Energy transitions: a view form institutions

Green Transition in Latin America, Harnessing regional integration and industrial policy to build the economies of the future 8-9 April 2024 UNCTAD-BNDES

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Low emission electricity



Marine carbon removal



Urban carbon removal

Dealing with new and old problems




UK's largest battery storage fund says electricity system is not taking advantage of crucial technology that can cut emissions





portes/PreEnerServConMTR.aspx.

Average Wholesale Electricity Prices per Load Zone (MXN/MWh)



Present prices as political history

MAPA 5.3.3. DISTRIBUCIÓN DE PRECIOS MARGINALES ESTIMADOS POR REGIÓN DE TRANSMISIÓN (Índice Base 2015)






Nota: Precios marginales estimados expresados en base 2015 (ver Anexos Tabla 5.3.1).


Fuente: Elaborado por SENER.

The promise of equity through markets

Average Wholesale Electricity Prices per Load Zone (MXN/MWh)



Source: IEA 2023. Latin America Energy Outlook Interactive Map



Note: Load Zones indicate areas from which average prices from nearby distribution nodes are aggregated. Data as of June 2023. Source: "Precios Marginales Locales MTR" [Local Marginal MTR Prices], Precios de Energía y Servicios Conexos MTR [Energy Prices and Related Services MTR], National Center for Energy Control (CENACE), June 2023, https://www.cenace.gob.mx/Paginas/SIM/Reportes/PreEnerServConMTR.aspx.



Present prices as political history

Where do we define the point at where stateindustry proactive infrastructure choices are made

Chile, future renewable, present prices




- 2019 in the middle of the social unrest
- Conservative Government under Political siege decided to lower consumer tariff
- In an extreme liberalised electricity sector
- Lower down tariff by displacing earning to the future, when the cost of generation is coming down from renewable energy contracts.

Social unrest and the collapsing of time in the electricity tariff

What are national and transnational opportunities to shift economic savings from the future to the present?

International interconnection



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Comisión National de Hidrocarburos, Mexico

Mexico's natural gas import infrastructure

Politics of deep integration




Politics of deep integration



- Trade has reached up to 10% for most countries
- Renewable energy between 40 and 99%
- But consumption still modest between 500 and 2,500kWh/c
- 1,800km from Guatemala to Panama (2010-2014) [distance Madrid-Berlin]

Politics of deep integration


MEXICO-TEXAS




- 1.5 / 1.9 GW (~2% of capacity)
- RE energy project dedicated exclusively to California.
- History of collapse in California and Texas.

The politics of cleavage

MEXICO-GUATEMALA



Perfil de Voltaje en 230 kV (Occidente-Oriente)



https://es.scribd.com/document/413791415/Interconexion-Guatemala-Mexico-400kV

How do make sure that integration projects accelerate both productive development and decarbonization?

New Actors of State Capacity



The importance of the SO


		Ownership				
		Pubic			Private	
operator	Integrated	Mexico Pre-reform	1 Chile Pre-reform	UK Pre-reform		
of system	Transmission				2 Chile UK Liberalization Liberalization	
Location	Independent	2 Mexico Reform	Chile Reforms (2016)	Future Systems Operator	UK License change (2017)	


Actor	UK	Mexico	Morocco
Ministry	0.77	0.70	0.35
Regulatory Agency	0.28	0.33	-
System Operator	0.46	0.50	-
Grid Company	0.31	-	0.68
Supply Company(ies)	-	0.28	-
Generation Company(ies)	0.38	0.22	0.13
Renewable Energy Agency	-	-	0.77

Governance of renewable energy auctions

Source: Work in Progress with

Emmanuelle Matthieu








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Original research article






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


Fig. 3. Analytical description of the institutional evolution in the UK. <u>CEA</u>: Central Electricity Authority; <u>CEGB</u>: Central Electricity Generating Board;
<u>DTI</u>: Department of Trade and Industry; <u>DE</u>: Department of Energy; <u>DECC</u>: Department of Energy and Climate Change; <u>CCC</u>: Climate Change Committee;
<u>BEIS</u>: Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; Low Carbon Contract Company; <u>Offer</u>: Office of Electricity Regulation; <u>Ofgem</u>: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets; <u>NG</u>: National Grid; <u>ESO</u>: Electricity System Operator;
FSO: Future System Operator; NG: National Grid.

Low Carbon Contract Company

Elexon

Energy System Operator / Future Systems Operator

Dealing with new and old problems



UK's largest battery storage fund says electricity system is not taking advantage of crucial technology that can cut emissions



Dimension	Re-regulation	State coordination
Role of the state	Assertive regulators steer private operators	State agencies take operational decisions
Governance tools	Differentiate regulation across market segments	Public mission agencies are in charge
Political objective	Efficient capital allocation and acceptable retail prices	Lowering capital cost and de-risking investment
UK Instruments	 Price Control Regulated asset-based remuneration Segmentation of markets (ie. REMA) 	 CfD area planning Future Energy Scenarios Offshore Coordination mechanisms
UK actors	BEIS; Ofgem	BEIS; SO, LCCC, Crown Estates



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Original research article

In plain sight: The rise of state coordination and fall of liberalised markets in the United Kingdom power sector



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Table 1 Structural reform and de-risking governance.

Principle	Structural reform governance	De-risking governance
Price	Deregulate and eliminate subsidies	Subsidies to avoid consumer backlash
Profit	Privatisation or corporatisation of the SOE	Political control of SOE
Competition	Enforced competition and limits to market power through regulation	Limit market power ex-ante and protect investors from competition

Liberalisation as derisking the politics of redistribution

World Development Perspectives 31 (2023) 100527

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World Development Perspectives



State ownership in liberal economic governance? De-risking private investment in the electricity sector in Mexico

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What unused institutional capacities can repower?

Thank you.

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