



Technical and statistical report

Eurasian Economic Union Investment Report 2026: International Investment Trends, Policy Developments



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Geneva, 2026

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Abbreviations

AI	artificial intelligence
BIT	bilateral investment treaty
CAGR	compound annual growth rate
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EV	electric vehicle
FDI	foreign direct investment
GTA	Global Trade Alert
GVC	global value chain
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICT	information and communication technology
IIA	international investment agreement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISDS	investor-State dispute settlement
LDC	least developed country
LSEG	London Stock Exchange Group
M&A	mergers and acquisitions
MNE	multinational enterprise
NIPO	New Industrial Policy Observatory
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEZ	special economic zone
TIP	treaty with investment provisions
UNCTAD	UN Trade and Development (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development)
USD	United States dollar
WIR	World Investment Report



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Executive summary

Global foreign direct investment showed resilience in 2025, increasing by 6 per cent to \$1.6 trillion. Underlying investment activity was less buoyant: cross-border mergers and acquisitions fell by 7 per cent, the number of announced greenfield projects declined by 10 per cent and the number of international project finance deals fell by 11 per cent. The result was an investment environment characterized by larger average transactions, stronger selectivity and rising concentration.

The patterns differed sharply across development groups and regions. Developed economies recorded an 11 per cent increase in FDI and developing economies a 2 per cent increase. Europe recorded a 39 per cent increase in FDI, whereas Africa experienced a 26 per cent fall. Developing Asia remained the largest recipient region, at \$644 billion, but greenfield and project finance activity weakened.

Within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), FDI inflows rebounded from \$4.5 billion in 2024 to \$27.2 billion in 2025. The Russian Federation attracted \$25.3 billion; Armenia and Kyrgyzstan also recorded strong percentage gains from low bases. Belarus remained broadly stable and Kazakhstan registered negative net inflows. Announced greenfield project value rose by 12 per cent to about \$26 billion, even as the number of projects declined from 122 to 80. Kazakhstan accounted for approximately \$24 billion. China was the largest investor in the grouping with \$16 billion of announced project value.

Investment policy became more active and more selective worldwide. A record 229 national investment policy measures were adopted in 2025; 73 per cent remained favourable to investors, but the share of restrictive measures continued to rise. Incentives accounted for half of favourable measures, while investment screening expanded to 52 economies. EAEU trends broadly mirrored this global pattern: most measures in the developing members were favourable, while most measures in Belarus and the Russian Federation were restrictive.

International Investment Agreements (IIAs) remain an important source of policy and litigation exposure. EAEU countries have concluded 293 IIAs, of which 242 are in force, and 79 per cent of the network predates 2010. About 97 per cent of ISDS cases against EAEU countries have relied on treaties signed before 2010. This creates a strong case for accelerating reform and aligning treaty design with contemporary objectives, including sustainable development and legitimate security regulation.

Indicator	2025 level	Key reading
Global FDI	\$1.624 trillion	+6% in 2025
Global greenfield project value	\$1.393 trillion	+1%, while project numbers fell 10%
EAEU FDI inflows	\$27.2 billion	Up from \$4.5 billion in 2024
EAEU greenfield projects	\$25.9 billion	+12%; 80 projects
EAEU international project finance	\$8.6 billion	+81%; 11 deals
EAEU IIAs in force	242	79% of the network predates 2010

The EAEU faces a stronger headline investment environment than in 2024, but one that is highly concentrated by country, investor, sector and project. The challenge is to convert a smaller number of large opportunities into broader productive capacity, resilience and development impact.





Introduction

As discussed in the World Investment Report 2026 (*WIR26*), regional cooperation on investment policies and promotion initiatives are becoming increasingly important in building productive capacity and supporting industrial development in the current global environment. UNCTAD is responding to that trend with a series of dedicated investment reports, based on the World Investment Report, for regional groups and regional economic cooperation organizations. This report is part of that series. It follows a successful webinar on Eurasian Economic Union investment trends held in October 2025,

which saw the participation of a wide range of regional stakeholders, policymakers and development organizations.

The report provides an overview of the global investment context before turning to the FDI profiles of the five EAEU member States. It then reviews national investment policy measures, international investment agreements and investor-State dispute settlement, and the broader picture around the evolving geography and sector composition of international investment.





Global investment trends


This chapter focuses on global investment trends to show the wider FDI landscape within which EAEU economies compete for investment. It distinguishes headline FDI resilience from weaker transaction volumes and shows how capital is being channeled towards a narrower set of countries, projects and strategic sectors.

Global FDI rose from \$1.532 trillion in 2024 to \$1.624 trillion in 2025, an increase of 6 per cent. This headline improvement indicates that international capital flows remained resilient despite geopolitical tensions, tighter policy scrutiny of investment and trade policy uncertainty.

The project-level indicators were less positive. UNCTAD considers three types of project-level data to complement its FDI data. Greenfield project announcements mostly concern manufacturing and services industries. International project finance mostly covers infrastructure sectors. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) merely represent changes in ownership. Cross-border merger and acquisition values fell by 7 per cent, from \$454 billion to \$421 billion. Announced greenfield project value increased by only 1 per cent, from \$1.379 trillion to \$1.393 trillion, while the number of projects declined by 10 per cent. International project finance values increased by 3 per cent to \$1.182 trillion, while the number of deals fell by 11 per cent.



Figure 1.
Global FDI resilience masks weaker project-level investment activity




The combination of stable or rising values with fewer projects and deals implies a shift towards larger transactions and a more selective investment pipeline.

A smaller number of capital-intensive projects can sustain aggregate values while leaving many locations and sectors with fewer opportunities.

The global investment environment remained resilient in 2025. Competition increasingly centers on the ability to secure large and strategically important projects.

Figure 2.
FDI trends diverged across development groups and regions



Developed economies attracted \$723 billion in FDI and developing economies \$901 billion in 2025. FDI increased by 11 per cent in developed economies and by 2 per cent in developing economies. Least developed countries received \$43 billion and recorded

21 per cent growth. However, this growth was from a very small base and mostly driven by only two countries. Considering a larger group of low-income and low middle-income countries, FDI inflows declined.


The project indicators moved differently. Greenfield project values increased by 19 per cent in developed economies but declined by 18 per cent in developing economies. In least developed countries, greenfield values increased by 56 per cent. International project finance fell by 12 per cent in developed economies, rose by 20 per cent in developing economies and increased sharply in least developed countries, by 185 per cent.

Regional outcomes were equally varied. Europe recorded FDI growth of 39 per cent, while North America declined by 2 per cent and Africa by 26 per cent. Developing Asia remained the largest recipient region at \$644 billion and grew by 3 per cent. Latin America and the Caribbean received \$188 billion and grew by 14 per cent. Across most regions, however, greenfield project and project finance indicators were weaker than FDI flows. As greenfield data is on an announcement basis, this lowers expectations for FDI flows going forward.

Figure 3.
Investment is concentrating in fewer sectors


Industries

(Global, project values)



SDG sectors

(Developing economies, project values)



All sectors,
developing economies
Value: -1%
Number: -6%



Global announced project values increased most strongly in the digital economy, at 47 per cent, while infrastructure and semiconductors each rose by 11 per cent and extractive industries by 8 per cent. By contrast, project values in global value-chain-intensive industries fell by 13 per cent. These movements point to a reallocation of capital towards digital and strategic infrastructure and selected technology platforms.

Infrastructure investment in 2025 showed a clear contrast between strong growth in digital infrastructure and weaker activity in other sectors. Digital investment, particularly in data centers, grew rapidly as demand for cloud computing and AI increased, with announced project values rising by more than 80 per cent. However, digital investment remained uneven globally, as developing economies accounted for just over one third of total digital investment.

Investment in renewable energy continued to weaken, marking the fourth consecutive annual decline. Greenfield investment fell by almost 25 per cent, although renewable energy remained the largest infrastructure segment, valued at more than \$600 billion. Investment in power, electricity, energy and gas supply also declined, pointing to broader weaknesses across the energy sector.

Investment in extractive industries fell by more than 25 per cent, while oil and gas investment remained relatively strong. Mining investment declined substantially because of challenges such as lower exploration spending, declining ore quality, long project timelines and environmental constraints. Critical minerals were an exception, with greenfield investment increasing from \$22 billion to \$26 billion, although investment remained concentrated in early-stage projects.

GVC-intensive manufacturing also weakened in 2025 due to uncertainty over trade policies. Announced greenfield projects in electronics, automotive, textiles and machinery declined by about 15 per cent. Semiconductors were the main exception, with investment increasing significantly, while investment in other electronics segments fell by nearly 40 per cent. Overall, investment became increasingly concentrated in digital infrastructure, semiconductors and selected critical-mineral activities. Investment in Sustainable Development Goal sectors in developing economies was uneven. Infrastructure project values rose by 61 per cent and agrifood systems by 69 per cent. Renewable energy and water, sanitation and hygiene each declined by 5 per cent, while health and education fell by 7 per cent. Across all sectors in developing economies, project value declined by 1 per cent and the number of projects by 6 per cent.

The divergence within SDG sectors matters because aggregate improvement can conceal setbacks in essential public-service and transition-related investment. The largest increases were concentrated in a small number of categories, reinforcing the wider pattern of investment selectivity.






International investment trends in EAEU member States

The chapter reveals the volatility of regional FDI, differences among member States, the performance of greenfield investment, the changing sector composition of announced projects and the evolution of international project finance.

FDI inflows to EAEU member States fluctuated sharply between 2015 and 2025. Inflows rose to \$44 billion in 2021.

FDI flows in the region can be strongly affected by large corporate transactions, reinvested earnings, intracompany financing and reversals. Trend assessments should therefore combine FDI flows with information on greenfield projects, M&As and international project finance (UNCTAD 2026).

Figure 4.
FDI inflows have remained highly volatile
(Billions of dollars and percentage)




Source: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).

Figure 5.
Country-level FDI outcomes diverged in 2025

**EAEU economies
in 2025**



**FDI inflows by country
(Billions of dollars)**



Source: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).

The EAEU total rose from \$4.5 billion in 2024 to \$27.2 billion in 2025, but the increase was highly concentrated. The Russian Federation attracted \$25.3 billion, up from \$2.2 billion, and accounted for approximately 93 per cent of the regional total. The Russian Federation recorded a sizeable increase in inflows despite very limited new project activity and ongoing restrictive economic measures. The rise likely reflected reinvested earnings under restrictions on profit repatriation, corporate restructuring and other financial flow effects, rather than new greenfield or project-based investment (IIF, 2025)

Armenia attracted \$0.61 billion, Kyrgyzstan \$0.64 billion, and Belarus \$1.6 billion.


Kazakhstan recorded net negative inflows of \$0.86 billion, compared with positive inflows of \$0.2 billion in the previous year.

Percentage growth rates in smaller economies signal momentum but should be read together with absolute values. Equally, negative net flows do not necessarily imply an absence of new projects; they can reflect financial repayments, divestments or other balance-of-payments movements. In fact, Kazakhstan was the largest destination for new greenfield project announcements in the region.

The rebound is significant but does not yet represent a broad-based regional upswing. A durable improvement would require a wider distribution of inflows across member States and investment sources.



Figure 6.
Greenfield investments and project finance both increased



Announced greenfield project value in the EAEU reached approximately \$26 billion in 2025, an increase of 12 per cent. International project finance reached about \$9 billion and increased by 81 per cent. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions returned to a positive value of \$0.4 billion after a negative \$2.5 billion outcome in 2024.

The origin of greenfield investment was strongly concentrated. China accounted for \$16 billion, far ahead of Türkiye at \$1.9 billion and the Russian Federation at \$1.2 billion. The Republic of Korea contributed \$1.1 billion, while the United Arab Emirates, Belgium and Georgia each contributed between \$0.8 billion and \$0.9 billion.

Intra-EAEU investment is largely driven by Russian investment in other member States. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan remain important destinations for Russian capital in the Eurasian region.


Armenia's Russian FDI increased by 14 per cent since 2022, with 22 projects worth \$4.3 billion underway, mainly in finance, energy, and transport. Belarus has accumulated \$4.7 billion in Russian investment, with 45 projects being implemented. Kazakhstan is the second-largest recipient of Russian FDI, reaching \$8.9 billion by July 2025, with major investments from LUKOIL, Tatneft, and EuroChem, particularly in the extractive sector. Notable projects include LUKOIL's investments in Kazakhstan and Unigreen Energy's solar power plant in Kyrgyzstan (Eurasia Development Bank, 2025).

The significant growth of China as a source of foreign direct investment in the region is indicative of an important partnership. Long-term, the breadth and durability of the regional project pipeline will depend on member States attracting projects that connect to multiple markets and financing sources.

Large anchor investments can transform sector capacity, but dependence on a narrow investor base increases exposure to changes in financing conditions, corporate strategy and bilateral relations.

Figure 7.
Greenfield values rose while project numbers fell

EAEU: Announced greenfield projects (Billions of dollars and number)



Announced greenfield projects (2025)



Source: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times Ltd, fDi markets (www.fdimarkets.com)

The value of announced greenfield projects increased from \$23.1 billion in 2024 to \$25.9 billion in 2025. The number of projects, however, declined from 122 to 80. The average announced value per project therefore increased substantially, reinforcing the conclusion that regional investment is becoming more concentrated in a smaller number of large projects, in line with global trends and the worldwide concentration of investments in few strategically important sectors.


Country outcomes diverged. Kazakhstan attracted approximately \$24 billion, an increase of 34 per cent, and accounted for the majority of the regional value.

The time series also shows the volatility of project announcements. The regional value exceeded \$54 billion in 2016 and fell to \$2.4 billion in 2022 before recovering in 2023-2025. Project numbers peaked at 479 in 2018 and have since fallen markedly.

A larger average project size can support transformative investment, but it also makes aggregate outcomes more sensitive to a small number of announcements and increases the importance of implementation follow-up.



Figure 8.
Metals became the leading announced greenfield industry
Announced greenfield projects by industry: Top five in 2025
(Billions of dollars)



Source: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com)*Excluding renewable energy.

Metals accounted for approximately \$12.5 billion of announced greenfield investment in 2025, compared with \$2.3 billion in 2024. Chemicals rose from \$0.2 billion to \$2.5 billion. These two categories produced the largest increases among the top five industries.

Transportation and warehousing declined from approximately \$5.9 billion to \$2.2 billion. Power projects increased from \$0.7 billion to about \$2.0 billion, while renewable energy remained substantial at \$1.6 billion, slightly below the \$1.8 billion recorded in 2024.



The sector mix suggests that natural-resource and processing activities remain central to the EAEU project pipeline, while infrastructure and energy investment continue to provide

important supporting opportunities. The development effect of metals projects will depend on domestic processing, supplier linkages, logistics, environmental performance and workforce capabilities.


The value of metals investment is potentially transformative, but the key policy objective is to move beyond extraction by linking projects to processing, engineering services, local suppliers and skills development.



Figure 9.
Project finance is recovering after a major sectoral transition


EAEU: International project finance deals

(Billions of dollars and number)



EAEU: Main international project finance sectors

(Billions of dollars, 3-year moving average)



Source: UNCTAD, based on information from LSEG.



International project finance reached \$8.6 billion in 2025 through 11 deals, up from \$4.7 billion and 10 deals in 2024. The recovery was only partial; total values remained far below the previous peaks of \$52.5 billion in 2016 and \$63.7 billion in 2021. Deal numbers have also fallen from 30 in 2019 to around 10-12 annually in recent years.

The three-year moving average demonstrates a structural change in sector composition. Petrochemicals and oil and gas dominated the earlier period, with petrochemicals reaching particularly

high levels around 2017-2019. Power became the largest component in 2021-2023, while industry also gained relative importance. Transportation and the hydrocarbon-related sectors declined.

Because project finance transactions are large and episodic, the moving average is useful for distinguishing structural shifts from annual volatility. It suggests that the region has moved from a petrochemical and oil-and-gas-dominated model towards a more diversified mix led by power and industry, even though total deal activity has weakened since the 2021 peak.



Table1.
Asian sponsors gained prominence in EAEU project finance

EAEU: Home countries of top sponsor nations of international project finance deals in 2025
(billions of dollars)

Kazakhstan Republic of Korea	3.1
Oman	1.4
Kazakhstan China	1.3
China	1.0

EAEU: Home countries of top 5 sponsors of international project finance deals (2015 – 2025)
(billions of dollars)

Germany	52
United Kingdom United States Netherlands	42
France Japan China Russian Federation	21
Russian Federation China	21
Republic of Korea	11
China	9

Source: UNCTAD, based on information from LSEG.

In 2025, the largest international project finance sponsors in the EAEU included sponsors from Kazakhstan and the Republic of Korea, with a combined total of \$3.1 billion. Sponsors from Oman accounted for \$1.4 billion, while sponsors from Kazakhstan and China accounted for \$1.3 billion, and those from China for a further \$1.0 billion. These figures suggest that Asia has become a major source of project finance for the EAEU.

Over the longer term, however, the ranking continues to reflect the significant role of sponsors from Europe and the United States. Between 2015 and 2025, project sponsors from Germany were associated with \$52 billion in project finance. Sponsor groupings from the United Kingdom,

the United States, and the Netherlands accounted for a combined \$42 billion. Other leading sponsor groupings included those from France, Japan, China, and the Russian Federation, as well as joint sponsor groupings from the Russian Federation and China, each associated with approximately \$21 billion in project finance. Sponsors from the Republic of Korea accounted for \$11 billion, while those from China accounted for a further \$9 billion.

This shift broadens the range of financing relationships available to the region. It also underscores the importance of applying consistent project appraisal, transparent procurement, and debt-sustainability standards, regardless of the origin of capital.

Sponsor diversification can improve financing options, but project selection and risk management should remain anchored in common standards and long-term development objectives.





3

National investment policy trends


This chapter places EAEU measures within a global context of record investment policymaking activity, wider use of targeted incentives and facilitation, and expanding screening and restrictions in strategic sectors.

Worldwide, 229 national investment policy measures were adopted in 2025, the highest annual number in the period covered. Although 73 per cent of measures remained favourable to investors, the number and share of restrictive measures increased. Over 2016-2025, the share of restrictive measures rose by 42 per cent.





Figure 10.
Investment policymaking reached a record high in 2025, with a rise in the share of the restrictive measures
(Number)



Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database

Favourable measures became more targeted. Governments increasingly used incentives, facilitation and selective liberalization to channel investment towards clean energy, digital infrastructure, advanced manufacturing and critical minerals. At the same time, screening, entry restrictions, localization requirements and tighter rules expanded in sectors considered strategic.

The shift reflects a more cautious approach to openness rather than a generalized retreat from investment attraction. Governments are attempting to combine the need for capital, technology and productive capacity with concerns about security, resilience, fiscal sustainability and the effectiveness of incentive regimes.

The emerging model is selective openness: active facilitation and support for priority projects combined with closer review of ownership, technology and security risks.

Investment incentives represented a record 50 per cent of all measures favourable to investors in 2025. Their use increased across all regions, with the strongest growth in developed economies. Incentives are becoming more focused on priority sectors, technologies and individual projects, often with performance conditions.


Investment facilitation remained the second-largest category of favourable measures. It continues to be used to

attract, retain and expand investment in an uncertain and competitive environment.

Investment restrictions continued to be driven by the introduction and expansion of FDI screening, especially in developed economies. The number of economies operating a screening regime increased from 21 in 2016 to 52 in 2025. Nevertheless, outright rejection remained rare, at less than 1 per cent of reviewed cases.



Figure 11.
Incentives dominated favourable measures while FDI screening expanded



Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database

Figure 12.
EAEU policy trends broadly followed global patterns
(Percentage)



Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database

A total of 43 investment policy measures were adopted across EAEU member States between 2016 and 2025. The Russian Federation accounted for 26 measures, or 60 per cent of the total.

The pattern differed according to development classification. In Belarus and the Russian Federation, 63 per cent of recorded measures were restrictive. In Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 69 per cent were favourable to investors. These outcomes are broadly consistent with the differences observed between developed and developing regions globally.

The comparison excludes sanctions and counter-sanctions adopted by Belarus and the Russian Federation. It therefore focuses on the underlying investment

policy framework rather than the wider set of geopolitical and trade-related measures affecting the investment climate.


Over the decade, the most common favourable measures in the EAEU concerned facilitation, incentives and liberalization.

Kazakhstan established a one-stop shop, introduced fast-track mechanisms for priority sectors, launched a digital investment platform and simplified visa and work-permit procedures for expatriates and their families. Belarus simplified administrative procedures and introduced mechanisms to encourage investment in priority sectors. The Russian Federation provided guidance on its screening regime.



Figure 13.
Facilitation and liberalization are the main type of measures adopted in EAEU

Measure favorable to investors, by category and region, 2016-2025
(Percentage)



Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database. Note: Policy measures falling under multiple categories are weighted equally across those categories.

Note: Policy measures falling under multiple categories are weighted equally across those categories.

Liberalization included Armenia's privatization program covering 47 State-owned enterprises and partial privatizations in the Russian oil-producing and diamond-mining industries. Incentive measures included expanded support for priority sectors in

Belarus and Kazakhstan and new special economic zone incentives in Kyrgyzstan. Restrictive measures included tighter Russian screening and foreign-ownership rules, the removal of incentives in Kazakhstan and a new Kazakh digital tax for foreign companies.

Interoperable one-stop shops, common information standards and coordinated investor aftercare could make the EAEU function more effectively as an integrated investment space.





4

International investment policies

This chapter reviews the expanding global stock of international investment agreements, the level of investor-State dispute settlement activity, the composition of the EAEU treaty network and the case for accelerated reform.

The worldwide stock of international investment agreements reached 3,367 treaties. Of these, 2,661 - approximately 79 per cent - were in force. The annual number of agreements signed returned to its pre-2020 level for the first time in 2025.

The large stock of treaties reflects decades of bilateral and regional investment policymaking. It also means that current investment relations remain governed by agreements concluded under very different policy approaches and at different stages of the evolution of sustainable development objectives and regulatory safeguards.

The continued conclusion of new agreements shows that IIAs remain an important instrument. At the same time, the dominance of older agreements makes reform of the existing stock at least as important as the design of new treaties.

Treaty policy must address both new negotiations and the legacy network. Updating only future agreements leaves most existing legal exposure unchanged.

Figure 14.
The global IIA universe reached 3,367 treaties





Figure 15.
ISDS cases totalled 1,463 by the end of 2025



Source: UNCTAD, ISDS Navigator database, accessed 1 April 2026.

Note: Information compiled from public sources, including specialized reporting services. UNCTAD statistics cover investor–State arbitration cases brought under bilateral investment treaties and treaties with investment provisions, but do not include cases based exclusively on investment contracts (State contracts) or national investment laws, nor cases in which a party has signalled its intention to submit a claim to ISDS but has not commenced arbitration. Annual and cumulative case numbers are continually adjusted as a result of verification processes and may not exactly match numbers reported in previous years. Abbreviations: ICSID, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes; ISDS, investor–State dispute settlement.

Fifty-six new treaty-based investor-State dispute settlement cases were initiated in 2025. The cumulative number of publicly known cases reached 1,463 for 1987-2025, and 136 countries plus the European Union had been respondents.

The annual caseload has stabilized at a lower level since 2019, but the cumulative exposure remains significant. The statistics cover treaty-based arbitration under


bilateral investment treaties and treaties with investment provisions. They exclude cases based exclusively on investment contracts or national investment laws.

Case numbers are continually adjusted as new information becomes public and earlier reports are verified. The trend nevertheless demonstrates that treaty obligations continue to create material legal and fiscal risks for a wide range of economies.

A lower annual caseload does not eliminate the need for reform. Existing treaties can generate claims many years after they were signed, and a single large case can have significant fiscal and policy consequences.



Figure 16.
EAEU countries have 242 international investment agreements in force



A total of **270** bilateral investment treaties (**BITs**) and **23** treaties with investment provisions (**TIPs**) were concluded by EAEU countries (9% of the world total IIAs).

This includes **242 IIAs in force** and **51 IIAs signed** but not in force. Another 24 IIAs have been terminated.

79% of EAEU IIAs were concluded before 2010.

10 IIAs were concluded among EAEU countries (intra-EAEU IIAs).

Source: UNCTAD, IIA Navigator database, accessed 30 June 2026. The UNCTAD IIA Navigator is updated continuously as new IIA-related information becomes available. Abbreviation: IIA, international investment agreement.

EAEU countries have concluded 270 bilateral investment treaties and 23 treaties with investment provisions, together accounting for approximately 9 per cent of

the global IIA stock. The network includes 242 agreements in force, 51 signed but not in force and 24 terminated agreements.



Seventy-nine per cent of the EAEU treaty network was concluded before 2010. Ten agreements were concluded among EAEU countries themselves. The Russian Federation's BITs alone represent 29 per cent of all BITs signed by EAEU countries.

The size and age of the network create a complex reform task. National treaty programs need to be coordinated with regional economic integration and with the practical treatment of intra-EAEU investment.

The EAEU's treaty exposure is shaped less by the number of newly signed agreements than by a large stock of old-generation treaties that remain in force.

IIA reform is urgent also for EAEU member states

Old-generation IIAs concluded before 2010 continue to dominate the EAEU network, as they do globally. Approximately 97 per cent of ISDS cases against EAEU countries have been filed under treaties signed before 2010.

Compensation claims and awards have also increased in scale. Globally, 130 claims have sought more than \$1 billion, including 16 claims against EAEU countries. Fourteen awards have exceeded \$1 billion, including six involving EAEU countries.

Developing countries are particularly disadvantaged by the slow pace of reform because their exposure to ISDS risk is significantly higher. Reform priorities include clearer substantive obligations, modern safeguards, improved dispute-settlement design and alignment with sustainable development and legitimate regulatory objectives.



International investment in a turbulent era

The final substantive theme of the report examines the resurgence of industrial policy, the subsidy gap, security-related treaty provisions and the reconfiguration of international manufacturing networks. It also looks at the rise of a limited number of “strategic sectors” in global investment patterns – i.e. sectors including advanced or sensitive technologies, critical minerals, or high-growth sectors such as energy transition-related technologies.

Announced greenfield investment in strategic sectors increased from \$109 billion in 2020 to \$576 billion in 2025. Over the same period, the share of global greenfield project value accounted for by these sectors rose from 16 per cent to 44 per cent.

The growth reflects several interconnected investment waves. AI infrastructure is the largest strategic investment sector, while semiconductors are the fastest-growing. Critical minerals, energy-transition technologies and other advanced technologies also recorded strong expansion.


This shift means that the composition of international investment has changed as much as its aggregate value. Countries increasingly compete for projects tied to digital capacity, technological leadership, supply-chain security and energy transition.



Figure 17.
Strategic sectors now attract almost half of global greenfield investment

Value of announced greenfield projects in strategic sectors

(Billions of dollars and percentage)



Source: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).

Notes: Data for 2025 are annualized on the basis of information available as of 30 November. Average CAGR of other sectors is 5 per cent.

The investment structure of the wider Eurasian region is also changing – but the global shift to strategic sectors is less visible. According to the Eurasian Development Bank's Monitoring of Mutual Investments (EDB, 2025a), mutual FDI among EAEU member States reached a record \$23.4 billion by mid-2025, 42 per cent above its 2016 level.¹ Across the wider Eurasian region covered by the EDB database, greenfield projects became the largest form of investment for the first time, while investment in manufacturing increased by \$1.5 billion over the preceding 18 months and the relative weight of extractive industries declined. Manufacturing, energy, transport

and logistics, and the agro-industrial complex have emerged as important destinations for new investment. These trends point to opportunities for EAEU economies to move from resource-based investment towards processing, infrastructure and more diversified production networks.

Across the strategic sectors analyzed, the average share of the top three investor economies reached 72 per cent of global greenfield project value in 2025. The average share of the top three recipient economies was 56 per cent. In other sectors, the corresponding shares were much lower, at 27 per cent for investors and 34 per cent for recipients.


As EAEU policymakers and firms look for realistic points of entry into strategic-sector value chains, existing assets in energy, minerals, logistics and technical skills can provide a basis for focused propositions. Resource endowments may create entry points in critical minerals, while regional energy systems, logistics corridors and industrial capabilities can support selected energy-transition and advanced-manufacturing activities.

¹ Eurasian Development Bank investment data may not coincide with UNCTAD's data. Analyses in this report, including all figures and tables, are strictly based on UNCTAD's dataset and on the World Investment Report 2026. EDB data is used where helpful for additional context.



Figure 18.
Strategic-sector investment is highly concentrated

Value of announced greenfield projects; share in total
(Percentage)



Source: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).

Notes: For strategic sectors, concentration measures are calculated as the simple average of the top three investor and top three recipient shares across individual sectors, rather than for strategic sectors as a whole, in order to account for differences in sector size, characteristics and investment patterns. Calculating concentration for strategic sectors as a single aggregate still yields a significant, though narrower gap relative to other sectors.

The concentration reflects the advantages of established technology hubs, large digital markets, strategic assets, infrastructure and supportive policy frameworks. Fragmentation and industrial policy can reinforce these advantages by directing investment towards a limited set of partner economies.

For economies outside the leading hubs, the implication is not that entry is impossible, but that credible specialization and connection to established networks are essential. Regional scale, market access, infrastructure and policy consistency become more important when investment decisions are highly concentrated.

In the EAEU, the changing geography of investment is visible, for example, in the investment relationship with China. The


EDB estimates China's FDI stock in EAEU economies at \$31.5 billion across 160 projects by mid-2025, around one and a half times its 2016 level. The Russian Federation and Kazakhstan account for more than 90 per cent of this portfolio. Extractive industries remain the largest component, at \$14.7 billion, or 47 per cent, but manufacturing has also expanded to \$9.8 billion, or 31 per cent. This diversification is significant for the EAEU's position in emerging production networks: investment relations with China increasingly encompass manufacturing, energy, transport and logistics in addition to resource extraction, creating potential opportunities for processing, supplier development and technology-intensive activities.

The EAEU's collective market and connectivity may help individual member States overcome scale constraints, but only if regional production and investment frameworks are sufficiently coherent.



Figure 19.
Industrial policy is increasingly driven by security and geopolitical concerns

Number of policy interventions by country grouping and change in motives



Source: UNCTAD, based on the New Industrial Policy Observatory (IMF/GTA February 2026).

Note: For measures with multiple motives, each motive is given equal weight.

a Developing includes estimates for China, as data for firm-specific from China has not yet been received in the database (estimates include the same number of firm-specific measures from China in 2025 as in 2024)

Industrial policy interventions increased sharply after 2020 in both developed and developing economies. The annual average number of interventions rose by approximately 60 per cent between 2016-2020 and 2021-2025.

Initially, many measures focused on post-pandemic recovery and supply-chain stabilization. They increasingly target sectors linked to economic security, technological leadership and geopolitical competition, particularly in developed economies.

National security and resilience have become more prominent motives alongside competitiveness and climate objectives.

In developing economies, industrial and investment policies remain more strongly focused on industrialization, structural transformation and job creation. The difference in objectives affects both policy design and the type of support governments can justify and sustain.


As EAEU policymakers consider industrial policy directions, experience in markets around the world shows that measures intended to create jobs and productive capacity require different design and evaluation criteria from measures intended primarily to address security risks.






Figure 20.
The subsidy gap between developed and developing economies is widening

Selective subsidies by economic grouping (number)



Selective subsidies by economic grouping (value in millions of dollars)



Source: UNCTAD, based on New Industrial Policy Observatory (NIPO) (IMF/GTA, February 2026).

Note: Only subsidies over \$10 million are recorded in the NIPO database.

The number of selective subsidies in developed and developing economies is broadly comparable, but the financial value differs substantially. The value of subsidies has risen sharply in developed economies while remaining relatively stable or declining in developing economies.

The figures include subsidies above \$10 million and demonstrate the unequal fiscal capacity available for competition in strategic sectors. Large developed economies can support individual firms and projects with packages that are difficult for smaller economies to match.

For developing economies, a direct subsidy race is therefore unlikely to be either sustainable or effective. More focused support can achieve greater impact by addressing infrastructure, skills, standards, finance and administrative bottlenecks around a limited number of priorities.

In the EAEU, industrial policy also has an increasingly important regional dimension. Under the EAEU's Main Directions of Industrial Cooperation, national industrial policies are complemented by mechanisms to promote cross-border production cooperation. Between 2016 and 2023, manufacturing output in the Union increased by 35.6 per cent and the value of cooperative deliveries among member States more than doubled, from \$13.7 billion to \$31.1 billion (EEC, 2025). Since 2024, a new supranational financing mechanism has allowed the EAEU budget to subsidize financing costs for qualifying industrial cooperation projects involving enterprises from at least three member States; the first projects were approved in January 2025. Such mechanisms can help pool limited fiscal resources around cross-border production networks rather than relying exclusively on competing national incentive packages.


Regional coordination can reduce duplication and improve the impact of scarce public resources. Shared infrastructure and common standards may be more effective than competing national subsidy packages.





Figure 21.
Cross-border manufacturing investment outside strategic sectors has fallen by 17 per cent

Value of announced greenfield projects in manufacturing (excluding strategic sectors), by largest investors



Source: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).

Note: Data for 2025 are annualized on the basis of information available as of 30 November. Investors are ordered by their share in total manufacturing investment in 2021-2025, from largest (bottom) to smallest (top).

Announced greenfield investment in manufacturing, excluding the strategic sectors analyzed above, declined by 17 per cent between the 2015-2019 and 2021-2025 periods. The fall points to weaker expansion and renewal of conventional international production networks.

The process is selective rather than uniform. Some economies are benefiting from diversification, relocation and the search for resilient supply chains, while others face project cancellations, downsizing or consolidation. The largest investor economies also show different sectors and destination patterns.

The decline weakens the traditional development pathway followed by many economies based on attracting labor-intensive export manufacturing. Competitiveness increasingly depends on logistics, supplier ecosystems, skills, digital readiness, market access and the ability to fit into reconfigured production networks.

For the EAEU, supply-chain reconfiguration is closely linked to changes in Eurasian transport connectivity. The Union's transport corridors account for about 70 per cent of transit traffic within the EAEU, and the regional integration agenda calls for coordinated investment in transport, logistics and digital infrastructure along international East-West and North-South routes. The EDB's Eurasian Transport Network identifies more than 50,000 km of interconnected corridors linking Asia, Europe and the Middle East (EDB, 2024). The five principal corridors handled about 260 million tons of international freight and 3.6 million containers in 2023, with container traffic more than tripling over the preceding decade. Investment opportunities therefore extend beyond transit infrastructure itself to logistics centers, warehousing, industrial parks, processing activities and other production capacity located around major corridors.

EAEU economies can seek to capture selected relocation and diversification projects, but they will need sector-specific propositions and strong investor aftercare rather than general cost-based promotion.



Five priorities for investment strategy and regional cooperation

In WIR 2026, UNCTAD puts forward five policy priorities for developing economies;

First, strategic prioritization requires member States to identify a limited number of realistic opportunities based on existing assets and capabilities that can be built within a credible timeframe. The objective is to develop investable propositions rather than long lists of priority sectors.

Second, focused industrial policy should remove the bottlenecks surrounding those priorities. This can include infrastructure, skills, technical standards, project preparation, supplier development and access to finance. The report explicitly cautions developing economies against attempting to match the subsidy programs of larger economies.

Third, national-security risks should be managed through targeted, transparent and risk-based mechanisms. Broad sector restrictions may discourage productive investment and create uncertainty, while well-defined review processes can address genuine risks in a more proportionate manner.

Fourth, disruption should be used as an opportunity for strategic repositioning. Investment promotion and investor aftercare can help preserve viable projects, address operational constraints and identify supply-chain opportunities created by relocation and diversification.

Fifth, regional integration should be treated as a development lever. Larger markets, stronger connectivity and deeper regional production networks can improve the attraction of FDI and increase its contribution to development. International cooperation remains important for maintaining transparency, dialogue and predictable conditions for cross-border investment.

The EAEU can compete in a more turbulent investment era by being more focused, more connected and more predictable - combining strategic priorities with disciplined implementation, transparent risk management and regional scale.



Concluding remarks

FDI in the EAEU remains low as a share of global inflows. Nonetheless, recent progress has been encouraging. The EAEU enters the next investment cycle with renewed momentum. FDI inflows rose to \$27.2 billion in 2025, while greenfield investment and international project finance also increased. This provides a constructive foundation for member States to advance investment priorities, strengthen productive capacity and expand the contribution of international investment to sustainable development.

Changes in the global investment landscape create enormous challenges but also selective opportunities for the region. Growing interest in digital infrastructure, critical minerals, energy and selected manufacturing activities offers scope for EAEU economies to build on their capabilities and deepen their participation in international production networks.

Focused investment strategies supported by improvements in infrastructure, workforce skills, project preparation and investor aftercare can help bring promising projects to fruition. Industrial policy that addresses specific development needs, alongside transparent and proportionate approaches to national-security risks, can strengthen investor confidence and provide predictable conditions for long-term investment. Modernizing international investment agreements can further support this progress. Combined with effective investment facilitation, these efforts can contribute to a more supportive and predictable investment environment.

Regional cooperation can amplify the benefits of national initiatives. Better connectivity, larger effective markets and deeper regional production networks can improve the viability of investment projects and broaden their development impact. By combining national strengths with regional cooperation and consistent implementation, EAEU member States can build on the 2025 recovery and work towards sustained investment growth and shared prosperity.



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