

THE LOGIC OF MARKET DEFINITION

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For more than a half century, antitrust trials have usually begun with the definition of a relevant market for the inquiry. Long experience has given this exercise an air of familiarity, but closer examination reveals market definition to be a confused exercise. Decades ago, Robert Pitofsky remarked that “no aspect of antitrust enforcement has been handled nearly as badly as market definition.”¹ That sentiment remains frustratingly apt today.² Despite its long tenure in antitrust analysis, and despite the crucial role it has played in many a case and investigation, the process of defining relevant markets remains both confused and uncertain.

Why do we define markets? How should we define them? One might think that such fundamental questions would have long been settled. But the sometimes unclear rationale for the exercise, and its inconsistent evolution in the

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¹ Robert Pitofsky, *New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust*, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1990); see also Donald F. Turner, *The Role of the “Market Concept” in Antitrust Law*, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1145, 1150 (1980) (“Let me turn now to what some of the current problems are with market definition. I have to say at the outset that as a general matter this whole area is a bloody mess.”).

² See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, *Why (Ever) Define Markets?*, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 466 (2010) (“[T]here is no canonical, operational statement of the standard for determining what constitutes a relevant market and, a fortiori, no developed underlying rationalization for whatever the principle might be.”); William Blumenthal, *Why Bother?: On Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines*, Statement before the FTC/DOJ Merger Enforcement Workshop 2 (Feb. 17, 2004), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/30/202600.pdf (“[T]he meaning of ‘relevant market’ today . . . probably is not understood by more than 500 people on the planet.”).

courts and scholarship, have not produced a straightforward set of criteria by which to assess the validity of relevant markets in antitrust. Even the term, *market definition*, is more ambiguous than it first appears. Does it refer to the identification of popularly recognized lines of commerce or products with similar characteristics? Does it refer to products with high cross-elasticity of demand? Does it refer to things like the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT) and efforts to identify groups of producers with potential market power?³ That, today, these are all potential answers, is both remarkable and unsettling.

In this article, we hope to cut through some of the ambiguity and confusion surrounding market definition. Our goal is to trace the internal logic of the exercise, identifying common errors and showing how the logic of market definition can focus and guide antitrust inquiries. While we are mainly concerned with *how* markets should be defined in antitrust, pragmatism requires us to pause to say *why* we should aim for proper market definition as well.

The need for pause is the sometimes-popular claim that market definition is unnecessary in antitrust law. While this argument is not new,⁴ Louis Kaplow has advanced the thesis with a particularly pointed argument that (1) market definition serves no role except to facilitate computing market shares, (2) market shares are poor measures of market power, and (3) antitrust goals would be better served by assessing market power from things like estimates of residual-demand curves than by computing market shares.⁵ This argument is not without its strengths, and there are cases in which the traditional market definition exercise can be skipped without adversely affecting the outcome of the investigation or trial.

³ This list does not purport to exhaust the range of possibilities. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, *The Problem of Geographical Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits*, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973) (defining markets based on consumer flow information); Mario Forni, *Using Stationarity Tests in Antitrust Market Definition*, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 441 (2004) (defining markets based on price stationarity); Ira Horowitz, *Market Definition in Antitrust Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach*, 48 S. ECON. J. 1 (1981) (defining markets based on price movements); George J. Stigler & Robert A. Sherwin, *The Extent of the Market*, 28 J.L. & ECON. 555 (1985) (defining markets based on empirical similarity of price movements).

⁴ E.g., Blumenthal, *supra* note 2, at 1 (“Worse than unnecessary, any effort formally to define markets would [be] unduly costly, time-consuming, and invasive, and it probably would [yield] less reliable outcomes than more streamlined techniques.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, *The Limits of Antitrust*, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22 (1984) (“Market definition is just a tool in the investigation of market power; it is an output of antitrust inquiry rather than an input into decisions, and it should be avoided whenever possible.”); *id.* (“An inquiry into power does not entail the definition of a ‘market,’ a subject that has bedeviled the law of mergers.”).

⁵ See generally Kaplow, *supra* note 2; Louis Kaplow, *Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines*, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 107 (2011); Louis Kaplow, *Market Definition Alchemy*, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 915 (2012) [hereinafter Kaplow, *Alchemy*]; Louis Kaplow, *Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive*, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 361 (2013) [hereinafter Kaplow, *Impossible*].

But even if traditional market definition is not necessary in every antitrust case,⁶ we believe that courts and practitioners must still understand how to properly define and interpret antitrust relevant markets in practice. There are three reasons for this.

First, the claim that market definition can be entirely replaced by things like econometric estimates of residual demand curves is doubtful, to say the least.⁷ It is difficult, for example, to imagine courts and practitioners analyzing ease of entry without a market concept. What exactly would firms be entering?⁸ Similar difficulties beset efforts to assess the danger of anticompetitive coordination without some idea of which firms would need to cooperate for their coordinated action to be able to raise prices.⁹ And while estimates of residual demand elasticity may often suffice to establish current or historic market power, they are not generally sufficient to predict future competitive effects—as needed, for example, in cases involving unconsummated mergers or prospective acts of exclusion.¹⁰ In such situations, antitrust analysis is advanced by defining relevant markets.

⁶ See *infra* Part IV.A (discussing cases where market definition is not necessary).

⁷ See generally Duncan Cameron, Mark Glick, & David Mangum, *Good Riddance to Market Definition?*, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 719 (2012); Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, *In Defense of Market Definition*, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (2012); Gregory Werden, *The Relevant Market: Possible and Productive*, ANTITRUST L.J. ONLINE (Apr. 2014) [hereinafter Werden, *Possible*], www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_law_journal/online-archive/werden-online-pdf.pdf; Gregory Werden, *Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow*, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729 (2013) [hereinafter Werden, *Answer*].

⁸ See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher, *Economic Analysis and “Bright-Line” Tests*, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 129, 131 (2008) (“Ease of entry must also be considered, and one might reasonably say that such a consideration requires one to know what it is that is being entered.”); Werden, *Answer*, *supra* note 7, at 729 (“Even if antitrust analysis never used market shares, the relevant market would remain essential for examining entry prospects and the durability of market power.”). But see Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, *Antitrust*, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1185–86 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (suggesting some ways to analyze exclusionary conduct in terms of elasticities); Kaplow, *Impossible*, *supra* note 5, at 363 n.3 (suggesting that potential entry analysis is similar to exclusionary conduct analysis).

⁹ See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, *Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof*, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2000 (2018) (“In cases in which the government alleges coordinated effects, the role of market definition and concentration measures such as the HHI is much more fundamental.”); Werden, *Answer*, *supra* note 7, at 739 (“[Coordinated effects analysis] uses the relevant market to determine how many, and which, competitors most likely would be involved in the coordination.”).

¹⁰ See, e.g., 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 531d (4th ed. 2014) (commenting that assessment of current market power is insufficient to address concerns about future market power); Phillip Areeda, *Market Definition and Horizontal Restraints*, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 553, 555 (1983) (“[Past] performance data cannot reveal unexercised power. . . . Thus, performance data is not relevant for determining whether a new merger creates new power.”); Gregory J. Werden, *Market Delineation and the Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines*, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 515 (1983) (“[A]pplication of [Section 7] requires predictions about the effects on competition of changes in market structure.”). Kaplow’s best effort to extend his approach to merger analysis rests on the assumption that the merger is between producers of a

Second, regardless of the academic debate, courts have long relied on market definition in antitrust cases,¹¹ and the Supreme Court shows no indication that it will abandon this practice soon. On the contrary, the Court has recently reaffirmed its view that “courts usually cannot properly apply the rule of reason without an accurate definition of the relevant market.”¹² So long as binding precedent continues to expect the definition of relevant markets in most applications, lower courts and practitioners need to understand the logic and proper execution of the market definition exercise.

Third, despite Kaplow’s insistence that market definition serves no purpose other than to facilitate the calculation of market shares,¹³ others perceive it to play additional roles. During investigational stages—in the review of merger notifications, for example—market definition is meant to clarify analysis by imposing analytic discipline on investigators,¹⁴ by providing a logical way to

homogeneous (undifferentiated) product. Kaplow, *Impossible*, *supra* note 5, at 370–71. Problematically for this approach, it is unclear how courts and practitioners are supposed to identify a homogeneous product; the matter normally arises within the context of market definition.

¹¹ See, e.g., Jonathan Baker, *Market Definition: An Analytical Overview*, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 129 (2007) (“Market definition is often the most critical step in evaluating market power and determining whether business conduct has or likely will have anticompetitive effects.”); Fisher, *supra* note 8, at 130 (“Market definition has become a necessary part of every antitrust case, and there is no avoiding discussing it.”); Dennis W. Carlton, Comment on Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines 3 (June 4, 2010), www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/horizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project-proposed-new-horizontal-merger-guidelines-548050-00034/548050-00034.pdf (“Any suggestion that the courts should abandon the use of market definition when analyzing the competitive effects of mergers is unwise, as the failure to define markets would likely increase the number of erroneous decisions reached by courts.”).

¹² *Ohio v. Am. Express Co.*, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018); see also *id.* (“Without a definition of [the] market there is no way to measure [the defendant’s] ability to lessen or destroy competition.” (alterations in original)).

¹³ E.g., Kaplow, *Impossible*, *supra* note 5, at 363 (claiming the only point of market definition is to “make market power inferences from market shares”); *id.* at n.3 (defending the prior claim with the statement that “I am skeptical that market definition is useful for other purposes”).

¹⁴ See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, *Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines*, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 619, 626 (2010) (“The discipline of forcing decision-makers to have a reasonable market definition in mind . . . is likely to be valuable in constraining agencies and especially courts from making decisions based on arbitrary criteria.”); Turner, *supra* note 1, at 1145 (“[One role of market definition is] to provide some sort of rational economic basis for assessing the consequence of the particular kind of conduct that is involved in the antitrust case.”); Robert Willig, Public Comments on the 2010 Draft Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2 (2010), www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/horizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project-proposed-new-horizontal-merger-guidelines-548050-00015/548050-00015.pdf (“The purpose behind a requirement of market definition . . . is the imperative for disciplined consideration of sources of competition beyond the parties’ own products, along with the need to generate a consistent calibration of the strength of that additional competition.”).

organize information,¹⁵ by helping to screen out implausible theories,¹⁶ and by focusing the scope of competitive effects analysis.¹⁷ During evidentiary stages—in court or before the agencies—market definition supports structural inferences about competitive effects,¹⁸ provides context for relevant evidentiary considerations such as the possibility of entry or exit,¹⁹ and again provides a conceptual framework to guide and discipline analysis.²⁰ As we discuss below, market definition may currently play different roles within the agencies and the courts.²¹ But in both contexts the exercise is meant to serve the common goal of identifying conduct and structural conditions that raise concerns about anticompetitive injury, and that therefore require scrutiny.²²

We do not challenge the consensus that market definition serves broad purposes, but we suspect that this breadth of use may actually be a source of some confusion. Common platitudes only reinforce the problem: the Supreme Court does not mislead when it says that “the purpose of [market definition] is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition,”²³ but neither does it take anything off the table. One

¹⁵ See, e.g., LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, *HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST* 64 (1977) (“[T]he only purpose for defining a market is to organize available data in a way which facilitates judgment about the extent of that power.”); Fisher, *supra* note 8, at 130 (“Market definition can be a useful tool, a way to begin organizing the material that must be studied.”).

¹⁶ See, e.g., Easterbrook, *supra* note 4, at 14–19.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Werden, *Answer*, *supra* note 7, at 739 (“The relevant market furthers the analysis by separating the active forces of competition from forces properly treated as part of the background.”); see also ROBERT TRIFFIN, *MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY* 85 (1962) (“[One purpose of defining a market in economic analysis is] that of delineating practical boundaries for any given inquiry, in order to narrow down to essentials the empirical points to be investigated.”).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Shapiro, *supra* note 9, at 2006 (“[E]conomic theory and a wide range of economic evidence support the conclusion that horizontal mergers that significantly increase market concentration are likely to lessen competition and harm consumers.”); Sean P. Sullivan, *What Structural Presumption?: Reuniting Evidence and Economics on the Role of Market Concentration in Horizontal Merger Analysis*, 42 J. CORP. L. 403, 409–10, 426–28, 433 (2016) (discussing the probative value of market concentration evidence in predicting the competitive effects of horizontal mergers).

¹⁹ See *supra* notes 7–10 and accompanying text.

²⁰ See, e.g., Carlton, *supra* note 14, at 637 (“[E]ven though market definition may be a crude tool to use, it does provide some structure to an antitrust analysis and its use likely prevents courts from making egregious errors.”).

²¹ See *infra* note 227 and accompanying text (discussing differences in how merger review is conducted in courts and before the federal agencies).

²² See, e.g., 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 531 (“Finding the relevant market and its structure is typically not a goal in itself but a mechanism for considering the plausibility of antitrust claims that the defendants’ business conduct will create, enlarge, or prolong market power.”); Christine A. Varney, *The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Evolution, Not Revolution*, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 653 (2011) (“[Flexibility in market definition] flows from the purpose of defining markets—helping to assess a merger’s potential to harm consumers.”).

²³ *FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986).

reason the logic of market definition remains obscure is that so little effort has ever been devoted to specifying what should not factor into the exercise.

This article aims to fill that void. Our objective is to clarify the logic of antitrust market definition; our strategy is to illustrate this logic by way of exclusion. The explanation of what should factor into market definition is hardened by the explanation of what should not. The article therefore focuses on three common fallacies of antitrust market definition.

The first is what we call the *natural market fallacy*: the belief that relevant markets should conform to intuition, convention, or observation. The reason they should not is that markets are not real, observable, tangible things that can be perceived and identified by simple observation. Markets are analytical constructs without corporeal presence or tangible form. Recognition of this fallacy leads to the conclusion that many traditional market-definition criteria are inappropriate and also highlights that many common objections to market definition—for example, that markets are unrealistic or gerrymandered unless they conform to lay intuition or common description—are without merit.

The second is what we call the *independent market fallacy*: the belief that relevant antitrust markets exist independent of underlying theories of harm. The reason they do not lies in the prior fallacy. As purely analytical constructs, markets do not exist independent of a problem or inquiry but must be defined in terms of a problem or inquiry. Specifically, antitrust markets are defined in terms of specific theories of anticompetitive harm. Recognition of this fallacy leads to the conclusion that a relevant market cannot be defined without an anticompetitive theory of harm upon which the relevant market is conditioned. Enduring confusion around the base price in HMT markets,²⁴ and even the infamous *Cellophane* fallacy itself,²⁵ are illustrations of this error.²⁶

²⁴ Cf. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.1.2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines], www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf (describing the typical baseline price against which the HMT markets are constructed in horizontal merger cases).

²⁵ See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 150–51 (2d ed. 2001) (providing the modern textbook treatment of the *Cellophane* fallacy); George W. Stocking, *Economic Tests of Monopoly and the Concept of the Relevant Market*, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 479 (1957) (providing perhaps the earliest clear articulation of the Court's error in the *Cellophane* case); see *infra* notes 113–124 and accompanying text (discussing the *Cellophane* fallacy).

²⁶ Many aspects of this fallacy have been previously identified and articulated by Steven Salop. See generally Steven C. Salop, *The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millennium*, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000). Our approach adds to Salop's first principles approach in two respects. First, we extend the argument by showing not just the desirability, but the logical necessity of defining markets by reference to specific theories of competitive injury. Second, we show how the theory-dependence of market definition ties in with the comprehensive logic of the market definition exercise.

The third is what we call the *single market fallacy*: the expectation that an antitrust case must involve a unique relevant market (or set of markets if there are multiple products). The reason not is implicit in the prior fallacies. Since a relevant market must be conditioned on a specific theory of harm, and since multiple theories of harm may be implicated by a given fact pattern, there may be multiple relevant markets to delineate in analyzing the competitive effects of the conduct in question. Recognition of this fallacy leads to the conclusion that the number of relevant markets in a given case or investigation may be as great as the number of theories of anticompetitive harm.

The remainder of this article explores each of these fallacies separately and then together in a discussion section that sketches some corollary implications for antitrust practice. Many of our suggestions about market definition can be extracted—to varying degrees of precision—from the text of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines²⁷ and from various remarks, asides, and footnotes scattered throughout the literature on market definition.²⁸ But the diffusion of insights through subtle implication and easily overlooked margin notes is an inefficient way to explain a concept as challenging as market definition. And the enduring confusion surrounding this exercise suggests that further exposition may be warranted.

I. THE NATURAL MARKET FALLACY

The *natural market fallacy* is the mistaken belief that the boundaries of relevant markets should conform to lay intuition, conventional language, or direct observation. The error flows from a false assumption that markets are tangible objects. They are not. Markets are analytical constructs with no necessary relation to industry practices or popular conceptions of trade lines.

If this seems obvious, consider two themes that have long held sway in discussions of market definition. The first is that market definition should prevent courts and plaintiffs from delineating artificially narrow markets.²⁹

²⁷ See generally 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24.

²⁸ See generally SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 41–74; TRIFFIN, *supra* note 17, at 78–96; Baker, *supra* note 11; Jonathan Baker, *Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Submarkets*, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 203 (2000); Hovenkamp & Shapiro, *supra* note 9; Werden, *Answer*, *supra* note 7; Gregory J. Werden, *The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm*, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (2003). Salop, *supra* note 26, discusses some of our points about the independent market fallacy in detail.

²⁹ This concern has endured over a span of decades. Compare *United States v. Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co.*, 240 F. Supp. 867, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“[T]he government cannot gerrymander the market any way it chooses.”), with *Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc.*, 808 F. Supp. 1503, 1512 (D. Colo. 1992), *aff’d*, 13 F.3d 366 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Plaintiff cannot artificially create antitrust claims by narrowly defining the relevant market to create the appearance of an antitrust injury.”), and *United States v. Anthem, Inc.*, 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 202 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The defense contends that [the plaintiff’s] proposed market is ‘gerrymander[ed]’ and ‘lacks economic coherence.’”).

The second is that courts may fail to identify the correct market for analysis.³⁰ Each reflects a similar understanding of market definition. To say a market is artificial is to say it is not a natural market; to say a market is defined incorrectly is to presume that the market could have been defined correctly. Both notions betray the influence of the natural market fallacy on market definition practice.³¹

We now trace the natural market fallacy through case law and academic commentary, showing how it hinders antitrust analysis. It will be helpful to distinguish two types of natural-market concepts: those that define markets by the observable characteristics of products and producers, and those that define markets by observed substitutability. Both concepts are problematic. Markets are nothing but mental constructs that facilitate the economic analysis of specific problems. Rejecting possible abstractions because they do not match an imagined set of natural-market boundaries can only impede that analysis.

A. NATURAL MARKETS DEFINED BY CHARACTERISTICS

Of the many ways that the Supreme Court has tried to articulate standards for defining markets, the most obviously naturalistic are those equating market definition with the identification of observable product characteristics and lay recognition of industry lines. At a high level, this approach seeks characteristics of products and producers that indicate how a market should be categorized—almost as a biologist might try to identify an insect by comparing its characteristics to those of known exemplars.

The leading authority for defining markets around the distinguishing characteristics of products is *du Pont-General Motors*, a merger case in which the Supreme Court distinguished a narrow relevant market of “automotive finishes and fabrics” from a broader class of similar industrial finishes and fabrics. The Court based this market definition on its conclusion that “automotive finishes and fabrics have sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses

³⁰ See, e.g., Morris A. Adelman, *The Antimerger Act, 1950–60*, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 236, 237 (1961) (“It is a pathetic illusion that the market is whatever the courts choose to call it. The market, like the weather, is simply there, whether we only talk about it or do something: apply to it the standards of Clayton, or of Sherman, or of any law, or none.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, *Markets in Merger Analysis*, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 887, 901 (2012) (“It is well known that the relevant market estimates . . . are never ‘correct’ in product differentiated markets or in those that have significant spatial dispersion and relatively high transportation costs.”).

³¹ This natural market fallacy might be viewed as a special case of the broader logical fallacy of attributing tangible forms and properties to abstract concepts. See, e.g., ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, *SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD* 51–52, 58 (1925) (describing the “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness,” wherein abstract concepts are mistaken for concrete entities, and therefor analyzed as though they were concrete facts); see also Rebecca Haw Allensworth, *Law and the Art of Modeling: Are Models Facts?*, 103 GEO. L.J. 825, 832–34 (2015) (describing some properties of scientific models and their relationship to reality or optimal description).

[relative to the broader category] to make them [the relevant market for analysis].”³² It is easy to imagine how differences in product characteristics and uses could indicate the competitive closeness of products, but the opinion did not explore this, resting instead on the mere observation of these differences. Beyond providing an articulable basis for distinguishing one group of products from another, the Court did not even try to explain why such peculiar characteristics and uses might affect the boundaries of the relevant market.³³

The leading authority for defining markets based on the public recognition of specific trade and industry lines is another merger case, *Brown Shoe*.³⁴ The district court, in this case, recited the standard litany of market definition concepts before focusing almost exclusively on a simple reporting of how commercial entities and the public viewed the boundaries of the market:

[A] “line of commerce” cannot be determined by any process of logic and should be determined by the processes of observation. . . . Therefore, we must go to the facts in the case and see what the testimony here reveals and make a determination of the “line of commerce” from the practices in the industry, the characteristics and uses of the products, their interchangeability, price, quality and style. In other words, determine how the industry itself and how the users, the public, treat the shoe product.³⁵

On appeal, the Supreme Court largely adopted this approach, articulating a laundry list of practical indicia—observational factors—that might be used to identify submarkets in which mergers could be assessed:

The boundaries of [a] submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.³⁶

We return briefly to the distinction between relevant markets and submarkets below. For now, the interesting point is that, while some of the *Brown Shoe* practical indicia could indeed reveal something about the competitive closeness of products and producers, the Court did not refer to this possibility in its own analysis.³⁷ Instead, the opinion’s treatment of market definition was pre-

³² *United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (du Pont-General Motors)*, 353 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1957).

³³ *See id.* at n.12 (reciting trial testimony without further commentary).

³⁴ *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

³⁵ *United States v. Brown Shoe Co.*, 179 F. Supp. 721, 730 (E.D. Mo. 1959), *aff’d*, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

³⁶ *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 325; *see also id.* at 336–37 (“Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one. The [market] must, therefore, . . . ‘correspond to the commercial realities’ of the industry.”).

³⁷ *See, e.g., id.* at 326 (dismissing, without further explanation, the possibility of drawing narrower markets around price/quality differences in shoes as “unrealistic”).

occupied with the question of the minimum size required for a potential submarket to warrant antitrust scrutiny.³⁸

Our aim here is not to criticize these opinions. Rather, we wish to emphasize what is left unclear by modern reinterpretations of the tests they created. It is not difficult to mold the peculiar-characteristics test into a rough approximation of how substitutable one product is for another. And courts and scholars have similarly reinterpreted several of the practical indicia as factors relevant to assessing closeness of competition.³⁹ Product characteristics and some of the practical indicia may indeed be relevant to assessing the potential for competitive injury in many cases.⁴⁰ But the discussion of market definition in these opinions, and thus the tests themselves, were never meant to fit the focus of modern antitrust analysis.

Antitrust law had not yet coalesced around the consumer welfare standard, and both *du Pont-General Motors* and *Brown Shoe* were influenced by the populist objectives that originally motivated the antitrust statutes. Congressional motivations for Section 7 of the Clayton Act included the desire to protect small, local competitors against larger rivals and to arrest and perhaps reverse a perceived trend toward growing concentration in various industries.⁴¹ Though less focused, Congressional concern with protecting small competitors against larger rivals motivated the Sherman Act as well.⁴²

³⁸ See, e.g., *id.* at 320 (reading legislative history to indicate that the “concern was with the adverse effects of a given merger on competition only in an *economically significant* ‘section’ of the country” (emphasis added)); *id.* at 325 (“[I]t is necessary to examine the effects of a merger in each such *economically significant* submarket.” (emphasis added)); *id.* at 335 (“The 1950 amendments made plain Congress’ intent that the validity of such combinations was to be gauged on a broader scale: their effect on competition generally in an *economically significant* market.” (emphasis added)).

³⁹ See, e.g., *Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.*, 792 F.2d 210, 218–19 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reinterpreting the Court’s practical indicia as “evidentiary proxies for direct proof of substitutability”); Baker, *supra* note 28, at 205 (providing a similar reinterpretation).

⁴⁰ See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency to make a fact [of consequence] more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).

⁴¹ See, e.g., *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 315–16 (“[C]onsiderations cited in support of [amendments to Section 7] were the desirability of retaining ‘local control’ over industry and the protection of small businesses.”); *id.* at 344 (“[We] cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.”); Hovenkamp, *supra* note 30, at 894–95 (“[T]he rationale for market definition in *Brown Shoe* was very different from, and is fundamentally at odds with, the rationale for market definition . . . today.”).

⁴² See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, *THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE* 41 (2005) (“Although writers heaped scorn upon Warren Court antitrust policy in the 1960s for its protection of small business, that policy was probably the most faithful to Congress’s goals in passing the Sherman Act.”); 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, *ANTITRUST LAW* ¶ 103 (4th ed. 2013) (“[W]hile the framers of the Sherman Act were intent on condemning ‘monopoly,’ they saw the principal injury of monopoly as reaching competitors rather than consumers.”); Carl Shapiro, *Antitrust in a Time of Populism*, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 715 (2018) (“[T]he Sherman Act itself was passed in 1890 in response to broad concerns about the political and economic power of large

Natural market concepts follow logically from these populist policy goals. In common usage, the terms *market*, *commodity*, and *industry* are not clearly related to substitutability and the closeness of competition between products and producers.⁴³ If Congress sought to protect small businesses and to prevent further concentration in industries and markets as popularly conceived,⁴⁴ then the naturalistic market-definition standards of these cases were reasonable efforts to comply with legislative intent. The problem is not that these natural market concepts were always inappropriate; the problem is that, having survived the evolution of antitrust policy, they have lost touch with what are now the motivating principles of the antitrust framework. At best, these tests are simply ignored as crude approximations of the modern approach, but they may also confuse and detract from market definition analysis.

B. NATURAL MARKETS DEFINED BY SUBSTITUTABILITY

While characteristic-based markets present the clearest examples of natural market reasoning, even in its older cases, the Supreme Court did not always adhere strictly to lay concepts of industry when defining relevant markets,⁴⁵ and standards for defining relevant markets have always included various approximations to the economic idea of substitutability. Such standards include the related notions of the cross-elasticity of demand and the reasonable interchangeability of use between products.⁴⁶ The idea is that somewhere in the

corporations in America.”); see also George J. Stigler, *The Origin of the Sherman Act*, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985) (arguing that the Sherman Act was passed to protect competitors against larger and more efficient rivals).

⁴³ See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 530a, at 235 n.5 (“In other contexts, of course, ‘market’ means something else—for example, a trading center, as in ‘the stock market’ or ‘the town’s flea market.’ Data collections, including the Census, frequently lump together a distribution level (‘retailing’) or a category of manufacture (‘motors and generators’) that covers products that do not compete with each other.”); cf. TRIFFIN, *supra* note 17, at 90 (“The term ‘commodity’ was one of those words which, for a long time, could be used without any question being raised as to its exact meaning.”).

⁴⁴ See Hovenkamp & Shapiro, *supra* note 9, at 2015 (commenting that the “line of commerce” language of Section 7 was probably never intended to mean more than “a particular ‘line’ [of products] that a seller might sell” as the term was used “by both businesspeople and courts” of the time, and noting that Congress could have adopted the relevant market term of art, but did not, when drafting revisions to this section of the statute); Hovenkamp, *supra* note 30, at 891 (“When it drafted the phrases ‘line of commerce’ and ‘section or community’ in 1914, and even when it restated them as ‘section of the country’ in 1950, Congress almost certainly did not have a technical definition of ‘relevant market’ in mind.”).

⁴⁵ *E.g.*, *United States v. Cont’l Can Co.*, 378 U.S. 441, 457 (1964) (“Where the area of effective competition cuts across industry lines, so must the relevant [market]; otherwise an adequate determination of the merger’s true impact cannot be made.”).

⁴⁶ The cross-elasticity and reasonable interchangeability standards are not the only ways that the Court has articulated this type of substitutability-based market concept. See, e.g., *Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.*, 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (defining the area of effective competition as “the market area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.”).

field of increasingly distant competing products, substitutability becomes too weak to warrant adding competitors to the relevant market—a generalization of the intuition that two general stores in the same small town compete in a common market but may not compete in a common market with stores in neighboring towns and certainly do not compete in the same market as stores hundreds of miles away. There are admirable qualities to this approach to market definition, but—without additional details in the analysis—it too rests on naturalistic market concepts.

A leading authority for defining markets using cross-elasticities of demand is *Times-Picayune*, a tying case in which the Court undertook no detailed market analysis but included a footnote commending market definition based on degrees of substitutability:

For every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite range. The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn; in technical terms, products whose “cross-elasticities of demand” are small.⁴⁷

In using the term “cross-elasticities of demand” the Court probably overstated the economic precision of its standard. Its own analysis of the “cross-elasticity of demand” considered no more than “the trade’s own characterization of the products involved,” observing that those in the trade “markedly differentiate” between certain products.⁴⁸

Another leading authority for defining relevant markets by cross-elasticity of demand is *Cellophane*.⁴⁹ Here, however, the Court confused the issue by seeming to separate the cross-elasticity approach from another standard for antitrust market definition based on the interchangeability of use between different products:

In considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition, no more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes make up that “part of the trade or commerce,” monopolization of which may be illegal.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States*, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).

⁴⁸ *Id.* (“Useful to [determining cross-elasticities of demand] is, among other things, the trade’s own characterization of the products involved. The advertising industry and its customers, for example, markedly differentiate between advertising in newspapers and in other mass media.”).

⁴⁹ *United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane)*, 351 U.S. 377, 380–81 (1956) (“Every manufacturer is the sole producer of the particular commodity it makes but its control in the . . . sense of the relevant market depends upon the availability of alternative commodities for buyers: i.e., whether there is a cross-elasticity of demand [between products].”).

⁵⁰ *Id.* at 395; *see also id.* at 404 (“[The relevant] market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced—price, use and qualities considered.”).

Whether an intelligible distinction exists between the concepts of cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of use is doubtful. Some lower courts have understood reasonable interchangeability to mean the court's own assessment of the technical substitutability of products and cross-elasticity of demand to mean customer willingness to substitute products at then-existing prices.⁵¹ But this bifurcated approach lacks economic rationale and conflicts with the standard articulated in *Cellophane*, which encompassed "reasonable interchangeability . . . price, use and qualities considered."⁵²

It is easy to overstate the degree to which the substitutability standards differ from the characteristics-based standards discussed in the previous section. The leading cases for the substitutability standards also relied upon evidence of product characteristics and industry recognition,⁵³ and vice versa.⁵⁴ The substitutability-based standards do, however, represent a conceptually distinct approach to the market definition exercise.

The basic strategy of that approach is to draw market boundary lines where the substitutability of products and producers becomes too attenuated. Unfortunately, neither the reasonable-interchangeability-of-use test nor the cross-elasticity-of-demand test even attempts to articulate where the cutoff lies. How small must be the cross-elasticity of demand, and how poor must be the interchangeability of use, before the edge of a relevant market has been reached?⁵⁵ The omission of any attempt to answer these questions exposes the naturalistic foundations of these standards.

First, and most importantly, these substitutability standards reflect the naturalistic presumption that markets exist identifiably in the world, distinct from any given inquiry or investigation. The error of ignoring the theory-depen-

⁵¹ *E.g.*, *FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc.*, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 119–20 (D.D.C. 2004), *case dismissed*, No. 04-5291, 2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004); *FTC v. Staples, Inc.*, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1074–75 (D.D.C. 1997); *United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.*, 246 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).

⁵² *Cellophane*, 351 U.S. at 404; *cf.* *United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.*, 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988) ("While sugar and HFCS are functionally interchangeable, they are not reasonably interchangeable because of the price differential between the two products.").

⁵³ *See supra* note 48 and accompanying text; *Cellophane*, 351 U.S. at 380–81 (commenting that "interchangeability is largely gauged by the purchase of competing products for similar uses considering the price, characteristics and adaptability of the competing commodities.").

⁵⁴ *E.g.*, *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) ("The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.").

⁵⁵ *See* FRITZ MACHLUP, *THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION* 213 (1952) ("If it is understood that the products of different firms are generally not identical but different, what degree of similarity or dissimilarity or, more concisely, what degree of substitutability would justify us in speaking of the 'same' industry or of 'different' industries?"); Patrick Massey, *Market Definition and Market Power in Competition Analysis: Some Practical Issues*, 31 *ECON. & SOC. REV.* 309, 314 ("It is unclear how high the cross price elasticity of demand needs to be before goods can be considered to be part of the same market.").

dence of market definition is addressed in Part II. Here, we are concerned with the naturalistic character of these standards. The Court's old substitutability standards conceive of markets as observable groups of products or producers, at least when all relevant elasticities are known. Such a situation would arise only if there were natural or physical boundaries to competition: a gap in the chain of substitutes so vast that the products, producers, and customers on one side of the gap were not competitively relevant to those on the other side.⁵⁶ Such markets would be naturally identifiable in the world, obviating the need to identify any particular cutoff as part of the test itself.

Second, the expectation that substitutability standards should reveal natural markets is revealed in the failure of this ideal. Perfect gaps in competition are rare; a given product usually faces competition from products of varying degrees of substitutability at different price points.⁵⁷ Precisely because the substitutability standards offer no clear guidance on what to do in these cases, courts and scholars have come to describe relevant markets as imperfect and artificial.⁵⁸ Often, but not always, these apologies are founded on the notion that a correct market exists, but has not been identified. Worse yet, the existence of plausible alternative markets is somehow thought to undermine the validity of any given choice of market.

Our point is not that market definition is unimportant, unprincipled, or impossible. As discussed further below, there are logical and helpful ways to approach the exercise. An appropriate use of the HMT, for example, may even consider some of the same evidence as the tests discussed above, but in the context of an analytical exercise keyed to modern competitive effects analysis. To reiterate, the point is not that market definition is not helpful, is not evidence based, or is not a factual question. The point is simply that mar-

⁵⁶ Cf. JOAN ROBINSON, *THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION* 17 (2d ed. 1969) ("The correspondence of [the classical economic idea of industry] to the industries of the real world is not perhaps very close. But in some cases, where a commodity in the real world is bounded on all sides by a marked gap between itself and its closest substitutes [the real-world industry will approximate the theoretic ideal.]").

⁵⁷ See MACHLUP, *supra* note 55, at 213 ("The use of the expression 'entry into the industry' presupposes that there are borderlines of some sort between one industry and another. Yet we know that often in reality there are no such borderlines of any sort."); Nicholas Kaldor, *Mrs. Robinson's "Economics of Imperfect Competition,"* 1 *ECONOMICA* 335, 335 (1934) ("Different producers are not selling either 'identical' or 'different' products, but 'more or less different' products—the demand confronting them being neither completely sensitive nor completely insensitive to the prices charged by other producers."); Stocking, *supra* note 25, at 483 ("All products compete with each other for the consumer's dollar, and in this sense each product is a substitute for any other.").

⁵⁸ See *United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank*, 374 U.S. 321, 361 (1963) (describing market definition as a "workable compromise" that merely avoids the indefensible extremes of overly narrow and overly broad markets); 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 530d ("The Supreme Court has wisely recognized there is 'some artificiality' in any boundaries, but that 'such fuzziness' is inherent in bounding any market.").

ket definition has often been understood as aiming to identify natural or pre-existing markets. That is a problematic goal, because in the general run of cases, natural markets simply do not exist.

C. THERE ARE NO NATURAL MARKETS

Unsurprisingly, the natural market bias of early antitrust opinions paralleled early economic thinking on this topic. Starting from an uncritical identification of markets with commodity concepts in textbook price-theory models,⁵⁹ economists contemplated the classification of industries around observable characteristics,⁶⁰ the definition of markets by close substitutability,⁶¹ and the termination of market boundaries at discrete gaps in the chain of substitutes.⁶² The unsatisfying properties of all these approaches were foreshadowed in the preceding pages.

The turning point in economic thinking occurred in the 1930s and 1940s with the development of the theory of monopolistic competition by Edward Chamberlin. In 1950, Chamberlin surveyed extant market concepts with this uninspiring review:

“Industry” or “commodity” boundaries are a snare and a delusion—in the highest degree arbitrarily drawn, and, wherever drawn, establishing at once wholly false implications both as to competition of substitutes within their limits, which supposedly stops at their borders, and as to the possibility of ruling on the presence or absence of oligopolistic forces by the simple device of counting the number of producers included. As for the *conventional* categories of industries, it seems increasingly evident to me that they have their origin, not primarily in substitution at all, but in similarity of raw materials or other inputs or of technical methods used.⁶³

⁵⁹ See GEORGE J. STIGLER, *THE THEORY OF PRICE* 85 (1966) (“A market, according to the masters, is the area within which the price of a commodity tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation costs.”); TRIFFIN, *supra* note 17, at 78–79 (noting that the equation of industry and commodity made sense in the classical perfect competition model because “Under pure competition, a number of sellers were supposed to compete for the sale of a homogeneous, identical commodity: these sellers constituted a group, or an industry.”); Andreas G. Papandreou, *Market Structure and Monopoly Power*, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 883, 885 (1949) (“Before the advent of the theory of monopolistic or imperfect competition, the concept of a ‘group’ of firms competing in the sale of a ‘commodity’ was considered self-explanatory.”).

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Edward S. Mason, *Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise*, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 61, 69 (1939) (proposing to classify market structures by observation of “similar objective conditions” including “the economic characteristics of the product” and “the cost and production characteristics of the firm’s operation.”).

⁶¹ Cf. Abba P. Lerner, *The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power*, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157, 167 (1934) (“In calling the same thing at different places different commodities, we have rejected the criterion of physical similarity as a basis for [identifying markets] and have put in its place the principle of substitutability at the margin.”).

⁶² See ROBINSON, *supra* note 56.

⁶³ Edward H. Chamberlin, *Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy*, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 86–87 (1950).

Yet Chamberlin did not reject the idea of the market itself. Instead, his writing suggested a different way to conceptualize markets: not as “definite economic [entities], the existence of which has merely to be recognized by the investigator,” but as analytical tools which “may and should be used with all degrees of inclusiveness” in the process of studying a problem.⁶⁴ Under this approach, markets are not concrete arenas or free-standing entities. They are lenses for focusing analysis on a given problem. Such markets can—in fact, must—be molded and shaped to fit the specifics of each problem.⁶⁵ Put another way, market definition remains a factual inquiry upon which evidence is needed, but that evidence is mixed with an understanding of the purpose of the exercise to define a market fit for the specific role it is to serve. In this approach, there are no right or wrong markets, only markets of varying utility in studying the particular economic question at hand.⁶⁶

The novelty of Chamberlin’s approach is taken for granted today.⁶⁷ For example, though the underlying logic often goes unstated, this analytical understanding of the market concept is foundational in much of modern equilibrium analysis.⁶⁸

Deeply integrated as modern antitrust is with economic analysis, this quick history of the economic concept of markets suggests two fundamental properties of antitrust market definition. First, there is no such thing as an economically interesting natural antitrust market. No *real* markets are waiting to be found.⁶⁹ A market is not true (false), correct (incorrect), or real (unreal), but merely appropriate (inappropriate) for a specific purpose. Appropriateness is a contextual quality. And, in antitrust, the context is the theory of harm. Thus,

⁶⁴ TRIFFIN, *supra* note 17, at 84 (explaining the “Chamberlinian ‘group’” concept).

⁶⁵ See Papandreou, *supra* note 59, at 886 (“For Professor Chamberlin the ‘group’ concept is merely an analytical tool which derives its content from the problem at hand.”).

⁶⁶ See, e.g., MACHLUP, *supra* note 55, at 217 (defining industry as “merely a short expression which stands [for] all firms whose operations affect one another’s selling opportunities and sales revenues so definitely that we must not neglect taking account of them.”); *id.* at 213–14 (explaining that “[i]t saves time and effort in analysis to assume certain variables as constant or, what often comes to the same thing, to disregard them; and it is quite legitimate to do so if changes of these variables are negligible for the particular problem or if the direction of the relationship is uncertain.”); TRIFFIN, *supra* note 17 (explaining that such a market “abstracts those firms that are more tightly linked with the enterprise under consideration and which, as a consequence, cannot be ignored in a discussion of its problems”).

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Kaplow, *supra* note 2, at 507 (“[T]here is no way to see (or feel or otherwise directly sense) the magnitude of a firm’s market power No aspect of the analysis is sensory; ‘markets’ as the term is used in this context are pure abstractions.”).

⁶⁸ Werden, *Answer*, *supra* note 7, at 746 (“Separating active and passive competitive forces is part of economic analysis because economic models distinguish the strategic action of competitors from background influences on them.”); Werden, *Possible*, *supra* note 7, at 2 (“[S]eparating active from passive competitive forces is the defining feature of the [most] ubiquitous modeling technique in the field—partial equilibrium analysis.”).

⁶⁹ SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 41 (“There is not for any product a single, real ‘market’ waiting to be discovered.”).

the second proposition: as a purely analytical construct, the definition of a relevant market must always depend upon the nature of the problem for which it is to be used. The second point is developed at length in Part II of this article, but the first point deserves brief attention as well.

While it would be unfair to criticize the Supreme Court for its early focus on natural-market concepts, the same cannot be said of the continued adherence to these concepts today. The problem is that the policy and framework of antitrust law have shifted over time to the economic analysis of effects on consumer welfare while the precedential language of these old cases has not changed accordingly. The old naturalistic standards have thus become a barrier to proper market definition and a lure toward naturalistic thinking.

The barrier is that even when the factors implicated by these standards are relevant to market definition, nothing in the Court's market-definition standards says what to do with this information. The substitutability standards do not say what degree of substitution defines a market;⁷⁰ the characteristics standards do not say how to interpret any given combination of characteristics.⁷¹ As discussed in Part II, the modern HMT and related tests of market definition provide answers to these questions. But if courts and practitioners continue to treat natural-market concepts as controlling standards—deserving equal or greater weight than the HMT—then market definition will continue to be confused.⁷²

The lure of the Court's old market-definition standards is what keeps natural-market thinking entrenched in market-definition practice. One example is the continued focus of courts and advocates on *Brown Shoe*'s practical indicia in merger cases.⁷³ While some of the underlying factors in this test may well be relevant in HMT analysis,⁷⁴ treating them as having any separate relevance outside of the HMT framework can only muddle market definition.

Another example is the occasional argument, based on the reasonable interchangeability standard in *du Pont-General Motors*, that a judge's own impression of substitutability should outweigh evidence of actual consumer

⁷⁰ See *supra* notes 55, 58, and accompanying text.

⁷¹ See Turner, *supra* note 1, at 1151 ("The problem is, you see, the courts really have not gotten around to trying to spell out the necessary analysis, and what the consequences are of certain facts."); *id.* ("[The *Brown Shoe* factors are] a laundry list, not a mode of analysis.").

⁷² E.g., *United States v. Anthem, Inc.*, 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 193–207 (D.D.C. 2017) (treating the *Brown Shoe* indicia and the HMT as complementary means of defining markets); *FTC v. Sysco Corp.*, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25–38 (D.D.C. 2015) (same); *FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc.*, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38–45 (D.D.C. 2009) (same).

⁷³ See *supra* note 72 and sources cited therein.

⁷⁴ See *supra* note 39.

preferences in market definition.⁷⁵ The incoherence of this idea reflects its naturalistic roots. Only if markets were observable entities in the world could it possibly make sense to elevate a judge's impression of product characteristics above otherwise reliable evidence of consumer preferences in market definition.⁷⁶

A final example is the misuse of *Brown Shoe*'s admonition that relevant markets must "correspond to . . . commercial realities"⁷⁷ to discredit proposed markets as "unrealistic" or "gerrymandered."⁷⁸ If there is no such thing as a natural or realistic market, then it makes no sense to reject a putative antitrust market for being artificial or unrealistic.⁷⁹ Defendants are always free to argue that a market is invalid for failing to meet a proper test—not satisfying the HMT, for example. But to reject any valid market as unrealistic or gerrymandered, simply because it fails to conform to lay observation or intuition, is to commit the naturalistic fallacy in its most extreme form.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ *United States v. Oracle Corp.*, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("The test of market definition turns on reasonable substitutability. This requires the court to determine whether or not products have 'reasonable interchangeability' based upon 'price, use and qualities.' What, instead, these witnesses testified to was, largely, their preferences. Customer preferences towards one product over another do not negate interchangeability." (citations omitted)); James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, "Tally-Ho!": *UPP and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines*, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 587, 607 (2011) ("While the case law remains somewhat murky on the role of cross-elasticity, it is now well-established precedent that consumer preferences are, at most, a component of reasonable interchangeability and should not provide a separate basis for defining a relevant market.").

⁷⁶ This is not to say that evidence of consumer preferences is entitled to uncritical deference. But, if product characteristics are relevant at all, it must be because they help to evaluate consumer preferences—not the other way around. *Cf. supra* note 75 and sources cited therein.

⁷⁷ *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962). Strictly, the court referred only to geographic markets in this assertion. Use of the idea has not remained so contained.

⁷⁸ *E.g.*, *U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc.*, No. CIV. 91-113-D, 1992 WL 59713, at *5 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 1992), *aff'd*, 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993) ("I find that the concept of a geographic market being the southern tier of New Hampshire is an unrealistic form of gerrymandering in light of the parties' recruiting, marketing and sales efforts."); *United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.*, 341 F. Supp. 534, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1972), *aff'd*, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) ("even were this court to accept the Government's unrealistic product and geographic market definitions . . .").

⁷⁹ *See Baker, supra* note 11, at 139 ("[T]here is no reason to expect that the concept of market employed by business executives when discussing issues of business strategy or marketing . . . would be the same as the concept of an 'antitrust market' or 'relevant market' defined for the purpose of antitrust analysis."); 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4, ¶ 8 ("Relevant antitrust markets defined according to the hypothetical monopolist test are not always intuitive and may not align with how industry members use the term 'market.'").

⁸⁰ There is no shortage of relevant markets about which claims of unrealistic gerrymandering still hang. *See, e.g.*, *FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.*, 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (involving the FTC's allegation of a "premium natural and organic supermarkets" relevant market); *United States v. Oracle Corp.*, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (involving the DOJ's allegation of a "high function FMS and HRM [software]" relevant market); Hill Wellford & Gregory Wells, *The "Litigation Mulligan" in the 2010 Merger Guidelines: Better Economics but Not (Necessarily) More Clarity Before the Agencies and the Courts*, CPI ANTITRUST J., Oct. 2010, at 1, 11 ("The Agencies' attempts to define as relevant markets certain 'high function'

One response to our argument, up to this point, is that it shows how natural-market concepts can derail market definition but does not show that these concepts have actually led to errors in recent cases. We provide one case study in Part IV.C below, but must admit that we cannot easily prove how the attention courts and advocates pay to these old tests affects outcomes in run-of-the-mill cases. The modern convention is to enumerate essentially all the different tests in reaching a market-definition conclusion. Perhaps no court or analyst is ever swayed by the old tests, which are simply announced as lip service to obviously decrepit precedent. We cannot disprove this.

But why continue to invoke the old standards at all? At worst, dropping these tests from the market definition exercise changes nothing. That would be the case, for example, if indeed no court or advocate was ever swayed by the old tests. Perhaps that is the case. But suppose the world is less extreme. Suppose some fact-finders do assign weight to these old tests and that some advocates do foment confusion with natural-market arguments.⁸¹ In a world where such things are possible, dropping the old tests would increase the clarity and accuracy of the market-definition exercise. It would eliminate an unnecessary distraction and would focus analysis on the critical task of defining markets to identify the scope of potential competitive harm.⁸²

There is no legal or rational defense for continuing to perpetuate the natural market fallacy. The Supreme Court's early efforts at market definition never purported to exhaust the ways to define a market.⁸³ And in more recently stating that the purpose of market definition "is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition,"⁸⁴ the Court has set an objective at odds with its earlier natural-market standards.

enterprise software . . . and 'premium natural and organic supermarkets' . . .—neither being a term used in the relevant industry—are now recognized as litigation mistakes.”).

⁸¹ See, e.g., 3A KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, *FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS* § 150:66 (6th ed. 2012) (proposing model instructions in which jurors are told that “[I]n determining the product market, the basic idea is that the products within it are interchangeable as a practical matter from the buyer's point of view. . . . What you are being asked to do is to decide which products compete with each other.”). But see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, *MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES* 106–07 (2016) [hereinafter ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (more clearly limiting the use of observational evidence to an application of the HMT in market definition).

⁸² See *FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986).

⁸³ Cf. *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Congress neither adopted nor rejected specifically any particular tests for measuring the relevant markets, either as defined in terms of product or in terms of geographic locus of competition.”).

⁸⁴ *Indiana Federation*, 476 U.S. at 460; see also BETTY BOCK, *MERGERS AND MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 1964 SUPREME COURT MERGER DECISIONS* 59 (4th ed. 1965) (“Because of the relative flexibility with which the Court has dealt with the problems of market boundaries, the term ‘relevant market’ . . . does not, and cannot, refer to a ‘market’ in any simple economic or trade sense, but refers rather to the . . . locale where [competitors, suppliers, or customers] may be affected by an acquisition—and nothing more.”).

The onus, here, is on courts and scholars to normalize the omission of the old tests in market definition. When advocates are finally free from the need to pay obeisance to natural-market concepts, the market-definition exercise will be clarified and rationalized.

II. THE INDEPENDENT MARKET FALLACY

The *independent market fallacy* is the common misconception that relevant markets exist independent of a theory of anticompetitive injury. The error in this assumption rests in the prior fallacy. If markets were indeed freestanding entities, then the process of defining a relevant market would be a matter of observation independent of competitive effects analysis. But antitrust markets are not observable entities; they are mental constructs designed to help assess specific competitive concerns. As a result, market definition can never be separated from the act of hypothesizing a specific competitive concern.

If this seems obvious, note that market definition has often been treated as an independent step in rule-of-reason analysis. Early Supreme Court cases were consistent with this view, articulating market-definition tests that were independent of theories of anticompetitive harm and treating market definition as a step preceding the start of competitive effects analysis.⁸⁵ A similar idea long applied in merger review. The understanding of market definition as a discrete, initial step in merger review could be inferred from the text and structure of the 1982 and 1992 Merger Guidelines,⁸⁶ and while the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines now deny this rote ordering of analysis, advocates of the old way remain.⁸⁷

The following shows how the economic understanding of markets as analytic tools necessitates conditioning market definition on specific theories of harm. Standards like the HMT broadly align market definition with theories of anticompetitive harm. But even these standards generally require further tailoring to fit the specific circumstances of a given case and theory.

⁸⁵ *E.g.*, *United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (du Pont-General Motors)*, 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (“Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation.”).

⁸⁶ *See* U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 2 (1982), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf (appearing to make market definition a discrete and initial step in merger analysis); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Merger Guidelines § 0.2, ¶ 1 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines], www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/2007/07/11/11250.pdf (similar).

⁸⁷ *Cf.* Varney, *supra* note 22, at 655 (responding to criticism of the 2010 Merger Guidelines’ position that merger review does not need to begin with market definition).

A. THEORY-DEPENDENCE OF THE MARKET CONCEPT

Antitrust scholars have long suspected that mainstream economics has little to say about market definition.⁸⁸ It has become popular to claim that economists *never* define markets.⁸⁹ Both ideas are curious, given the substantial effort that economists have devoted to studying the theory of market concepts and the identification of markets.⁹⁰ In microeconomic theory markets are typically taken as a primitive concept, leaving it to the applied microeconomist to define a market appropriate to a given empirical study. Perhaps the point is that mainstream microeconomists rarely define antitrust markets in their research. That is correct, but unsurprising.

Because antitrust markets are constructed for the specific purpose of studying antitrust problems, it would be remarkable indeed if they *were* of interest to economists studying non-antitrust problems. The point is not that antitrust market concepts differ in any fundamental way from the market concepts used other places in economics.⁹¹ What really differs from one context to the other is the problem at hand.

⁸⁸ *E.g.*, Horowitz, *supra* note 3, at 1–2 (“Curiously enough, economists have had comparatively little to say about how to delineate markets.”); George J. Stigler, *The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly*, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1982) (“My lament is that this battle on market definitions, which is fought thousands of times what with all the private antitrust suits, has received virtually no attention from us economists.”); Stigler & Sherwin, *supra* note 3, at 555 (“The infrequency with which one encounters actual market size determinations outside the antitrust area is surprising and perhaps disquieting.”).

⁸⁹ Kaplow, *Impossible*, *supra* note 5, at 364 (“[T]he notion of a relevant market does not exist [in industrial organization economics].”); Kaplow, *Alchemy*, *supra* note 5, at 927 n.16 (“It is the market definition approach that is unsubstantiated; . . . in the economic theory of industrial organization it does not even exist.”); Hovenkamp, *supra* note 30, at 910 (“Indeed, as Kaplow observes, the concept of market definition has virtually no presence in the theoretical or empirical literature of industrial organization today.”); Fisher, *supra* note 8, at 132 (“What, then, does economic analysis have to say about market definition? In one sense, the answer is ‘Nothing at all.’ The question of what is ‘the’ relevant market never arises in economics outside of antitrust.”).

⁹⁰ *See supra* Part I.C (citing and discussing just some of this work).

⁹¹ *Cf.* Massey, *supra* note 55, at 317 (“An important development in the literature on market definition . . . is the distinction between the concept of a relevant market used in competition analysis, and traditional economic definitions of a market.”); Turner, *supra* note 1, at 1147 (“[T]here is bound to be, it seems to me, a difference between the economic and legal concepts of the market.”); Werden, *supra* note 10, at 515–16 (“[T]he concept of market delineation as it is used in the antitrust context is quite foreign to economic theorists, and it is only this context that gives meaning to the market delineation question.”); Papandreou, *supra* note 59, at 883 (“One important reason for this gap between the legal and economic concepts of monopoly is their difference in emphasis. Whereas the lawyer deals with competitive relationships, the economist is primarily interested in the allocation mechanism and welfare economics.”). Note that we are referring to antitrust relevant markets here; the term “relevant market” may deviate from the economic concept in other areas of law. *See generally* CHRISTIAN A. MELISCHEK, *THE RELEVANT MARKET IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW* (2012).

In antitrust trials and investigations, attention is typically devoted to one of two questions: (1) has suspect conduct caused any anticompetitive injury? or (2) might it, or some future conduct, cause future anticompetitive injury?⁹² One market concept helpful in answering either question is an outer bound on the entities sufficient to bring about the potential injury: a market defined as a class of transactions in which the suspected injury *could* occur, at least under assumptions favorable to that theory of harm.⁹³ Sometimes defining such a market will answer the question whether competitive injury did, or is likely to, occur. In most cases, this type of market definition cannot itself provide an answer but will facilitate further analysis by identifying questions that must be answered to dispose of the ultimate question of the past or future likelihood of anticompetitive injury.

In the right circumstance, the HMT exemplifies this type of market concept.⁹⁴ The basic idea is to take a putative market (e.g., a set of products) and ask whether a hypothetical monopolist over this market would profitably raise the price of some of the products by a “small but significant amount” (e.g., by 5 percent) over an appropriate baseline (e.g., the competitive price) for an appreciable period of time (e.g., a year). If the answer is yes, then the candidate market satisfies the test and is a relevant antitrust market; if the answer is no, then the candidate market is expanded to include additional products and the test is repeated until a relevant antitrust market is found. Less elaborate articulations of the HMT,⁹⁵ and comparable standards based on the identifica-

⁹² This does not describe all antitrust applications. Proof of anticompetitive injury is not required in hard-core collusion cases under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, for example. Tellingly, this is one situation in which courts have long dispensed with the need to define relevant markets.

⁹³ See, e.g., POSNER, *supra* note 25, at 148–49 (“[A group of sellers] is thus a market in the sense, which is the only one relevant to an economic analysis of competition and monopoly, of a group of sellers who have the power to increase the market price by merging or colluding.”); Werden, *Answer*, *supra* note 7, at 741 (“When the [HMT] is used, the allegation of the relevant market certifies at least the possibility of harm the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.”).

⁹⁴ See generally 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.1 (providing the modern expression of the HMT as applied to horizontal mergers).

⁹⁵ See, e.g., 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 533, at 267 (“A ‘market’ is any grouping of sales whose sellers, if unified by a hypothetical cartel or merger, could profitably raise prices significantly above the competitive level.”); SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 41 (“To define a market . . . is to say that if prices were appreciably raised or volume appreciably curtailed . . . while demand held constant, supply from other sources could not be expected to enter promptly enough and in large enough amounts to restore the old price or volume.”); Hovenkamp & Shapiro, *supra* note 9, at 1999 (“Any candidate market for which the court concludes that a perfectly functioning cartel would lead to a significant price increase qualifies as a relevant market.”).

tion of possible collusive groups⁹⁶ or producers that would otherwise constrain a given exercise of market power,⁹⁷ amount to roughly the same idea.

Tests of this form lead to the delineation of appropriate antitrust markets if they correspond to the theory of harm at issue. To illustrate, suppose a proposed merger of two rival producers raises concern that coordination among the remaining producers of similar products will cause modest, near-term price elevation. The typical articulation of the HMT (focusing on a non-transitory 5 percent price increase) defines a relevant market corresponding to just such a theory of harm. Proper implementation of this version of the HMT will delineate only those markets in which coordination among the set of producers could result in something like a 5 percent price increase in the near future. Whether the merger *would* bring about this result is a question requiring further analysis of market structure and the feasibility of coordination. Either way, the relevant market identifies suspect participants, helping to contextualize the analysis needed to assess the likelihood of a post-merger price increase.

But the usual articulation of the HMT fails to identify a proper market unless it corresponds to the relevant theory of harm. Suppose, for example, that a proposed merger instead raised concern about coordination causing a large price increase, not taking effect until the next bidding cycle three years in the future. The usual articulation of the HMT is ill-suited to identifying a relevant market for this theory of harm. The typical HMT parameters target moderate price elevation in the near term, not large price elevation in the longer term. The groups of producers with sufficient power and incentive to impose large price increases may well differ from those with the power and incentive to target moderate price increases. And the ability of customers to avoid price increases in the more distant future by substituting products or suppliers may well differ from the ability of customers to cover against near-term price increases. The point is not that the HMT cannot be used in this setting, just that it must be adjusted to fit the relevant theory of harm.

⁹⁶ E.g., Kenneth D. Boyer, *Is There a Principle for Defining Industries?*, 50 S. ECON. J. 761, 763 (1984) (defining markets around possible collusive groups).

⁹⁷ See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, *COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE* 102 (2004) (“[T]he relevant market should . . . [contain] the set of products (and geographical areas) that exercise some competitive constraint on each other.”); Fisher, *supra* note 8, at 133 (“[A] useful market definition should include in the market all of the firms and products or services that constrain the exploitation of monopoly power by the firm.”); see also Boyer, *supra* note 96, at 763 (“A firm’s competitors . . . are those sellers who would cause significant losses if that firm took independent action.”).

B. CUSTOMIZATION OF THE MARKET CONCEPT

Decades ago, Phillip Areeda complained, “I am repeatedly disappointed that my students leap into market definition without first specifying the particular legal question that the tribunal hopes to answer through market definition.”⁹⁸ We doubt Areeda would be better disposed toward current practices. Even in a framework as sophisticated as the HMT, market definition is often treated as if it were a theory-independent step in the analysis. This is clearly wrong. A meaningful relevant market must be conditioned on a specific theory of anticompetitive harm;⁹⁹ otherwise, the relevant market cannot properly inform the analysis of competitive effects.¹⁰⁰

This simple proposition clarifies the important role of market definition in antitrust. Consider the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. While conceding that the base price and hypothesized price increase may differ from one application of the HMT to another,¹⁰¹ the Guidelines offer no rationale for how or why these parameters should be chosen in particular applications. Confusion would have been avoided if the Guidelines had stated that the base price and hypothesized price increase must correspond to the specific theory of anticompetitive harm being investigated. We now discuss how this correspondence can be achieved in practice.

1. *Customizing the Price Increase*

The gravest omission in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines may be its failure to explain how to choose the size of the hypothesized price increase in

⁹⁸ Areeda, *supra* note 10, at 553; *see also* Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 568–69 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part) (“The market definition in this case shows why you can’t pick a market without knowing the purpose of the choice. The court has defined a market of professional basketball in Chicago. This is a plausible market, if the question is whether anything injured consumers. . . . If, instead, we seek to learn whether CPSC harmed competition for a sports franchise, we must define a market that looks at the demand and supply possibilities facing Rich and IBL.”); Fisher, *supra* note 8, at 130 (“The first thing to understand about market definition is that how it is done depends on the purpose for which it is used.”).

⁹⁹ Areeda, *supra* note 10, at 553 (“[A] subordinate question needs to be focused before market definition can be attempted: namely, what particular impairment of competition is to be feared.”).

¹⁰⁰ *See, e.g.*, Salop, *supra* note 26, at 191 (“Market definition and market power should be evaluated in the context of the alleged anticompetitive conduct and effect, not as a flawed filter carried out in a vacuum divorced from these factors.”); Gregory J. Werden, *Four Suggestions on Market Delineation*, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 107, 108 (1992) (“Assuring that markets are suitable for the purposes to which they are put requires that a preliminary step be taken before market delineation. This step is the identification of who might exercise market power, against whom it might be exercised, and how it might be exercised.”).

¹⁰¹ *E.g.*, 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.1, ¶ 2 n.4 (considering circumstances in which a hypothetical cartel should be used in place of a hypothetical monopolist); *id.* § 4.1.2, ¶ 1 (defining the HMT benchmark price as that which “would likely prevail absent the merger”); *id.* § 4.1.2, ¶ 3 (allowing the size of the hypothesized price increase to depend on “the nature of the industry and the merging firms’ positions in it”).

applying the HMT.¹⁰² After noting that the size of the increase is a methodological question, not a policy choice,¹⁰³ the Guidelines say only that the size of a hypothetical price increase depends on “the nature of the industry and the merging firms’ positions in it.”¹⁰⁴ This guidance verges on uselessness, and may even be read as reverting to natural market concepts—the “nature” of some metaphysical “industry”—even while articulating an analytical market concept. The clearer and more useful guidance would have been to say that the size of the price increase should reflect the specifics of the potential injury under investigation.

To put this point in perspective, it helps to consider the typical and flawed policy argument that relevant markets should be defined based on price increases of no less than, say, 5 percent because only substantial price increases constitute antitrust violations in warrant of enforcement actions.¹⁰⁵ There are two problems with this argument. First, apart from some loose qualifiers (*undue* restraint of trade; *substantial* lessening of competition)¹⁰⁶ there is no quantitative threshold for violating any antitrust statute,¹⁰⁷ so it would be odd to contemplate implementing any particular choice of threshold at the market definition stage. Second, even if there *were* something like a minimum 5 percent price-increase requirement to prove a violation, the requirement would

¹⁰² We recognize that omitting this detail could serve important ends. It might preserve some flexibility in the process or increase accessibility to lay readers. Our focus is on the Guidelines’ role as a description of the market definition process, and we hope our comment will be understood as limited to this scope.

¹⁰³ 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.1, ¶ 2 (“The SSNIP is . . . a methodological tool for performing the hypothetical monopolist test; it is not a tolerance level for price increases resulting from a merger.”).

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* § 4.1.2, ¶ 3.

¹⁰⁵ *See, e.g.*, 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 530a, at 238 (“[T]he extent of the market for legal purposes depends on the magnitude and duration of power that antitrust law deems critical. . . . [S]electing the relevant degree and duration are questions of legal policy.”); *id.* ¶ 530e, at 241 (“Because the market power that concerns antitrust law must be ‘substantial,’ a product that can be profitably priced only a few percentage points above the perfectly competitive level . . . should not be deemed a ‘market’ for antitrust purposes.”); Werden, *supra* note 10, at 538–39 (“The Guidelines also require price increases to be ‘significant and non-transitory’ because collusion that increased price only slightly or for a very short time would not have a significant adverse effect on the economic welfare of the nation, and therefore would not justify governmental intervention in the marketplace.”).

¹⁰⁶ *E.g.*, *Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States*, 221 U.S. 1, 58–60 (1911) (interpreting Sherman Act § 1 to reach only “undue” restraints of trade); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)) (prohibiting mergers, the effects of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly”).

¹⁰⁷ *See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 321 (1962) (“[Congress did not] adopt a definition of the word ‘substantially,’ whether in quantitative terms . . . or in designated qualitative terms.”). Note that we are referring to U.S. antitrust law here. *Cf.* Eur. Comm’n, Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), 2014 O.J. (C 291) 1.

logically apply to the competitive effect of some challenged conduct, not the relevant market in which that conduct is assessed.

Suppose that a hypothetical monopolist over a given set of products would raise the price of every product in the set by 10 percent. This set of products constitutes a valid relevant market when tested by the HMT with a 5 percent hypothesized price increase, but the actual price effect resulting from whatever conduct is being explored is unclear. If the conduct in question is a merger to monopoly, then the price effect would be double the assumed 5 percent threshold. If the conduct in question is the merger of two out of ten firms in the relevant market, then the price effect could be much smaller than the assumed 5 percent threshold.¹⁰⁸ In either case, implementing the substantiality threshold at the market definition stage is both clumsy and misleading.

So, on what basis should the hypothetical price increase be chosen when applying the HMT? The answer is on the basis of the theory of anticompetitive injury in question. At a minimum, then, we ought never to choose a hypothetical price increase larger than what the actual anticompetitive effect is expected to be. Suppose, for example, that the anticompetitive concern around some challenged conduct is a price increase of only 3 percent—because an elastic supply of an alternative product is known to be available at a price 3 percent above the current price.¹⁰⁹ As we discuss below, a 3 percent price increase on a large mass of sales may amount to substantial competitive harm and thus warrant antitrust scrutiny.¹¹⁰ How should we define the market for this inquiry? A relevant market defined by the HMT with the usual 5 percent price increase is inappropriate. Of what importance are the suppliers that are “in” the market for a 4–5 percent price increase when our actual concern is a 1–3 percent price increase? If these suppliers would not constrain the hypothesized 3 percent price increase, then their inclusion in the market could only confuse analysis, overstating the competitive forces constraining the hypothesized injury. The maximum price increase for the HMT in this example would be at most 3 percent—the upper bound on the price increase posited by the anticompetitive theory at issue.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ See Gregory J. Werden, *The History of Antitrust Market Delineation*, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 204 (1992) (offering a similar observation); Dennis W. Carlton, *Market Definition: Use and Abuse*, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 6 n.3 (2007) (same).

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., *United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.*, 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that a monopolist of high fructose corn syrup could raise the price of this product “to just below the . . . price of sugar before being constrained by the competitive forces of sugar”).

¹¹⁰ We provide a more detailed discussion of how a proper understanding of market definition informs the substantiality inquiry in Part IV.B.

¹¹¹ Whether a price increase of at most 3% warrants legal relief is a conceptually and logically separate question from how to define the relevant market for this injury. The logic of market definition does inform this question, however, and we return to this subject in Part IV.B.

This point can be generalized. If the hypothesized anticompetitive injury is a large price increase, something like 10–20 percent, then a relevant market defined by the HMT with a 5 percent hypothesized price increase is similarly inapt to the inquiry. If a large price increase is the concern, then the absence of adequate substitutes in response to a small price increase is at most of partial interest. Here, it is critical to know which producers are “in” the market for a large price increase on the order of the theorized concern. An appropriate choice of price increase for the HMT in this example is thus something like 10–20 percent.

We recognize that in many cases it may be impossible to state the anticompetitive concern with such precision. Early in the review of merger notifications, for example, precise predictions of the potential anticompetitive concern cannot be expected. In other situations, such as those involving a range of potential coordination strategies, it may never be possible to specify competitive concerns in fine detail. Where nothing about the conduct or context suggests otherwise, the longstanding default 5 percent price increase of the Merger Guidelines seems reasonable.¹¹² But it should not be treated as the presumptive standard that it is today. If the relevant market is to be helpful in analyzing questions, then as the nature of anticompetitive concern evolves and comes into focus, so should the relevant market.

2. Customizing the Base Price

Another HMT parameter in need of customization is the base price. Though rarely described in quite these terms,¹¹³ the poster child for failing to heed this requirement is the Supreme Court’s infamous blunder in *Cellophane*.¹¹⁴ To translate the Court’s mistake into HMT terms, in attempting to define the relevant market for assessing a monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Court asked whether DuPont would have found it profitable to increase the price of its cellophane product by 5 percent. Finding that DuPont would not have profited from such a price increase—to the surprise of no one operating under the assumption that firms set prices to maximize profits—the Court went on to expand the relevant market and misleadingly mask DuPont’s apparent ability to exercise market power. If the base price in the HMT had not been the current price, but instead some estimate of Cello-

¹¹² 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.2, ¶ 3 (“The Agencies most often use a SSNIP of five percent of the price paid by customers.”).

¹¹³ An exception is Salop’s treatment of this subject. Salop, *supra* note 26, at 194, 197 (providing a description of the “*Cellophane* trap” analogous to what we describe here).

¹¹⁴ *United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane)*, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).

phane's competitive price, then the relevant market would have been narrowed and DuPont's market power would have been evident.¹¹⁵

Few antitrust decisions have been pilloried so deservedly as *Cellophane*. But just what made the Court's reasoning fallacious has never fully crystallized in the literature. Comments on the topic often draw a distinction between market definition in monopolization cases versus merger cases, wrongly suggesting that the statutory standard is of more than derivative importance in dictating how markets should be defined.¹¹⁶ Similar ambiguity envelops the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines' approach to selecting the baseline price in the HMT. The Guidelines expressly contemplate alternatives to the current-price default baseline but describe the situations justifying alternative baselines by vague and confusing references to likely future prices absent the merger.¹¹⁷ While none of these commentaries is entirely off the mark, none answers the root question: what dictates the proper choice of baseline price?

The answer is, once again, the theory of anticompetitive injury. As purely conceptual tools, relevant markets are defined to address specific economic questions. And like any tool, the appropriate market definition depends on the purpose for which it is to be used.¹¹⁸ The appropriate market for one question may be inappropriate for another. *Cellophane* illustrates just this.

As noted above, *Cellophane* presented the Court with a theory of monopolization.¹¹⁹ Possession of monopoly power is an element of this claim, and the purpose of defining a market in *Cellophane* was to help determine whether DuPont already possessed monopoly power.¹²⁰ Whether market definition was

¹¹⁵ See generally 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 539 (providing an extended treatment of the *Cellophane* fallacy); POSNER, *supra* note 25, at 150–51 (same).

¹¹⁶ E.g., Massey, *supra* note 55, at 323 (“Applying the SSNIP test ignores the fact that a firm may already have market power. However, such considerations are not relevant for defining a market in merger cases. . . . The *cellophane trap* means that a different approach is required in abuse of dominance cases.”); Werden, *supra* note 10, at 526 (asserting non-applicability of the *Cellophane* fallacy in merger cases); cf. POSNER, *supra* note 25, at 151 (stating that because the *Cellophane* fallacy “may seem not to be a problem in a merger case,” “the criteria for defining the market should be different in monopolization and merger cases,” but noting paradoxes with this conclusion).

¹¹⁷ See 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.2, ¶ 1 (“The Agencies apply the SSNIP starting from prices that would likely prevail absent the merger. . . . If prices are likely to change absent the merger . . . the Agencies may use anticipated future prices as the benchmark for the test.”).

¹¹⁸ See Werden, *supra* note 10, at 516 (“Markets are an analytical tool, and in economics and law as well as in carpentry and auto mechanics the most useful tools are those designed for a specific job.”).

¹¹⁹ The government had originally made claims of attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize as well, but these theories were not before the Court on appeal. *Cellophane*, 351 U.S. at 379.

¹²⁰ Cf. *id.* at 380 (“Market delimitation is necessary . . . to determine whether an alleged monopolist violates [Section 2]. The ultimate consideration in such a determination is whether the

really needed to address this element is debatable,¹²¹ but insofar as market definition *was* used, the appropriate market concept would have been obtained by asking whether DuPont had sufficient market power to raise its price above the competitive level, at least under assumptions favorable to the claim. The HMT with base price equal to an estimate of Cellophane's competitive price would have validated markets responsive to this question.¹²² This is not to say that estimating that competitive price would have been easy.¹²³ It is simply to observe that the competitive price is the baseline demanded by the substantive law if market definition is to be used in assessing the monopolization theory presented in cases like *Cellophane*.

To make that point another way, what the Court did in *Cellophane* was not to define the wrong market but to define the right market for the wrong question. The HMT with a base price equal to the current price—roughly the test used in the case—validates markets responsive to the following question: what group of competitors would a monopolist need to control or collude with in order to further raise the price of its product? This is an interesting question, and this market concept may well have been appropriate for assessing a claim of attempted monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize.¹²⁴ The problem is not, therefore, that the current price is the wrong baseline for every market definition exercise in a Section 2 claim. The problem is simply that this base price was inappropriate for the specific claim of monopolization that the Court was trying to address in *Cellophane*.

The same logic applies when selecting the base price for defining relevant markets in merger cases. An opportunity for illustration is the long-standing unease attaching to whether the *Cellophane* fallacy applies in the merger context. Is the proper HMT base price in merger cases the current price—even if it reflects the ongoing exercise of market power—or is it an estimate of the

defendants control the price and competition in the market for such part of trade or commerce as they are charged with monopolizing.”); SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 56 (“The purpose for market definition in a monopoly case is to see whether the alleged monopolist has power to maintain a price substantially higher than costs (or, by lowering price . . . to drive others out).”).

¹²¹ See generally *supra* notes 2, 5, and sources cited therein (proposing the use of estimates derived from residual demand curves in place of market definition).

¹²² See Werden, *supra* note 108, at 139 (“The relevant question for assessing the firm’s market power is whether the cross-elasticities of demand were so great near competitive price levels as to prevent a significant elevation of prices above the competitive level in the first instance.”).

¹²³ See generally Lawrence J. White, *Market Power and Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A Paradigm Is Missing*, in 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 913 (W. Dale Collins ed., 2008) (discussing this and related challenges in the Section 2 context); Carlton, *supra* note 108, at 19–20 (discussing issues with market definition in the Section 2 context).

¹²⁴ Cf. 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 539a, at 321 (commenting that relevant markets defined around price increases may be appropriate in attempted monopolization cases).

competitive price?¹²⁵ The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines continue a tradition of not really answering this question, instead defining the HMT baseline as the price “that would likely prevail absent the merger.”¹²⁶ Evidently, this aspires to have a current-price default baseline but to allow for deviations from this rule in vaguely identified special cases.¹²⁷

The theory-dependence of market definition provides a simple answer to the choice-of-baseline question. The answer is—once again—that the proper choice of base price depends on the theory of harm. If the concern is that a merger will allow the remaining firms to elevate price above the current level, then the current price is the appropriate baseline against which to define the market. If the concern is that a merger could stabilize or entrench already existing price elevation, then some measure of competitive pricing but for the ongoing cause of price elevation is the appropriate baseline. The reason for the difference is the fundamental difference in the question posed. In the case of already ongoing coordination, the economic question in the entrenchment theory is not “what firms would need to coordinate to further raise the price?” Rather, the question is “what firms would need to deviate from coordination to effectively depress the price?”¹²⁸ Again, an analytically helpful relevant market must be customized to fit a particular theory of anticompetitive harm.

The theory-dependence of market definition also highlights deficiencies in the Guidelines’ likely-future-price paradigm. While the Guidelines prescribe the right result in the case of a theory of harm based on price elevation, they mask the reason for this choice of baseline. Use of a current or likely-future-price baseline is only appropriate when the theory of harm is an increase in price above this current or likely-future-price level. If the theory of harm is entrenchment of existing market power, then the appropriate choice of baseline price is something like a competitive price—a result reached awkwardly, if it is reached at all, by the likely-future-price paradigm.

¹²⁵ Compare Gene C. Schaerr, *The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department’s Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers*, 94 YALE L.J. 670 (1985) (suggesting that failure to adopt a competitive price baseline benefits mergers between firms already exercising market power and may result in overly broad relevant markets), with Werden, *supra* note 10, at 525–26 (suggesting that, because “the ultimate question is whether a merger would create or enhance market power,” the current price is the appropriate baseline “[even if it is already] well above competitive levels because of collusion or monopoly”).

¹²⁶ 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.2, ¶ 1.

¹²⁷ Cf. Werden, *supra* note 10, at 526 (“The only possible exception [to using current price as the baseline] would be when a merger would strengthen a shaky cartel and prevent price from falling. In this case, a price significantly below the prevailing price could be considered to be a ‘likely future’ price.”).

¹²⁸ See generally Sean P. Sullivan, *Anticompetitive Entrenchment*, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1133 (2020) (discussing entrenchment theories of merger enforcement).

To illustrate, suppose that several firms have settled into a pattern of stable coordination on elevated prices. If two of these firms propose to merge, a possible theory of harm is that the merger may reduce the likelihood that a future shock would disrupt this pattern of coordination—random disruption being more likely the more independent concerns there are in the coordinated equilibrium.¹²⁹ As this theory of harm centers on disruption of coordination, the proper base price for defining the relevant market is some measure of the competitive price but for coordination. The Guidelines appear to recognize this answer, but only through a vague and unexplained exception, rather than by applying a general approach to market definition.¹³⁰

As another illustration, consider the proposed acquisition of a fringe competitor, already in the market, by a dominant firm that has raised its price to the limit that would trigger entry by higher-cost firms. An entrenchment theory of harm is that this merger will allow the dominant firm to forestall possible future price depression by the fringe competitor, not that the merger will allow the dominant firm to further raise its prices.¹³¹ In defining the relevant market for this theory of harm, the appropriate base price is some estimate of the competitive price. It is debatable whether the Guidelines anticipate market definition addressing this type of maintenance of monopoly situation at all.¹³² Even if this situation is meant to be addressed, the likely-future-price paradigm excuses reliance on a competitive base price only when that is the price

¹²⁹ We are grateful to Robert Tovskey for suggesting this particular articulation of the theory of anticompetitive entrenchment, which exists in various forms in caselaw and scholarship. *See id.* at 1151–57 (identifying tacit collusion as a target for the entrenchment approach to merger enforcement); *see also* *Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League*, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010) (focusing on the existence of “separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,” “independent centers of decisionmaking,” and “diversity of entrepreneurial interests” as the catalysts of the “actual or potential competition” that is protected by the antitrust laws); Jonathan B. Baker, *Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects under the Antitrust Laws*, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 163–73 (2002) (discussing the tensions in partial coordination and the role of disruptive “maverick” firms); Christopher R. Leslie, *Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust*, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 564–95 (2004) (discussing tensions in trust among cartel participants).

¹³⁰ 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.2, ¶ 1 (“If prices might fall absent the merger due to the breakdown of pre-merger coordination, the Agencies may use those lower prices as the benchmark for the test.”).

¹³¹ *See, e.g., Stanley Works*, 78 F.T.C. 1023, 1066–68 (1971) (noting minimal increase in concentration resulting from a merger but focusing on the elimination of prospective competition and foreclosure of future price reductions as anticompetitive concern), *aff'd*, *Stanley Works v. FTC*, 469 F.2d 498, 505–08 (2d Cir. 1972).

¹³² *Cf. Werden*, *supra* note 10, at 526–27 (describing merger cases as focused on the question whether a merger would “create or enhance market power” and thus interpreting deviation from a current-price baseline as limited to a merger that would “strengthen a shaky cartel”).

that “would likely prevail absent the merger,”¹³³ circularly conditioning the ability to analyze this theory of harm on its own conclusion.

The likely-future-price paradigm is doubly problematic. As shown above, it obscures the logic of selecting a proper HMT base price in merger cases. But its greater fault may be that its framing of market definition seems inadvertently to bias merger analysis against theories of anticompetitive harm alleging entrenchment of market power.¹³⁴ Indeed, these cases are rarely brought today, despite both case law and statutory authority for mergers to be blocked if they entrench rather than augment existing market power.¹³⁵ If antitrust authorities are unwilling to rely on entrenchment theories in challenging mergers, that unwillingness ought to follow from an explicit policy decision and not from the adoption of market definition practices that just happen to preclude challenging mergers on such grounds.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET DEFINITION

The need to condition market definition on a theory of harm has implications beyond those discussed above.¹³⁶ We will not discuss every implication in detail, but four deserve highlighting. First, besides clarifying the level of the HMT baseline, the need to customize market definition explains the selection of price concepts in the HMT. Whether a hypothesized price increase should be relative to the immediate price of an intermediate product, to its value-added price, or to the final price of the end product¹³⁷ should be guided by the theory of harm. Second, whereas the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines seem to treat price discrimination as a special case of market definition,¹³⁸ price discrimination markets are actually just applications of the principle that market definition should be conditioned on a theory of harm. If

¹³³ 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.2, ¶ 1; *see also id.* (limiting deviations from the current-price baseline to situations in which “prices are likely to change absent the merger, e.g., because of innovation or entry”).

¹³⁴ *See Sullivan*, *supra* note 128, at 1142–51 (describing entrenchment theories of harm in horizontal merger enforcement).

¹³⁵ *See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank*, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (“[I]f concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great.”); *Areeda*, *supra* note 10, at 564 (“Merger precedents have been concerned not only with combinations creating new power but also with those reinforcing present power. One need not endorse all the cases making or misusing that point to accept the proposition that Clayton Act Section 7’s prophylactic mandate is violated by a merger which reinforces pre-existing monopoly or oligopoly pricing.”); 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24 (“The unifying theme of these Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise.” (emphasis added)).

¹³⁶ *See Salop*, *supra* note 26, at 194–95 (outlining five analytic traps that can be avoided by explicitly recognizing the theory-dependence of market definition).

¹³⁷ *Cf. Werden*, *supra* note 10, at 534–38 (discussing these types of alternatives).

¹³⁸ *See* 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, §§ 3, 4.1.4, 4.2.2.

the theory of harm is market-wide price elevation, it is unnecessary to specify the customer component of the market. If the theory of harm is price elevation to a subset of customers, then this should be reflected in the relevant market. Third, when considering the appropriateness of including captive capacity or excluding presently uncontested share from the definition of a market,¹³⁹ no fixed answer can ever be given in the abstract. Like all aspects of market definition, the appropriateness of including or excluding any given facet of competition in a relevant market depends on the theory of harm and the analytical purpose for which the market is being defined. Fourth, the theory-dependence of market definition helps to clarify market delineation in tying cases. Without embarking on too detailed an aside on tying doctrine,¹⁴⁰ we note that the value of defining a relevant market for the tying product differs fundamentally from the value of defining a relevant market for the tied product.¹⁴¹ The former helps assess ability to leverage (a question of current market power); the latter helps assess whether leveraging could harm consumers (a question of the acquisition of market power). Approaching market definition from a theory-dependent perspective clarifies how and why the exercise differs between the two separate relevant markets in this analysis.

To summarize, a relevant antitrust market must always be conditioned on a specific theory of competitive injury, and courts and advocates should resist the urge to see market definition as a rote, theory-independent process. Nor need they submit to the independent-market fallacy. While the Court's commentary on market definition has not always been clear, the principle that relevant markets should correspond to specific theories of harm is evident. This was clear in *Philadelphia National Bank*, which defined the market by looking to where competitive effects would be direct and immediate.¹⁴² It was reaffirmed in *Indiana Federation of Dentists*, which explained that the point of market definition is to determine "whether an arrangement has the potential

¹³⁹ Cf. Fiona M. Scott Morton & Zachary Abrahamson, *A Unifying Analytical Framework for Loyalty Rebates*, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 777 (2017) (discussing the complicated interplay between contested and uncontested market shares in the context of contracts referencing rivals).

¹⁴⁰ See generally 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (3d ed. 2011) (providing exhaustive treatment of the antitrust analysis of tying and related practices); 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (3d ed. 2011) (same).

¹⁴¹ See *Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984) ("The requirement that two distinguishable product markets be involved follows from the underlying rationale of the rule against tying."); *Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp.*, 33 F.3d 194, 200–01 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The first inquiry in any § 1 tying case is whether the defendant has sufficient market power over the tying product, which requires a finding that two separate product markets exist and a determination of precisely what the tying and tied product markets are."); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 3.3.a1, at 127 (5th ed. 2016) (noting that market power in the primary market may or may not exist independently of market power in an aftermarket, such that "each of the markets must be evaluated separately"); *id.* at 524–25 (similar).

¹⁴² *United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank*, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963).

for genuine adverse effects on competition.”¹⁴³ Where a theory of harm has been identified, and to as much specificity as that theory allows, the delineation of relevant markets should always aim to identify market concepts tailored to the specific injuries implied by the anticompetitive theory at issue.

III. THE SINGLE MARKET FALLACY

The *single market fallacy* is the common mistake of assuming each antitrust case involves a single relevant market. Most markets encompass a variety of products, and we are not suggesting that courts have failed to recognize this or to define multiple product markets where different sets of products are implicated by the facts. Rather, our concern is the assumption that a single relevant market (or markets) applies in common to every aspect of an antitrust case. The error in this assumption stems from both of the prior fallacies. The existence of a single market is congruent with the assumption of natural, free-standing markets. And the mistake is amplified by a failure to grasp the theory-dependence of relevant markets. When these foundational errors are recognized, the single-market fallacy becomes obvious. The number of potential theories of harm implicated by a given fact pattern marks the upper limit on the number of potentially helpful relevant markets to define.

If this seems obvious, note that it has not deterred legions of courts, practitioners, and scholars from battling over selection of *the* relevant market for a given case or investigation. Since the inception of antitrust litigation, trial courts have treated market definition as a fact question to be answered definitively by the fact-finder, taking advocacy under advisement but ultimately finding by themselves what the relevant market is to be.¹⁴⁴ Antitrust scholars have proven no less fixated on trying to identify unique relevant markets,¹⁴⁵ or at least on trying to distill principles for choosing a single market from among

¹⁴³ *FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986).

¹⁴⁴ *See, e.g., JBL Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc.*, 698 F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1983) (“In determining what the field of competition is, courts are not free to accept whatever market is suggested by the plaintiff, but must examine the commercial realities within the industry in question.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.*, 585 F.2d 381, 389 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Thus in determining the relevant market the courts are not free to accept whatever market is suggested by the plaintiff as fitting most persuasively with his contention that his power to compete effectively has suffered injury.”).

¹⁴⁵ *See, e.g., Areeda, supra* note 10, at 584 (“[F]or each such product and region, there can be only a single legally relevant market and not a multiplicity of legal relevant submarkets.”); Horowitz, *supra* note 3, at 5 (“[T]he platitude that the geographic market is ‘the area of effective competition’ fails to provide a comprehensive guide for delineating *the* geographic market that is uniquely relevant for the antitrust issue in question.”); Werden, *supra* note 108, at 194–95 (stating that the smallest market principle means “there is a unique relevant market for every initial candidate market”).

the alternatives.¹⁴⁶ In each of these examples, the focus of attention makes sense only if one starts from the premise that there is and must be a unique relevant market for each inquiry.

An accurate understanding of markets compels the conclusion that multiple relevant markets can—and often should—be defined within a single case or investigation.¹⁴⁷ This multiple-market paradigm highlights aspects of current practice in need of change. Specifically, the multiple-market paradigm suggests that a distinct relevant market should be defined for each theory of harm in a trial or investigation. It also suggests a subordinate role for courts and defendants in market definition: the choice of relevant markets should be left to the plaintiff, with fact-finders and defendants limited to the task of testing the validity of whatever market the plaintiff proposes by applying the HMT or a related concept. To be clear, the plaintiff's choice is not unconstrained in this approach: any relevant market must satisfy something like the HMT, and any proposal failing such a test refutes the underlying theory of harm. But where multiple alternative market delineations would satisfy the requirements of the HMT or a comparable market concept, the choice among them is the plaintiff's. These may seem like tectonic changes, but they are all logical outgrowths of a principled approach to market definition, and they are all within the bounds of what courts are already free to do today.

A. MULTIPLICITY OF RELEVANT MARKETS

It is often considered beyond dispute that any antitrust case or investigation should give rise to a single relevant market, or, where different products are involved, a single set of relevant markets. A single definition of the relevant market is usually assumed to apply to every theory or alternative theory in a case. This is not to say that courts have never defined alternative markets in antitrust cases. Indeed, some older merger cases multiplied markets with almost comedic abandon.¹⁴⁸ But the modern view is that market definition should produce a single market concept germane to all aspects of the case or

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Werden, *supra* note 100, at 117 (“Under the Guidelines, there are many markets but generally only one relevant market, and it is determined by the smallest market principle, which holds that the smallest market generally is the relevant market.”).

¹⁴⁷ This should not be taken as a suggestion that market definition is always necessary. But if market definition would be helpful to analysis, then a multiple-market paradigm is appropriate.

¹⁴⁸ *E.g.*, *United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.*, 168 F. Supp. 576, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (finding relevant markets to include “(1) the iron and steel industry, (2) hot rolled sheets, (3) cold rolled sheets, and (4) hot rolled bars, in (a) the United States as a whole, (b) the northeast quadrant of the United States, (c) Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York, (d) Michigan and Ohio, (e) Michigan, and (f) Ohio, (5) butt weld pipe, (6) electric weld pipe, (7) seamless pipe, (8) oil field equipment, (9) oil field equipment and supplies, (10) tin plate, and (11) track spikes, in (a) the United States as a whole”).

investigation,¹⁴⁹ with at most an allowance for nested price discrimination markets in special circumstances.¹⁵⁰ This single-market philosophy manifests in several observable practices.

One such practice is for courts to treat market definition as their own responsibility. Not always, but often, antitrust trials play out with the plaintiff and defendant putting forth competing arguments for what the relevant market should be¹⁵¹ and with the judge or jury deciding which of these definitions prevails.¹⁵² Whatever market the court announces as the outcome of this tournament becomes *the* relevant market for the case.¹⁵³

Closely related to the previous practice is scholarly discussion of market definition as an exercise in selecting the best relevant market from among the

¹⁴⁹ *E.g.*, *FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.*, 548 F.3d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he FTC may have alternate theories of the merger’s anticompetitive harm, depending on inconsistent market definitions . . . [but] on the merits, the FTC would have to proceed with only one of those theories.”); 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 533, at 266 (“[D]egrees of constraint do in fact vary [but] the ‘market’ for antitrust purposes is the *one* relevant to the particular legal issue at hand.”); Werden, *supra* note 100, at 117 (“Under the Guidelines, there are many markets but generally only *one* relevant market” (emphasis added)).

¹⁵⁰ *See, e.g.*, *FTC v. Sysco Corp.*, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 40–48 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding both “broadline foodservice distribution” and “broadline foodservice distribution to national customers” to be relevant markets for the case); 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.4, ¶ 1 (“If a hypothetical monopolist could profitably target a subset of customers for price increases, the Agencies may identify relevant markets defined around those targeted customers.”).

¹⁵¹ *See, e.g.*, *Sysco*, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 24–25 (describing the competing market definition proposals of the government and defendant); *United States v. H & R Block, Inc.*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 50 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); *see also* Turner, *supra* note 1, at 1150 (describing the typical trial as follows: “you have two protagonists, one on each side, plaintiff and defendant, both seeking to establish the market definition most favorable to them”); O’MALLEY, GREINIG & LEE, *supra* note 81, § 150:132 (providing model jury instructions in which the plaintiff and defendant both offer competing market definition proposals); ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, *supra* note 81, at 109 (providing model jury instructions that include “*defendant’s contention, if any, about the scope of the relevant . . . market*”).

¹⁵² *See, e.g.*, *supra* note 144 and sources cited therein; *FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc.*, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 123 (D.D.C. 2004), *case dismissed*, No. 04-5291, 2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004) (rejecting portions of both plaintiff’s and defendant’s proposed market definitions); *see also* Turner, *supra* note 1, at 1152 (commenting that if the defendant’s market concept would not lead to illegality, and the plaintiff “has not really shown enough to indicate that his market is better, then [the plaintiff] loses.”). This is not a new practice. *See* RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, *COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW* 211 (2000) (“The first opinion to consider explicitly alternative market definitions and to give reasons for choosing one over the other was Learned Hand’s opinion in [*Alcoa*]. The Supreme Court followed Hand’s example in [*Cellophane*].”).

¹⁵³ *Cf. H & R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (“While some inappropriate proposed relevant markets would be ruled out by the critical loss test, the fact that the test could still confirm multiple relevant markets means that the Court must rely on additional evidence in reaching *the single, appropriate market definition*.” (emphasis added)); Areeda, *supra* note 10, at 583 (commenting that submarkets allow courts to avoid choosing the relevant market from among alternatives—implying that a choice is necessary in the first place).

possible alternatives.¹⁵⁴ The best market, in this approach, is typically understood to mean the market concept that most accurately reflects the market power of the relevant parties.¹⁵⁵ Again, the best or most representative market is taken as *the* relevant market for a given application.

Finally, and related to both of the previous practices, the disfavored status of *Brown Shoe* submarkets appears largely driven by the single-market idea. This is not to say that submarket concepts were sound as originally conceived, nor that we endorse their occasional abuse in antitrust practice.¹⁵⁶ It is simply to say that the frequent claim that relevant markets and submarkets cannot simultaneously coexist appears to rest on the assumption that different definitions of the markets are always mutually exclusive.¹⁵⁷

What the foregoing examples show is that these futile practices and arguments could be avoided if practitioners and courts understood that identifying a unique or best relevant market is not a factual question that needs to be resolved in antitrust cases and investigations. The irony of all the above examples is that the need for these practices and arguments would rarely arise if unique or best markets really did exist in most antitrust applications. That they do not might have been taken as a sign that economic reality is inconsistent with the expectation of a single best market. This warning unheeded, the exis-

¹⁵⁴ E.g., Kaplow, *supra* note 2, at 442 (assuming market definition to encompass the rule that “the best market is that which yields the most accurate inference about market power”); Kaplow, *Alchemy*, *supra* note 5, at 941 (“[I]t is well understood that, for any [market structure] statements to be meaningful, one must look at the market shares in the relevant (best) market.”).

¹⁵⁵ E.g., Areeda, *supra* note 10, at 583–84 (describing useful market definition as “identifying the one product and geographic market that best gives the tribunal insight into the defendant’s power with respect to each of his products or regions”); Kaplow, *supra* note 2, at 439 (“[Defining a relevant market] involves choosing from among candidate markets that which most accurately depicts the extent of market power.”); see also SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 44 (“Courts in monopolization cases usually begin by defining a single geographic and product market. In most cases the effort is to identify what seems to be . . . the one market which is most meaningful economically.”).

¹⁵⁶ See Baker, *supra* note 28, at 206 (discussing some of the errors that have resulted when practical indicia factors have been “applied blindly, without reference to the goals of identifying buyer and seller substitution possibilities”).

¹⁵⁷ E.g., 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 533c, at 269–70 (“The mischief of submarket talk is the frequent supposition that a shoe market and an HQMS submarket can both be simultaneously relevant to appraising the merger of two HQMS producers. Although that is not possible . . .”); G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, *A Line of Commerce: Market Definition in Anti-Merger Cases*, 52 IOWA L. REV. 406, 426 (1966) (“[T]he notion of a submarket is an odd one: either there is or there is not a market in which competition may be affected. . . . If the line of commerce is men’s shoes, it should not also be men’s golf shoes: if one boundary is right, the other must be wrong.”); Turner, *supra* note 1, at 1151 (“If you have applied proper analysis in trying to decide what the market is and, for example, you have concluded that price responsiveness among this group of products is so high that they really belong in the same market, that is the end. . . . Once you have said these products are so closely substitutable they are in the same market, there are no meaningful submarkets.”).

tence of alternative plausible market concepts has instead been seen as a challenge to be overcome—with confusion the only result of the effort.

The simultaneous existence of multiple relevant markets flows immediately from economic fundamentals. Since economically meaningful markets are mental constructs, and since in antitrust analysis these constructs are conditioned on specific theories of anticompetitive harm, there is potentially a different relevant market for every theory of harm. There will often be additional or alternative theories of harm in a single case or investigation and, if so, there will be multiple relevant markets to be drawn. Whether these markets overlap, nest, or intersect is of no consequence; each of the relevant markets serves a distinct role.

To see the reason for this, note that to search for the best relevant market gives rise to an obvious question: best for what? Best in the sense of whatever market “most accurately depicts the extent of market power” is no answer.¹⁵⁸ The best market concept for gauging the possibility of unilateral harm from a merger need not correspond to the best market for gauging the possibility of coordinated price elevation as the result of the same merger. The best market concept for gauging the possibility for modest coordinated price elevation need not be the best for gauging the possibility of more substantial coordinated price elevation. And the best market for studying the anticompetitive potential of one type of exclusionary conduct need not be the best for studying another type of conduct. As discussed in Part II, the appropriate definition of a relevant market depends on the specific features of a theory of harm. For each theory of harm implicated by a given fact pattern, a different relevant market may be needed to guide analysis.¹⁵⁹ Logical clarity in antitrust requires a multiple-market paradigm.

B. MULTIPLE MARKETS IN ANTITRUST PRACTICE

Because there may be many theories of harm in a given trial or investigation, there may be multiple helpful relevant markets in the trial or investigation. This simple proposition has remarkable potential to streamline and clarify antitrust practice. We now discuss a few important implications.

¹⁵⁸ Kaplow, *supra* note 2, at 439.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Pitofsky, *supra* note 1, at 1812–13 (“The tendency to see relevant market definition as an all-or-nothing proposition rather than as an array of estimates with no market description being exactly right has led to the most serious errors in antitrust enforcement.”); Easterbrook, *supra* note 4, at 22 (“Usually the search for the ‘right’ market is a fool’s errand. . . . [T]here may be tens of possible markets, each offering a little insight into conditions of competition.”).

1. *Multiple Markets by Type of Harm*

The most obvious reason for defining multiple markets is to tailor relevant markets to distinct theories of harm. This is not an alien concept. The Supreme Court adopted just such a siloed approach to market definition in *Brown Shoe*, conducting separate relevant market analyses for the vertical and horizontal theories of harm at issue in that case.¹⁶⁰ The D.C. Circuit contemplated a similar separation of market definition by theory of harm in *Microsoft*.¹⁶¹ But the principle applies to lower-level differences in the theory of harm as well.

An example is the definition of relevant markets in horizontal merger cases in which the plaintiff alleges both unilateral and coordinated theories of anticompetitive injury. Despite drawing a sharp distinction between the analysis of unilateral and coordinated effects, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines can be read to imply that the same relevant market should be used to assess both of these different theories of harm.¹⁶² Recent merger cases have tended to follow this suggestion.¹⁶³

This is a strange practice, as it is actually unclear when it would ever make sense to use the same market concept to analyze both unilateral effects and coordinated theories of harm. In unilateral effects analysis, there is a strong argument that separate market definition analysis is unnecessary—the relevant market being an output of the model rather than an input. But in coordinated effects analysis, market definition can never be dispensed with, since it plays the central role of identifying in the first instance the groups of producers that could achieve anticompetitive outcomes through coordination, and whose coordination incentives must therefore be considered.¹⁶⁴ It is natural

¹⁶⁰ *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 325–28 (1962) (defining the relevant market for the vertical aspects of the merger); *id.* at 336–39 (defining the relevant market for the horizontal aspects of the merger).

¹⁶¹ *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that “[d]efining a market for an attempted monopolization claim involves the same steps as defining a market for a monopoly maintenance claim” before observing that “[t]he District Court never engaged in such an analysis nor entered detailed findings defining what a browser is or what products might constitute substitutes [in its analysis of the government’s attempted monopolization claim]”).

¹⁶² The Guidelines do not specifically oppose the definition of alternative relevant markets for alternative theories of harm. They simply do not discuss this possibility at all. *See generally* 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, §§ 4, 6–7. This omission could be read to suggest the (improper) norm that a common relevant market should apply across all alternative theories of harm. *See infra* note 166 and accompanying text (discussing one way that this single-market fallacy could hinder sound antitrust analysis).

¹⁶³ *E.g.*, *United States v. H & R Block, Inc.*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 50–71 (D.D.C. 2011) (mechanically defining the same relevant market for both unilateral and coordinated effects analysis); *FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc.*, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38–44 (D.D.C. 2009) (same).

¹⁶⁴ Compare Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, *Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition*, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., Vol. 10, No. 1, Art. 9, at 1 (2010) (describing definition of a relevant market as “clumsy and inaccurate in industries

and intuitive to define different relevant markets when assessing different theories of anticompetitive harm.

The contrary practice, though common, is unnatural and unintuitive. There is nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, from trying to force a compromise between a market focused on the loss of competition between merging firms and a market focused on the potential for coordination among the remaining firms in the market.¹⁶⁵ Worse yet is the possibility that a viable theory of harm could be marginalized or omitted in order to protect the market concept favorable to an alternative theory of harm. Nothing could be more flawed than forcing an antitrust plaintiff to decline to allege a coordinated-effects theory, for example, because the relevant market corresponding to that theory of harm is broader than the relevant market implied by an additional unilateral-effects theory.¹⁶⁶ Multiple relevant markets can and should be defined to focus analysis and avoid such unnecessary and self-defeating compromises.

2. Multiple Markets Within a Type of Harm

By the same logic, multiple relevant markets can be defined within a given type of anticompetitive harm. This point was foreshadowed in our earlier discussion of how market definition depends on the implied magnitude of the competitive effect corresponding to a theory of harm.¹⁶⁷ To illustrate, suppose that six producers of differentiated products could, if united in a cartel, maximize profits by raising prices 10 percent above prevailing levels; suppose further that three of these producers make products of closer similarity to each other than to the others, and that these three could, if alone united in a cartel, maximize profits by raising prices 5 percent above prevailing levels.¹⁶⁸ What is the appropriate definition of the relevant market for assessing possible coordination resulting from a merger of two of the three close competitors?

with differentiated products where the theory of harm is related to unilateral (rather than coordinated) effects”), with J. Thomas Rosch, *Litigating Merger Challenges: Lessons Learned, Remarks Presented at the Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference 2* (June 2, 2008), reproduced at 5 HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW App. E 165 (2018) (“A coordinated effects challenge requires an assessment of who is ‘in’ and ‘out’ of a market. Only once the market participants have been identified, can one assess the likelihood that a merger will facilitate the coordination of pricing or output decisions and thus substantially lessen competition.”).

¹⁶⁵ See Baker, *supra* note 28, at 216 (“A market definition analyzing the loss of localized competition may well be unduly narrow for analyzing the likelihood of post-merger coordination, even though the same economic force, buyer substitution, is at stake in each.”).

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Carlton, *supra* note 14, at 621 (discussing the different but related practice of the agencies concentrating on unilateral effects analysis “when standard ‘coordinated effects’ analysis based on market definition implies a very narrow market that might make agencies or courts uncomfortable for advocacy purposes”).

¹⁶⁷ See Part II.B.1.

¹⁶⁸ This hypothetical is a variation on a puzzle described by Areeda and Hovenkamp, itself based on prior discussion by Baker, Bresnahan, and others. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 537d, at 311–12 and sources cited therein.

There are at least two possible theories of harm: (1) modest potential price elevation resulting from coordination among the two remaining close competitors, and (2) greater potential price elevation resulting from coordination among the five remaining competitors overall. While a finding of likely harm on the latter theory might obviate consideration of the former, it does not follow that the latter theory is better or the only antitrust concern implicated by these facts. Proper analysis of the competitive effects of this merger requires that both theories of harm be considered.

Specific economic conditions are needed to bring about this type of tiered system of price constraints, but such conditions are neither impossible,¹⁶⁹ nor even necessarily rare.¹⁷⁰ Insofar as these conditions arise, to insist, as modern market definition practice seems to do, that one market concept or another should be chosen as *the* relevant market only obscures the analysis. Harm in a broad market deserves no less consideration than harm in a narrow market.¹⁷¹ If both theories of harm are possible, then both warrant scrutiny.¹⁷² And if market definition is to aid in this consideration, then each theory should be assessed within its own relevant market.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHOICE OF MARKET

A question that follows from the previous discussion is how antitrust violations should be defined in the absence of a singular-relevant-market concept. What should happen if analysis suggests that anticompetitive injury has occurred or is likely to occur in some relevant markets but not in others? Special cases like out-of-market efficiencies aside,¹⁷³ the answer is that injury in any

¹⁶⁹ See *supra* note 109 (discussing the tiered constraints that evidently beset sugar producers).

¹⁷⁰ See HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 141, § 3.2c, at 118 (“The existence of a relatively large relevant market does not preclude the existence of smaller relevant markets within it.”); *id.* at 118–19 (discussing how market concepts can be diagrammed as concentric or overlapping circles, each representing a potential relevant market); SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 72 (“The position of any seller can be [diagrammatically] represented within a series of concentric circles, each representing groups of other sellers which affect the subject seller less and less directly.”).

¹⁷¹ See Baker *supra* note 28, at 207 (“To the extent this slogan [there are no submarkets, only markets] suggests that when a broad aggregation of products constitutes a market, a narrower collection cannot also do so, it misleads.”); Werden, *supra* note 10, at 532 (“[I]t need not be the case that the smallest market is a better basis for predicting the likelihood of collusion than a slightly larger market.”).

¹⁷² See Baker, *supra* note 11, at 148 (“Recognizing the possibility of multiple markets in which the competitive effects of firm conduct could be evaluated allows for more accurate targeting of the competitive effects analysis in each case. It is appropriate to analyze firm conduct in any or all relevant markets in which harm to competition may be found.”).

¹⁷³ See 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 10, ¶ 6 n.14 (discussing efficiencies arising outside of the relevant market); see also *Ohio v. Am. Express Co.*, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2282–83 (2018) (discussing related complications in two-sided markets).

properly defined relevant market is sufficient to establish a violation of the antitrust laws.¹⁷⁴ This principle has further implications for market definition.

First, an immediate corollary is that market definition should largely be left to the antitrust plaintiff. Since proof of anticompetitive injury in any relevant market is sufficient, it is no answer for a court or defendant to point to other alternative market definitions in which harm is unlikely to occur. If injury is sufficiently proved in the plaintiff's chosen market, that ends the inquiry.¹⁷⁵ This relieves antitrust plaintiffs of the burden of proving more than potential injury in a chosen, valid relevant market.¹⁷⁶

Second, and closely related to the previous comment, the "smallest-market principle" should be dropped in a multiple-market approach. As a reminder, this principle instructs that, when several different markets might satisfy a test like the HMT, the "smallest" or "narrowest" of these markets should usually be preferred.¹⁷⁷ A charitable reading of the smallest-market principle is that it approximates the previous comment in a single-market paradigm—suggesting that if anticompetitive harm is possible in a narrow market, then that possibility should not be ignored simply because harm would not be possible in some broader market. A less charitable reading is that the smallest-market principle represents a crude heuristic for reducing the set of possible relevant markets to a single choice that is hoped to be more likely than others to reflect common theories of anticompetitive harm.¹⁷⁸ Either way, the principle is redundant in a

¹⁷⁴ See *supra* note 172; 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 10, ¶ 6 n.14 ("The Agencies normally assess competition in each relevant market affected by a merger independently and normally will challenge the merger if it is likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market."); see also Hovenkamp & Shapiro, *supra* note 9, at 1999 ("[T]he government should be entitled to the structural presumption if the merger causes the requisite increase in concentration in any properly defined relevant market. Even if the defense can identify an alternative relevant market (whether broader or narrower) in which the level or increase in concentration is insufficient to trigger the structural presumption, that showing does not negate or rebut the presumption.").

¹⁷⁵ This is obviously true at the pleading stage as a point of civil procedure. A plaintiff does not fail to state a claim for relief, for example, because some alternative definition of the market may be possible. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Our point is that the same is true at the merits stage. If the plaintiff's proposal of a cellophane market would be valid under a proper application of the HMT, it is immaterial that a broader all-flexible-wrapping-materials market might also state a valid relevant market.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 64 ("Economic theory, sensitively utilized, often suggests that there is no one 'right' market, but congeries of interlinked 'markets' Thus, the party asserting monopoly should have no burden other than that of showing a market which is plausible in the sense that those included within it have a clear and substantial commercial advantage over those who are excluded from it in selling to a designated class of customers.").

¹⁷⁷ See, e.g., 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4.1.1, ¶ 5 ("[W]hen the Agencies rely on market shares and concentration, they usually do so in the smallest relevant market satisfying the hypothetical monopolist test.").

¹⁷⁸ See *id.* (justifying this approach on the basis that "the relative competitive significance of more distant substitutes is apt to be overstated by their share of sales"); Werden, *Answer, supra* note 7, at 742 ("Standardization is accomplished with the help of the 'smallest market principle,'

proper understanding of market definition. The irrelevance of alternative broader markets is explained above; the smallest-market principle is not needed to reach this result. And leaving the choice of relevant markets up to the plaintiff obviates the need to try to guess which market concepts would best fit the theories of harm brought forth by plaintiffs in future cases. Providing plaintiffs with flexibility over the choice of relevant markets focuses analysis on the market concepts that are relevant to the actual theories of harm at issue.

Third, allowing antitrust plaintiffs to select any relevant market satisfying the HMT test does not allow the plaintiff to gerrymander an artificial and unrealistic market.¹⁷⁹ As already explained above (Part I.C), antitrust markets are not real or observable entities. Every market is in some sense artificial, so to criticize any market as artificial or gerrymandered is a category mistake.¹⁸⁰ As explained in Part II.A, a relevant market—validated by the HMT or another comparable standard—has demonstrated the potential for competitive injury, at least under assumptions favorable to the theory of harm. This leaves no room for objection to any valid relevant market chosen by the plaintiff. So long as an antitrust injury is possible within the proposed market, there is no basis or excuse for refusing to consider it.¹⁸¹

Nor is there reason to waste time or attention on claims of gerrymandering, better alternative markets, or any other facet of the single market fallacy. As already noted, there is precedent for defining multiple relevant markets where analytically helpful,¹⁸² and all that we argue here is that multiple market concepts are often helpful. Courts have never been prohibited from accepting any

holding that, of the markets that could be delineated around some starting product or location, the relevant market is, roughly, the narrowest one.”).

¹⁷⁹ Cf. *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 368 n.3 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“If the Government were permitted to choose its ‘line of commerce’ it could presumably draw the market narrowly in a case that turns on the existence *vel non* of monopoly power and draw it broadly when the question is whether both parties to a merger are within the same competitive market.”); POSNER, *supra* note 25, at 145 (“Given enough flexibility in market definition, high concentration becomes ubiquitous and a surprising number of innocuous mergers can be made to appear dangerously monopolistic.”); Werden, *supra* note 10, at 532 (“[I]f the Guidelines permitted the exercise of considerable discretion in selecting the relevant market, there would be considerable potential for gerrymandering.”).

¹⁸⁰ See *supra* notes 78–79 and accompanying text.

¹⁸¹ See *United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.*, 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966) (“[W]hen the Government brings an action under [Section 7] it must, according to the language of the statute, prove no more than that . . . [the] effect of the merger may be substantially to lessen competition . . . in any line of commerce ‘in any section of the country.’ . . . The language of this section requires merely that the Government prove the merger may have a substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in the United States.”); Carlton, *supra* note 14, at 638 (“While I sense that enforcement agencies may be reluctant to define [narrow markets]—for fear a court will think the definition is artificial—my view is that one should use and defend a narrow market if it is indeed appropriate.”).

¹⁸² See *supra* note 160 and accompanying text.

valid market proposed by the plaintiff.¹⁸³ Nor have courts ever been bound by the smallest-market principle or any other rote heuristic for defining relevant markets.¹⁸⁴ On the contrary, in determining whether an arrangement has the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition,”¹⁸⁵ a court must consider any market in which anticompetitive harm could arise. A multiple-market paradigm is not only permissible; it is required.

IV. FOLLOWING THE LOGIC OF MARKET DEFINITION

Our objective has been to explain the logic of market definition and to expose some troubling errors in market-definition practice. Having addressed that objective, we now explore how the logic of market definition informs market definition practice and some related aspects of antitrust law.

A. NEED FOR MARKET DEFINITION

A peculiarly persistent artifact of the Supreme Court’s early work on market definition is the vestigial notion that market definition must be performed in every rule-of-reason case, or at least every merger case.¹⁸⁶ One justification for requiring market definition is that this exercise weeds out insubstantial antitrust injuries, a subject addressed in Part IV.B below. Another justification conceives of market definition as the necessary starting point of all antitrust analysis.¹⁸⁷ Another views it as a necessary element in any claim for relief.¹⁸⁸ Indeed, modern jury instructions typically include proof of a relevant market among the factual elements of a plaintiff’s case,¹⁸⁹ and failure to allege a plau-

¹⁸³ See *United States v. Aetna Inc.*, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The Guidelines make clear that the hypothetical monopolist test does not aim to identify a ‘single relevant market.’ . . . [T]he government ‘may evaluate a merger in any relevant market satisfying the [hypothetical monopolist] test,’ and will ‘usually do so in the smallest’ market that qualifies. . . . The government has operated within those parameters here.”).

¹⁸⁴ See *Baker*, *supra* note 28, at 207 (“Although a court might often focus its concern and analysis on the smallest such market, as the Merger Guidelines ‘generally’ recommend, a court is entitled to identify a violation of the antitrust laws based on harmful effects in any market, even one that is not the smallest.”).

¹⁸⁵ See *FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986).

¹⁸⁶ See, e.g., *Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.*, 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (“Without [market definition] there is no way to measure [an attempted monopolist’s] ability to lessen or destroy competition.”); *FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.*, 548 F.3d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Brown, C.J.) (“Inexplicably, the FTC now asserts a market definition is not necessary in a § 7 case . . . in contravention of the statute itself.”).

¹⁸⁷ E.g., *FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc.*, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Defining the relevant market is the starting point for any merger analysis.”).

¹⁸⁸ E.g., *Keyte & Schwartz*, *supra* note 75, at 589 (“[M]arket definition unquestionably remains a statutory predicate to finding a Section 7 violation.”).

¹⁸⁹ E.g., O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, *supra* note 81, § 150:66 (proposing model instructions in which “proof of monopolization requires determination of [a relevant market]”); *id.* § 150:132 (“Determination of the relevant product market is a necessary predicate to the determination of the legality of an acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.”); ABA MODEL JURY INSTRU-

sible relevant market may be taken as grounds for dismissal.¹⁹⁰ All of these ideas are flawed because all are based on confused notions of what relevant markets are and of what role they play in antitrust analysis.

As we have explained, relevant markets are analytical tools for evaluating specific theories of anticompetitive harm.¹⁹¹ The theory-dependence of relevant markets invalidates the notion that market definition must be the starting point of antitrust analysis. Even if it were possible to define a relevant market without first considering potential theories of harm—and it is not—such rote prioritization would only confuse analysis¹⁹² and distract attention from the ultimate question whether injury has occurred or is likely to occur.¹⁹³

The logic of market definition also invalidates the idea that a claim for antitrust relief requires alleging a relevant market. What a relevant market does is identify a group of transactions in which competitive injury could occur, at least under conditions favorable to the theory of harm. Thus, at the pleading stage, allegation of a relevant market is no more than explanatory context for the allegation of competitive injury itself.¹⁹⁴ If injury has otherwise been adequately plead, nothing but hollow formalism is advanced by insisting on separate allegation of a relevant market. The same holds at the fact-finding stage. Often the definition of a relevant market provides important context for the fact-finder's assessment of evidence of an alleged injury. And, as dis-

TIONS, *supra* note 81, at 106 (“Defining the relevant market is essential because you are required to make a judgment about whether defendant has monopoly power in a properly defined economic market.”).

¹⁹⁰ *E.g.*, *City of New York v. Grp. Health Inc.*, 649 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2011) (“To state a claim under § 7 of the Clayton Act, §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, or New York’s Donnelly Act, a plaintiff must allege a plausible relevant market in which competition will be impaired.”); *Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc.*, 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Where the plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant market . . . a motion to dismiss may be granted.”).

¹⁹¹ See Part II.A (explaining this point in greater detail).

¹⁹² See Salop, *supra* note 26, at 189 (explaining that the “threshold test approach is fraught with potential for error” because it is generally “impossible to evaluate market power accurately without understanding the conduct and effect claims at issue and analyzing market power in the context of those claims”); *id.* at 198 (observing that the use of market definition as a threshold test can lead to a confused conclusion that a firm lacks market power when the very conduct at question is targeted at allowing the firm to *obtain* such market power).

¹⁹³ See Rosch, *supra* note 164, at 1 (“Judges have also often focused on market definition as a ‘threshold issue’ in merger litigation. I would suggest this is a mistake. A focus on market definition risks obscuring the ultimate question under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which is whether the transaction is likely to substantially lessen competition.”).

¹⁹⁴ *Cf.* Carlton, *supra* note 14, at 626 (“[A] finding that a merger will have an anticompetitive effect implies that competition in a particular economic market would be harmed. Viewed in this way, an analysis that identifies an anticompetitive effect should be viewed as defining a market in which a merger harms consumers.”); Kaplow, *Alchemy*, *supra* note 5, at 930 (“[I]f one insists on market definition, one can satisfy such a formal doctrinal requirement by working backwards—which it appears courts and enforcement agencies already sometimes do.”).

cussed previously,¹⁹⁵ where the plaintiff proposes a relevant market, validity of the market concept remains a fact question to be tested by the trier of fact.¹⁹⁶ But in those cases where an antitrust injury can be sufficiently proven without explicit market definition, nothing is gained from objecting to the omission of this inherently supportive and ancillary step in the analysis.

In sum, the logic of market definition clarifies that market definition can be a useful step in antitrust analysis, but also clarifies that it is not a necessary step. The Supreme Court recognized as much when it said that “Proof of the section of the country where the anticompetitive effect exists is entirely subsidiary to the crucial question . . . whether a merger may substantially lessen competition anywhere in the United States.”¹⁹⁷ The per se rules under Section 1 of the Sherman Act exemplify this logic, and cases like *Staples I* show how something akin to direct proof of anticompetitive injury can make separate market definition redundant.¹⁹⁸ The ability of appropriate proof of competitive effects to substitute for the definition of a relevant market is a proposition with academic support,¹⁹⁹ agency support,²⁰⁰ and doctrinal support.²⁰¹ Simply put, there is no need for courts or litigants to waste time and resources insist-

¹⁹⁵ See *supra* notes 179–181 and accompanying text (discussing the limited role of defendants and fact-finders in testing the validity of proposed relevant markets).

¹⁹⁶ Strictly speaking, market definition under something like the HMT is a conjectural fact question, as it is based on the assumption of a hypothetical monopolist (or cartel) that doesn’t actually exist. A near analog is the mixed question of fact and law. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, *Mixed Questions of Law and Fact*, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1924); J.L. Clark, *A Mixed Question of Law and Fact*, 18 YALE L.J. 404 (1909); Frederick Green, *Mixed Questions of Law and Fact*, 15 HARV. L. REV. 271 (1901). Another analog is counterfactual reasoning. See generally Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, *The Relation Between Counterfactual (“But For”) and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors’ Decisions*, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2001).

¹⁹⁷ *United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.*, 384 U.S. 546, 549–50 (1966).

¹⁹⁸ *FTC v. Staples, Inc.*, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075–76 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting substantial price differences depending on which office supply superstores competed in a given locality in concluding that a merger of Staples and Office Depot would likely harm consumers).

¹⁹⁹ See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 521 (commenting that market definition is unnecessary if anticompetitive effects are directly observable); see also John B. Kirkwood, *Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement*, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169 (2108) (suggesting how market power may be inferred from the likely competitive effects of challenged conduct).

²⁰⁰ See 2010 Merger Guidelines, *supra* note 24, § 4, ¶ 2 (noting that “the Agencies’ analysis need not start with market definition” and that some tools of competitive effects analysis do not require formal market definition at all).

²⁰¹ E.g., *FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (“Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output, can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a surrogate for detrimental effects.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also *Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp.*, 33 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Market share is just a way of estimating market power, which is the ultimate consideration. When there are better ways to estimate market power, the court should use them.”); *Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc.*, 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).

ing on traditional market definition when other evidence is sufficient to meet the relevant standard of proof in demonstrating anticompetitive effects.

B. SUBSTANTIALITY OF INJURY

Closely related to arguments that market definition is necessary is the notion that market definition ensures an injury is substantial enough to warrant relief under the antitrust laws. This thinking appears to be derived from a bald proposition in *du Pont-General Motors*: “Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition ‘within the area of effective competition.’”²⁰²

The vitality of this language in modern opinions is disproportionate to its threadbare rationale. In the protectionist context of merger review in the 1950s and 1960s, a lay concept of the market might have helped to determine which competitors required antitrust protection.²⁰³ But under the modern consumer-welfare standard, defining a relevant market has negligible value in assessing or assuring the substantiality of antitrust injury.

To illustrate, consider a common justification for relying on a hypothetical price increase of at least 5 percent when defining relevant markets under the HMT. While the size of this price increase is not intended to signify a tolerance level for antitrust enforcement,²⁰⁴ the usual argument for using a *significant* price increase to test a relevant market under the HMT is transparently just that. The Areeda & Hovenkamp treatise explains the typical thinking:

A “significant” price increase for market definition purposes must be large enough to suggest that antitrust enforcement will be worth its cost while minimizing interference with private activity that is generally desirable or unavoidable though it creates small amounts of market power.²⁰⁵

Whether a de minimis standard is necessary is a debatable proposition,²⁰⁶ but even assuming that it is, there is little defense for implementing it as a minimum percentage price increase in market definition. That approach has two

²⁰² *United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (du Pont-General Motors)*, 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).

²⁰³ See *supra* notes 39–44 and accompanying text.

²⁰⁴ See *supra* note 103 and accompanying text.

²⁰⁵ 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 537a, at 306.

²⁰⁶ One wonders, for example, why private plaintiffs or enforcement agencies need the guidance of a de minimis standard to aid them in efficiently allocating their own resources. Perhaps antitrust defendants deserve the protection of a de minimis standard as an assurance that small anticompetitive injuries will not result in investigations or litigation. But even if this is accepted, it is not obvious how any given choice of threshold would adequately protect defendants’ interests without also creating a vehicle for the accretion of market power through series of individually modest anticompetitive acts.

flaws. First, as noted earlier, the ultimate concern of a de minimis requirement is the size of the competitive effect—and this has little correspondence with the size of hypothesized price increase in something like the HMT.²⁰⁷ Second, if indeed some fixed quantity of harm were needed to justify relief, that should be tested by a measure of total harm, not a percentage price increase. A one percent increase in the price of \$100,000,000 in transactions would seem a far greater social concern than a 100 percent increase in the price of \$1,000 in transactions. That a percentage price increase, alone, says so little about the social significance of potential harm should arrest any suggestion that relevant markets defined around less than 5 percent hypothetical price increases are somehow categorically unworthy of antitrust scrutiny or attention.

In carpentry, a drill is a poor substitute for a hammer. So, too, with market definition and the substantiality of antitrust injury. Relevant markets are tools, but they are not tools for assessing the substantiality of injury, and they should not be distorted to try to serve this purpose.

C. TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS

With courts increasingly required to apply antitrust law to two-sided platforms,²⁰⁸ the question naturally arises whether our approach has anything to say about the appropriate definition of relevant markets in this context. The salience of the question was underscored by the Supreme Court's decision in *Ohio v. American Express*,²⁰⁹ delineating a controversial relevant market in a platform context, and by related scholarly commentary asserting that standard market definition approaches are inappropriate where platform competition is involved.²¹⁰ The answer is that our approach to market definition is entirely applicable in the two-sided platform context. The unique features of platform competition must surely be accounted for, but the basic logic of market definition remains unchanged.

Indeed, *American Express* illustrates the problems that arise when the logic of market definition is wrongly assumed to change between different contexts and applications. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that “anti-steering” provisions in American Express (Amex) merchant contracts constituted anticompe-

²⁰⁷ See *supra* notes 108, 107, and accompanying text.

²⁰⁸ See, e.g., *Ohio v. Am. Express Co.*, 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (involving an antitrust claim concerning American Express's credit payment platform); *Meyer v. Kalanick*, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (involving an antitrust claim involving Uber's ride-sharing platform).

²⁰⁹ *American Express*, 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (holding that “courts must include both sides of the platform . . . when defining the credit-card market”).

²¹⁰ See, e.g., David S. Evans, *Two-Sided Market Definition*, in *MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST: THEORY AND CASE STUDIES* ch. XI § D ¶ 1 (2012) (“The standard approaches to market definition do not apply to two-sided markets without significant modification. Even the two-sided versions of these approaches should be used with caution.”).

titive vertical restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.²¹¹ These provisions prohibited merchants from “steering” customers toward the use of competing credit cards, even when those competing cards charged lower merchant fees that might have been shared with the customer in the form of a lower purchase price.²¹² Focusing on the two-sided character of credit-card-network platforms, the majority held that “courts must include both sides of the platform—merchants and cardholders—when defining the credit-card market.”²¹³

The majority opinion in *American Express* is peculiar in many respects, and is marred by both substantive and procedural errors.²¹⁴ For present purposes, our only interest is the confusion displayed by the majority opinion regarding market definition in the two-sided platform context. Perhaps distracted by the apparent novelty of the setting, the opinion deviated from appropriate market definition principles in several important respects.

First, the majority opinion exhibits the natural market fallacy. After reciting the naturalistic platitude that markets must “reflect[]” and “correspond to the commercial realities of the industry,”²¹⁵ the opinion goes on to hold that, at least where credit card networks are implicated, relevant markets must include both the merchant and cardholder sides of the market.²¹⁶ The statement betrays its naturalistic underpinnings. Categorical statements about how relevant markets should be defined in a given “industry” epitomize the confusion of lay concepts of industry with antitrust relevant markets. As already explained, relevant markets cannot be defined except by reference to a given theory of anticompetitive harm. To define a market on the basis of industry or competitive classifications (*credit card networks* or *two-sided transaction platforms*), without regard to the theory of harm, is to commit a category error.

Second, the opinion illustrates the effects of the independent market fallacy. The theory of anticompetitive harm at issue was that Amex’s anti-steering

²¹¹ *Ohio v. Am. Express Co.*, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2282–83 (2018).

²¹² *Id.* at 2282–83, 2288 (describing Amex’s anti-steering provision); Herbert Hovenkamp, *Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case*, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 53, 77–78 (2019) (providing a clear explanation of how both customers and merchants could have shared the benefits of having customers “steered” to lower-merchant-fee cards).

²¹³ *American Express*, 138 S. Ct. at 2286.

²¹⁴ See generally Hovenkamp, *supra* note 212 (noting that the majority opinion contained only a single reference to the record, ignored without disrupting findings of fact that directly contradicted its conclusions, and cited a complex academic literature while providing almost no analysis of how that literature applied to the particular facts of the case); John B. Kirkwood, *Antitrust and Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure of American Express*, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1805 (2020) (noting these and other substantive problems with the majority opinion).

²¹⁵ *American Express*, 138 S. Ct. at 2285 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

²¹⁶ See *supra* note 213 and accompanying text; see also *id.* at 2286 (ostensibly expanding this holding to cover a class of “two-sided transaction platforms”).

provisions were raising merchant fees,²¹⁷ which, in turn, were raising the retail prices paid by consumers.²¹⁸ The undisturbed factual record suggests no reason why a relevant market narrowly defined around the merchant side of the credit-card transaction would have failed something like the HMT.²¹⁹ On the contrary, the record reveals direct evidence of the alleged injury, validating a merchant-side relevant market by implication.²²⁰ While the majority is certainly correct that network effects must be accounted for in the antitrust analysis of this case, this does not require both the merchant and cardholder sides of the platform to be included in the relevant market—at least, not under the specific theory of harm at issue in this case.²²¹

Third, the majority opinion displays the single market fallacy. While the plaintiff's proposed market concept would evidently have satisfied something like the HMT and was thus a valid relevant market,²²² the majority rejected this valid choice of relevant market in favor of a different market more to the majority's liking. In fairness, the point was evidently to account for the possibility that injury to one group of consumers might be offset by a benefit to another group.²²³ But even assuming that a benefit to one group would justify anticompetitive injury to another, the majority was not compelled to conflate both sides of the credit card platform into a single relevant market. Nothing about the plaintiff's proposed market precluded the consideration of offsetting benefits.²²⁴ On the contrary, considering the alleged injury in light of the

²¹⁷ *United States v. Am. Express Co.*, 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding as fact that the anti-steering provisions “allowed all four networks to raise their swipe fees” and “resulted in higher all-in merchant prices across the network service market”).

²¹⁸ *Id.* at 216 (finding as fact that “[m]erchants facing increased [fees] will pass most, if not all, of their additional costs along to their customers in the form of higher retail prices”).

²¹⁹ *See American Express*, 138 S. Ct. at 2293–94 (Breyer J., dissenting) (noting the majority's lack of discussion of the factual record and summarizing the district court's findings).

²²⁰ *See Hovenkamp*, *supra* note 212, at 53 (noting that record evidence and basic economic inferences on the support of it “established unambiguously” that the anti-steering provisions led to “higher prices across the board”).

²²¹ *See* Dennis W. Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, *Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints and Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules*, 61 J.L. & Econ. 215, 217–18 (2018) (commenting on the false belief that explicit accounting for two-sidedness is essential to competitive effects analysis and stating that “[d]espite its two-sided property, one can analyze a credit card market using the vertical structure of a one-sided market”); *id.* at 242 (“The two-sidedness of credit card markets does not require a new set of economic principles for assessing competition policy because the difference between the credit card setting and a conventional one-sided market is essentially a matter of labeling.”); Hovenkamp, *supra* note 212, at 49 (noting that a court can always consider network effects as part of its competitive effects analysis “[w]ithout relying on an economically incoherent conception of a relevant market”).

²²² *See supra* note 176 and accompanying text.

²²³ *See American Express*, 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (“Price increases on one side of the platform . . . do not suggest anticompetitive effects without some evidence that they have increased the overall cost of the platform's services.”).

²²⁴ *See Kirkwood*, *supra* note 214, at 1838–46 (noting that it is possible to define the relevant market as one side of a transaction while still considering effects on the other side).

plaintiff's proposed market makes clear that the effects of Amex's anti-steering provisions necessarily accrued to the detriment of *both* merchants and marginal cardholders in this setting.²²⁵

The antitrust implications of two-sided platforms are still being worked out in a rapidly growing scholarly literature, and it may be some time before consensus forms around the appropriate frameworks for analysis in this setting. While the errors of *American Express* may seem like obstacles to the future maturation of this area of antitrust practice, perhaps the opinion will be limited to its narrow facts or treated as *sui generis* in the arc of the Court's recent and more soundly reasoned decisions. Either way, *American Express* illustrates the dangers of straying from fundamentals in market definition, especially in the context of new and complex competitive environments.

D. DIFFICULTIES AND DATA LIMITATIONS

Finally, we wish to recognize a reasonable critique of market definition as we describe it in this article: that it is too complicated and too demanding to be used in many practical applications. A common version of this critique is that concepts like the HMT are simply too sophisticated for the minds of generalist judges and juries, leading to unpredictable results in practice.²²⁶ A related idea is that sophisticated market definition is possible within the federal antitrust agencies, but that different techniques are needed when disputes enter the generalist legal system.²²⁷ Another version of the critique amounts to

²²⁵ Intuitively, if a cardholder valued the perks of using the Amex card more than the lower effective price that a steering practice allowed, that cardholder would simply use the Amex card despite the steering effort. The actual effect of the anti-steering provision is to stop some cardholders from switching to other cards when their revealed preference is for a lower-price transaction over the recoupment of Amex perks. See Hovenkamp, *supra* note 212 (providing a more detailed explanation of this point).

²²⁶ See, e.g., Gopal Das Varma, *Market Definition, Upward Pricing Pressure, and the Role of Courts: A Response to Carlton and Israel*, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Dec. 2010), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Dec10_DasVarma12_21f.pdf (“[M]any courts—presided over by generalist judges—lack the economic sophistication that is required to evaluate the merits of competing econometric analyses of market definition that are submitted by opposing experts.”); J. Douglas Richards, *Is Market Definition Necessary in Sherman Act Cases When Anticompetitive Effects Can Be Shown with Direct Evidence*, ANTITRUST, Summer 2012, at 53, 57 (“[I]n retrospective analysis of the effects of past conduct, direct evidence of the actual effects of such conduct is often more probative than comparatively confusing and misleading market definition and market share analysis.”); Rosch, *supra* note 164, at 3 (“A case focused on market definition risks getting bogged down in esoteric fights over the SSNIP test. Asking a customer witness whether they would have switched to an alternative in the face of a 5% price increase is arguably not a persuasive line of questioning.”); see also SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 63 (discussing concerns about the adjudicatory institution's competence to make the kinds of judgements that sophisticated economic theory demands).

²²⁷ Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, *Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control*, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1100–04 (2010) (discussing how merger review before the federal antitrust agencies differs from purely adjudicatory antitrust practice); Daniel A. Crane, *Technocracy and Antitrust*, 86

a pragmatic claim that data limitations often constrain and dictate the scope of market definition more than any consideration of economic theory.²²⁸ We acknowledge the challenges raised in these critiques, and we do not endeavor to refute these essentially empirical claims about what judges and juries understand and what available data allow.

Nor need we. Because even if all these claims were true, practicing market definition without an understanding of its logical underpinnings would still be inappropriate and counterproductive. Thus, the challenge of coping with data limitations may well affect the plaintiff's choice of relevant market, but a proper understanding of market definition would allow the plaintiff to propose whatever valid market the imperfect data support, and would foreclose complaints that such a market is unrealistic or defective because it does not conform to an alternative for which there is insufficient data. The claim that market definition practice before the agencies differs from market definition practice before the courts may well be true today, but this only underscores the need for a common and coherent rationale to guide market definition in both contexts. Similarly, the challenge of guiding generalist judges and juries through the intricacies of market definition may continue to weigh on litigants, but that challenge only highlights the importance of exposing common fallacies and misperceptions to help triers of fact discharge their market definition duties. The errors of *American Express* illustrate this need quite vividly.

Market definition is challenging. Nothing in our approach changes that. The difficulty of the task makes clarity all the more important. Where the logic of market definition reveals the irrelevance of a previously contentious consideration, it simplifies the exercise. Where it calls for additional work—defining different relevant markets for different theories of harm, for example—it complicates the exercise. But in either case, the outcome is improved by focusing attention on a coherent and economically meaningful market concept. Regardless of the constraints and limitations that beset the market definition exercise in practice, the economic analysis of antitrust issues can only be strengthened by clarifying the logic of market definition.

TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1194–96 (2008) (similar); Wellford & Wells, *supra* note 80, at 2, 11 (describing growing divergence between merger advocacy before the courts and Agencies).

²²⁸ See, e.g., 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 10, ¶ 530a, at 236 (“As a matter of practicality . . . the only data we ever have is historical. . . . To at least some extent, future behavior must be inferred from historical observations.”); SULLIVAN, *supra* note 15, at 61 (“Another pragmatic factor is the availability of data. One can only count things for which there are numbers. Unless exhaustive statistical surveys are to be done the parties must utilize either the data gathered by the census taker, or the business records of firms or trade associations, or both. Markets, then, will tend to be defined the way the Bureau of the Census has defined them, or the way firms have perceived them, despite imperfections.”); Werden, *Answer, supra* note 7, at 742 n.59 (“In practice . . . relevant markets tend to be delineated on the basis of natural market boundaries and hence are broader than absolutely necessary to satisfy the test.”).

V. CONCLUSION

As stated at the outset, our objective in this article has been to clarify the logic of market definition. We have illustrated this logic in part by pointing out several prominent mistakes in market definition thinking: the natural market fallacy, the independent market fallacy, and the single market fallacy. These fallacies are a vehicle for understanding the internal logic of market definition. Because there is no meaningful natural market, relevant markets are just analytic constructs. Because analytic constructs are tied to the subject of analysis, relevant markets can be defined only with respect to particular theories of anticompetitive harm. And because theories of anticompetitive harm may be numerous in common applications, multiple helpful relevant markets can and should be defined if and when doing so aids antitrust analysis. The whole of this article, we hope, is a useful guide to the logic of market definition.

