



Aid at the crossroads

Trends in official
development assistance



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About UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

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UNCTAD supports developing countries to access the benefits of a globalized economy more fairly and effectively by providing economic and trade analysis, facilitating consensus-building and offering technical assistance to help developing countries use trade, investment, finance and technology for inclusive and sustainable development.

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Introduction

For millions of people, official development assistance (ODA) is both a source of emergency relief and a promise of a better future through education, healthcare, and economic opportunities.

In 2023, ODA remained high but declined in real terms. Between 2022 and 2023, ODA¹—also referred to as aid—increased to \$288 billion at current prices, but decreased by about 1% to \$275 billion in real terms (i.e., at constant 2022 prices).

As such, the global aid target was missed by almost half. While the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17.2² target aims at an ODA contribution of 0.7% of donors' gross national income, in 2023 aid provided by OECD-DAC members reached 0.37%.

For developing countries, ODA remains an important source of financing, but it has declined for the third consecutive year.³ From its peak of \$175 billion in 2020, ODA to developing countries fell to \$160 billion in 2023. As economies grow wealthier, their dependence on concessional finance diminishes in favour of domestic public and private resources. However, in vulnerable economies, where alternative funding is limited, and shocks like natural disasters or war can easily destabilize a country, ODA is crucial to supplement domestic resource mobilization efforts.

ODA has been a relatively stable and predictable source of external financing. Notably, during the COVID-19 pandemic, while other external flows such as foreign direct investment declined, aid to developing countries increased.

However, geopolitical challenges are straining these financial flows, which are vital for the poorest and most fragile economies. New emergencies, some directly affecting donor countries, have shifted priorities and led to increased pressure on aid budgets. In 2023, ODA to developed countries increased further to \$43 billion, while ODA for asylum seekers and refugees in donor countries remained elevated at \$31 billion. Conversely, ODA to Africa declined by almost 7% to \$74 billion, and aid to Latin America and the Caribbean dropped by 15% to \$14 billion.

¹ This report presents evidence based on data retrieved from the Creditor Reporting System maintained by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Please refer to the annex for details on the list of DAC members and the methodology and scope of this document.

² Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target 17.2 contains two ODA-related targets, which reaffirm past commitments. The first target is for developed countries to mobilise 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) in ODA to developing countries, adopted in the UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV, paragraph 43) in 1970. The second target is to mobilise 0.15–0.20% of DAC countries' GNI to least developed countries (LDCs), adopted in the Paris Programme of Action for LDCs in 1990. The SDG Stimulus reaffirms the need to reach these targets to ensure the accomplishment of the 2030 Agenda. ODA figures related to the SDG 17 target are computed based on the grants equivalent approach, following OECD-DAC practice. Please refer to the annex for details.

³ Throughout the report, countries are classified by region and development status according to the UN M49 standard. Figures for developing countries therefore deviate from aggregates computed by the OECD.



Recent donor announcements point toward an unprecedented strain in global aid.

A number of traditional donor countries have announced reductions in their aid budgets, as they struggle to cope with economic and geopolitical challenges and refocus public expenditure or embark on fiscal consolidation.

The Fourth international Conference on Financing for Development represents an opportunity to reaffirm the role of international cooperation in addressing global challenges. We must ensure that ODA continues to flow, mitigating instability and propelling development toward a more equitable, sustainable, and resilient world. We must enhance its effectiveness and the agency of developing countries in international cooperation. We must better support their domestic resource mobilization efforts. In times of unprecedented needs, we cannot afford to lose sight of our collective “[plan of action for people, planet, and prosperity](#)”.



1.

ODA to developing regions declined for the third year in a row.

After a record level in 2022, ODA remained high in 2023 but decreased in real terms. Between 2022 and 2023, global ODA increased by 4% reaching a nominal record of \$288 billion. However, due to accelerating global inflation, this was equivalent to \$275 billion at constant 2022 prices, underpinning a decline of about 1% in real terms.⁴ This implies that the actual purchasing power of aid—and therefore its impact—diminished due to inflation.

⁴ Henceforth, unless otherwise indicated, all data on ODA refer to disbursements in billion US\$ at constant 2022 prices, to allow for comparison across regions and time.


For developing regions, ODA decreased for the third year in a row. From its peak of \$175 billion in 2020, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, ODA to developing regions declined to \$170 billion in 2021, \$163 billion in 2022 and further by 2% to \$160 billion in 2023. By contrast, ODA toward developed countries, notably Ukraine since the start of the war in early 2022, and unspecified recipients⁵ were key drivers for the overall increase in ODA in 2022. In 2023, ODA toward developed countries increased by further 23%, while ODA to “unspecified” recipients declined by 10%.



Figure 1.

Aid remains high but has been declining for developing countries since 2020.

ODA disbursements in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025)

⁵ ODA to “unspecified” recipients can benefit several regions or cannot be assigned to specific recipient countries or regions, such as ODA for refugees in donor countries, infectious disease control, research institutions, or administrative costs.




More than 40% of ODA to “unspecified” recipients concerns spending for asylum seekers and refugees in donor countries. Over the past decade, there have been two significant increases in ODA spending for asylum seekers and refugees in donor countries.⁶ First, in 2016, related ODA reached \$18 billion (37% of ODA to “unspecified” recipients) after one million people—mainly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq—arrived in Europe. It has remained high since then. Second, between 2021 and 2022, ODA for asylum seekers and refugees increased by 154% to \$33 billion (41% of total ODA for “unspecified” recipients) and decreased by only 4% to \$31 billion in 2023.



Figure 2.

Aid for refugees in donor countries remains at unprecedented levels.

ODA disbursements to “unspecified” recipients by purpose in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025)

⁶ Specific expenditures for asylum seekers and recognised refugees in donor countries are considered as a form of humanitarian assistance and thus can be reported as international aid flows for a maximum period of 12 months.



ODA for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean fell by nearly 8 billion dollars.


In 2023, Africa received \$74 billion in ODA, only slightly above Asia and Oceania (\$73 billion), while Latin America and the Caribbean received \$14 billion. However, in 2023, only ODA to Asia and Oceania experienced a rebound from the decline in 2022, growing by \$4.8 billion (+7.1%). In contrast, ODA decreased the fastest for Latin America and the Caribbean by \$2.3 billion (–14.5%), while Africa saw the biggest decrease in absolute terms by \$5.3 billion (–6.8%). The protracted decline in aid to Africa is particularly severe, as the region accounts for the majority of men and women living in extreme poverty, suffering from compounding forms of deprivations.



Figure 3.

Africa sees the biggest decrease in aid.

ODA disbursements toward developing regions in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025)

ODA to LDCs and SIDS increased by more than 2 billion dollars. Neither least developed countries (LDCs) nor small island developing States (SIDS) were spared from the overall decrease in ODA to developing countries in 2022. However, in 2023, ODA to these vulnerable groups rebounded. Aid to LDCs increased by 3.5% to \$65 billion, while for SIDS, it increased by 2.6% to \$5.8 billion. Conversely, ODA to landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) decreased by more than 5.5% to \$32 billion, returning to pre-COVID levels.


Compared to pre-COVID levels, all vulnerable country groups experienced a decline in their share of total ODA. This trend is most evident for LDCs, which used to receive around 30% of total ODA, but accounted for only 23% in 2023. The share of ODA allocated to the SIDS steadily decreased, reaching 2% in 2023, in spite of their heightened vulnerability to climate change, rising sea levels, and extreme weather events.



Figure 4.

In 2023, aid increased for LDCs and SIDS but declined for LLDCs.

ODA disbursements toward developing country groups in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025)

Note: LDCs include Sao Tome and Principe, which graduated from the LDC category in December 2024.





2. What are the ODA trends for developing regions?

The importance of multilateral donors continues to rise, but bilateral donors still account for most of ODA

Only multilateral donors maintained their ODA toward developing countries.

Between 2022 and 2023, ODA to developing regions from members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC⁷) decreased to \$98 billion (-1.6%), and to \$13 billion from non-DAC countries (-8.9%). Overall, ODA from bilateral DAC and non-DAC donors in 2023 was 10% below its peak in 2021, roughly returning to its 2018 level. In contrast, ODA from multilateral donors reached \$49 billion (+0.3%), remaining significantly above pre-pandemic levels. In 2023, the International Development Association (IDA) accounted for almost half of multilateral aid (\$24 billion), followed by the Global Fund (\$5 billion) and the Asian Development Bank (\$3 billion).

⁷ Please refer to the annex for details on the list of DAC members and non-DAC donors considered in the report.






Figure 5.

Decreases in bilateral aid outweigh increases in multilateral aid.

ODA disbursements to developing regions by donor type in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025)

Note: European Union institutions are contained in DAC.

DAC members remain the biggest source of aid to developing countries, but their share continues to decline. In 2023, DAC members accounted for 61% of ODA to developing countries, down from more than 70% a decade ago. All regions experienced a decrease in the share of ODA from bilateral DAC and non-DAC members over the past decade, though to varying degrees. By contrast, the share of ODA from multilateral donors remained stable at around 25% until the COVID-19 pandemic hit. Since then, its importance has increased significantly, especially for Africa, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2023, multilateral donors accounted for 30% of ODA to developing countries.




The European Union accounts for a quarter of total ODA to developing countries.

In 2023, ODA from members of the European Union (EU) amounted to \$28 billion. When combined with \$12 billion disbursed by EU institutions, the EU represented 25% of total ODA to developing countries. It was followed by the United States, with \$27 billion (17%), and Japan, with \$17 billion (10%). Collectively, bilateral aid of the three largest donor economies accounted for more than half (52%) of all aid to developing countries in 2023.⁸



Figure 6.
Europe remains the main bilateral donor.

Calculations based on ODA disbursements toward developing regions in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025)

Note: European Union including DAC and non-DAC bilateral donors and EU institutions.

⁸ Their significance for global aid is even bigger considering their indirect aid through the contributions to multilateral donors. See, e.g. [Multilateral Development Finance 2024](#).

The ODA shift from grants to loans saw a slight reversal in 2023.

Grants represent two-thirds of total ODA to developing countries. The share of ODA grants in total ODA has been continuously falling over the past two decades.⁹ Between 2010 and 2020, ODA grants represented an average of 70% of the total ODA. However, during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the first year of the war in Ukraine, their share dropped below 65%. In 2023, the share of ODA grants partially recovered to 67%, with regional variations: 62% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 64% in Asia and Oceania, and 72% in Africa.


Grants picked up, while loans declined again. The year 2023 showed a slight reversal of what was observed in 2022, when less of the ODA resources took the form of grants while loans increased. The expanding share of loans implied lower levels of concessionality of development assistance and growing risk of unsustainable debt burdens. In 2023, this evolution partly reversed. ODA grants increased again by 2.5% to \$108 billion, while ODA loans decreased by 7.6% to \$52 billion. ODA in the form of equity investment—already minimal—plummeted by 78% to just \$0.3 billion.



Figure 7.

ODA grants have expanded compared to 2022, unlike ODA loans.

ODA disbursements to developing regions by instrument in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025).

⁹ The share of ODA grants peaked in 2006 as a result of the sizeable debt relief granted under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative and the related Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.



However, not every region experienced a return toward grants. Between 2022 and 2023, ODA loans to Asia and Oceania decreased by 2% to \$26 billion, while ODA grants increased by 14% to \$47 billion, resulting in an overall increase in ODA and a growing importance of grants. For Latin America and the Caribbean, however, the decrease in loans, which fell by 33% to \$5.1 billion, was much stronger than the increase in grants, which rose by 5% to \$8.4 billion, resulting in a significant overall decline in ODA in 2023. Strikingly, for Africa, both loans and grants contributed to the overall decline in ODA by more than \$5 billion in 2023. ODA through both instruments declined by 6% each, to \$21 billion and \$53 billion, respectively.



The acute need for crisis responses puts financing for sustainable development under strain

Scarce ODA resources are increasingly strained between cascading crises requiring emergency responses and long-term development priorities. The sectoral and recipient breakdown of ODA flows reflects these inevitable, painful trade-offs. Related challenges have become even more apparent over the last few years, as the SDG investment gap increased from \$2.5 trillion in 2015 to more than \$4 trillion per year in 2023.


Despite a sharp contraction, social infrastructure and services remain by far the largest component of ODA to developing countries. Aid to developing countries for social infrastructure and services totalled \$63 billion in 2023. In real terms, this represents a 7% decrease compared to 2022. It also makes 2023 the third consecutive year of decline since the peak of related aid in 2020. Despite this downward trend, social infrastructure and services continue to account for the largest part of aid flows to developing countries, maintaining a relatively stable share of 39% of the total.



Figure 8.

Social infrastructure represents the bulk of aid, but is in decline.

ODA disbursements to developing countries by purpose in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025)

Note: The sectoral breakdown follows the OECD-DAC classification. "Other" includes ODA used for asylum seekers and refugees in donor countries, administrative costs, and unallocated or unspecified ODA.



Humanitarian aid has been the fastest growing ODA item since 2010 and witnessed another double-digit expansion. After a modest decline in 2022, humanitarian aid to developing countries rebounded strongly in 2023, reaching \$31 billion. This makes humanitarian aid the second-largest component of ODA spending, with a share of close to 20% of the total envelope for developing countries.

ODA for economic infrastructure dropped back to pre-COVID levels, while aid for production sectors saw a moderate increase. Aid for economic infrastructure and services reached \$28 billion in 2023 (roughly the same level as in the 2017-2019 period), thus portending a 7% year-on-year drop. Meanwhile, aid for production sectors rose to roughly \$13 billion (+12% compared to 2022). Taken together, these two key components account for some 25% of total ODA to developing countries, a share that remains marginally lower than in the pre-COVID period.


Despite mounting concerns about debt sustainability, ODA for debt action continued its decline, reaching a historic low in 2023.¹⁰ ODA related to the debt of developing countries decreased from its peak of \$72 billion in 2006, at the height of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, down to a historical low point of a mere \$0.2 billion in 2023. Such a fall is equally visible in relative terms, with aid for debt action accounting for only 0.1% of total aid to developing countries in 2023, down from 5% ten years earlier and as much as 48% in 2006.



Figure 9.

Aid grew sharply for emergency response but fell for health and energy.

ODA disbursements to developing countries by purpose in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD (Jan. 2025)

Note: The sectoral breakdown follows the OECD-DAC classification. Selection of subsectors with strongest growth/decrease in absolute terms between 2022 and 2023, sorted by their 2022 value.

¹⁰ Action relating to debt encompasses a range of ODA purposes such as debt forgiveness, relief of multilateral debt, rescheduling and refinancing, debt for development swap, other debt swap and debt buy-back.




Aid for health and energy sectors experienced significant contractions, while disbursements increased for emergency response and, to a lesser extent, agriculture. At a deeper level of disaggregation, health stands out as the subsector experiencing the largest decline between 2022 and 2023, with a contraction of \$5.1 billion (-27%), in part related to declining aid for COVID-19 control. Aid to developing countries dropped significantly also in relation to general budget support (\$1.9 billion, -19%), banking and financial services (\$1.8 billion, -40%) and the energy sector (\$1.6 billion, -15%).¹¹ At the other end of the spectrum, aid for emergency response expanded by \$3 billion (+12%), by far the largest increase between 2022 and 2023. In addition, aid for agriculture, forestry, and fishing (\$1.2 billion, +16%), transport and storage (\$0.9 billion, +7%) and other multisectoral aid (\$0.8 billion, +14%) also experienced visible year-on-year increases.

Country programmable aid declined more strongly than aid overall.¹² Country programmable aid represents the portion of ODA that is subject to multi-year planning and can be programmed by the donor at the partner country level. Excluding aid categories, such as humanitarian aid or spending for refugees in donor countries, it is aimed at giving a clearer picture of the resources transferred to developing countries for specific projects. Country programmable aid to developing countries contracted from \$125 billion to \$118 billion between 2022 and 2023. This corresponds to a drop of 5%, compared to 2% for total aid. The decrease was particularly severe for Africa (-10%) and Latin America and the Caribbean (-26%). Asia and Oceania stands out as the only developing region witnessing an increase in country programmable aid disbursements (+6%).



Figure 10.
Country programmable aid declined in all developing regions except Asia and Oceania.

Country programmable aid, disbursements to developing regions in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices



Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on OECD Country Programmable Aid (CPA v1) (Jan. 2025)

¹¹ Within the energy sector, energy generation from renewable and non-renewable sources suffered similar declines in international support, with aid contracting by roughly 23 percentage points compared to 2022.

¹² Country Programmable Aid is calculated by subtracting the following categories of aid from the total of gross bilateral ODA: debt relief, humanitarian aid, administrative costs not included elsewhere, scholarships/training in donor countries, imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, refugees in donor country, core support to NGOs, equity investments, and other unallocated spending.



The world's most vulnerable countries have been partly spared from the above developments in 2023. Although, in real terms, total aid to LDCs increased by 3.5% in 2023, this remains below the corresponding levels for 2020 and 2021; moreover, the levels of concessionality have continued to deteriorate, with 28% of ODA being provided in the form of concessional loans (instead of grants), up from 13% in 2010. In terms of sectoral allocation, commodity-related and humanitarian aid saw the largest expansions in LDCs between 2022 and 2023. Social infrastructures and services stand out as the largest aid-sector, but also the one for which aid contracted by 3% in 2023. The only other sector for which ODA to LDCs shrank notably was action against debt, which contracted by 23%.





3. Looking ahead

The aid target of the Sustainable Development Goals remains nearly 50% unmet.

In 2023, ODA by members countries of the DAC accounted for 0.37% of their gross national income (GNI)—roughly the same percentage as in 2022¹³. This compares to the SDG 17.2 aid target of 0.7% of donor countries' GNI, which, if achieved, would have resulted in an additional \$196 billion in ODA at current prices. In 2023, only five DAC countries (Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, Germany and Denmark) achieved the SDG target.

Public announcements suggest that ODA could suffer an unprecedented fall in 2025.

With uncertainties looming large over the global economic outlook, several traditional donor countries have announced reductions in their aid budgets, as they struggle to cope with the lingering effects of recent crises and the need to refocus public expenditure toward other sectors (including military spending) or embark on fiscal consolidation. Based on publicly available information from governments, research institutes, and international media, at the time of writing it is estimated that ODA could shrink by roughly 20% in 2025.¹⁴

¹³ ODA figures relating to SDG target 17.2 are computed based on the grants equivalent approach, following OECD-DAC practice. Please refer to the annex for details


¹⁴ Based on Kinsbergen and Rana (2025), 'Global Trends in Development Cooperation budgets at a glance 2020-2025', published budgets for the years 2023-2025 for EU Institutions, Canada, Poland, U.S. Department of State spokespersons' statements and media reporting.



Although this is an indicative figure, prospects are dire, notwithstanding a few DAC members expected to increase or maintain their contributions. Moreover, ODA has come under growing criticism in both donor and recipient countries, raising deeper questions on its effectiveness, on its alignment to developing countries' priorities, and its pertinence to the development challenges of the 21st century.

Sustainable development needs more resources, and not less. The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development is an opportunity to underscore the role of international cooperation. UNCTAD estimates suggest that the SDG investment gap has increased to more than \$4 trillion per year, up from \$2.5 trillion in 2015, at the time of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa. Against this background, the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development provides an occasion to revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. With only 17% of SDGs targets on track, aid alone cannot be the answer to insufficient progress toward sustainable development. Yet, better leveraging international cooperation remains a necessary step to tackle today's development challenges.





Four priorities stand out in this respect:

- 1** **Recommitting to fulfilling long-standing goals related to aid and additional climate finance flows** could go a long way in rebuilding trust in the multilateral system and mobilizing resources to address competing humanitarian and development priorities.
- 2** **Rethinking aid effectiveness** is critical to provide better value proposition and strengthen the synergies between aid and other financial flows, notably from the private sector, taking into account that not all aid sectors can benefit from blending instruments or private sector interventions.
- 3** **Enhancing the agency of developing countries in international cooperation** remains key to striking a better balance between their long-term sustainable development needs and the interest of development partners.
- 4** **Reforming the international financial architecture to scale-up affordable long-term finance** in developing countries is as important as ever. In light of dwindling aid resources, supporting domestic resource mobilization, curbing illicit financial flows and providing debt relief are key priorities.

Aid is at the crossroads.

**In times of unprecedented needs,
we cannot afford to lose sight of our collective plan of action
for people, planet and prosperity.**



Annex

This report analyses ODA data released in January 2025 in the Creditor Reporting System maintained by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

All ODA data presented refer to gross disbursements, rather than commitments. Figures are presented in US\$ billion at constant 2022 prices, if not explicitly indicated differently, to allow for comparability across regions and time. Countries are classified by region and development status according to the [UN M49 standard](#).

ODA figures follow the OECD-DAC standards in relation to both the definition of ODA and the coverage of development partners reporting their development assistance. Data include ODA flows in the forms of grants, loans and equity investments reported to the OECD-DAC by DAC and non-DAC bilateral and multilateral donors. Hence, many development partners from the Global South that do not report to the OECD-DAC (e.g. China and India) are not covered in the analysis. Since the focus is on ODA flows, the report does not cover private flows nor other official flows.

Unless otherwise specified, in order to have consistent series for at least a decade, the cash flow methodology to compute ODA has been preferred to the [grant equivalent methodology](#), which underpins OECD's headline figures but is only available from 2018. According to the cash flow methodology, ODA refers to flows (i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; (ii) administered with the main objective of promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries; and (iii) concessional in character, with a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%).

DAC members as of December 2024:

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, EU Institutions, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Non-DAC donors:

Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Taiwan Province of China, Croatia, Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates.



