and Parliament briefings for instance in Rwanda and Kenya.

\*\* Includes principally follow-up TA funded by IPR Trust Fund. Does not include consistently other TA financed through other UNCTAD funding sources

Table 3  
E-regulations (Business Facilitation Programme) as of 2014

Country/province/ city	E-regulations				Re-engineering and simplification: Business registration only**					E-registration	
	Start year of UNCTAD technical assistance	Number of procedures online*	Number of steps online	Website hits (unique visitors), 2012 versus 2013	Start year of simplification	Reduction in steps	Reduction in agencies involved	Reduction in required documents	Reduction in required days	Year online single window established	Number of companies e-registered through online single window
Argentina/Lomas de Zamora/Buenos Aires	2012	223	518	From 91,747 to 242,786 (+ 63%)	2013	From 13 to 3 (-77%)	From 4 to 1 (-75%)	From 14 to 2 (-85%)	From 82 to 3 (-96%)	2014	
Argentina/Chubut	2012	39	76	From 2,251 to 1,097 (-51%)							
Benin	2011	68	279	From 15,221 to 26,223 (+72%)	2011	From 7 to 4 (-43%)	From 5 to 1 (-80%)	From 10 to 8 (-20%)	From 4 to 1 (-75%)		
Burkina Faso	2011	63	179	From 7,881 to 11,773 (+49%)	2011	From 13 to 13 (-0%)	From 3 to 3 (-0%)	From 16 to 16 (-0%)	From 5 to (-0%)		
Cameroon	2011	103	377	From 29,400 to 42,686 (+45%)	2012	From 10 to 3 (-70%)	From 3 to 1 (-67%)	From 10 to 4 (-60%)	From 8 to 3 (-63%)		
Cape Verde	2010	24	38	From 11,223 to 9,262 (-17%)							
Comoros	2009	31	100	From 19,115 to 20,869 (+9%)							
Congo	2011	30	119	From 353 to 1,912 (+442%)							
Costa Rica	2011	125	225	From 67,485 to 90,263 (+ 25%)							
Côte d'Ivoire	2012	78	327	From 13,378 to 41,722 (+212%)	2012	From 11 to 4 (-64%)	From 4 to 2 (-50%)	From 15 to 10 (-33%)	From 16 to 2 (-88%)		

El Salvador	2011	332	373	From 146,192 to 139,636 (-9%)	2012	From 10 to 3 (-70%)	From 8 to 1 (-87.5%)	From 7 to 1 (-85%)	From 7 to 3 (-57%)	2012	6,000
Guatemala	2011	208	907	From 111,637 to 213,086 (+47%)	2012	From 41 to 4 (-90%)	From 5 to 1 (-80%)	From 15 to 1 (-93%)	From 30 to 15 (-50%)	2013	2,000
Guinea Bissau	2013	15	22	From 1 to 276 (+37,500%)							
Honduras	2012	36	174	From 28,411 to 48,473 (+41%)	2012	From 11 to 3 (-72%)	From 4 to 1 (-75%)	From 4 to 1 (-75%)	From 5 to 2 (-60%)	2014	—
Mali	2009	172	107	From 32,642 to 37,374 (+14%)	2011	From 9 to 9 (-0%)	From 4 to 4 (-0%)	From 14 to 14 (-0%)	From 5 to 5 (-0%)		
Morocco/Rabat	2011	7	23	From 7,333 to 11,803 (+61%)							
Morocco/L'Oriental	2010	49	106	From 4,046 to 5,539 (+37%)							
Nicaragua	2011	224	624	From 124,428 to 70,426 (-43%)							
Niger	2011	107	25	From 3,644 to 5,651 (+55%)							
Panama	2012	112	558	From 29,484 to 117,634 (+74%)							
Rwanda	2009	145	277	From 37,708 to 43,154(+14%)							
Senegal	2011	38	72	From 2,017 to 11,146 (+453%)	2012	From 7 to 5 (-29%)	From 4 to 4 (-0%)	From 8 to 7 (-13%)	From 4 to 3 (-25%)		

Togo	2011	103	212	From 11,669 to 23,653 (+103%)	2011	From 15 to 4 (-75%)	From 5 to 1 (-80%)	From 27 to 11 (-59%)	From 41 to 1 (-98%)		
United Republic of Tanzania	2012	105	157	From 7,067 to 29,374 (+316%)	2013	From 20 to 2 (-90%)	From 8 to 2 (-75%)	From 27 to 3 (-89%)	From 30 to 2 (-94%)	2014	—
Viet Nam/Danang	2010	32	153	From 7,183 to 6,152 (-14%)							
Viet Nam/Hanoi	2010	40	205	From 4,926 to 5,013 (+2%)							
Viet Nam/Ho Chi Minh City	2010	22	93	From 11,973 to 7,397 (-38%)							
Viet Nam/Binh Dinh	2013	24	249	From 0 to 616 (+616%)							
Viet Nam/Hai Duong	2013	27	170	From 0 to 741 (+741%)							
Viet Nam/Phu Yen	2013	20	87	From 0 to 479 (+479%)							
Viet Nam/Vinh Phuc	2013	26	168	From 0 to 497 (+497%)							
Number of countries/ provinces/cities where e-regulations were established	31				12					4	

*Note:* Dark highlights indicate UNCTAD technical assistance provided in 2010–2013; light highlights indicate outcomes.

\* Typically a regulatory procedure requires several steps, includes multiple documents, and involves multiple agencies. For instance, business registration is one procedure involving multiple steps and documents.

\*\* Reductions shown are those achieved as a result of simplifications introduced by Governments

Table 4  
Empretec centres as of 2014

<i>Country (total: 36)</i>	<i>Year Empretec centre started</i>	<i>Number of certified trainers</i>	<i>Legal status of Empretec centre</i>	<i>Source of funding (post start-up phase)</i>	<i>Number of entrepreneurs trained since start</i>
Angola	2004	0	Stopped operating in 2005		180
Argentina	1988	12	Non-profit foundation	Banco de la Nación Argentina (Government)	5 100
Benin	2000	4	Non-profit organization	Private sector partnerships, service fees	4 429
Botswana	1997	9	Private limited company	Private sector partnerships, service fees	6 755
Brazil	1993	227 trainers, 105 interviewers	Non-profit organization	Service fees, Government	197 065
Chile	1990	5	Foundation hosted by Universidad Mayor	University (government subsidies) and private sector	2 816
Colombia	1996	6	Government agency (Caja de Compensación Familiar)	Contributions from private sector, service fees	1 500
Dominican Republic	2007	3	Foundation	Service fees	386
Ecuador	2010	2	Private non-profit organization	Consolidation phase	217
El Salvador	2000	3	Foundation	Government, membership, service fees	3 311
Ethiopia	1999	4	Government, starting in 2014 (United Nations Development Programme until 2013)	United Nations Development Programme until 2013; Government, starting in 2014	12 000*
Ghana	1990	12	Private limited company	Donors through competitive bidding, Government	30 200*
Guatemala	2001	6	Non-profit organization	Donors, membership, service fees	3 727
Guyana	2003	2	Non- profit organization	Service fees	50
India	2013	0	Partnership firm	Start-up phase, service fees	41
Jordan	2002	5	Non- profit organization	Service fees, donors through competitive bidding	1 115
Mauritius	2000	3	Non- profit organization	Service fees, international tenders for proposals	697
Mexico	2006	0	No longer operational (stopped operating in 2009)		103

Morocco	1998	2	No longer operational		134
Mozambique	2000	7	Foundation	Donors, service fees	1 375
Nigeria	1999	1	Foundation	Private sector partnerships, service fees	680
Panama	2000	7	Foundation; counterpart changed in 2009	Donors, service fees	1 036
Peru	2010	3	Private limited company	Private sector partnerships	712
Romania	2003	7	Government agency supporting small and medium-sized enterprises	Government	2 000
Russian Federation	2011	1	Financed by Vnesheconombank (development bank)	Start-up phase (development bank)	203
Saudi Arabia	2014	0	Hosted by Saudi Credit and Saving Bank	Start-up phase (development bank)	20
Senegal	2002	—	No longer operational		240
South Africa	2010	9	Hosted by Small Enterprise Development Agency; Empretec centre started in 2000, revamped in 2010	Government, service fees	600
Uganda	2001	2	Foundation	Donors, Government, service fees	38 776*
United Republic of Tanzania	2008	2	Counterpart changed twice, currently hosted by Small Industries Development Organization; since 2012, the only workshops held have been organized by Tanzania Investment Centre (business linkages)	Still dependent on start-up donors	428
Uruguay	1989	9	Non-profit organization	Service fees	2 100
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	2008	8	Started in 1993, new counterpart in 2008 (non-governmental organization)	Service fees	1 025
Viet Nam	2012	3	Hosted by Viet Nam Trade Promotion Agency	Government	
Zambia	2009	3	Hosted by Zambia Development Agency (government agency responsible for investment and small and medium-sized enterprise promotion)	Still dependent on start-up donors, service fees	192
Zimbabwe	1992	2	Non-governmental organization	Service fees	7 565
Occupied Palestinian Territory			Not operational (project ended in 2004)		123

Note: Dark highlights indicate UNCTAD technical assistance provided in 2010–2013; light highlights indicate outcomes.

\* Includes entrepreneurs supported through Empretec and other business development services.



Table 5  
**Median foreign direct investment economic contribution index 2009:**  
**Beneficiaries of investment-related assistance versus non-beneficiary comparators**

<i>Beneficiary investment-related assistance (Latin America and the Caribbean)</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Colombia	10
Costa Rica	25
Dominican Republic	22
Ecuador	52
El Salvador	—
Guatemala	54
Honduras	36
Nicaragua	—
Panama	20
Peru	47
<i>Median ranking</i>	<i>30</i>
<b>Non-beneficiary comparators (Latin America and the Caribbean)</b>	
Belize	—
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	9
Chile	53
Ecuador	52
Guyana	—
Jamaica	51
Mexico	62
Paraguay	77
Suriname	—
Uruguay	55
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	71
<i>Median ranking</i>	<i>54</i>

*Note:* Countries characterized by a high FDI economic contribution index have a low rank (1 being the highest); those with a low FDI economic contribution index have a high rank

Table 6  
Status of subprogramme 2 websites

<i>Subprogramme 2 websites</i>	<i>Address</i>	<i>Update status</i>
Green FDI	<a href="http://greenfdi.org">greenfdi.org</a>	Recent
World Investment Forum	<a href="http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org">unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org</a>	Recent
Business facilitation	<a href="http://businessfacilitation.org">businessfacilitation.org</a>	Recent
Investment guides (iGuides)	<a href="http://theiguides.org">theiguides.org</a>	Recent
E-regulations	<a href="http://eregulations.org">eregulations.org</a>	Recent
Investment Policy Hub	<a href="http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org">investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org</a>	New
Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative	<a href="http://www.sseinitiative.org">http://www.sseinitiative.org</a>	New
Empretec	<a href="http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Startpage_7428.aspx">http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Startpage_7428.aspx</a>	Old
Division's main website (subsites below)	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/DIAE.aspx">unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/DIAE.aspx</a>	Old
FDI statistics page	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics.aspx</a>	Old
<i>World Investment Report</i>	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/World_Investment_Report.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/World_Investment_Report.aspx</a>	Old
Investment Policy Reviews	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Investment%20Policy%20Reviews/Investment-Policy-Reviews.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Investment%20Policy%20Reviews/Investment-Policy-Reviews.aspx</a>	Old
Trends and monitors	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Research%20on%20FDI%20and%20TNCs/Global-Investment-Trends-Monitor.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Research%20on%20FDI%20and%20TNCs/Global-Investment-Trends-Monitor.aspx</a>	Old
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/ISAR/ISAR-Corporate-Transparency-Accounting.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/ISAR/ISAR-Corporate-Transparency-Accounting.aspx</a>	Old
Insurance programme	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Enterprise%20Development/Insurance-Programme.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Enterprise%20Development/Insurance-Programme.aspx</a>	Old
Corporate social responsibility	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ISAR/Corporate-Social-Responsibility.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ISAR/Corporate-Social-Responsibility.aspx</a>	Old
IAs	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/International-Investment-Agreements-(IIAs).aspx">http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/International-Investment-Agreements-(IIAs).aspx</a>	Old
Publications index	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/DIAE%20Publications%20-%20Bibliographic%20Index/DIAE-Publications-Bibliographic-Index.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/DIAE%20Publications%20-%20Bibliographic%20Index/DIAE-Publications-Bibliographic-Index.aspx</a>	Old
Research on FDI and transnational corporations	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Research%20on%20FDI%20and%20TNCs/Research-on-FDI-and-TNCs.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Research%20on%20FDI%20and%20TNCs/Research-on-FDI-and-TNCs.aspx</a>	Old
Investment facilitation compact	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Investment%20Facilitation%20Compact/Investment-Facilitation-Compact.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Investment%20Facilitation%20Compact/Investment-Facilitation-Compact.aspx</a>	Old
Intellectual property	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Intellectual%20Property/Development-Dimensions-of-Intellectual-Property-Rights.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Intellectual%20Property/Development-Dimensions-of-Intellectual-Property-Rights.aspx</a>	Old
Enterprise development	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Enterprise%20Development/Enterprise-Development.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Enterprise%20Development/Enterprise-Development.aspx</a>	Old
Group of 20	<a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/G-20/G20-Investment.aspx">http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/G-20/G20-Investment.aspx</a>	Old

*Note:* Websites with an unctad.org address are hosted on UNCTAD servers. Others are hosted externally.


Table 7  
**Annual expenditure of extrabudgetary resources by DIAE, 2010–2013**  
(In thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Year</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>
FDI trends and issues	470	485	888	1 202
Investment policies	2 091	1 093	897	811
Investment facilitation	785	2 288	2 461	2 166
Enterprise development	1 816	1 784	327	270
<b>Total</b>	<b>5 162</b>	<b>5 650</b>	<b>4 573</b>	<b>4 449</b>


*Source:* Reviews of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing, as contained in Annex II: Statistical tables from 2010 to 2013 (TD/B/WP/232/Add.2, TD/B/WP/243/Add.2, TD/B/WP/253/Add.2 and TD/B/WP/262/Add.2).

**Figure**

**Foreign direct investment growth in countries benefiting from UNCTAD assistance in Investment Policy Reviews, investment promotion guides and e-regulations, versus non-beneficiary comparator countries**



Abbreviation: LAC, Latin America and the Caribbean.



Source: UNCTAD FDI database.\*

**\*List of countries**

<i>Beneficiary investment-related assistance (sub-Saharan Africa)</i>	<i>Beneficiary investment-related assistance (Latin America and the Caribbean)</i>	<i>Beneficiary investment-related assistance (low-income Asia)</i>	<i>Beneficiary investment-related assistance (Central Europe/Central Asia)</i>
Benin	Colombia	Bangladesh	Belarus
Botswana	Costa Rica	Bhutan	Mongolia
Burkina Faso	Dominican Republic	Cambodia	Republic of Moldova
Burundi	Ecuador	Lao People's Democratic Republic	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Cameroon	El Salvador	Nepal	Uzbekistan
Cape Verde	Guatemala	Sri Lanka	
Comoros	Honduras	Viet Nam	
Congo	Nicaragua		
Côte d'Ivoire	Panama		
Djibouti	Peru		
Ethiopia			
Ghana			
Guinea-Bissau			
Kenya			
Lesotho			
Mali			
Mauritania			
Mauritius			
Mozambique			
Niger			
Nigeria			
Rwanda			
Senegal			
Sierra Leone			
Uganda			
United Republic of Tanzania			
Togo			
Zambia			

<i>Non-beneficiary comparators (sub-Saharan Africa)</i>	<i>Non-beneficiary comparators (Latin America and the Caribbean)</i>	<i>Non-beneficiary comparators (low-income Asia)</i>	<i>Non-beneficiary comparators (Central Europe/Central Asia)</i>
Angola	Belize	Maldives	Croatia
Central African Republic	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Myanmar	Kazakhstan
Chad	Chile	Papua New Guinea	Romania
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Ecuador	Philippines	Slovenia
Gabon	Guyana		Tajikistan
Gambia	Jamaica		Ukraine
Guinea-Bissau	Mexico		
Liberia	Paraguay		
Madagascar	Suriname		
Namibia	Uruguay		
Seychelles	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)		
Sudan			
Swaziland			
Zimbabwe			

*Multiple investment-related assistance (sub-Saharan Africa)*

Benin
Burkina Faso
Mauritius
Mozambique
Rwanda
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Zambia

## Appendices

### Appendix 1 Results of survey questionnaires

*Survey sample country composition versus countries receiving technical assistance from SP2*

IIAs	Survey sample	3 African countries (including 1 LDC), 4 middle-income developing countries, 3 regional groupings: <b>total, 10</b>
	SP2 support	Number of countries/groupings receiving SP2 support 2000–2014: <b>total, not applicable</b>
IPRs	Survey sample	3 African countries (including 1 LDC + 1 landlocked LDC), 3 landlocked Commonwealth of Independent States, 3 middle-income developing countries: <b>total, 9</b>
	SP2 support	17 African countries (including 13 LDCs + 2 landlocked LDCs + 1 landlocked middle-income), 1 Asian LDCs + 1 Asian landlocked LDC, 17 middle-income developing countries and CIS (including 6 landlocked): <b>total, 36</b>
Empretec	Survey sample	4 African countries (including 3 LDCs + 1 landlocked LDC), 3 middle-income developing countries, 2 high-income developing countries: <b>total, 9</b>
	SP2 support	13 African countries (including 7 LDCs + 2 landlocked LDC + 1 landlocked + 1 small island), 16 middle-income developing countries + Commonwealth of Independent States (including 2 landlocked), 5 high-income developing countries, 2 developed countries: <b>total, 36</b>
E-regulations	Survey sample	6 African countries (including 6 LDCs), 2 middle-income LDCs, 1 high-income developing country: <b>total, 9</b>
	SP2 support	15 African countries (11 LDCs + 1 landlocked LDC + 2 small island LDCs), 7 middle-income developing countries or regions, 7 low-income developing countries or regions, 2 high-income developing countries: <b>total, 31</b>


#### A. International investment agreements

##### Relevance

- Nearly all IIA beneficiaries rate the usefulness of UNCTAD technical cooperation on IIAs as very high.
- Very high relevance is partly based on the very high timeliness of IIA support, high value added of UNCTAD support and high relevance to the specific needs of LDCs, African countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States and vulnerable economies.



- For Pacific island countries, for example, UNCTAD tailored assistance for the benefit of those States that are negotiating an economic partnership agreement with Australia and New Zealand.
- IIA beneficiaries rate the overall relevance of IIA technical cooperation close to very high.



Abbreviation: TA, technical assistance.

- One IIA stakeholder describes UNCTAD as the pioneer international organization focusing on research related to IIAs that provides the most comprehensive view of the development of investment rule-making worldwide.

### Effectiveness

- Beneficiaries perceive IIAs to be very highly effective.
- Countries rate close to very high their improved understanding of issues pertinent to international investment agreements and capacity in negotiating and implementing such agreements and dealing with investor–State disputes.

- One IIA beneficiary stressed the usefulness of UNCTAD assistance in carrying out an informal evaluation of the country's model bilateral investment treaty and guidance on potential problem areas. The exercise resulted in the country reformulating its model bilateral investment treaty in line with the Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development.
- In one country visited during the evaluation, UNCTAD's IIA support raised awareness about increasing challenges in settling disputes.

### Efficiency

- Beneficiaries give a high score to SP2 staff and administration for efficient delivery of its support during the IIA process, partly based on hands-on, proactive support from staff.
- SP2 is highly efficient in using an enhanced information and communications technology (ICT) approach, strategic partnerships and networks.
- Cooperation with other development partners working in the IIA area is perceived as medium by beneficiaries.
- Beneficiaries agree that overall efficiency of IIA support is high.

### Sustainability

- Beneficiaries have a high to very high perception of a lasting change in the knowledge of policy options and awareness among countries' key stakeholders as a result of IIA technical cooperation.
- Beneficiaries have a medium to high perception of a lasting change in the policy behaviour of pertinent institutions at country level, partly due to the IIA Section's longer term engagement with countries.

- Beneficiaries perceive that institutions intended to support long-term implementation of the results of IIA support have a medium to high technical and financial capacity to carry forward their mission, following technical cooperation from UNCTAD.

**Impact and impact loss if UNCTAD had not provided technical assistance**

- Beneficiaries perceive a medium to high contribution of IIAs to ensuring development gains from increased investment flows, including to some extent for job creation.
- Beneficiaries indicate that, had UNCTAD not provided IIA support, the impact loss would have been high due to SP2’s unique role in this area.

**Gender**

- Beneficiaries perceive the gender focus in IIA support as low.


**Green economy**

- Beneficiaries identify a high integration of green economy objectives into IIA support.
- One country surveyed indicates that all investments are now screened very strictly based on environmental criteria. Another country indicates that the review of its model bilateral investment treaty helped refine the Government’s environmentally sustainable objectives.

**B. Investment Policy Review**

**Relevance**

- The IPR’s relevance in meeting country needs is high but undermined somewhat by the fact that timeliness of delivery is medium
- In that regard, several countries observe that the timeliness of service delivery can be an issue, as up to four years may pass between countries soliciting technical cooperation and delivery of the IPR report. By that time, Governments might have changed and the subsequent relevance and use of IPR results by a new administration may be jeopardized.



Abbreviation: TA, technical assistance.

**Effectiveness**

- The IPR’s ability to increase countries’ understanding of key public and private investment issues, the impact of FDI on development and related policies to increase the development impact of investment is high, as is its influence on countries’ ability to create an investment-friendly environment that is conducive to development.

**Efficiency**

- Stakeholders give a relatively high mark to UNCTAD’s staff and administration

for coordinating the delivery of activities during the IPR process.

- There is evidence of synergies between the IPR and other SP2 core products such as IIAs, e-regulations and investment guides in some countries. However, other IPR stakeholders seem to struggle with getting guidance on how to access specific SP2 or other UNCTAD services that might help them with implementing recommendations.
- The IPR makes limited use of an enhanced ICT approach or networking.
- UNCTAD's capacity to leverage additional financial resources for implementation of the IPR is perceived to be low by IPR stakeholders.

### **Sustainability**

- Medium to high lasting change in the knowledge of policy options and awareness among countries' key stakeholders following technical assistance.
- Medium lasting change in the policy behaviour of pertinent institutions in IPR countries, related also to technical and financial limitations particularly in LDCs.
- Beneficiaries perceive the sustainability of IPR as medium. LDCs and other low-income economies tend to see implementation as quite challenging which explains their medium to low score on sustainability.
- Some IPR stakeholders feel that a built-in monitoring mechanism would help sustain the momentum created during the IPR process and make it easier for stakeholders to access more systematically other related technical assistance.

### **Impact and impact loss if UNCTAD did not provide technical assistance**

- IPR stakeholders perceive a medium contribution of IPR services to ensuring development gains from increased investment flows, including the creation of jobs. The same perception applies to the loss of impact had UNCTAD not provided IPR related technical assistance. These perceptions seem related to the time lag between the IPR, the implementation of reform and the point at which reform may begin to yield significant results.
- Various stakeholders identify several "quick wins" following an IPR including (a) implementing recommendations already in line with government priorities; (b) implementing recommendations where steps are clearly defined in the IPR; (c) factoring in a Government's coordination capacity to implement recommendations; and (d) implementing reforms that avoid painful tax cuts or significant government investments.

### **Gender**

- IPR beneficiaries see the focus on gender equity as low to medium.


### **Green economy**

- Green economy objectives are integrated into IPRs from a medium to high degree.

## C. Empretec

### Relevance

- Empretec centres rate the usefulness of technical cooperation from UNCTAD very highly as in most countries the supply of entrepreneur behavioural skills is either very limited or non-existent among owners of microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).
- Empretec (trained entrepreneurs) rate the training they receive equally very high.
- Empretec is very well suited to the needs of LDCs, African countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States and vulnerable economies.




- Timeliness is medium. Some countries would have liked an earlier engagement with Empretec but lacked a policy framework to accommodate their centres; in contrast, one centre in the western hemisphere operated outside a clear policy framework for MSMEs until 2014.

### Effectiveness

- Countries score the capacity to stimulate enterprise development and business facilitation as much enhanced.
- Empretec (trained entrepreneurs) stress the practical nature of Empretec training.

### Efficiency

- Empretec centres give a high score to SP2 for coordinating the establishment of centres, but a medium score for leveraging additional external funding.
- In many countries the leadership of the private sector has been essential in establishing successfully and managing efficiently Empretec centres; in countries where the centres are located in the Government, the record of public sector agencies at getting centres “up-and-running” is more mixed.
- Centres rate high the ability of SP2 to develop synergies with other SP2 services or services provided by other development agencies, pointing to synergies with Business Linkages and with complementary services provided by selected other agencies.
- The use of an enhanced ICT approach by SP2 to implement Empretec technical cooperation at country level is viewed as medium by the centres. In fact distance-learning is not applied by Empretec.



Abbreviation: TA, technical assistance.

While this might be a challenge for training in behaviour change, Empretec trainers in one country suggested a pilot to test distance learning, given the high cost of the current model which hinders easy upscaling.

- At the country level, a cumbersome and lengthy process for certifying trainers, which is costly to the trainers themselves, is a hindrance to the efficient implementation of Empretec.
- From the point of view of Empretec, attending a week-long Empretec training while running a business at the same time is often highly challenging; some Empretec centres have responded and offer for example half-day courses over a two-week period.

### **Sustainability**

- Empretec's contribution to lasting changes in policies aimed at MSME entrepreneurs is viewed as medium by the centres.
- The maturing process for a centre to get to full sustainability is long. In African LDCs, it seems somewhere around five years. The challenge for SP2 is to ensure external resources until that stage is reached. Absent such resources, the technical and financial viability of Empretec centres can be compromised if UNCTAD support ceases too early.
- In one country visited during the evaluation, one to two Empretec trainings are undertaken per year, benefiting an average of 30 to 60 trainees. Costs to organize one training module run between \$4,000 and \$5,200, depending on the focus and location of training. Course fees, calculated to defray costs, are over \$250 per participant. This is quite high for participants from areas with high levels of poverty, particularly rural areas. To be able to reach out to such potential participants, there is a need to revisit how to organize and deliver training modules in order to bring costs down.

### **Impact and impact loss if UNCTAD had not provided technical assistance**

- Empretec centres see the high contribution of technical cooperation to the strengthening of MSMEs, including job creation in MSMEs. Empretec sees the impact as even higher (very high).
- A quantifiable assessment of Empretec impact on Empretec across countries is not possible in the absence of implementing the existing Empretec monitoring and evaluation module. The necessary data are produced only at irregular intervals by external evaluators and for selected countries.<sup>2</sup>
- In at least one country, the Empretec centre collects data on training results at the enterprise level ex post, as the non-United Nations funders pay to reengage with those enterprises; this was not the case for UNCTAD-funded training.

### **Gender**

- Perceptions regarding the inclusion of women's empowerment objectives in Empretec training differ. For Empretec Centers, it is high; for Empretec, medium to high with many unsure about a gender focus.

<sup>2</sup> For example, Engelhardt A, 2012, External evaluation of UNCTAD's Empretec and Business Linkages Programmes (United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia).


### Green economy

- Empretec centres see medium integration of green economy objectives into Empretec training; Empretec perceives a stronger focus (which may be the result of the particular training programmes in the countries where the small group of Empretec were surveyed).

## D. E-regulations

### Relevance

- E-regulations support services come in a mostly timely manner, are very useful in meeting demands from beneficiaries and have very high value added.
- According to beneficiaries, the high relevance of UNCTAD's e-regulations technical cooperation is rooted in (i) the selection of highly skilled national and international consultants; (ii) a working environment of mutual respect and dialogue; and (iii) improved transparency and better interaction between citizens and the public administration.



Abbreviation: TA, technical assistance.

### Effectiveness

- Beneficiaries perceive very high effectiveness of e-regulations in terms of increasing countries' ability to (i) create an investment-friendly environment conducive to development; and (ii) stimulate enterprise development and business facilitation.
- Country stakeholders stress the importance of enhanced transparency following work on e-regulations.
- Attainment of results is enhanced by learning from other countries how they tackle problems in business procedures through UNCTAD's regional approach to implementation

(West African Economic and Monetary Union and Central America). The spirit of

both competition and cooperation within each region strengthens the effectiveness of UNCTAD e-regulations support.

### Efficiency

- Beneficiaries are pleased with the very high efficiency demonstrated by UNCTAD in deploying technical cooperation for e-regulations. This is helped by very good use of an enhanced ICT approach.
- UNCTAD is perceived to be slightly less efficient in leveraging additional funding for implementing e-regulations. However, specific stories from LDCs and middle-income countries suggest many countries manage to get funding from donors or other United Nations agencies to implement e-regulations.

- Beneficiaries indicate a high assessment of overall efficiency in the delivery of e-regulations support.

**Sustainability**

- From a beneficiary's perspective, the institutions managing e-regulations are technically and financially viable to continue the work initially supported by UNCTAD. One middle-income country indicated that the agency in charge of e-regulations ended up hiring the expert working on the original UNCTAD support as staff to ensure continued technical capability. The high level of public funds commitments by beneficiaries to continue with maintaining the system shows the high degree of ownership and sustainability.
- Beneficiaries assess the sustainability of change as a result of e-regulations as high to very high.

**Impact and impact loss if UNCTAD had not provided technical assistance**

- Beneficiaries indicate a very high positive impact of e-regulations on enterprise creation at the country level.
- Beneficiaries believe that, in the absence of UNCTAD technical cooperation on e-regulations, the results for job and enterprise creation would have been significantly different.

**Gender**

- The inclusion of the gender dimension in e-regulations is perceived as close to high by beneficiaries.

**Green economy**

- Beneficiaries see medium integration of green economy objectives in e-registration and related impacts.

## **Appendix 2**

### **Summary findings from field visits**

#### **I. Key findings from field mission to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (8 April 2014)**

##### **International investment agreements**

###### **Key message:**

- UNCTAD work on Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development is very important as it addresses issues overlooked during the first generation of bilateral investment treaties, including a more balanced approach to representing the interests of both States and investors, addressing pitfalls in investor–State dispute settlements, liberalization clauses among others.

###### **Relevance:**

- Issues discussed during technical assistance activities provided by SP2 are highly relevant to LDCs (many COMESA members are LDCs).
- Very timely support from UNCTAD. COMESA has resources to finance activities so all that is needed is technical input from SP2 (review of drafts, resource people for training).

###### **Effectiveness:**

- Very high impact on the understanding by COMESA countries of IIA issues and the Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development.
- Getting funding to finance training activities is always an issue. Since training is organized at the regional level, there are limitations on the number of individuals that can be trained in each country.

###### **Efficiency:**

- Good complementarities between SP2 and assistance COMESA receives from the International Institute for Sustainable Development, Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tends to act alone; its work is useful but tends to favour strongly the interests of investors over States.
- The SP2 bilateral investment treaty database is very useful (available since 2005); the more recent database on investor–State dispute settlements is also extremely helpful.

###### **Sustainability:**

- COMESA members are using the knowledge gained.
- “We need to go deeper and train larger groups of experts at country level to enhance sustainability: more distance learning and training of regional trainers might be part of a solution.”



**Impact:**

- FDI is attracted by many factors, not simply IIAs. Also, the long-term impact of IIAs is hard to define.

**Cross-cutting issues:**

- The Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development includes no particular focus on gender equity but the green economy figures in it explicitly.

**II. Key findings from field mission to Zambia (7–12 April 2014)****A. International investment agreements****Key message:**

- UNCTAD has played an important role in developing IIA capacity in the region through COMESA and the Southern African Development Community. Through Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, UNCTAD provide a best practice model and it is for each country to adapt it to its needs.
- COMESA may not be ready to move to a single model of IIAs for member States. For instance, the needs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and those of Zambia are quite different if only due to differences in levels of good governance.

**Relevance:**

- Support is very timely and very useful.

**Effectiveness:**

- UNCTAD has been very effective in getting the beneficiaries to understand the new challenges of bilateral investment treaties.

**Efficiency:**

- UNCTAD coordinates quite extensively with the International Institute for Sustainable Development.
- The Investment Policy Hub and the databases on bilateral investment treaties and investor–State dispute settlements are very useful.
- There is good networking through COMESA and the Southern African Development Community.

**Sustainability:**

- There is a need for more people at the country level to be trained. Regional training via COMESA limits how many people can get trained.

**Impact:**

- IIAs are part of the improvement in the investment environment geared at attracting new investment, including FDI.

**Cross-cutting issues:**

- While Zambia's bilateral investment treaties do not have an explicit reference to the green economy, any new FDI investor must submit an environmental impact assessment.

## **B. Investment Policy Review**

**Key message:**

- The IPR has been very helpful in pointing to key issues in the country's investment environment. However, it would also have benefited from being a bit more focused on issues specific to the fact that Zambia is a landlocked country.

**Relevance:**

- Support was somewhat slow
- The OECD provides a technical cooperation service focusing on investment environment. It has a strong focus on the model of investment environment used in OECD countries. UNCTAD is more balanced.

**Effectiveness:**

- The IPR was very useful in helping Zambia understand key issues to improve the environment for investment.

**Efficiency:**

- Zambia has been able to get additional support services from other UNCTAD divisions including in areas of trade facilitation and trade preferences. These issues have an impact on the investment environment.

**Sustainability:**

- The IPR is leading to lasting policy changes in Zambia. We have also reorganized our investment promotion services under the Zambia Development Agency as a result of the IPR.

**Impact:**

- The impact of changes in the investment environment is hard for the beneficiaries to assess because there is a time lag between reform and new investment.

**Cross-cutting issues:**

- There is no direct focus on gender issues. Our investment review process requires an environmental impact assessment.

## **C. Empretec**

**Key message:**

- Empretec provides a type of training (entrepreneurial behaviour) that no other development agency provides.

- Empretec coordinates well with other development agencies. Current funding is part of a One United Nations project that includes the ILO, International Trade Centre and UNCTAD and focuses on green jobs.

**Relevance:**

- Very relevant but slow moving to get up and running.
- Empretec and the green jobs programme are coordinated through the Zambia Development Agency which is responsible for MSME development in Zambia. Empretec is hosted by the Zambia Development Agency.

**Efficiency:**

- The process for finalizing certification of local trainers is quite slow. From the original batch of nine potential trainers selected, there have been many dropouts and the focus is on getting three out of the nine to be fully certified. The certification process is time consuming for people who must otherwise make a living and run a business while also going through the certification process.
- UNCTAD has helped get external funding but the centre is financially not yet fully self-sustaining.

**Sustainability:**

- Not yet financially sustainable.
- The impact of Empretec on policymakers' understanding of the policy needs of MSMEs has been very limited.

**Impact:**

- Only few Empretec trainees thus far but trainees say it has made a big difference for them regarding how they are running their firm and looking at opportunities to develop new markets and new clients.

**Cross-cutting issues**

- Under the One United Nations green jobs programme, there is a strong focus on the green economy and the construction sector. Zambia mining companies invest approximately \$3 billion per year in new construction which is significant. Zambia is looking at how best to link construction-sector MSMEs to that market.
- There is a large share of women among trainees. One of them is a finalist for UNCTAD's 2014 Best Woman Entrepreneur award.

### **III. Key findings from field mission to Guatemala (8–10 May 2014)**

#### **A. Investment Policy Review**

**Key message:**

- The IPR raised expectations but lacked specific follow-up support on how best to address the issues identified and what specific investments to make.

- A very high increase in the understanding of government officials on key public and private investment issues as a result of the IPR, including an increase in the understanding of the potential development impact of FDI and related policies.
- Expert advice provided by UNCTAD was valued.

**Effectiveness of technical cooperation in increasing ability of Guatemala to create an investment-friendly environment conducive to development was only medium because:**

- The IPR was conducted during a transition period of Government and timing was suboptimal.
- Lack of UNCTAD follow-up support to guide best way to implement recommendations.
- Limited communication with UNCTAD; staff seemed overstretched.
- No recommendation about specific investments that could be attracted: IPR results remained at the political level and did not trickle not down to the practical level.

**Lessons learned:**

- E-monitoring of IPR implementation would be much more useful than a possible review of the implementation of recommendations years later.
- The IPR raised expectations but then nothing followed. A gap in communications and action was caused by a change of Government and limited follow-up communications with UNCTAD.

## **B. Empretec**

**Key message:**

- Empretec reached a stage in Guatemala where it needs to move from the interesting to the essential. To do so requires a more active and focused role for DIAE.

**Issues:**

- Many demands for entrepreneurial skills. UNCTAD support is required in terms of core technical assistance and annual or biannual training-of-trainers.
- Very high results for the country's capacity to stimulate enterprise development and business facilitation: "Empretec is an incredible eye opener".
- Limitation for training to have an impact: access to finance and business linkages. The latter is now being addressed with Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funds.
- Training delivered thanks to IADB funds, sponsorships by companies and a \$400 fee for Empretec participants in the capital city.
- Guatemala feels that UNCTAD's Empretec support was important to establish the centre but it came late for major impact on MSMEs. Important results were achieved but only for a limited number of trainees.

**Enhanced information technology approach:**

- Online training for behavioural change of trainees is difficult. Training tends to be more effective face-to-face. To move to distance learning, an e-learning pilot would

be required. Still “we need to advance with information technology: young people are into information technology”.

**Lessons learned:**

- The institutional presence of UNCTAD is key and desired. UNCTAD’s presence in the region is lacking; things tend to move when UNCTAD staff come to the field and talk to high-level government authorities.
- For Empretec to impact public policies, UNCTAD needs to provide sufficient support and puts its trademark on the efforts of the national partner, Asociación de Gerentes de Guatemala. This could help tap into concrete funding opportunities with the new Government with the aim of scaling up Empretec.
- The Vice-Minister is very open, but so far there is insufficient support from UNCTAD to create a policy environment.
- Some upgrading of the Empretec product is needed. Empretec has big potential in Guatemala due to very good alignment with government policies. There are opportunities for strategic alliances between UNCTAD and the Government, as the Government gets funds from the donor community and could spend it on issues such as Empretec (e.g. funds from Germany, IADB and United States Agency for International Development).
- UNCTAD could get more involved even through Skype. Empretec would benefit from UNCTAD being more proactive and taking more leadership.
- There would be much more weight vis-à-vis the government cabinet if the Empretec centre/Asociación de Gerentes de Guatemala came with UNCTAD’s blessing.

## C. E-regulations

**Key message:**

- E-regulations has led to an increase of 33 positions in the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking, through UNCTAD support and financing by Luxembourg. The national e-regulations partner has received an IADB credit to continue work recommended by UNCTAD.
- UNCTAD has contributed to a wider process. The understanding of high-level authorities has increased. The President received an award from IADB for improvements in the investment environment.
- E-regulations is getting financing support through the IADB project (\$0.5 million for 2014–2016), with a business climate component under that project also providing support to Pronacom. E-regulations is helpful in the implementation of a set of reforms diagnosed by the World Bank.
- E-regulations is being publicized by several Guatemalan embassies, including in Danish in Denmark.

**Regional knowledge sharing:**

- Central American countries implementing e-regulations are networking to share knowledge. Honduras learned from El Salvador. Guatemala learned from El Salvador: it took 12 months to implement one element in El Salvador, but only 3 months in Guatemala. Use of open source software keeps cost down.

**UNCTAD instrumental for change:**

- Guatemala would not have embarked on e-regulations/e-registration without UNCTAD.
- E-regulations/e-registration have put enormous pressure on ministries to become more transparent. It would not have happened otherwise.

**Opportunities for future engagement:**

- Guatemala is looking into creating a one-stop online investment window in addition to the e-registration online window to assist foreign investors; the country is also looking at developing an investment guide with UNCTAD.

**IV. Key findings from field mission to the Dominican Republic  
(12–14 May 2014)**

**A. Investment Policy Review**

**Relevance:**

- IPR was needed in the absence of coordination for investment promotion among government departments.
- When new administration started in office in 2004, it saw the need for a baseline.

**Timeliness:**

- The IPR was requested by the Government in 2005, started in 2007 and a report was received in 2009 when the Government left office (the new Administration reaped the fruits of the previous Government's efforts with little ownership of recommendations).

**Main results:**

- Creation of a one-stop shop for investors.
- Major change in IIAs, thanks to synergies within DIAE. No new IIA has been signed since the IPR. There are serious concerns about the arbitration clause in old model IIAs. In the past, there was an IIA signed with each foreign visit of the President. The Dominican Republic is looking at new model IIAs.
- Counterparts in the Dominican Republic wanted to implement the IPR-recommended Business Linkages Programme; however, finding the relevant interlocutor in SP2 took too much time and only became clear when the Administration left office.

**Implementation:**

- About \$100,000 – 70 per cent funded by donors – facilitated by UNCTAD.
- Full IPR implementation of recommendations: good technical expertise, but there is a lack of funding.

**Lessons learned:**

- Quick wins should have been pursued immediately after the IPR, but funds were exhausted.

- Lack of a single entry point in DIAE to provide guidance for follow-up (this resulted in Business Linkages not being fully implemented).
- Basic guidance about how to apply for an IPR and the processes involved is missing from UNCTAD (e.g. step-by-step guide, budget requirements, time frame).
- IPR process: Learned much by doing the assessment (benchmarking, etc.) and benefited from world-class experts in the process.
- Gaps in the IPR: a monitoring platform/system for implementation of IPR recommendations is lacking.

**Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana interested in:**

- Follow-up to IPR recommendations. Structured follow-up would be interesting for the new Government, but a common set of procedures seems to be missing to engage with UNCTAD for this purpose (e.g. what are the technical and financial requirements for follow-up, how much time and resources are required).

**Conclusion:**

- The new Government keeps using the IPR which shows a level of ownership (the same party is in power but different Administration).
- A clearer IPR process on the UNCTAD side is needed.
- The Government is to take more ownership of the IPR (e.g. legislative changes), including for financing.

## **B. Empretec**

**Key Message:**

- The Dominican Republic has never had a national strategy to support small and medium-sized enterprises. This is changing with the new Government and a dedicated Vice-Ministry.
- Empretec will be relocated to the small and medium-sized enterprises centre in October 2014 and then decentralized, based on the regional strategy of the Central American Integration System countries where the Dominican Republic currently holds the presidency.

**Issues:**

- Empretec administration needs to be clarified.
- The chain of command needs to be clear to ensure the relaunch of Empretec in the Dominican Republic work.
- Roles and responsibilities are unclear with different streams of Empretec training through different players (lack of communication).
- The Vice-Ministry would like to clear up the relationship with the current Instituto Tecnológico de las Américas/Centro Empretec and complement the Instituto, rather than substituting for it.
- The Vice-Ministry would like to take on Business Linkages.
- The perception is that UNCTAD wants to retain control over the new centres, but this is not what local counterparts want.

- The Dominican Republic has outgrown UNCTAD and its support and should take its own decisions once it clarifies its view on Empretec (Empretec is a protected brand with a licence; thus some kind of relationship with UNCTAD would need to be maintained).
- Financing and control issue (the Government does not prioritize the budget for the Vice-Ministry).

**Future:**

- A tough 1.5 years for the relaunch lies ahead. UNCTAD has promised to accompany the Vice-Ministry to look for funding for future training: e.g. through national institutions and programmes, and local partnerships and local leadership (e.g. with Chamber of Commerce) can work and can increase sustainability.

**Relevance:**

- Empretec is needed in the Dominican Republic. Capacity-building is a must and must work. There is a lack of behavioural training similar to that provided by Empretec.

**Impacts:**

- Countryside: Not too many options for entrepreneurs. Empretec is useful to strengthen associative status and move to cooperatives but training is expensive (approximately US\$4,000 for a 33-hour training course for microentrepreneurs (15 to 30 trainees) and US\$5,200 for a 54-hour training course for small and medium-sized enterprises).
- In cities, there are more options. Individuals can leave jobs and start enterprises. The course costs 10 per cent more in the capital city.

**Conclusion:**

- There is confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the current Empretec centre and the new one.
- Training is too expensive, too long and too much for MSMEs.

**Recommendations:**

- UNCTAD to clarify the chain of command and create clarity about the only Empretec centre in the country.
- UNCTAD to develop a less expensive and time-consuming Empretec light module.

The national education strategy to focus on adult education and to include Empretec-type training on entrepreneurship.



## Appendix 3

### Summary review of independent evaluations of SP2 core products 2010–2013

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Relevance</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Impact</i> <sup>3</sup>	<i>Sustainability</i>
L van Oijen, 2012, External evaluation of UNCTAD Project Account: Support to decision-making and policy formulation on foreign direct investment in the context of the MDGs and the Monterrey Consensus (topic: FDI statistics)	Harmonization of practices at the level of regional groupings is crucial, as shown by the interest of regional economic commission in this project, COMESA in particular.	Participating regional organizations and beneficiary countries appreciated the events organized in terms of their content, UNCTAD expertise and quality of organization.	The decision to cover many regions and countries is considered defensible given limited resources, and the extent of initial emphasis was on awareness-building and networking. Still, beneficiary considered the technical cooperation received as a first step requiring follow-up support.		Involvement of a regional partner such as COMESA was crucial for the successful organization of activities and sustainability.
	The focus of the project on training on the latest definitions and methodological standards pertaining to FDI statistics issued by the OECD was timely. UNCTAD played (and continues to play) a catalytic role to inform, through workshops, non-OECD countries about the latest international standards in this field.	There was some cooperation with international organizations in the field of official statistics pertaining to FDI. The International Monetary Fund was involved in the task force meeting in Zambia and in the regional workshop in Peru. However, no effective linkage with related Fund training has emerged, suggesting that Fund involvement was more ad hoc.	The publication of COMESA's first Investment Report is a result of UNCTAD support to COMESA under this project.		Networking of stakeholders involved in compilation, analysis, use of FDI/transnational corporation statistics at the national and regional levels was facilitated through regional and national workshops. These networks were an important step in the search for sustainable results.
		Cost-sharing by the regional partner organizations (particularly the COMESA secretariat) was important.			UNCTAD's emphasis on country ownership is right. It is up to countries, rather than external parties, to undertake FDI surveys.
		The budget seemed too small to support follow-up advisory or monitoring missions by UNCTAD staff to regional partners and participating countries			The project inspired similar interventions in other countries, using the same materials, with funding from other sources.
		UNCTAD staff played a direct role in implementation, over and above their responsibilities as regards the preparation of publications pertaining to FDI. External consultants played a secondary role.			

<sup>3</sup> Not every evaluation included an assessment of impact in its terms of reference.

<p>F Theoleyre and D Colonna d'Istria Owen, 2013, External evaluation of UNCTAD Project Account: Strengthening small and medium-sized enterprise competitiveness in the tourism sector of six African developing countries of the Economic Community of West African States subregion (topic: e-tourism)</p>	<p>No other justification for the grouping of target countries except that they are francophone.</p>	<p>Each workshop and/or seminar was delivered on a strictly national level, closely structured along the same model. The project does not therefore have a truly regional nature.</p>	<p>Project reached its intended objective of "increased understanding of decision makers about positive externalities of ICT tools for tourism sector".</p>	<p>Due to lack of human and material resources, the beneficiaries at the national level have not been able to take the matter forward. (For example, national websites of the six countries have not been upgraded to meet some of the basic recommendations of the project. Positioning of the six countries as touristic destinations is still weak, and effective e-tourism tools and solutions, in line with the project's recommendations are not in place.)</p>	<p>No follow-up activities of the project at the regional level have been reported, despite the launch of a West African Economic and Monetary Union tourism initiative.</p>
	<p>The evaluation team is of the opinion that the project's selection of countries responds to various external constraints and is not driven by the thematic logic of intervention, thereby limiting its potential effectiveness. Each country had differing, specific expectations, different level of mobilization, capacity, technical knowledge and access to resources.</p>	<p>Funding was adequately and prudently managed. But its level did not allow going beyond the "short-term" expected outcome of raised awareness in the beneficiary countries of the issues at hand.</p>	<p>Achievement of project objectives:  1. Understanding the potential of e-technologies for the development of tourism as an important economic sector to boost local development, increase access to income and contribute to integration in the global market  2. The level of awareness of the need to structure the touristic offer in order to match demand and therefore successfully harness local resources to derive benefit from tourism  3. The level of awareness of the need to adopt an integrated approach to the development of tourism  4. The fostering of initial networks of relevant partners to move forward in the paths opened by the workshops and the "ateliers".</p>	<p>Impact is lowered by allocating too few resources (about one quarter of a million dollars) to six countries over a period of two to three years.</p>	

		<p>Recommendations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. E-learning solutions for the e-tourism modules could be developed within the methodologies of UNCTAD.</li> <li>2. Better identification of relevant private sector stakeholders prior to the workshops in order to strengthen participation of the most relevant private sector leaders.</li> </ol>	<p>Recommendation:</p> <p>UNCTAD should move beyond awareness-raising initiated through the project to concrete results via additional activities.</p>		
<p>AE Rausch, 2013, Panamá: Red de oportunidades empresariales para familias pobres, MDG Fund (topic: Empretec)</p>	<p>The design for this joint program dates back to 2009 but lacked relevance. The situation analysis of beneficiaries was incorrect and proposed solutions to solve poverty-related problems through microentrepreneurship were inappropriate.</p>	<p>The three-year joint programme started in 2010 but was interrupted temporarily following observations from the MDG Fund secretariat in March 2011. Following a reformulation in May 2011, the programme suffered another interruption due a decision taken by the programme's national counterpart between July and August 2011.</p>	<p>The Entrepreneurship Support Centre was created thanks to technical assistance from UNCTAD.</p>		<p>The changes achieved for microenterprises and small enterprises are sustainable as the latter have the administrative and technical skills to plan appropriately (...) and to replicate experiences made in other areas.</p>

S Karuga, 2011, Broad-based wealth and job creation in Zambia economic empowerment through MSME development (topic: Business Linkages)	The interventions of the broad-based wealth and job creation programme remain as relevant to target beneficiaries, ILO constituents, national stakeholders and collaborating partners as when the project started.	Division of labour was clarified from the start and joint programming among ILO projects and between ILO and other United Nations agencies can succeed as demonstrated by UNCTAD/ILO cooperation in the Business Linkages Programme.	Nine business linkages between microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises and large corporations (versus a target of 10) have been operationalized. In all, 1,634 business development service units have been sold, of which 822 service units were sold through the business development services-VP; 812 service units were sold through the broad-based wealth and job creation programme. A business development services providers directory with 800 registered service providers (versus a target of 300) is now available on the Zambia Development Agency website. Fifty local business development service organizations were trained in international best practice in business development service marketing strategies in Siavonga.	In all, 1,634 enterprises or about 20.4 per cent of the original target of 8,000 MSMEs have been directly and indirectly reached by the programme across the whole of the country, during the period 2009–2011. Annual sales increased by an average of 25 per cent, annual profits by an average of 51 per cent and job creation by an average of 2.5 additional jobs per MSME reached by the programme, for an overall estimated total of 430 new jobs (of which 178 were women employees) across the 1,634 sampled enterprises. By extrapolating this result, it would imply that programme interventions resulted in the creation of about 4,085 additional jobs across the 1,634 enterprises reached directly and indirectly by the programme.	The program was strategically designed to deliver through national institutions and has built the capacity of collaborating local institutions: for instance, the Zambia Development Agency in business linkages.	
	Target MSMEs felt that the programme should have included financial access as one of the immediate objectives as it is one of the most binding constraints facing such enterprises in Zambia. The importance of access to credit was confirmed by nearly all the studies done before and/or during project implementation.	The programme budget of US\$2.24 million was rather inadequate given the wide range of activities underpinning the delivery of the four immediate objectives.				
	Gender (women's) concerns should be built into the project logical framework by way of outputs, outcome and impact indicators, otherwise the participation and sharing of project benefits by women may inadvertently be sidelined.					

DP Keller, 2013, Viet Nam: Green production and trade to increase income and employment opportunities for the rural poor, MDG Fund (topic: Empretec)	Supporting rural women's enterprises at different stages of the value chain is particularly meaningful and effective in empowering women and promoting local economic development. It contributes to creating jobs in Vietnamese rural areas that are lagging behind in terms of social and economic development.		There is much training and technical cooperation made available to household beneficiaries. However, an internal assessment by Vietrade/Vietcraft revealed that it is not always clear whether knowledge/skills are effectively appropriated by households and result in a sustainable change in the workplace behaviour of households concerned.	It should never be taken for granted that capacity-building activities are in fact leading to the sought-after impact at the household level (including productivity enhancement and income/employment generation).	Ownership of the program at provincial level was considered insufficient due to the fact that programming and planning of activities was too much UN-led top-down with insufficient input from the provincial levels and the four provincial coordinators.
	Strengthening a value chain requires a range of technical expertise specific to the type of businesses as well as to different steps of the value chain.		In all, 198 entrepreneurs were trained and certified as Empretecos, of which 40 per cent are women. One of them, from provinces (Sanda Hoa Binh company), was selected to be among the 10 finalists of the Empretec Women in Business Award and attended the final ceremony in Qatar in April 2012.	Good practice: In order to monitor and encourage better prospects for appropriation of knowledge and skills by household beneficiaries, the Project Management Unit strengthened impact-oriented monitoring, through qualitative interviews with household beneficiaries in the field, to feedback monitoring data back to United Nations agencies and urge these to take measures to provide proper follow-up (p.22).	There is much training and technical cooperation available to household beneficiaries. However, an internal assessment by Vietrade/Vietcraft revealed that it is not always clear whether knowledge/skills are effectively appropriated by households and result in a sustainable change in the workplace behaviour of households concerned.

	<p>Different United Nations agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ILO, International Trade Centre, United Nations Industrial Development Organization and UNCTAD joined together, and with their national implementing partners, provided technical support according to each agency's strengths and expertise. Since it is impossible for one agency to provide technical support in all of these areas, it is imperative to mobilize support by collaborating and coordinating with different institutions.</p>		<p>In all, 103 Empretec companies have benefited from business and financial planning trainings. For monitoring business plan implementation, one business plan prize competition was organized with one final selection round event and one award ceremony for three finalists, namely Duc Phong company (first prize), Kana company (second prize) and Vinaem company (third prize). Support to attend the lifestyle fair in Ho Chi Minh City was provided to the three companies as rewards for the business plan competition in April 2012. Twenty-one Empretec companies attended the total quality management and lean production training in handicraft production organized in collaboration with the Viet Nam Productivity Centre. All belong to five value chains of JP. In December 2012, the certification ceremony for the national Empretec trainers was organized in Hanoi, back to back to a networking event for all Empretec companies on the importance of design from an Italian perspective. It was held by the Director of the Milan-based Nuova Accademia di Belle Arti design school.</p>		<p>Based on the introduction of Empretec programme, Vietrade recently agreed with UNCTAD to set up an Empretec training centre in Viet Nam which shall be used under Vietrade for future entrepreneurship training. To this purpose, the Empretec Viet Nam webpage has been integrated into the official website of Vietrade.</p>
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	<p>While the value link approach has been widely used before, some distinctive features of the programme concept were innovative and incorporated lessons learned from similar programmes: e.g. bundling a holistic set of services under one assistance framework, as opposed to assuming support of other donor interventions that subsequently does not materialize as planned; and addressing constraints relating to some external framework conditions (policies, access to credit).</p>				
<p>A Engelhardt, 2012 External evaluation of UNCTAD's Empretec and Business Linkages Programmes (United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia); (topics: Empretec and Business Linkages)</p>	<p>Both programmes are highly relevant for skills and business development needs of microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises in the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. However, access to finance should be included in the programmes, particularly in Zambia.</p>	<p>Both UNCTAD and the Government of Finland suffer the consequences of a lack of clear objectives, quantifiable targets, and SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound) indicators to assess the performance of the two programmes. As a result, DIAE is unclear about the level of achievements to be expected by the donor. Finland, as donor, is unclear about how to evaluate the results delivered by UNCTAD.</p>	<p>All 16 Empretec trainees interviewed praised the training for changing their mindset from subsistence-oriented businesses to goal-focused and growth-oriented businesses. In total, 341 entrepreneurs were trained in the United Republic of Tanzania in 13 Empretec workshops, and 137 in Zambia in six Empretec workshops. The Business Linkages Programme linked 30 suppliers to transnational corporations, such as the Vodaphone-subsiary Vodacom in the United Republic of Tanzania, and 45 new supplies to the supply chains of transnational corporations, such as the South African supermarkets Pick n' Pay or Shoprite in Zambia, apart from providing Empretec training to 50 pre-existing suppliers of the Zambia's largest mining company, KonkolaCopper Mines.</p>	<p>In the United Republic of Tanzania employment in 10 MSMEs increased by 14 per cent and by 38 per cent in 11 MSMEs in Zambia. The enterprises of 6 Empretec participants in the United Republic of Tanzania showed a 100 per cent increase in median turnover compared to a 35 per cent increase for three Business Linkages Programme enterprises in the United Republic of Tanzania and 27.5 per cent for seven Business Linkages Programme enterprises in Zambia. This compares to a 144 per cent increase in median turnover in Business Linkages Programme enterprises in Uganda.</p>	<p>Small Industries Development Organization (United Republic of Tanzania) and Zambia Development Agency seem dependent on UNCTAD funding for the time being and seem to be unable to fund Empretec training through regular budgets. However, costs for Empretec training are coming down by up to 50 per cent for UNCTAD as the first national trainers are getting certified and dependency on costly international trainers decreases.</p>

		<p>Another inefficiency is the incomplete implementation of the Business Linkages Programme evaluation module and lack of monitoring and evaluation for Empretec.</p>	<p>Linkages of MSMEs to the supply chain of larger local or national companies emerged as complementary and at times alternative to linkages to transnational corporations. The particular value of those “unintended” linkages, which developed through market dynamics in both countries, is reflected in a more gradual increase of the standards, quality and volumes that suppliers must meet. In addition, those linkages often entail the advantage of cash business, which is very important for entrepreneurs with very limited access to finance.</p>		
		<p>Consultants are engaged only on a short-term basis, with no long-term stability, which is of particular relevance for a non-resident organization like UNCTAD. Lack of predictable funding resulted in implementation delays.</p>	<p>Recommendation: Prior to co-funding any further Empretec trainings, UNCTAD is invited to double-check that trainees are participating or likely to be participating in the Business Linkages Programme so as to make full use of the strong conceptual synergies between the two programmes. This should not be misunderstood as micromanagement but due diligence to ensure higher programme effectiveness.</p>		
		<p>Recommendation: Finland should change its funding modalities from 2013 onwards, if it decides to continue funding the UNCTAD programmes. Committing funds for a full-fledged three years to the Empretec/Business Linkages Programme with a clear performance framework would be significantly more efficient than continuing with the current funding modalities.</p>			



		<p>Recommendation: Given challenges in the programmes' monitoring and follow-up, the evaluator would recommend that Finland earmark part of its funding specifically for monitoring and evaluation. This could help implementation partners to follow-up more actively and monitor Empretec trainees and enterprises engaged in the Business Linkages Programme, leading to increased programme efficiency and effectiveness.</p>			
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<p>T Apoteker et al., 2010, In-depth evaluation of UNCTAD's technical cooperation activities dedicated to least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States and other structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies, TD/B/WP/223/Add.1 (topic: all technical assistance)</p>	<p>While UNCTAD's technical assistance budget is very small compared to total international technical assistance, the share of its technical assistance budget dedicated to these four groups of countries is high.</p>	<p>The lack of interdivisional coordination is undermining the efficiency of UNCTAD's technical assistance programmes.</p>	<p>UNCTAD's technical cooperation targeting LDCs, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States and other structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies is not properly monitored and reported. This makes a thorough and comprehensive evaluation very difficult</p>	<p>Beneficiary countries mention a number of difficulties, relative to local staff limitations and rotations. This sometimes diminishes the impact of programmes. UNCTAD technical assistance, particularly when involving the use of software, requires high skills (economics, management, statistics, database management, manipulation of large data sets, management of networks of workstations/servers, etc.). This assistance is usually provided by highly qualified experts and/or highly skilled computer professionals. Unfortunately, most of the time, the vast majority of local officials do not have that expertise. Technical knowledge provided by UNCTAD through training sessions/workshops is concentrated on a few local experts. Therefore, beneficiary countries indicate the need for additional training sessions, particularly when staff rotate.</p>	<p>The lack of financial resources and skills, particularly in LDCs, can be a difficult obstacle to manage. In UNCTAD's case, these needs are increased by the large share of technical assistance dedicated to software and capacity-building. These not only require technical skills (rarely available locally), but also hardware and other software (such as Oracle) that beneficiary countries have to finance.</p>
	<p>UNCTAD is a niche player in technical assistance. One of its advantages lies in the absence of conflict of interest between itself and the beneficiary Government.</p>	<p>Efficiency is perceived by beneficiary countries as the weakest point in UNCTAD's interventions. Issues range from flexibility (such as software, response to immediate needs or challenges, among others) to cost elements (overheads in joint projects with other agencies, intervention costs compared to other agencies, among others) as well as occasional communication difficulties and serious resource limitations. It is partly a result of the institutional setting of UNCTAD and perceived "competition" among divisions.</p>	<p>UNCTAD has the mandate and expertise to position itself as a catalyst to enable a better link between trade issues and negotiations on one side and development and poverty reduction on the other side. (...) However, this niche appears not to be exploited fully, with insufficient specific, customized and packaged offers dedicated to these countries, apart from the advisory work conducted by the Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes.</p>		

	Most of the activities implemented in support of the four categories of countries are demand-driven, with a large component of “shared” design and definition of activities with beneficiary countries.	Review meetings in Geneva, Switzerland are very much appreciated by beneficiary countries. However, the cost of participation was raised by them as an issue. Their suggestion is regional meetings and online forums as useful means for exchange of experiences and best practices.			
A Engelhardt, 2014, External evaluation of UNCTAD Development Account Project: Towards developing a global monitoring system in national investment policies (2010–2013) (topic: IIAs)	Seventy-five per cent of external stakeholders and internal staff are unaware of the existence of platforms similar to UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub for investment policy-related information; 68 per cent of registered Investment Policy Hub users value the platform as a one-stop-shop for investment policy related issues.	Overall, the project design included a planning and monitoring framework but lacked target settings and baselines for all expected accomplishments.	Targeting investment policy officers (through workshops) as an accompanying measure to the development of the Investment Policy Hub leads to more effective formulation of investment policy in developing countries.		Seventy-one per cent of direct workshop costs (US\$132,000) were co-financed by partners through strategic partnerships. This shows partners’ interest and ownership of project results.
	The Development Account project fits strategically with the DIAE work programme. As a result, the project shows significant synergies with DIAE products and capacities.	The Development Account project was well integrated within the work programme of DIAE, resulting in intensive use of in-house expertise, existing data and database implementation	The impact of the project on DIAE is significant. It is likely to become one of the Division’s “modus operandi” if DIAE continues to develop its strategic “enhanced information technology” approach and promotes fully the interactive features of the Investment Policy Hub when the final version is launched.		