

---

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT  
Geneva

---

# ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 2008

## EXPORT PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING TRADE LIBERALIZATION: Some Patterns and Policy Perspectives



UNITED NATIONS  
New York and Geneva, 2008

## Notes

- 1 The exchange rate premium is calculated as the parallel rate minus the official rate over the official rate.
- 2 First, the thresholds for taxes, non-tariff barriers and the premium are arbitrary. This is unavoidable because there is no known perfectly liberalized economy which could be used as a benchmark. Second, the definition of liberalization involves different types of data from different sources, some of which require some level of subjective interpretation. Moreover, relevant information was not available for each criterion and each country, so not all the countries were classified on the basis of all five criteria. This limitation is acknowledged by Sachs and Warner themselves. Third, it is clear that some criteria for trade liberalization are time-sensitive, meaning that they do not have the same relevance across time. For example, with the fall of communism in the late 1980s, criterion (v) lost its relevance in the 1990s and 2000s. The same may be said with respect to criteria (iii) and (iv): official and parallel exchange rates converged in the 1990s in most developing countries, reducing the premium to very low levels. Moreover, State monopolies on exports have largely been dismantled in most countries. Fourth, using period averages of the tariff, non-tariff barriers and parallel market premium variables, and end-of-period information on export marketing boards and socialism variables are very rough measures of the timing of liberalization. It is more interesting to determine the year, not just the decade, during which a country liberalized. Overall, it has been found that the Sachs and Warner measure has a tendency to under-predict trade openness.
- 3 The coefficient on the variable in the African sub-sample is almost twice that of the group of other developing countries and the two are statistically different.
- 4 Most of these traditional commodities suffered significant declines in trade volumes, from 18 to 11 per cent, between the period 1980–1981 and the period 2000–2001, even though the volume of international trade in fruit and vegetables increased by about 15 per cent. Internationally traded volumes in the case of rice, chickens and cut flowers increased by more than 40 per cent in each case between 1993–1995 and 2003–2005 (Havnevik et. al., 2007: 26).
- 5 Despite the strong increases in nominal export prices for a range of primary agricultural commodities in recent years, the overall trend depicts a fall in real prices between the period 1993–1995 and the period 2003–2005 (Havnevik et al., 2007: 26). For a detailed discussion of high price volatility and its impact on African economies, see UNCTAD, 2003a, in particular pp. 2–22).
- 6 Of the 48 countries for which data were presented for the period 2003–2005, primary commodities made up more than 90 per cent of the total exports of 13 countries, including 8 which are oil exporters; and more than 75 per cent of half the total number of countries. Excluding fuels, primary commodities made up at least 70 per cent of the total exports of one in three countries. Almost all the 10 countries for which primary commodities (including fuels) made up less than 50 per cent of total exports were middle-income countries.
- 7 The transforming economies in South Asia, East Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa have accounted for about two thirds of agricultural growth in the developing world, mainly through productivity gains rather than through expansion in

the amount of land devoted to agriculture. Cereal yields in East Asia rose by 2.8 per cent a year between 1961 and 2004, far more than the 1.8 per cent recorded in the industrial countries (World Bank, 2008b).

- 8 “The reform’s main objective is to increase the productivity and efficiency of the cotton sector by successfully moving from a monopolistic structure to a system based on competition. The reform aims at expanding cotton production while spreading the productivity gains and income increases to a larger number of cotton producers and generating multiplier effects within and outside the cotton sector and the rest of the economy.” (Summary of the poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) of the Benin Cotton Sector Reform, available on the World Bank website, at [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)).
- 9 In 2007, farmers were able to buy a 50 kg bag of fertilizer for about \$6.50, a quarter of the price in 2004.
- 10 This is the main conclusion reached by the abundant economics literature on the elasticity of supply of agriculture to price signals, which deals with mostly methodological issues and the quality of data for evaluating supply response in different socio-economic contexts. However, this is not discussed here as it is not directly related to the analysis in this section.
- 11 Unless otherwise stated, the discussion in this section is based on UNCTAD, 1998a, chap. III.
- 12 These include consumer goods such as soap, textiles, sugar, cooking oil, tinned milk, matches, roofing sheets, radios and bicycles, which were in short supply because of the collapse experienced by many countries prior to the implementation of adjustment programmes.
- 13 This much has been acknowledged by the Independent Evaluation Group that reviewed World Bank assistance to agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 (World Bank, 2007).
- 14 This is defined as the agricultural value added less the total consumption of agricultural producers.
- 15 It is still an open question whether tenure systems encourage or discourage investments and agricultural innovation. There is some evidence that indigenous land-tenure systems, including rules of inheritance that necessitate the division of a deceased’s farm among numerous heirs, have often reduced farms to sizes that are too small — or, where the deceased had several farms, have led to scattered plots that are too far apart — to justify any meaningful investment. On the other hand, it has also been suggested that investments to improve land are actually increased under this system because they can increase the security of user rights (UNCTAD, 1997b; 1998a).
- 16 <http://www.country-studies.com/ghana/the-economic-recovery-program.html>.
- 17 This proportion is far lower than the level attained by other developing regions, even in the early 1960s.
- 18 This excludes dry land agriculture.
- 19 For detailed discussions on market access issues and subsidies, see UNCTAD, 2003a, pp. 22–26.
- 20 Despite the fact that the true preference margin for Africa is negative (on average, African exports are given lower preference than those from the rest of the world), its market access is still good because of the preferential market access it enjoys, which

- decreases its average export tariffs (the so-called “composition effect”). This effect outweighs Africa’s negative “true preference margin” (Bora et al., 2007).
- 21 Exports from Benin, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland and Togo, for instance, are penalized because they are mostly highly protected products, and preferences do not fully compensate for the loss. In contrast, those of Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya are not, as these are mainly oil, gas and mineral products (Bora et al., 2007).
  - 22 The developed countries have been accused of “box-shifting” of domestic subsidies, whereby many of these subsidies subject to reduction commitments have been reallocated to the “green box” (Das, 2006; Sharma, 2006).
  - 23 The SPS sets out the rules on food safety and animal and plant health standards. While it allows countries to set their own standards, it also stipulates that regulations must be based on science; and should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. They should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail. Member countries are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist. However, members may use measures which result in higher standards if there is scientific justification. The objective of the TBT is to ensure that regulations, standards, testing and certification procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles. However, this agreement also recognizes countries’ rights to adopt the standards they consider appropriate. The agreement says the procedures used to decide whether a product conforms with relevant standards have to be fair and equitable. It discourages any methods that would give domestically produced goods an unfair advantage. Despite all these built-in safeguards against misuse, there is some evidence that both Agreements have been to use to serve protectionist ends.
  - 24 Except where otherwise stated, the discussion in this section is based on UNCTAD, 2003a.
  - 25 The governance of these global value chains (which defines the functional division of labour along the chain) determines the chain membership and obliges other actors to perform unwanted value-added activities, or else excludes them. Redistribution takes place in the global value chains along the axes of marginalization/exclusion and inclusion/upgrading (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).
  - 26 However, country-specific analysis would be necessary to shed more light on the nexus between Africa’s agricultural export performance and trade liberalization, as there are differences in agro-ecological conditions and in the quality of implementation of trade liberalization policies by different Governments, as well as in the initial conditions prevailing in different countries.
  - 27 It should nevertheless be pointed out that the socio-economic structures that determine access to land, the gender division of labour, the control of resources and the distribution of returns from farming do not lend themselves easily to simple policy solutions in the short to medium term.
  - 28 Specific explanations of the failure to produce large quantities of manufactured exports are provided in the section dealing with microeconomic issues.
  - 29 For more on this specific point, see “Commodity dependence and development” by Action Aid and the South Centre available at: <http://www.southcentre.org>.

- 30 The sophistication index is based on the assumption that richer countries export more sophisticated products because these products must allow their high-wage producers to compete in world markets. Such products are characterized by high technology content, low transport costs, good infrastructure, marketing, etc. The sophistication index is a combination of all these factors. For details on the computation of the sophistication index, refer to Lall et al. (2006).
- 31 The least productive goods are primary commodities exported by a number of African countries. They include vegetable products, sisal and agave, cloves, and vanilla beans. The most productive goods are not produced in Africa. They include some types of iron and steel coated with aluminium, sheet piling of iron or steel, tyre cord fabric of viscose rayon, and foil of refined copper, not backed (see table 3). Interestingly, these are products that could be produced in Africa using the continent's raw materials.
- 32 Hausmann et al. (2007) describe the concept of "cost discovery" as a process through which an entrepreneur trying to produce a product for the first time in a developing country faces a level of cost uncertainty that is much higher than the one faced by subsequent entrants. Indeed, if the first entrant is successful, he sends a signal to other potential entrepreneurs that the product can be profitably produced, reducing their search costs. In such a case, social returns are very high. On the other hand, if the first entrant fails, he bears the total cost. Therefore, in order to encourage more entrepreneurs to engage in this "cost discovery" process through which new products are "discovered", produced and eventually exported, and given the positive externalities associated with a successful search, first entrants must be properly compensated.
- 33 Technical efficiency relates a firm's actual production to the production frontier or the maximum possible production, taking technology as given and considering a set of inputs. Allocative efficiency, on the other hand, refers to the efficiency with which a firm allocates its production factors to minimize cost.
- 34 The issue of non-tax entry barriers is discussed in chapters 1 and 2.
- 35 The issue of credit rationing is discussed in detail later in this section.
- 36 For a detailed discussion of these policies, see UNCTAD, 2003a; UNCTAD, 2003b; and NEPAD's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y6831E/y6831e-01.htm#TopOfPage>.
- 37 Considering that most Governments have already fallen short of this target, the timeline for meeting it should, perhaps, be extended to 2015.
- 38 The following measures are permitted under the agreement: increasing expenditure for agricultural research, extension, training for specific food crops (including the provision of the means to facilitate the transfer of information and results of research to producers), pest and disease control and even marketing. Sub-Saharan African Governments could also provide infrastructure in support of agricultural development without falling foul of the provisions of the agreement. These include: physical infrastructure to promote agricultural activities — including roads, electricity, water, dams and drainage schemes — environmental programmes and assistance for deprived regions. The calculation and application of the aggregate measurement of support is not product-specific, and as such guarantees some flexibility in domestic support policies, as long as global commitments reflected in individual country schedules are not exceeded. Under the special and differential treatment accorded LDCs and other poor developing countries, including sub-Saharan Africa, Governments are also free

to use a special category of production support policies, which are exempt from the calculation of a country's current total aggregate measure of support. These policies encompass agricultural input subsidies to low-income or resource-poor producers, investment subsidies, and government assistance to encourage agricultural and rural development. These exemptions allow considerable leeway for sub-Saharan African Governments to support their agricultural sectors (Gayi, 2007; Hodge and Charman, 2007).

- 39 Considering the distortions that “project funds” could introduce into the budgetary process, such a fund could be disbursed through national budgets, but earmarked specifically for diversification activities.
- 40 For a discussion of some specific proposals on how the ongoing negotiations of the Doha Round could help improve the agricultural sector, enhance exports and address sub-Saharan Africa food security concerns, see Gayi, 2007: 313–316.
- 41 For some examples of United States support in the area of investment and trade in Africa, see the Statement of the United States delegate to the forty-fourth Executive Session of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board on 9 July 2008.
- 42 The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme is the outcome of a joint institutional effort by FAO, the World Food Programme, and the World Bank/ Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa Partnership. The programme covers three mutually-reinforcing “pillars” with the objective of addressing the crisis in Africa's agriculture expeditiously: (a) extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems; (b) improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for improved market access; and (c) increasing food supply and reducing hunger. It also contains one long-term “pillar” on agricultural research, technological dissemination and adoption, and addresses other issues such as institutional reform, capacity-building and the role of women in agriculture. See <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y6831E/y6831e-01.htm#TopOfPage> (assessed 12 June 2008).
- 43 See *Jeune Afrique* (2007).
- 44 This problem was highlighted during discussions in Burundi and Zambia in the context of UNCTAD workshops on “Enhancing the role of domestic financial resources in development” in April 2008. This is a project funded under the fifth tranche of the United Nations Development Account.

## References

- Ackah C and Morrissey O (2005). Trade policy and performance in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1980s. Economic research working paper 78. Tunis. African Development Bank.
- Amurgo-Pacheco A and Pierola MD (2008). Patterns of export diversification in developing countries: intensive and extensive margins. Policy research working paper 4473. Washington, DC. World Bank.
- Audretsch DB (1991). New-firm survival and the technological regime. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 73 (3): 441–450.
- Audretsch DB and Mahmood T (1995): New firm survival: new results using a hazard function. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 77 (1): 97–103.
- Baldwin RE and Seghezza E (1996). Testing for trade-induced investment-led growth. *NBER Working Paper Series* 5416. Cambridge. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Bigsten A and Soderbom M (2006). What have we learned from a decade of manufacturing enterprise surveys in Africa? *The World Bank Research Observer*, 2 (2): 241–265.
- Bigsten A, Collier P, Dercon S, Fafchamps M, Gauthier B, Gunning J, Oduro A, Oostendorp R, Pattillo C, Soderbom M, Teal F and Zeufack A (2004). Do African manufacturing firms learn from exporting? *Journal of Development Studies*, 40 (3): 115–141.
- Bigsten A, Collier P, Dercon S, Fafchamps M, Gauthier B, Gunning J, Oduro A, Oostendorp R, Pattillo C, Soderbom M, Teal F and Zeufack A (2003). Credit constraints in manufacturing enterprises in Africa. *Journal of African Economies*, 12 (1): 104–125.
- Bora B, Kuwahara A and Laird S (2002). *Quantification of Non-Tariff Measures*. UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/19. Geneva: UNCTAD.
- Bora S, Bouet A and Roy D (2007). The marginalization of Africa in world trade. *IFPRI Research Brief* 7. Washington DC. International Food Policy Research Institute.
- Borgatti L (2007). Timing and sequencing of trade liberalization in the least developed countries: Does foreign aid play a role? *Economia Internazionale*, LX (1): 33–56.
- Brownbridge M and Gayi S (1999). Progress, constraints and limitations of financial sector reforms in the least developed countries. *Finance and Development Research Programme Paper No.7*. Manchester. Institute for Development Policy and Management.
- Das BL (2006). Imbalances in the Hong Kong (China) ministerial outcome. [http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/par/HK\\_outcome\\_SUNS\\_version\\_13feb06.doc](http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/par/HK_outcome_SUNS_version_13feb06.doc) (accessed 11 July, 2008).
- Dean JM, Desai S and Riedel J (1994). Trade policy reform in developing countries since 1985: a review of the evidence. *World Bank Discussion Paper* 267. Washington, DC. World Bank.
- Diouf J (1989). The challenge of agricultural development in Africa. Sir John Crawford memorial lecture given on 2 November. Washington, DC. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.
- Dollar D and Zeufack A (1999). *Why Are Thai Firms More Productive than Kenyan Firms? Using Firm Data to Explore International Differences in Productivity and Business Environment*. Manuscript. Washington DC, World Bank.
- Economic Commission for Africa and African Union (2007). *Economic Report on Africa 2007: Accelerating Africa's Development through Diversification*. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa publication. Sales no. E.07.II.K.1. Addis Ababa.

- Economic Commission for Africa and African Union (2008). *Economic Report on Africa 2008: Africa and the Monterrey Consensus*. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa publication. Sales no. E.08.II.K.3. Addis Ababa.
- Fafchamps M, El Hamine S and Zeufack A (2008). Learning to export: evidence from Moroccan manufacturing. *Journal of African Economies*, 17 (2): 305–355.
- FAO (2008a). FAOSTAT Online statistical database.
- FAO (2008b). Low-income food-deficit countries' food situation overview. Crop Prospects and Food Situation 2.
- Fitter R and Kaplinsky R (2001). Who gains from product rents as the coffee market becomes more differentiated? A value chain analysis. *IDS Bulletin* 32 (3): 69–82.
- Fukunishi T (2007). Has low productivity constrained competitiveness of African firms? Comparison of firm performances with Asian firms. *IDE Discussion Paper 129*. Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies.
- Gala P (2008). Real exchange rate levels and economic development: theoretical analysis and econometric evidence. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 32 (2): 273–288.
- Gayi SK (2007). Does the WTO Agreement on Agriculture endanger food security in sub-Saharan Africa? In Shabd SA, Davis B and Guha-Khasnobis B (Eds.) (2007). *Food Security: Indicators, Measurement, and the Impact of Trade*. UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford University Press.
- Gibbon P and Ponte S (2005). *Trading Down: Africa, Value Chains and the Global Economy*. Philadelphia. Temple University Press.
- Green CJ, Kimuyu P, Manos R and Murinde V (2007). How do small firms in developing countries raise capital? Evidence from a large-scale Survey of Kenyan micro and small-scale enterprises. *Advances in Financial Economics*, 12: 379–404.
- Habyarimana J (2003). The benefits of banking relationships: evidence from Uganda's banking crisis. Mimeographed document. Harvard University.
- Hausmann R, Hwang J and Rodrik D (2007). What you export matters. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12 (1): 1–25.
- Havnevik K, Bryceson D, Birgegard L, Matondi P and Beyene A (2007). *African Agriculture and the World Bank: Development of Impoverishment?* Report based on a workshop organized by the Nordic Africa Institute. Uppsala. 13–14 March. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Herbst J (1993). *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982–1991*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Heydon K (2006). After the WTO Hong Kong (China) ministerial meeting: what is at stake? OECD Trade Policy Working Paper, No. 27. OECD. Paris.
- Hodge J and Charman A (2007). An analysis of the potential impact of the current WTO agricultural negotiations on government strategies in the SADC region. In Shabd SA, Davis B and Guha-Khasnobis B (Eds.) (2007). *Food Security: Indicators, Measurement, and the Impact of Trade*. UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford University Press.
- Hoekman B, Ng F and Olareaga M (2002). Reducing agricultural tariffs versus domestic support: What's more important for developing countries? *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2918*. Washington, DC. World Bank.
- Holslag J, Geeraerts G, Gorus J and Smis S (2007). *China's Resources and Energy Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Report for the Development Committee of the European Parliament, Vrije Universiteit. Brussels, 19 March.



- Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (2007). Introduction: What is the problem with natural resource wealth? In Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (Eds.) *Escaping the Resource Curse*. New York. Columbia University Press, 1–20.
- IMF (2005). Review of the IMF's trade restrictiveness index. Background paper to the Review of Fund Work on Trade. Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund.
- Jeune Afrique (2007). Les dessous de l'offensive chinoise en République Démocratique du Congo, 2438: 98. 30 September.
- Kaplinsky R and Morris M (2007). Do the Asian drivers undermine export-oriented industrialization in sub-Saharan Africa? *World Development* 36 (2): 254–273.
- Lall S, Weiss J and Zhang J (2006). The "sophistication" of exports: a new measure of product characteristics. *World Development* 34 (2): 222–237.
- McCalla AF and Nash J (2007). *Reforming Agricultural Trade for Developing Countries, Key Issues for a Pro-development Outcome of the Doha Round*. Volume One. The World Bank. Washington, DC.
- Mayer J and Fajarnes P (2005). Tripling Africa's primary exports: What? How? Where? UNCTAD Discussion Paper 180. Geneva. UNCTAD.
- Mengistae T and Pattillo C (2004). Export orientation and productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. *IMF Staff Papers* 51 (2): 327–53.
- Muteme G (2006). New barriers hinder African trade. *Africa Renewal*. January, 19 (4), pp. 18–19.
- Nzobonimpa O, Nkurunziza J and Ndikumana L (2006). Promoting a development-oriented financial system in Burundi. Paper prepared for the African Economic Research Consortium. June.
- Ndikumana L (2000). Financial determinants of domestic investment in sub-Saharan Africa: evidence from panel data. *World Development* 28 (2): 381–400.
- Nkurunziza JD (2005a). Credit can precipitate firm failure: evidence from Kenyan manufacturing in the 1990s. Working paper WPS 2005-04. Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Nkurunziza JD (2005b). The effect of credit on growth and convergence of firms in Kenyan manufacturing. Working Paper WPS/2005-01. Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Ocampo JA and Parra MA (2003). The terms of trade for commodities in the twentieth century. CEPAL Review 79. Santiago, Chile. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.
- OECD (2008a) *Business for Development 2008, Promoting Commercial Agriculture in Africa, A development Centre Perspective*. Paris. OECD.
- OECD (2008b) OECD Online Statistical Database [accessed 21 July 2008].
- Sachs JD and Warner A (1995). Economic reform and the process of global integration. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*. 1: 1–118.
- Santos-Paulino A and Thirlwall A (2004). The impact of trade liberalization on exports, imports and the balance of payments of developing countries. *Economic Journal* 114: 50–72.
- Sharma D (2006). WTO Hong Kong (China) ministerial: much ado about nothing. *Motion Magazine*. 21 January.
- Teal F (1999a). Why can Mauritius export manufactures and Ghana not? *The World Economy* 22 (7): 981–993.

- Teal F (1999b). The Ghanaian manufacturing sector 1991–1995: firm growth, productivity and convergence. *Journal of Development Studies* 36: 109–127.
- Traoré A (1990). Ivory Coast: agricultural and industrial development. In Hamid Ait Amara and Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua (Eds.) (1990). *African Agriculture: The Critical Choices*. Zed Books. London and New Jersey. United Nations University Press, Tokyo. In cooperation with the Third World Forum, Dakar.
- UNCTAD (1997a). *Trade and Development Report, 1997*. United Nations publication, sales no. E.97.II.D.8, New York and Geneva.
- UNCTAD (1997b). *The Least Developed Countries Report 1997*. United Nations publication, sales No.E.97.II.D6. New York and Geneva.
- UNCTAD (1998a). *African Development in a Comparative Perspective*. United Nations publication, sales No. GV.E.99.0.21. Oxford: James Curry and Trenton NJ: Africa World Press.
- UNCTAD (1998b). *The Least Developed Countries Report 1998*. United Nations publication, sales No.E.98.II.D11. New York and Geneva.
- UNCTAD (2003a). *Economic Development in Africa: Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence*. United Nations publication, sales No. E.03.II.D.34. New York and Geneva.
- UNCTAD (2003b). Report of the Meeting of Eminent Persons on Commodity Issues. Presented to the fiftieth session of the Trade and Development Board, 6–17 October. TD/B/50/11. Geneva. 30 September.
- UNCTAD (2004). *Economic Development in Africa: Debt Sustainability, Oasis or Mirage?* United Nations publication, sales No. E.04.II.D.37. New York and Geneva.
- UNCTAD (2005). *Economic Development in Africa: Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment*. United Nations publication, sales No.E.05.II.D12. New York and Geneva.
- UNCTAD (2006). *Economic Development in Africa: Doubling Aid: Making the “Big Push” Work*. United Nations publication, sales No. E.06.II.D10. New York and Geneva.
- UNCTAD (2007). *Economic Development in Africa: Reclaiming Policy Space – Domestic Resource Mobilization and Developmental States*. United Nations publication, sales No. E.07.II.D.12. New York and Geneva.
- UNCTAD (2008a). Handbook of Trade Statistics. Available Online at <http://www.unctad.org/>.
- UNCTAD (2008b). *The Changing face of commodities in the twenty-first century*. TD/428. Note prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat, UNCTAD XII, Accra, Ghana, 20–25 April.
- UNCTAD (2008c). UNCAD TRAINS database Online. Accessed on 27 May, 2008.
- United States Energy Information Administration (US EIA) (2008). *US EIA Online Statistical Database*. Available at: <http://www.eia.doe.gov> [accessed 28 May 2008].
- Van Biesebroeck J (2005). Exporting raises productivity in sub-Saharan African manufacturing firms. *Journal of International Economics* 67 (2): 373–91.
- Wacziarg R and Welch KH (2003). Trade liberalization and growth: new evidence. NBER working paper series 10152. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Wang J (2007). What drives China’s growing role in Africa? IMF working paper WP/07/211. Washington, DC. IMF.
- Wood A and Mayer J (2001). Africa’s export structure in a comparative perspective. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25 (3): 369–394.

- World Bank (1981). *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*. Washington, DC. World Bank.
- World Bank (1994). *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead*. Washington, DC. World Bank.
- World Bank (2006). Africa Database, CD-ROM.
- World Bank (2007). World Bank assistance to agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. *AIEG Review*. Washington, DC. World Bank.
- World Bank (2008a). *World Development Indicators*. Washington, DC. The World Bank.
- World Bank (2008b). *World Development Report: Agriculture for Development*. Washington, DC. World Bank.
- WTO (2001). Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. 20 November.
- WTO (2005). Doha Work Programme: Ministerial declaration. WT/MIN(05)/DEC. Ministerial Conference, sixth session. Hong Kong (China). 22 December.
- Wu Y and Zeng L (2008). The impact of trade liberalization on the trade balance in developing countries. IMF working paper WP/08/14. Washington, DC. IMF.

***Economic Development in Africa series:***

- 2000** *Capital Flows and Growth in Africa*—TD/B/47/4—UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/7  
Contributors: Yilmaz Akyüz, Kamran Kousari (team leader), Korkut Boratav (consultant).
- 2001** *Performance, Prospects and Policy Issues*—UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/1  
Contributors: Yilmaz Akyüz, Kamran Kousari (team leader), Korkut Boratav (consultant).
- 2002** *From Adjustment to Poverty Reduction: What is New?*—UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2  
Contributors: Yilmaz Akyüz, Kamran Kousari (team leader), Korkut Boratav (consultant).
- 2003** *Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence* – UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2003/1  
Contributors: Yilmaz Akyüz, Kamran Kousari (team leader), Samuel Gayi.
- 2004** *Debt Sustainability: Oasis or Mirage?* – UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2004/1  
Contributors: Kamran Kousari (team leader), Samuel Gayi, Bernhard Gunter (consultant), Phillip Cobbina (research).
- 2005** *Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment* – UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2005/1  
Contributors: Kamran Kousari (team leader), Samuel Gayi, Richard Kozul-Wright, Phillip Cobbina (research).
- 2006** *Doubling Aid: Making the “Big Push” Work* – UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2006/1  
Contributors: Kamran Kousari (team leader), Samuel Gayi, Richard Kozul-Wright, Jane Harrigan (consultant), Victoria Chisala (research).
- 2007** *Reclaiming Policy Space: Domestic Resource Mobilization and Developmental States* – UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2007  
Contributors: Samuel Gayi (team leader), Janvier Nkurunziza, Martin Halle, Shigehisa Kasahara.

Copies of the series of reports on *Economic Development in Africa* may be obtained from the Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes, UNCTAD, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland (fax: 022 917 0274; e-mail: [africadev@unctad.org](mailto:africadev@unctad.org)). The reports are also accessible on the UNCTAD website at [www.unctad.org](http://www.unctad.org).