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# COVID-19 and Commodities: Assessing the Impact on Exports from Commonwealth Countries

#### Abstract

This study analyses the salience of commodities in Commonwealth members' merchandise trade and estimates the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic-induced trade disruptions on the commodities exports to five main markets: China, the United States of America European Union (EU-27), the United Kingdom and Australia.

The analysis finds that commodities constitute almost half of Commonwealth countries' global merchandise exports but the share for 35 commodity dependent Commonwealth countries is above 80 per cent. The COVID-19 shock has been perceived as a global negative shock hurting all sectors and all markets. Indeed, the estimates presented in this study indicate that compared to business-as-usual, the commodity exports to these five destination markets are expected to fall by between US\$ 98 and 123 billion in 2020. This represents an export loss of 19 to 24 per cent with respect to benchmark estimates. On aggregate, all destinations are characterised by COVID-19 projections below their respective counterfactual. Exports to the United Kingdom, the lowest hit destination market, are expected to stand at between US\$ 352 and 399 million below a business as usual situation. Exports to the United States market are the largest hit (between US\$ -50 and -41 billion) followed by those to the EU-27 (between US\$ -41 and -33 billion) and China (between US\$ -26 and -18 billion).

The picture arising from a more granular analysis on the exporters side shows relatively strong nuances. The results clearly indicate that for the countries dependent on fuel exports, the recent collapse in oil prices and its detrimental effect on their export earnings has been amplified by the pandemic.

Overall, projections and simulation results would suggest that dependency patterns have at best been maintained because of the pandemic shock. At worst, and especially among highly dependent commodity exporters, the pandemic has further accentuated a fragile macroeconomic situation already under pressure due to heightened price fluctuations in several commodity markets.

Key words: Exports, Commodities, Commonwealth, COVID-19

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## Introduction

Commodity exports constitute a large share of world merchandise trade for many developing and developed countries. In 2019, the share of commodities in the US\$ 18.9 trillion world merchandise trade was about one third. That share was 25 per cent and 30 per cent for developed and developing countries, respectively. The number of Commodity-Dependent Developing Countries (CDDCs), namely countries that derive at least 60 per cent of their merchandise export earnings from primary commodities, stood at 102 out of 189 countries (UNCTAD, 2019).<sup>1</sup> This included 60 per cent the Commonwealth's membership (31 of 54 member countries).

Globally, Commonwealth countries account for one-fifth of commodities exports. However, the share of commodities in the Commonwealth's total merchandise exports is much higher, 45 per cent against the global average of 30 per cent. Moreover, the share of commodities in the merchandise exports for 35 Commonwealth countries is at about 84 per cent.<sup>2</sup> The failure to sufficiently diversify exports beyond primary commodities undermines their resilience and accentuates their vulnerability to external shocks such as COVID-19.

During the last few years, commodity prices have been susceptible to the escalating trade tensions between the world's two largest economies, the United States of America and China. However, the recent COVID-19 shock has brought the commodities exports of several Commonwealth countries to a grinding halt. Demand contraction in main export markets along with supply challenges because of disruptions to logistics networks have adversely affected the exports of these countries. This drop in exports led to a collapse in some commodity prices creating several macroeconomic challenges for commodity dependent economies. The immediate repercussions include reduced fiscal space for overall government expenditure, especially healthcare, sourcing of essential medical and food supplies and providing social safety nets to the most vulnerable.

This study analyses the impact of COVID-19 on commodity exports by Commonwealth countries. It estimates the value of lost exports resulting from the Coronavirus outbreak and explores the variation of the impact across countries, regions and commodity type. Besides focusing on the impact of pandemic-induced trade disruptions, it also examines the importance of commodities in the merchandise exports of Commonwealth countries, including historical patterns and structure of commodities exports, and export market concentration.

This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the data and estimation approach. Section 3 examines the salience of commodities trade for Commonwealth countries along with the structure, composition and direction of exports, including long-term trade patterns. Section 4 explores the impact of the COVID-19 shock and Section 5 concludes with a summary of the findings.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2439

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Commonwealth secretariat computations based on UNCTADStats data for the 2013-2018 period.

# 1. Data, descriptive statistics and estimation methodology

#### Data

The study uses data from UNCTADstat and the International Trade Centre (ITC). We retrieve aggregate information on broader categories of commodities exports from 54 Commonwealth members at a bilateral level from UNCTADstat and use it to generate descriptive statistics on the structure, composition and historical trend of commodities exports from member countries. We employ the ITC dataset for the product level analysis for the recent period after the onset of COVID-19. The projections and simulations are based on monthly trade flow data from the ITC. Use of these two sources enables us to expand the breadth and depth of the analysis and examine commodity trade of Commonwealth countries from multiple macro and micro dimensions.

Category	Group	HS codes (4/6 digits)
	Dairy	0401-0403, 0409
	Edible oils	1507-1515
	Fisheries products	0302-0308
Food itomo	Fruits & Nuts	0801-0810, 0813
Food items	Meat	0201-0210, 0504
	Salt	2501
	Sugars	1701, 1703
	Grains	1001-1008, 1101-1104, 1201, 0701, 0713, 0714
	Cotton	5201
	Paper pulp	4701-4706
Agricultural	Rubber	4001, 4002
producto	Wood	4403, 4407
	Wool	5101
	Crude oil	2709
Fuels	Refined oil	2710
Fuels	Natural gases	271111, 271121
	Coal & Lignite	2701, 2702
	Ores	2601, 2603, 2606
Ores and	Ores products	7208-7229, 7301-7307, 7402-7412, 7601-7612
Minerals	Diamonds	7102
	Fertilizers	2827, 2834, 3101-3105

Table 1: Commodity groups used for projections and simulation exercise

Note: HS product groups are based on Chinese customs groups definition.

Data for January-February imports by China have been downloaded from the Chinese customs website. As trade information refers to the January and February months taken together, monthly flows available for other countries and the rest of the years under consideration have been transformed into bi-monthly aggregates to preserve overall coherence. This implies that each year includes six two-month periods. Projections and simulations exercises are run at the 6-digit level of the HS classification in its 2012

version. Included products correspond to those for which Chinese customs released information for the January-February period. Results are presented at a more aggregated level and follow product groups and categories defined in Table 1.

The HS 6-digit level detailed information on commodity imports is available for 52 Commonwealth members<sup>3</sup> at a bilateral level except for imports by China in the January-February period. In the latter case, variations observed at the aggregate level were applied to all bilateral trade relationships.

While exploring the impact of COVID-19 on all Commonwealth countries, we specifically investigate the implications for 35 Commodity Dependent Commonwealth Countries (CDCWCs) that have more than 50 per cent share of commodities in their merchandise exports (Table 6). As discussed earlier, commodities constitute around 84 per cent of the merchandise exports of these economies. Overall, these 35 countries account for around two-thirds of the Commonwealth's membership and about a half of the Commonwealth's commodities exports. We mainly focus on exports to five large markets, namely the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Australia and the EU-27. These five markets absorb more than half of Commonwealth countries' global commodities exports (see Section 3.2 for details).

#### Methodological approach<sup>4</sup>

The study uses a parsimonious computational approach based exclusively on trade flow information. This technique provides a more specialized analysis of up-to-date and disaggregated information. The computational exercise involves comparing potential commodities exports scenarios reflecting the shock imposed by the Coronavirus with an historical business-as usual trend. To construct the baseline, we assume that, in the absence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the commodity exports could have followed the historical growth pattern. We establish this benchmark with bi-monthly trade data for the past three years (2017-19) as discussed above.

Although the nature of the exercise is essentially in line with partial equilibrium estimations, using realized values to define shock-related variations may also encompass some general equilibrium effects. A proper general equilibrium approach would require inter alia information about input-output linkages and would have to rely on a large set of ad-hoc assumptions as, for instance, in the case of simulations. Moreover, shocks would reflect in the first place, variations in production/gross domestic product (GDP) to be translated into import demand shocks via estimated elasticity parameters.

Two shock scenarios reflecting the possible impact of the COVID-19 health crisis with respect to the benchmark set of projections are identified. In both cases, deviation levels from the baseline are defined using import information observed during the first three bi-monthly period (January-February, March-April and May-June) of 2020 for China and during the second and third bi-monthly (March-April and May-June) period for the other destination markets, namely the United States, the EU-27, the United Kingdom and Australia. These COVID-19 scenarios are consistent with the fact that the wave of contamination impacted Eastern Asia in the first place and then gradually propagated towards Europe and North America.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> No information for Tuvalu and Nauru could be retrieved from imports data for the year 2020. This could indicate an absence of exports from these two members to the five destinations included in the study

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Fugazza (2020) for a detailed presentation of the approach and discussion.

In scenario 1, deviations from baseline levels are extended until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations. In scenario 2, deviations from baseline levels are extended until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations. The second scenario aims at capturing the potentially depressing effects of the second wave of restrictive sanitary measures implemented during the second half of October 2020 in several European countries. At the end of the impact period, convergence with the benchmark scenario is imposed in both scenarios until the end of the calendar year.

#### Limitations of the study

To construct the baseline, the study assumes that in the absence of the COVID-19 pandemic, commodity exports could have followed the historical growth pattern. It is further postulated that, hopefully, the COVID-19 induced production and trade disruptions would be over by these cut off dates and commodity exports could return to their normal trajectory.

Alongside these implicit modelling assumptions, two limitations of the analysis need to be kept in view of interpreting the results. First, the analysis is based on values rather than volumes as product aggregation becomes complicated due to differences in units of weight across products within the same commodity group. A major limitation while working with values only is the impossibility to disentangle price effects and quantity effects driven by either changing demand and/or supply conditions. A major consequence could be the smoothing out of simulated future variations in import values. It can also be argued that focusing on values scenarios makes the simulation exercise less exposed to extraordinary quantity variations due to unexpected decisions or market behavior. Despite the limitation, the approach serves the primary objective i.e. understanding short-term trends in exports of major commodities groups.

Second, the deviations from projected baseline import values may not be exclusively associated with the outbreak of the pandemic as several other factors might have exacerbated this decline. For instance, the Sino-American trade conflict is certainly affecting commodity prices. The commodity trade follows the twists and turns of political developments. The imposition of tariffs by the United States on Chinese imports and retaliation by China had dampened demand, causing prices to fall with some impact on trade values overall. Nevertheless, the pandemic shock has proved to be predominant, with severe disruptions going far beyond the expected consequences of the trade conflict between two large markets.

# 2. The state of the Commonwealth's commodities exports

Globally, approximately 20 per cent of commodities originate from Commonwealth countries and this share has been quite stable over time (see Table A1 for details). However, as a share of merchandise exports, Commonwealth countries have a higher dependence on commodities than the world average, at about 45 per cent compared to 29 per cent. This distribution varies widely across countries and regions.

#### Share of commodities in merchandise exports

Contrary to commonly held views about the predominance of commodities in developing countries exports, Figure 1 (panel A) shows that six developed

Commonwealth countries have a larger share of commodities in their merchandise exports (51 per cent) than 48 developing member countries (40 per cent). The relatively higher proportion of commodities in merchandise exports of New Zealand (79 per cent), Australia (71 per cent) and Canada (48 per cent) drives this effect. Panel B further indicates that reliance on commodity exports varies across developing countries with Pacific members at 97 per cent followed by African (79 per cent) and Caribbean members (58 per cent).

Overall, 35 Commonwealth member countries are highly dependent on commodities exports with a share of commodities in merchandise exports above 84 per cent.<sup>5</sup> The share varies from 55 per cent for Grenada to above 98 per cent for Solomon Islands (Table 2). The high level of reliance on commodity export earnings makes these economies extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations in international markets. Of these 35 CDCWCs, two are developed economies — Australia and New Zealand — with shares of commodities at 71 per cent and 79 per cent respectively, while the remaining 33 CDCWCs are developing, of which 16 are located in Africa, two in Asia, eight in the Pacific and seven in the Caribbean.



Figure 1: Significance of commodities in merchandise exports (per cent, 2018)

<sup>5</sup> These CDCWCs have more than 50 per cent share of commodities in their merchandise exports.

(a) Commonwealth regions/groups





Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat

Note: The chart presents commodities share in merchandise exports. CDCWCs have more than 50 per cent share of commodities in their merchandise exports.

#### Main export destinations

The five largest export destinations for commodities are China, United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom and Australia. These five markets combined absorb more than half of Commonwealth countries' global commodities exports. China is the largest export destination accounting for 19 per cent, followed by the United States (17 per cent) and the European Union (13 per cent). The share of commodities destined to the United Kingdom and Australia are relatively small, 3 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively (Figure 2, panel A).

The share of Commonwealth countries in the global commodity imports of these five main markets varies greatly, ranging from around 42 per cent for Australia and 40 per cent for the United States, to 25 per cent for China and 11 per cent for the European Union (Figure 2, panel B). This relatively large dependence puts the export earnings at high risk due to the collapse in import demand in any of these countries.

la	bie 2: Commo	alty export	is of Com	monw	eaith col	intries ir	1 2018 (U	isş, milli	on)	
	Region/ Economy	World E	xports (US\$	6 M)	Share of	commodit	y exports t	to key des	tinations	
		Merchandise exports	Commodity exports	Share (%)	Australia	China	United Kingdom	United States	EU-27	ROW
		1	2	3 (col 2/1)	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Australia	252 776	178 930	70.8	-	40.1	1.4	2.0	3.3	53.2
þ	Canada	450 278	214 830	47.7	0.1	7.6	4.8	67.4	4.7	15.3
do	Cyprus	5 065	1 689	33.3	1.0	1.1	8.9	0.7	15.0	73.3
svel	Malta	3 012	1 250	41.5	0.0	0.2	0.9	0.2	25.9	72.7
ă	New Zealand	39 839	31 446	78.9	13.0	28.0	2.7	8.5	6.4	41.5
	United Kingdom	487 069	130 298	26.8	0.6	10.1	-	6.4	-	82.9

	Region/ Economy	World Ex	kports (US\$	5 M)	Share of	commodit	y exports t	to key des	tinations	
		Merchandise exports	Commodity exports	Share (%)	Australia	China	United Kingdom	United States	EU-27	ROW
		1	2	3 (col 2/1)	4	5	6	7	8	q
		•	2				0		0	0
	Botswana	6 573	6 141	93.4	0.0	0.1	0.9	5.4	24.9	68.7
	Cameroon	3 838	3 575	93.2	0.0	19.5	1.0	3.4	44.2	31.9
	Eswatini	1 838	543	29.5	0.4	-	3.4	1.7	9.2	85.4
	Gambia,The	102	92	90.0	-	46.4	1.9	0.2	4.9	46.6
	Ghana	14 868	14 319	96.3	0.0	14.5	3.2	3.6	20.0	58.6
	Kenya	6 050	4 306	71.2	0.6	2.4	8.8	3.0	21.2	64.0
	Lesotho	1 175	528	44.9	0.0	1.8	0.1	5.4	57.8	34.9
	Malawi	1 046	957	91.5	0.1	4.1	3.9	6.2	38.4	47.3
_	Mauritius	2 372	869	36.6	0.4	3.3	11.0	9.4	43.1	32.8
rice	Mozambique	5 196	4 970	95.7	0.1	8.4	1.9	1.7	33.5	54.5
Ą	Namibia	5 395	4 207	78.0	0.9	17.0	1.8	2.1	29.8	48.4
	Nigeria	62 400	60 524	97.0	0.7	3.4	4.3	8.1	32.2	51.2
	Rwanda	1 126	1 015	90.2	0.1	3.7	1.3	5.3	5.8	83.7
	Seychelles	569	409	71.9	2.5	0.1	14.2	0.6	40.2	42.3
	Sierra Leone	554	401	72.4	0.3	21.7	0.4	3.0	42.2	32.3
	South Africa	93 570	53 590	57.3	0.3	13.7	5.8	6.8	12.4	61.0
	Onited Republic	3 669	2 387	65.0	0.1	3.9	0.3	0.8	10.9	83.9
	Uganda	3 087	2 613	84.7	0.1	0.7	0.4	1.5	17.5	80.0
	Zambia	9 052	7 760	85.7	0.0	28.4	1.1	1.2	3.5	65.7
	Bangladesh	38 471	1 825	4.7	0.4	9.2	6.2	3.3	22.5	58.4
	Brunei	6 574	6 046	92.0	9.6	2.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	87.6
	India	322 492	125 236	38.8	1.0	6.2	1.3	13.7	10.4	67.5
ia.	Malaysia	247 324	76 826	31.1	6.2	15.1	0.2	2.1	5.4	71.0
As	Maldives	339	329	97.0	0.2	0.8	5.7	7.1	20.6	65.8
	Pakistan	23 631	6 089	25.8	1.3	9.6	2.7	2.5	7.1	76.9
	Singapore	411 743	95 883	23.3	8.3	10.6	0.2	5.1	2.9	72.9
	Sri Lanka	12 288	3 789	30.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	7.0	15.7	72.0
	Antigua and	07	47	10.0	5.4		0.0	0.1	1.0	07.0
	Barbuda	8/	17	19.2	5.4	0.0	0.2	2.1	4.9	87.3
	Danamas Barbados	000	200	39.7	0.2	1.1	0.1	27.4	0.0	60.4
	Baliza	430	31/	69.6	0.4	2.2	2.2	24.3	17.2	33.5
	Dominica	432	5	24.7			10.4	20.4	34.5	52.7
_	Grenada	31	17	55.3	0.1	0.0	0.2	20.2	81	71.2
ear	Guvana	1 487	1 292	86.8	0.0	1.7	2.8	15.7	13.8	66.0
ibb	Jamaica	1 879	1 658	88.3	0.1	1.4	2.7	39.9	18.5	37.3
Cai	Saint Kitts and									
	Nevis	54	5	8.4	0.1	-	0.1	15.6	5.5	78.7
	Saint Lucia	133	91	68.4	0.0	0.1	9.5	6.0	1.3	83.0
	Saint Vincent									
	and the Grenadines	44	25	56 7	0.0	0.0	17	2.0	0.4	95.9
	Trinidad and		20	00.1	0.0	0.0		2.0	0.1	00.0
L	Tobago	9 997	5 939	59.4	0.0	0.9	0.6	21.2	6.6	70.6
	Fiji	1 041	812	78.0	9.8	6.1	0.9	27.5	4.2	51.6
fic	Kiribati	13	13	97.5	0.0	0.1	-	1.7	-	98.2
aci	Nauru	16	6	35.2	27.8	-	-	0.2	-	72.0
۵.	Papua New									
	Guinea	10 041	9 652	96.1	28.3	19.6	1.5	1.0	9.8	39.8

Region/ Economy	World E	xports (US\$	5 M)	Share of	commodit	ty exports t	to key des	tinations	
	Merchandise exports	Commodity exports	Share (%)	Australia	China	United Kingdom	United States	EU-27	ROW
	1	2	3 (col 2/1)	4	5	6	7	8	9
Samoa	46	34	74.6	5.4	1.1	0.2	9.2	0.7	83.5
Solomon Islands	569	559	98.3	0.9	69.6	1.2	0.4	8.2	19.6
Tonga	15	11	73.9	13.3	0.5	0.3	21.0	0.4	64.4
Tuvalu	0	0	61.0	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	99.9
Vanuatu	55	46	83.3	10.3	3.5	1.5	12.3	3.4	68.9

Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat.

Note: Commodity dependent countries with more than 50 per cent share of commodities in merchandise exports are highlighted in blue.

China is the largest destination for developed country members, accounting for 40 per cent of total commodities exports from Australia and around one-third of food exports from New Zealand. The Chinese economy's deceleration over the last several years can also affect the value of commodity exports being sourced from these countries (Ehsan and Ali, 2019).

Figure 2: Large markets for Commonwealth's commodities exports





B: Market share of Commonwealth countries in 2018



Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat

	uity Exports			2010 (033, 111110	···)
		Dep	endence level of c	ommodity exports	s (%)
Export market	Year	N	umber of CDCW, b	y Dependence Lev	/el
		>10	>10=<25	>25=<50	>=50
	2015	18	8	9	-
	2016	19	6	10	-
	2017	17	10	7	1
EU-27	2018	18	10	7	-
	2015	30	4	1	-
	2016	31	3	1	-
	2017	29	5	1	-
Australia	2018	31	3	1	-
	2015	25	5	4	1
	2016	26	5	3	1
	2017	25	4	5	1
China	2018	24	6	4	1
	2015	30	4	1	-
	2016	33	2	-	-
	2017	32	2	1	-
United Kingdom	2018	33	1	1	-
	2015	25	7	3	-
	2016	26	5	4	-
	2017	28	6	1	-
United States	2018	27	6	2	-

Т	a	b	I	8	B	H	H	D)	î	î	1	D	d	Ħ	ī	1	e	)	(	0	۵	ľ	t	S	D	f	F	ſ	î	1	î	1	0	ľ	١	Λ	T	2	I	l	1	G	1		n	T	T	e.	S	H	1	2	I	ſ	F	В	U	S	S	ľ	n	Η	Ш	D	lï	Y	

Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat

Overall export market concentration is very high for several Commonwealth countries (Table 3). Seven Commonwealth countries depend on the EU-27 for 25 to 50 per cent of their commodities exports, while four (Australia, New Zealand, The Gambia and Zambia) have a similar level of dependence on China and two members (Jamaica and Fiji) on the United States. This pattern has largely remained consistent over the last four years (Table A2).

Commodities exports from Seychelles and Solomon Islands are very concentrated in a few destinations: Seychelles has more than 50 per cent dependence on the EU-27 while Solomon Islands has more than 50 per cent dependence on China. Interestingly, no country has more than 50 per cent dependence on the United States, United Kingdom and Australia.

#### Structure of commodities exports

Commonwealth countries export commodities ranging from food products to mineral ores, metals and fuels. Fuels are the largest exported item constituting around 42 per cent of all commodities. This is followed by mineral ores (36 per cent) and agri-food products (22 per cent) (Figure 3).



Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat.

Note: The chart uses UNCTAD's classification to group all commodities in these broader groups: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Classifications/DimCommodityProducts\_Commodities\_Hierarchy.pdf.

Asian and African members have large shares of fuels (49 per cent and 45 per cent, respectively) in their commodities exports while the Pacific members have a large share of mineral ores (47 per cent). Fuels make up the largest commodity export of Caribbean members (Figure 4).



Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat.

The overall composition of commodities exports from the 35 CDCWCs share a similar pattern except with a large share of mineral ores and metals (42 per cent) and a slightly lower share of fuels (37 per cent). Among developed CDCWCs, Australia exports mineral ores while food items are the largest exported commodity from New Zealand. The structure of exports from developing CDCWCs contrasts with their developed counterparts. African CDCWCs largely export mineral fuels and lubricants (46 per cent) followed by food items (15 per cent). For Asian CDCWCs (Brunei and Maldives), mineral fuel is the single most predominant category, accounting for more than 95 per cent of their commodities exports. The composition of commodities exports from the Pacific and Caribbean CDCWCs is very similar to that of African members, with a large share of mineral fuels followed by food items.

While other large Commonwealth countries (i.e. Canada, India, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom) also export substantial amounts of commodities in value terms, the share of commodities in their merchandise trade is, on average, less than 50 per cent, varying from 25 per cent for the United Kingdom to 47 per cent for Canada. Commodity exports from these countries are mainly concentrated in fuels and mineral ores with relatively smaller shares of agricultural and food products (Table 4).

Note: The figures in the chart represent the per centage share of each commodity group in total commodities exports.

Table 4: Commodities expo	rts by	large	Comm	onwe	alth co	ountrie	<b>es in 2</b>	018 (U	IS\$ billio	n)
Commodity	Can	ada	Inc	dia	Mala	aysia	Singa	apore	United K	Kingdom
	Value	Share	Value	Share	Value	Share	Value	Share	Value	Share
All primary commodities	215	100	125	100	77	100	96	100	130	100
of which										
Agricultural products	43	20.2	33	26.1	23	29.4	14	14.2	31	23.7
Fuels	99	46.2	49	38.8	39	50.1	62	65.2	44	33.6
Minerals, ores and metals	72	33.6	44	35.1	16	20.5	20	20.7	56	42.7

Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat

Note: The share indicates the fraction of commodities in country's total commodity exports.

#### Historical trends

The commodity exports of Commonwealth countries increased steadily between 2000 and 2008 but have been very volatile in more recent years (Figure 5). All commodities experienced a mini peak in 2008, a year before the global financial crisis (GFC), and a V-shaped recovery following the GFC, reaching all-time high in 2011. This was most likely the beginning of the commodity-led growth boom in Africa largely due to the expansion of demand in China. The later years witnessed another sharp deceleration and a steep fall in 2016, followed by a modest recovery in 2017-18 before the onset of Coronavirus-induced collapse.

The fluctuation has largely been uneven across commodity groups, with the largest variations observed in fuels and the smallest in food commodities. Exports of food items are relatively less susceptible to economic shocks due to the predominance of staple food in these commodity groups (around 70-80 per cent), of which consumption is inelastic. By contrast, fuel prices are volatile as they largely reflect manoeuvring by large oil suppliers (both OPEC and non-OPEC exporters) and the performance of the United States' shale sector, in addition to demand and supply fundamentals.<sup>6</sup> At the start of the recent pandemic, fuel prices experienced the largest decline, mainly due to decimation of oil demand and partly due to a conflict between large oil producers, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.

<sup>6</sup> https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/the-2008-oil-price-shock-markets-ormayhem/





Figure 6: Variation in the share of various commodities between 2000 and 201

Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat

Note: The figures in the chart represent per centage point changes in the share of each commodity type in the respective region's total merchandise exports. Figures in parentheses represent negative changes.



Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat

Note 1: Country names acronyms following the ISO country code are used expcetionnally for expositional purposes. Correspondances with full length country names are available at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search.

Note 2: The data points below the 45-degree line indicate a drop in commodities share in total merchandise exports in 2018 compared to that in 2000, while the data points above the 45-degree line indicate an increase in the share in 2018.

#### Shift in commodities share over time

Over time, a moderate shift can be observed in the share of various commodity groups in different Commonwealth regions but unfortunately most of these countries have not weaned away from commodities (Figure 6). The exports of mineral ores from African countries have expanded while those of fuels have dropped. The exports of fuels have increased from Pacific countries while those of food products have decreased. The exports of agricultural and food products have dropped from all Commonwealth regions.

Unfortunately, rather than diversifying production structures during the last two decades, the dependence on commodity exports has increased for 25 Commonwealth members (Figure 7). The largest increase occurred for Maldives (from 30 per cent to 97 per cent),<sup>7</sup> followed by Sierra Leone (from 21 per cent to 72 per cent). These 25 countries include 15 CDCWCs (Figure 7), of which the largest increase occurred for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Maldives exports fish (65.9% of total exports), meat/seafood preparations (15.5%) and mineral fuels including oil (12.7%).

Samoa (from 27 per cent to 74 per cent), Vanuatu (38 to 84) and Tuvalu (29 to 61). In the same period, 12 countries diversified their exports to some extent and made some progress in reducing their dependence on commodities, with the largest shift occurring in Nauru (from 87 per cent to 35 per cent) and Antigua and Barbuda (from 67 per cent to 19 per cent). These 12 countries include six CDCWCs that reduced reliance on commodities – notably Seychelles (22 per cent), United Republic of Tanzania (22 per cent) and Belize (13 per cent). For the remaining 17 member countries (including nine CDCWCs), the share of commodities has remained steady (less than 5 per cent variation in the last two decades), indicating the lack of structural transformation and continued vulnerability of these economies.

# 3. Simulation results

Projections and simulation results will provide a first sense of the possible evolution of Commonwealth members' commodities exports in the short and medium term. They can be used to infer how the stringency of the commodity dependence constraint has been affected by the COVID-19 shock. We first present and discuss aggregate effects obtained in our two scenarios and then show sectoral effects. Country-level effects are also discussed to identify potential winners and losers from the crisis. As mentioned previously, the interpretation of the below results requires some caution. As we are unable to disentangle demand from supply effects of the pandemic, or even speculative behavior on international commodities markets, a precise understanding of the mechanisms characterizing some specific simulation outcome would require some additional investigation and possibly the inclusion of prices information.

#### Aggregate effects

Total imports from the retained import markets are expected to fall by between US\$ 98 and 123 billion as compared to the projections for the year 2020 based on a businessas-usual scenario. This represents a loss of 19 to 24 per cent with respect to these benchmark projections. As represented in Figure 8, total commodities exports to Australia are expected to be lower by between US\$ 5 to 6 billion as compared to business-as-usual projections. Export losses for the Chinese market could fall by between US\$ 18 and 26 billion, those for the EU-27 market by between US\$ 33 and 41 billion and those for the United States market by between US\$ 41 and 50 billion. The largest drop in relative terms is found for the Australian market with a loss potentially reaching 43 per cent with respect to benchmark projections if the case scenario 2 applies (for details, see Section 2.2 above). The smallest drop both in absolute and relative terms is observed for the United Kingdom market with forgone export revenues varying between US\$ 352 and 399 million, representing respectively a drop of 4 to 5 per cent compared to benchmark projections.

Table 5 reports import values obtained with benchmark projections (column 3) and in the two COVID-19 scenarios (columns 4 and 5) for each destination market and by category of products for exports from all Commonwealth countries. Differences between levels reached in each scenario and benchmark projections are also shown both in absolute and relative terms for scenario 1 (columns 6 and 7) and scenario 2 (columns 8 and 9), respectively. Note that positive differences across scenarios do not necessarily reflect positive annual growth rates as can be seen in Table A5. A positive difference could in fact correspond to a smaller drop in imports in COVID-19 scenarios than in the benchmark scenario. Results reported in Table 5 show that except for exports of food and raw agricultural directed to the United Kingdom, all difference

figures are negative. This indicates that import demand shocks due to COVID-19 in the five destination markets considered here have been negative for most products in all categories. The United Kingdom case for food products does not necessarily reflect an overall positive demand shock but also some substitution mechanism in sourcing as discussed below. The export of fuels experienced the largest drop, followed by mineral ores (Figure 9). Australian, EU-27 and the United States imports of fuels are expected to be respectively 49, 40 and 37 per cent lower in the worst scenario than in a situation without COVID-19. The corresponding figure is about 27 per cent for food products imported by China, and about one fourth for ores and minerals imported by the EU-27 countries and the United States. Imports of ores and minerals form the United Kingdom are also expected to fall significantly by more than one third in the worst scenario. Overall, exports to the United States market are the hardest hit, followed by those to the EU-27 and China (Figure 8).





Note: The chart indicates the aggregate value of export losses across all commodities in each of the five destinations. Bar numbers refer to deviations from baseline levels. The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset



Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset

Note: The chart indicates the aggregate value of export losses across all five destinations. Bars numbers refer to deviations from baseline levels. The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

		<b>F</b> atim			Differen	ce fror	n benchr	nark
Importer	Category	Estin	lated value	es	Scenar	io 1	Scena	rio 2
importer	Oalegory	Benchmark	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Australia	Food products	1 013	906	845	-107	-11	-168	-17
	Agricultural products	148	127	123	-20	-14	-25	-17
	Fuels	11 807	7 045	6 017	-4 762	-40	-5 790	-49
	Ores and mineral	996	964	926	-32	-3	-70	-7
	Total	13 964	9 042	7 911	-4 921	-35	-6 052	-43
China	Food products	32 555	25 842	23 695	-6 712	-21	-8 859	-27
	Agricultural products	12 241	11 923	11 740	-318	-3	-500	-4
	Fuels	55 769	51 857	48 187	-3 912	-7	-7 583	-14
	Ores and mineral	97 026	89 896	88 290	-7 130	-7	-8 736	-9
	Total	197 591	179 518	171 912	-18 072	-9	-25 678	-13
EU-27	Food products	22 131	18 081	17 792	-4 050	-18	-4 338	-20
	Agricultural products	1 643	1 608	1 605	-35	-2	-38	-2
	Fuels	76 662	51 669	45 798	-24 993	-33	-30 864	-40
	Ores and mineral	22 848	18 412	17 415	-4 436	-19	-5 433	-24

#### Table 5: Simulation results, by products and destination market (US\$, million)

		Eatim			Differen	ce fror	n benchr	nark
Importer	Category	Esum		es	Scenar	io 1	Scena	rio 2
importer	outegory	Benchmark	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Total	12 3284	89 770	82 610	-33 514	-27	-40 673	-33
United	Food products	2 644	2 880	3 365	236	9	721	27
Kingdom	Agricultural products	135	133	133	-2	-1	-2	-2
	Fuels	3 994	3 796	3 574	-198	-5	-420	-11
	Ores and mineral	1 919	1 531	1 221	-388	-20	-698	-36
	Total	8 692	8 340	8 293	-352	-4	-399	-5
United	Food products	20 262	18 587	18 213	-1 674	-8	-2 048	-10
States	Agricultural products	7 052	6 672	6 584	-381	-5	-468	-7
	Fuels	106 421	74 352	67 493	-32 069	-30	-38 928	-37
	Ores and mineral	32 683	25 597	24 254	-7 086	-22	-8 429	-26
	Total	166 418	125 208	116 544	-41 210	-25	-49 874	-30

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset

Note: Trade values are in US\$ million. A detailed definition of each product category is provided in Table 1. The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

Table 6 shows aggregate results obtained across destinations for each country group. It also splits the estimates for commodity dependent and non-commodity dependent Commonwealth member countries. Projections of imports are negative in most cases. However, some exceptions can be identified. For instance, exports of commodity dependent developed Commonwealth countries to the EU-27 market could outpace baseline projections by up to US\$343 million in scenario 1 driven by food and agricultural products. Exports of Asian commodity dependent developing Commonwealth countries to the Chinese market may increase by up to US\$81 million in scenario 1 driven by exports of natural gases from Brunei Darussalam. Exports of Caribbean commodity dependent developing Commonwealth countries to the United States are projected to fall in scenario 2 by up to US\$326 million. The latter number is essentially the consequence of a drop in exports of refined oil from Trinidad and Tobago.

Amongst commodity dependent Commonwealth countries, the largest decrease in absolute terms is obtained for exports from African members directed to the EU-27 market. The largest negative COVID shock in that market is faced by Nigeria in its exports of crude and refined oil which are expected to stand at US\$ 13.7 to 16.7 billion below reference projections. As to Commonwealth members that are not commodity dependent, the largest loss is projected for exports from developed members to the United States market. These results are driven to a large extent by the projected trajectory of exports of crude and refined oil from Canada and from the United Kingdom. In relative terms, the largest drop amongst all Commonwealth member countries pertains to exports from the Pacific developing country group to Australia. This effect is dominated by the collapse in exports of crude oil from Papua New Guinea relative to benchmark projections.

			Es	stimated value	es	Differen	nce fro	m benchm	ark
E	Exporters	Importers				Scenar	io 1	Scenar	io 2
	Developed		Benchmark	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%
	Developed	Australia	1 184	996	938	-188	-16	-246	-21
		China	115 814	112 866	112 078	-2 948	-3	-3 737	-3
		EU-27	5 241	5 585	5 543	343	7	302	6
		United Kingdom	603	598	576	-5	-1	-27	-4
	Africa	United States	5 753	5 766	5 707	13	0	-46	-1
	Africa	Australia	521	329	196	-193	-37	-325	-62
		China	21 053	18 537	18 153	-2 516	-12	-2 900	-14
lent		EU-27	41 691	29 003	26 511	-12 688	-30	-15 180	-36
enc		United Kingdom	3 314	4 061	3 995	747	23	681	21
dep		United States	5 241	4 149	3 897	-1 092	-21	-1 345	-26
dity	Asia	Australia	298	137	72	-161	-54	-226	-76
ŏu		China	99	180	130	81	82	31	32
шö		EU-27	50	36	32	-14	-28	-18	-35
tho		United Kingdom	2.6	1.5	1.3	-1.1	-43	-1.3	-53
vea		United States	18	11	9	-7	-39	-10	-53
Nuo	Caribbean	Australia	0.36	0.61	0.52	0.26	72	0.16	44
un m		China	140	57	24	-83	-59	-116	-83
ပိ		EU-27	2 580	1 432	1 081	-1 148	-45	-1 499	-58
		United Kingdom	253	257	216	3	1	-38	-15
		United States	1 743	1 560	1 417	-183	-11	-326	-19
	Pacific	Australia	321	51	52	-270	-84	-269	-84
		China	2 182	2 126	1 906	-56	-3	-276	-13
		EU-27	341	447	447	106	31	106	31
		United Kingdom	60	90	92	30	51	32	54
		United States	36	22	18	-14	-39	-18	-49
Л	.c	Australia	358	360	347	2	1	-11	-3
odit	ealtl	China	20 263	18 310	17 659	-1 953	-10	-2 604	-13
u u	bed	EU-27	47 077	39 155	37 206	-7 923	-17	-9 871	-21
<u>ب</u> -د	omn	United Kingdom	2 052	1 505	1 766	-547	-27	-286	-14
non Ider	Con	United States	132 637	101 095	94 049	-31 543	-24	-38 588	-29
lith per		Australia	9 883	7 556	6 957	-2 326	-24	-2 926	-30
wea	alth	China	32 409	24 587	22 911	-7 822	-24	-9 498	-29
non	nwe ing	FU-27	19 204	13 596	12 148	-5 608	-29	-7 056	-37
umo	om	United Kingdom	2 533	2 022	1 835	-511	-20	-699	-28
ŏ	Som	United States	19 474	13 340	12 186	-6 134	-32	-7 288	-37
	Non-	Australia	22 181	18 870	17 073	-3 311	_15	-4207	_10
Con	nmonwealth	China	EEE 200	10 070	17 513	62 0/5	-13	-4207	-19
			000,000	496 291	4/0 090	-00 045	-12	-90 740	-10
		EU-27	449,600	387 594	372 486	-62 006	-14	-// 114	-17
		United Kingdom	78,199	63 592	59 873	-14 607	-19	-18 326	-23
		United States	174.114	141 708	134 612	-32 406	-19	-39 501	-23

#### Table 6: Projection results, by country groups and destination market (US\$, million)

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset.

Note: The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

Differences in differences with respect to baseline projections could imply some composition effects in terms of import sourcing. For instance, the share of imports by Australia from all country groups is expected to fall significantly because of the pandemic; however, no change is expected for exports from Commonwealth developed members. As to non-Commonwealth countries, their share is expected to jump by about 4 per centage points moving from 59 per cent in the baseline to up to 63 per cent in scenario 2, despite the projected drop of 19 per cent of their exports to Australia in that last scenario.

Projections for the United Kingdom as a destination market are clearly the most contrasted. Imports from other Commonwealth members are projected to fall with respect to the baseline but much less proportionately if compared with imports from non-Commonwealth countries. Whether this is a pure COVID-19 effect remains unclear, as part of this tendency may have been instigated by Brexit at the beginning of 2020. The pandemic may have accentuated the tendency and accelerated the compositional shift towards Commonwealth countries. However, note that even in the worst COVID-19 scenario, the share of non-Commonwealth member countries stands at about 86 per cent compared to about 90 per cent in the baseline.

In absolute terms, imports from non-Commonwealth countries may decrease with respect to the baseline by between US\$ 180 and 230 billion. The largest absolute differences are obtained for China and the EU-27.

#### Country groups and individual effects

In value terms, developed Commonwealth members could experience a large drop in exports, ranging from US\$ 45 to 57 billion, which is mainly driven by a fall in commodities exports from Canada (Figure 10). However, in relative terms, the drop faced by developed countries' exports would stand between 14 and 17 per cent (Table 7) and this would make them the least affected members group. Losses incurred by developed members represent up to about 46 per cent of total Commonwealth losses and Canada would represent about one third on its own. In absolute terms, Asian Commonwealth members would be the second most affected group, closely followed by African members. Looking at relative variations, however, Caribbean members would be hit more severely. Their commodities exports could drop by 40 per cent to 60 per cent compared with the historical average. The main drivers of such negative impact are the exports of crude and refined oil as well as of natural gases from Trinidad Tobago and to a lesser extent of sugars and of crustacean's exports from Belize essentially to the EU-27 market. Commonwealth members from the Pacific region are no exception although they appear to be the least affected group at least from both an absolute and relative point of view. However, the progression in the size of potential losses from the pandemic is the most spectacular moving from scenario 1 to scenario 2. This almost exponential export performance deterioration (from - 7 per cent in scenario 1 to - 15 per cent in scenario 2) is due to a collapse of natural gases exports of Papua New Guinea to China with respect to business as usual projections. Such a strong decoupling from business as usual projections may require some caution as deviations observed in the half of 2020 and retained in our shock simulations, do not necessarily account for demand adjustments possibly due to unexpected shifts in seasonal consumption components as natural gases may be an important source of heating during fall and winter.



Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset

Note: The chart indicates the aggregate value of export losses for each commonwealth members group across all commodities and across the five destinations. Bar numbers refer to deviations from baseline levels. The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

As shown in Table 7, 45 Commonwealth members are expected to be negatively affected by the pandemic and seven positively affected in both scenarios. The seven members whose exports are expected to be higher than those that would have been observed without the pandemic are Bangladesh (by about 6 per cent in both scenarios driven by its exports of sugars and edible oils to China and the United Kingdom), Botswana (by up to 45 per cent in scenario 2 driven by its exports of diamonds to the EU-27, United States and China), Cyprus (by up to 15 per cent in scenario 2 driven by its exports of salt to China), Dominica (by up to 114 per cent in scenario 2 driven by its exports of bananas to the EU-27), Malawi (by up to 83 per cent in scenario 2 driven by its exports of sugars to the EU-27 and the United States), the Solomon Islands (by up to 25 per cent in scenario 2) and Tonga (by up to 20 per cent in scenario 2). Amongst those negatively affected, Saint Kitts and Nevis is expected to face the largest losses in relative terms with a total drop of its exports (i.e. fish products to the United States) under scenario 2. Other countries with losses larger than 50 per cent in either scenario are Sierra Leone (-82 per cent in scenario 2), Vanuatu (-77 per cent in scenario 2), Grenada (-74 per cent in scenario 2), Rwanda (-72 per cent in scenario 2), Fiji (-60 per cent in scenario 2), Saint Vincent & the Grenadines (-60 per cent in scenario 2), Belize (-54 per cent in scenario 2), Trinidad and Tobago (-52 per cent in scenario 2) and, Kenya (-51 per cent in scenario 2). The largest losses in absolute terms are expected for Canada (up to US\$41.3 billion in scenario 2), followed by Nigeria (up to US\$17.4 billion in scenario 2), India (up to US\$16.4 billion in scenario 2) and Malaysia (up to US\$13.2 billion in scenario 2).

	F	Estimated value	s	Differe	ence fro	m Benchmar	'k
Exporter				Scenar	io 1	Scenario	2
	Benchmark	Scenario1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%
1	2	3	4	5	7	6	8
All Commonwealth	509 950	411 878	387 273	-98 069	-19	-122 677	-24
of which							
Developed	331 277	286 057	274 177	-45 221	-14	-57 100	-17
Australia	111 439	110 409	108 194	-1 030	-1	-3 245	-3
Canada	153 425	119 493	112 150	-33 932	-22	-41 276	-27
Cyprus	16	18.1	18.3	2.11	13	2.3	15
Malta	1.9	1.7	1.5	0.2	-13	0.4	-23
New Zealand	17 628	15 826	15 539	-1 802	-10	-2 090	-12
United Kingdom	48 767	40 309	38 275	-8 458	-17	-10 492	-22
Developing	178 673	125 821	113 095	-52 848	-30	-65 576	-37
of which							
Africa	79 190	56 228	51 595	-22 959	-29	-27 595	-35
Botswana	1 322	1725	1 919	404	31	597	45
Cameroon	2 191	2 008	1 815	-183	-8	-376	-17
Eswatini	21	12	13	-9	-42	-9	-41
Gambia	45	29	26	-16	-35	-18	-41
Ghana	5 610	3 056	2 902	-2 554	-46	-2 708	-48
Kenya	421	221	207	-200	-47	-214	-51
Lesotho	439	322	295	-118	-27	-144	-33
Malawi	46	78	84	32	70	38	83
Mauritius	367	331	310	-36	-10	-57	-16
Mozambique	1 736	1 535	1 501	-200	-12	-234	-14
Namibia	1 052	931	857	-121	-12	-195	-19
Nigeria	38 628	24 557	21 193	-14 071	-36	-17 436	-45
Rwanda	2,3	1,0	0,7	-1,4	-59	-1,7	-72
Seychelles	43	39	36	-3	-8	-6	-14
Sierra Leone	565	241	103	-324	-57	-463	-82
South Africa	22 315	17 516	16 917	-4 799	-22	-5 398	-24
United Republic of Tanzania	318	228	215	-90	-28	-103	-32
Uganda	97	91	88	-5	-6	-9	-9
Zambia	3 972	3 307	3 113	-665	-17	-859	-22
Asia	91 753	63 847	56 572	-27 906	-30	-35 182	-38
Bangladesh	551	576	587	25	5	35	6
Brunei Darussalam	396	317	202	-80	-20	-194	-49
India	40 662	27 150	24 247	-13 512	-33	-16 415	-40
Malaysia	35 479	25 445	22 300	-10 034	-28	-13 179	-37
Maldives	71	49	42	-22	-31	-29	-41
Pakistan	3 633	2 400	2 092	-1 233	-34	-1 541	-42

#### Table 7: Estimates by country and region (US\$, million)

				Difference from Benchmark					
Exporter	E	stimated value	es	Scenar	io 1	Scenario	2		
	Benchmark	Scenario1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%		
1	2	3	4	5	7	6	8		
Singapore	10 645	7 666	6 876	-2 979	-28	-3 769	-35		
Sri Lanka	316	244	226	-72	-23	-91	-29		
Caribbean	4 801	3 027	2 439	-1 774	-37	-2 361	-49		
Antigua and Barbuda	0,4	0,3	0,3	-0,1	-17	-0,1	-33		
Bahamas	131	118	104	-13	-10	-26	-20		
Barbados	2,1	1,5	1,5	-0,6	-26	-0,6	-27		
Belize	240	120	110	-120	-50	-130	-54		
Dominica	0,7	1,3	1,4	0,7	106	0,7	114		
Grenada	18	6	5	-12	-66	-13	-74		
Guyana	225	194	181	-31	-14	-44	-20		
Jamaica	64	47	44	-17	-27	-20	-31		
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0,1	0,0	0,0	-0,1	-77	-0,1	-100		
Saint Lucia	9,0	6,0	5,0	-3,2	-35	-3,9	-42		
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines	9,0	5,0	3,5	-4,0	-45	-5,2	-60		
Trinidad and Tobago	4 102	2 528	1 983	-1 573	-38	-2 119	-52		
Pacific	2 929	2 719	2 490	-210	-7	-438	-15		
Fiji	82	47	33	-36	-43	-49	-60		
Kiribati	1,8	1,4	1,2	-0,4	-24	-0,6	-33		
Papua New Guinea	2 488	2 252	2 024	-236	-10	-464	-19		
Samoa	2,2	2,0	1,5	-0,3	-13	-0,8	-35		
Solomon Islands	342	411	425	69	20	84	25		
Tonga	2,6	3,0	3,1	0,5	18	0,5	20		
Vanuatu	10	2,8	2,2	-6,8	-71	-7,3	-77		

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset.

Note: The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

Table A3 shows the variation of the estimates for commodity dependent and other Commonwealth countries per category of products. Amongst commodity dependent Commonwealth members, the largest projected falls in absolute terms are found for imports of food products and mineral ores by China sourced from developed countries. In scenario 2, this corresponds to a loss in absolute terms varying between US\$ 4.5 for ores and minerals and US\$5.3 billion for food products. In relative terms, this would correspond to a drop varying between 6 per cent for the former products group and 29 per cent for the latter as compared to a non-COVID 19 situation. As to Commonwealth developing countries, the largest absolute loss is incurred by African fuels exporters to the EU-27 market which are projected to be halved in scenario 2. In relative terms, several import lines drop to zero amongst commodity dependent economies. This is case for exports of fuels to China and ores and minerals to the United Kingdom from the Caribbean members group, but also for exports ores and minerals from the Pacific members group to both Australia and the EU-27. Positive relative differences are also observed. Amongst developed members the largest positive difference in absolute terms is found for fuels exports to China and more precisely exports of coal from

Australia. As to developing economies members, positive differences are obtained for exports of food and agricultural products and mostly from commodity dependent members. However, the largest positive absolute number is observed for exports of ores and minerals from Africa to the United Kingdom driven by a significant increase in the demand for diamonds essentially from Botswana.

In the food products category, positive differences are obtained for several exporters of fish to the EU-27 market, including Bangladesh, Ghana and Namibia, and, to a lesser extent, The Bahamas and the Seychelles. The same is true for exporters of edible oils to the EU-27 market. The most significant positive differences are found for Ghana and Papua New Guinea. As hinted previously, differences found for exports from developed Commonwealth members are negative on aggregate in most cases. The most remarkable exceptions are exports of food and agricultural products to the EU-27 and the United Kingdom for which positive differences are found. A detailed analysis indicates that the food products results are influenced essentially by imports of grains from Canada and of meat from Australia and New Zealand.

#### Sectoral effects

Table A4 shows pandemic effects at the level of product groups and Table A5 complements this information by reporting annual growth rates that would prevail in the three scenarios. Growth rates realized in 2018 and 2019 are also reported for comparison. As mentioned previously, positive differences between business-as-usual and COVID scenarios projections do not necessarily correspond to higher positive annual growth rates but could also correspond to lower negative annual growth rates.

The picture emerging from this data is more nuanced than the one retrieved from the results presented in Tables 5 and 6. Despite a predominance of negative effects, several product groups appear to be positively affected in some destination markets. Out of 102 product group-destination combinations 30 show some potentially positive impact of the pandemic even though part of these positive experiences would reflect a lower deceleration of annual growth rates with respect to previous years rather than a net increase.

Overall, positively affected product groups are edible oils (+ 0.2 per cent with respect to benchmark in best scenario), paper pulp (+1.9 per cent with respect to benchmark in best scenario), grains (+ 2.8 per cent with respect to benchmark in best scenario), salt (+ 18.5 per cent with respect to benchmark in best scenario), fertilizers (+21.4 with respect to benchmark in best scenario), cotton (+96 per cent with respect to benchmark in best scenario) and, coal and lignite (+76 per cent with respect to benchmark in best scenario). Amongst negatively affected product group-destination combinations, the largest negative differences are found amongst the fuels category. Overall, imports of crude and refined oil products are the most negatively affected both in absolute and relative terms. Because of COVID-19, they are expected to fall below those projected in the benchmark scenario by between US\$ 78 and 84 billion. Imports of ores and ore products are expected to fall by between US\$11.5 and 15 billion, those of fish by between US\$5 and 6.6 billion and those of dairy by between US\$1.8 and \$2 billion.

Figure 11 further shows that amongst food products (depicted in the first panel) edible oils face an increase in import demand in all destinations under consideration except for China. Projection results as reported in Table A4 suggest that with respect to a non-COVID situation, the largest positive difference with reference levels is obtained for the EU-27 market and could reach US\$175 million. This would represent an about 7 per cent positive difference and an increase by more than 14 per cent with respect to 2019

(Table A5). Imports of edible oils in the United Kingdom may be boosted by between 38 and 47 per cent with respect to benchmark projections. However, on a year to year basis growth rates would be negative in both scenarios with respect to 2019. Import demand in the United Kingdom for meat and grains is also expected to increase significantly because of the pandemic. Other remarkable upward effects are found for imports of sugars in China. The latter are projected to increase by between 16.2 and 17.6 per cent with respect to a non-COVID situation even though they would also correspond to negative growth rates with respect to 2019. On the negative side, the largest downward effects amongst food products due to the pandemic are found for imports of dairy and fish products in China. Projected variations with respect to benchmark fall between -32 and minus -29 per cent and between -46 and minus -33 per cent, respectively. Australia's imports of meat are projected to fall by at least one fourth as compared to benchmark numbers.

In the case of agricultural products, Figure 11 and Table A4 reveal a mix picture. Overall cotton and paper pulp are expected to be positively affected by the pandemic at least relative to benchmark projections. Indeed, only cotton and more precisely exports to the EU-27 would show some positive growth rate with respect to 2019. In the case of paper pulp all destination markets would be characterized by negative annual growth rates with respect to 2019 although differences in absolute levels with respect to benchmark projections would be positive in both COVID scenarios. Table A4 further indicates that the largest negative difference with respect to business-as-usual results is found for imports of wood by China and amounts to about US\$733 million in the worst scenario. In relative terms, the largest negative effects are observed for cotton imported by the United Kingdom and wood products imported by Australia. Positive figures are the largest in relative terms for imports of cotton by China and rubber by Australia. The latter are expected to outpace benchmark projections by up to 101 per cent and up to 57 per cent, respectively. In absolute terms, the largest effects are found for imports of cotton and paper pulp by China.

Imports of fuels products are negatively impacted in most destinations as represented in Figure 11. Only imports of coal by China and the United States and, of crude oil and natural gases (only in scenario 1) by the United Kingdom are projected to increase because of COVID-19 relative to the benchmark. In relative terms, imports of coal by China show the largest increase up to 137 per cent in scenario 2. Table A5 indicates that as in the case of cotton above, positive differences obtain in some COVID scenario may reflect the fact projected falls in annual imports are more contained because of the pandemic. That would be the case of imports of coal in the United States. While benchmark projections would have anticipated a negative annual growth rate of coal imports by China, the pandemic may clearly invert that trend.

Within the category of minerals and ores, only import demand for fertilizers appears to be positively impacted by the pandemic on aggregate and in all destinations but the EU-27 market (and the United Kingdom market in scenario 2). Nevertheless, except for Australia and to a lesser extent the United States, projections point to lower reductions with respect to the previous year rather than net increases (Table A5). The largest difference is found for Chinese imports, which are expected to outpace benchmark levels by US\$402 to \$498 million (Table A4). Imports of diamonds are expected to fall below baseline values because of the pandemic except for the United Kingdom. Ores and ores products share the largest dampening effects, despite overall positive projected annual growth rates.



Figure 11: Normalized annual imports, by product and destination market (2020)



A=Australia; C=China; E=EU-27; G= United Kingdom; U= United States



Figure 11: Normalized annual imports, by product and destination market (2020) (cont.)



A = Australia; C = China; E = EU-27; G = United Kingdom; U = United States

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset

Note: Ratios are with respect to benchmark projections (all green bars equal unity). The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

# 4. Findings and conclusion

Commodities constitute a large share of Commonwealth countries' merchandise exports (about 45 per cent). Two-thirds of Commonwealth members (35 of 54) – comprising two developed and 33 developing economies – depend heavily on commodities for their export earnings. The large shares of commodities in the overall merchandise exports of these 35 commodity dependent countries (at about 80 per cent) makes them particularly vulnerable to global shocks like COVID-19. Secondly, a large geographical concentration of the commodities exports adds to the vulnerability for several Commonwealth countries. For instance, seven Commonwealth countries depend on the EU-27 countries for 25 to 50 per cent of their commodities exports, while four (Australia, New Zealand, the Gambia and Zambia) have a similar level of dependence on China. The commodities exports of two members (Jamaica and Fiji) are concentrated in the United States market. This pattern has largely remained consistent over the last four years.

The pandemic may fragilize several Commonwealth member states' economies and it is highly probable that these fragilized economies will take time to return to equilibrium after 2020. As shown in Figure 12, most countries are expected to lose export revenues in 2020 both as compared to business-as-usual projections (solid line curve) and with respect to 2019 performance (all occurrences to the left of the vertical line).Indeed, figure 12 indicates that the majority of export flows (highest densities) in either COVID-19 scenario are projected to the left of the vertical line (negative growth rate with respect to 2019) and in comparison to business-as-usual projections a larger share of occurrences are obtained for negative annual growth rates. Table A.6 provides the details of these distributions. Canada is expected to be the most affected economy in absolute terms. Its exports are expected to fall of US\$ 34 to 41 billion below businessas-usual projections. Other developed countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia are expected to underperform with respect to business-as-usual projections by US\$ 1 to 10.5 billion. African oil exporters are also among the hardest hit both in absolute terms. Nigeria losses in 2020 with respect to a business-as-usual progression amount to US\$ 14 to 17.5 billion and those of Ghana to US\$ 2.5 to 2.7 billion. However, the impact on the commodity sector is disproportionately higher among smaller economies, which face a relatively deeper reduction in their exports and resulting revenues. Commonwealth members such Eswatini, Vanuatu, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Brunei Darussalam, the Gambia, Kiribati, Rwanda, Samoa, Grenada, Maldives and Fiji may see their revenues to be retrieved in 2020 for their exports of commodities fall by at least 40 per cent.

The decline in export earnings represents an additional source of balance of payments disequilibrium especially for primary commodity exporters. It adds to the decrease in FDI flows observed in 2019 and projected to deepen in 2020. Indeed, investment flows in Africa are set to drop 25 per cent to 40 per cent in 2020 after a 10 per cent drop in inflows in 2019 (UNCTAD, 2020). The decline in export earnings also adds to the projected decline in remittances. For instance, remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa registered a small decline of 0.5 per cent to \$48 billion in 2019. Due to the COVID-19 crisis, remittance flows to the region are expected to decline by 23.1 per cent in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). With dropping external revenues and the associated balance of payment difficulties, the capacity of impacted countries to honour their debt reimbursement obligations will be seriously altered. Maintaining such obligations and their repayment schedule can only reduce sharply governments' capacity to extend the public services needed to respond effectively to the crisis.

These losses and the consequent macroeconomic tensions may have severe negative repercussions for the progress of post-COVID-19 recovery and resilience building efforts, and the Sustainable Development Goals and Africa's Agenda 2063 in the long term as most CDCWCs are situated in sub-Saharan Africa.

The countries dependent on the export of fuels would need intensive policy interventions to wean away from commodities and diversify their export bases. Recent technological developments and ongoing energy transitions toward renewable energy sources suggests the world could be on the verge of a profound shift in transportation technologies. The large-scale adoption of electric cars could cut oil consumption substantially in the coming decades and the use oil as the main fuel for transportation could have a much shorter life span than commonly assumed. In the fast adoption scenario, oil prices could converge to the level of coal prices.

Demand for commodities in these markets would remain sluggish in 2020. The United Kingdom and the EU-27 economies are expected to contract by around 10 per cent and the United States and Australian economies by 8 per cent and 4.5 per cent, respectively. With no other key commodity market, apart from China, set to show positive growth in 2020, this portends a slow recovery more dependent on domestic demand for many economies. Even the countries relying on the Chinese market for commodities exports could struggle. This time, China's stimulus is much smaller as a share of GDP and the country's debt level is very high. On top of that, existing overcapacity in many industries means that factory output in China is also piling up. Far from supporting the recovery in other places as in the post GFD period, this time China could be a drag as firms look to sell their inventory internationally, which will depress commodity demand and lower prices.

A cautious approach is necessary when attributing these findings to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the novel Coronavirus is the leading cause of the drop in commodity prices, several other factors could have also exacerbated this decline. For example, the Sino-American trade conflict is affecting commodity prices. The commodity trade follows the twists and turns of political developments. The imposition of tariffs by the United States on Chinese imports and retaliation by China has dampened demand, causing prices to fall.

Looking ahead, commodity dependent developing countries should consider a set of targeted policies and investments to achieve inclusive structural transformation that diversifies the economy away from commodity dependence. These countries should seek to leverage international assistance and trade support measures, like Aid for Trade or preference schemes of developed and larger developing countries, to help trigger this transformation process. Regional integration, like the African Continental Free Trade Area, can also support greater value-addition and diversification, especially through participation in regional value chains. At the same time, commodity-dependent countries will need to adopt policy frameworks and measures to support a sustainable post-COVID recovery and build resilience against future shocks.



Figure 12: Distribution of normalized country projections for 2020 (reference year:2019)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on simulation results using ITC dataset

Note: Country totals are expressed with corresponding 2019 totals. Points to the left of the vertical line correspond to negative growth rates with respect to 2019 totals. Points to the rights of the vertical line correspond to positive growth rates with respect to 2019 totals. Higher ordinates (vertical axis) represent higher density i.e. larger number of occurrences of a given ratio value (horizontal axis). The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

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#### UNCTADstat database

(https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS\_ChosenLang=en)

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# Appendix

#### Table A.1: Export market concentration, 2016-18 (in US\$ billions and per centage)

Partne	er		World		All Comr	nonwealt	h count	ries (54)	Commodity Dependent CW countries (35)			nt CW
Economy	Year	Merchan dise	Commo dities	Share	Merchan dise	Commo dities	Share	Share in world	Merchan dise	Commo dities	Share	Share in CW
								7				11
		1	2	3	4	5	6	(col 5/2)	8	9	10	(col 9/5)
World	2015	16 600	4,603	28	2,259	992	44	22	515	421	82	42
	2016	16 100	4,247	26	2,109	877	42	21	470	382	81	44
	2017	17 874	4,991	28	2,378	1,064	45	21	564	471	84	44
	2018	19 670	5,762	29	2,645	1,202	45	21	637	533	84	44
of which												
EU-27	2015	4 582	1,225	27	396	124	31	10	62	48	78	39
	2016	4 584	1,118	24	384	110	29	10	54	40	75	37
	2017	5 121	1,314	26	434	132	30	10	65	49	76	38
	2018	5 708	1,511	26	478	156	33	10	79	61	77	39
Australia	2015	200	43	22	36	18	49	41	10	7	69	39
	2016	189	41	22	34	17	50	41	10	7	72	43
	2017	228	49	21	38	20	53	42	11	8	72	40
	2018	236	57	24	43	24	56	42	12	9	74	36
China	2015	1 680	607	36	263	164	62	27	120	115	96	70
	2016	1 588	556	35	237	143	60	26	109	104	95	73
	2017	1 844	686	37	292	191	65	28	141	135	96	70
	2018	2 136	904	42	356	230	65	25	171	164	96	71
l Inite d												
Kingdom	2015	630	159	25	53	25	47	16	14	12	83	48
	2016	636	182	29	58	32	55	18	21	19	89	58
	2017	641	177	28	58	31	53	17	18	15	84	48
	2018	670	188	28	57	30	52	16	18	15	86	51
United												
States	2015	2 313	440	19	508	169	33	38	33	18	55	11
	2016	2 247	408	18	488	153	31	38	32	18	58	12
	2017	2 405	465	19	520	183	35	39	38	24	63	13
	2018	2 611	517	20	563	203	36	39	37	24	64	12

Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat

						>=50%	25%-50%>	<10%-25%	>						
	2016					2017	2J/0* JU/0*	<10/0°ZJ/0	/		2018				
Destination	Australia	China	UK	USA	EU27	Australia	China	UK	USA	EU27	Australia	China	UK	USA	EU27
All Commonwealth	2,07	13,21	3,00	18,21	6,68	2,05	14,57	2,41	18,08	6,71	2,20	14,9	2,22	18,46	7,55
of Which															
Developed															
Australia		33,72	4,11	2,08	2,87	<b>.</b>	33,51	1,86	1,75	2,92		40,12	1,38	2,00	3,26
Canada	0,18	6,93	6,45	66,53	4,31	0,14	6,88	5,91	67,50	4,25	0,14	7,62	4,82	67,43	4,70
Cyprus Malta	1,40	1,39	1 57	0,07	24,00	1,24	1,00	0.22	0,04	23,20	1,02	0.22	0,90	0,00	14,99
Malla New Zealand	14 19	22 72	3 78	9,07	6.85	13 40	26 14	2 80	8 67	6 23	12 97	27.96	2 70	0,24 8 51	6 39
United Kingdom	0.71	6.26	- 5,20	8.21	-	0.59	6.72	-	7,19	- 0,25	0.62	10.13	-	6.35	-
Developing	-,	-,		-)		-,	•,•=		.,		-,	,		-,	
of Which															
Africa															
Botswana	0,00	0,77	1,72	4,27	27,00	0,00	0,39	0,77	7,14	22,68	0,00	0,10	0,88	5,41	24,95
Cameroon	0,00	9,29	1,83	3,48	49,63		12,26	1,12	2,22	51,30	0,00	19,47	1,00	3,37	44,22
Eswatini	0,41	0,00	5,47	1,98	14,48	0,46	0,31	1,42	2,10	10,18	0,38	•	3,36	1,68	9,18
Gambia, The		44,19	2,17	0,07	5,82	0.40	48,39	1,59	0,25	4,09	0.02	46,44	1,86	0,17	4,89
Gnana	0,04	10,44	1,69	2,27	16,60	0,19	15,8/	2,09 0 70	4,61	16,7Z	0,02	14,53	3,24	3,58	20,04
kenya Losotho	0,50	1,90	9,71	3,00 7.67	21,29	0,04	2,09	0,70	4,0Z	21,00	0,02	2,44 1 94	0,03 0.07	2,90 5.42	ZI, 17
Malawi	0,01	0,99 4 32	4 03	7,07	34.26	0,00	2,70	3 75	2,07 5,36	43.02	0,01	1,04 4 10	3.90	5,45 6 25	38.38
Mauritius	0,30	1.69	11.24	6.44	48.99	0.43	2.11	10.40	8,22	52.02	0,05	3.34	10.97	9.44	43.05
Mozambique	0.02	9,35	2,26	2,44	36,21	0.33	7,70	2,61	1.93	28,59	0,10	8,43	1,86	1.66	33,45
Namibia	0,20	3,06	1,36	2,77	26,54	0,18	5,31	1,10	3,07	29,42	0,87	17,01	1,78	2,11	29,83
Nigeria	0,02	2,71	2,65	10,22	25,72	0,84	3,90	3,07	13,81	28,50	0,74	3,44	4,29	8,12	32,20
Rwanda	0,22	4,57	1,99	4,32	7,01	0,16	3,71	1,77	5,40	6,70	0,11	3,74	1,31	5,32	5,81
Seychelles	0,18	0,00	15,65	0,28	42,57	0,73	0,19	14,17	0,66	40,79	2,53	0,10	14,20	0,59	40,24
Sierra Leone	0,01	28,36	0,08	11,52	33,83	1,23	38,39	1,15	3,22	36,56	0,27	21,72	0,44	3,03	42,25
South Africa	0,37	13,41	5,38	5,49	13,51	0,32	14,71	4,79	6,33	12,24	0,31	13,74	5,80	6,75	12,44
United Rep. of Tanzania	0,08	7,16	0,45	1,59	14,75	0,11	4,88	0,41	1,06	11,04	0,07	3,93	0,34	0,79	10,93
Ugdillida Zambia	0,00	20,90	0,93	1,00	20,00 1 15	0,07	20.64	0,00	2,20	21,15	0,00	0,00	0,30	1,40	2 52
Asia	0,01	20,70	3,31	0,05	1,15	0,00	30,04	0,37	0,47	2,75	0,04	20,42	1,15	1,21	5,52
Bangladesh	0.30	10.30	7.16	4.86	22.74	0.39	9.46	6.93	3.45	25,56	0.41	9.19	6.20	3.34	22.47
Brunei	5,30	3,76	0,22	0,01	0,00	3,54	5,17	0,01	0,19	0,01	9,59	1,99	0,00	0,81	0,00
India	1,21	4,44	1,05	13,91	9,00	1,59	5,57	1,13	13,01	8,70	1,02	6,19	1,26	13,68	10,39
Malaysia	5,49	13,24	0,24	2,24	4,80	5,80	15,23	0,22	2,33	4,69	6,15	15,09	0,20	2,15	5,43
Maldives	0,31	0,07	3,43	9,03	28,79	0,31	0,17	3,98	6,65	19,88	0,18	0,78	5,67	7,05	20,56
Pakistan	2,11	10,05	1,94	3,19	5,84	1,60	8,05	1,87	3,24	6,37	1,26	9,63	2,67	2,50	7,07
Singapore	6,37	10,61	0,35	2,19	3,15	6,31	16,34	0,34	1,77	3,56	8,29	10,60	0,19	5,11	2,89
Sri Lanka	1,70	2,26	2,03	7,45	14,11	1,72	2,66	1,89	6,65	14,04	1,78	1,72	1,76	7,05	15,68
Antigua and Barbuda	0.71	0.05	0.61	1 37	1 01	8 61	0.03	0.28	5 82	11 67	5.45	0.01	0.20	2 13	1 87
Rahamas	0,71	1 07	0.08	27.56	6 52	0,01	1 12	0.09	26.63	6.66	0.16	1 13	0,20	2,13	6,87
Barbados	0,40	0.05	4.04	25.22	8,99	0,36	0.03	3,59	20,54	7,45	0,10	2.20	2,21	24.33	10.52
Belize	0,13	0,76	24,12	26,74	9,19	0,05	0,03	26,85	19,39	26,98	0,09	0,43	25,35	23,44	17,18
Dominica	-	-	10,50	2,34	34,45	-	-	10,43	2,43	34,18	-	-	10,41	2,41	34,51
Grenada	0,12	0,03	0,21	19,45	8,87	0,12	0,03	0,21	19,89	8,63	0,13	0,03	0,22	20,24	8,15
Guyana	0,02	1,46	3,35	25,33	13,08	0,03	1,95	6,56	19,26	13,35	0,02	1,68	2,82	15,67	13,82
Jamaica	0,10	2,65	4,52	40,75	14,42	0,06	1,44	4,06	41,44	15,67	0,10	1,43	2,73	39,91	18,50
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0,15	•	-	15,93	-	0,07	-	0,28	15,20	5,24	0,11	•	0,14	15,57	5,47
St. Lucia	0.00	0,07	7,15	2,95	1,41	0,00	0,13	11,78	8,93	1,22	0,00	0,10	9,54	6,03	1,31
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0,00	0,00	1,70	2,07	0,38	0,01	0,00	1,//	1,89	0,38	0,01	0,00	1,/4	1,98	0,38
Pacific	0,04	0,67	0,62	22,37	0,01	0,04	0,96	0,04	20,21	0,43	0,04	0,93	0,03	21,21	0,00
Fiii	12 11	4 77	4 66	27 35	5 30	11 45	4 58	6 00	29 70	8 29	9 77	6 15	0.87	27 45	4 18
Kiribati	0.04	3.75	0.01	1.92	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.00	1.53	0,15	0.05	0.06	0,07	1.71	1,10
Nauru	27,70	-	-	0,16	-	31,17	-	-	0,11	-	27,79	-		0.16	
Papua New Guinea	32,17	14,47	1,91	1,19	8,91	28,82	15,42	1,77	1,31	10,21	28,26	19,59	1,49	1,02	9,81
Samoa	9,40	1,89	0,11	8,43	0,64	10,67	0,99	0,27	5,80	0,41	5,39	1,09	0,19	9,19	0,69
Solomon Islands	0,84	63,04	2,76	0,31	7,95	0,69	66,90	0,57	0,42	9,26	0,94	69,61	1,17	0,45	8,21
Tonga	9,73	0,07	0,10	19,35	0,91	10,04	1,85	0,01	18,06	1,02	13,30	0,54	0,33	21,04	0,39
Tuvalu				-		0,51	0,30				0,09	0,05			
Vanuatu	18,93	1,42	3,05	9,11	1,13	11,74	3,16	0,21	9,12	2,71	10,35	3,52	1,51	12,34	3,38

#### Table A.2: Export market concentration (per cent, 2016-18)

Source: Authors' calculations using UNCTADstat

Note. The figure represents per cent share of each export destination in total commodities exports.

_	_			Ea	time at a division		Differen	ice fro	m benchm	ark
Ex regio	(porters ons/aroup	Importers	Commodity	ES	limated value	es	Scenari	o 1	Scenari	o 2
	51.0, <u>9</u> . eup			Benchmark	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%
	Developed	Australia	Food products	577	490	445	-87	-15.1	-132	-22.9
			Agricultural products	105	89	86	-15	-14.7	-19	-17.9
			Fuels	452	375	368	-77	-17	-84	-18.6
			Ores and mineral	51	42	39	-9	-17.3	-11	-22.1
		China	Food products	18 481	13 910	13 132	-4 571	-24.7	-5 349	-28.9
			Agricultural products	4 809	4 743	4 794	-66	-1.4	-15	-0.3
			Fuels	22 556	27 559	27 064	5 002	22.2	4 507	20
			Ores and mineral	70 366	66 891	65 834	-3 475	-4.9	-4 532	-6.4
		EU-27	Food products	2 524	3 344	3 447	820	32.5	924	36.6
			Agricultural products	258	292	300	34	13.1	41	16
			Fuels	1 864	1 645	1 594	-218	-11.7	-270	-14.5
			Ores and mineral	531	294	215	-237	-44.6	-317	-59.6
		United Kingdom	Food products	415	479	505	63	15.3	90	21.7
			Agricultural products	29	33	33	3.9	13.6	4.5	15.6
				112	/8	38	-34	-30.5	-74	-66
		Lipitod States	Ores and mineral	44	16	11	-28	-63	-33	-/4.5
		United States		4 / 94	4 / 08	4 631	-85	-1.8	-162	-3.4
			Agricultural products	1/1	155	101	-10	-9.4	-20	-11.0
				026	1 000	1 044	-0.9	-91.0	-0.9	-92.4
	Africa	Australia	Food products	920 /0	20	1 044	_104	-25.9	-13	-32.7
	Amoa	Australia	Agricultural products	40	0.3	0.3	0.1	-20.0	-13	65.3
			Fuels	444	269	141	-176	-39.6	-304	-68.3
			Ores and mineral	37	29	27	-8	-21	-10	-26.9
ut .		China	Food products	1 075	547	225	-528	-49.1	-850	-79.1
puge			Agricultural products	1 534	1 341	1 171	-193	-12.6	-363	-23.7
epe			Fuels	3 391	3 893	3 547	503	14.8	156	4.6
요			Ores and mineral	14 312	12 446	12 430	-1 866	-13	-1 882	-13.1
odit		EU-27	Food products	6 177	3 070	2 949	-3 106	-50.3	-3 228	-52.3
Ĕ			Agricultural products	479	436	426	-43	-8.9	-53	-11.1
Co			Fuels	34 797	20 406	17 348	-14 391	-41.4	-17 450	-50.1
			Ores and mineral	5 821	5 517	5 466	-304	-5.2	-355	-6.1
		United Kingdom	Food products	731	877	803	146	20	72	9.9
			Agricultural products	47	39	38	-8	-16.1	-9	-18.6
			Fuels	2 104	2 204	2 223	100	4.8	119	5.7
			Ores and mineral	241	807	810	566	235.1	569	236.3
		United States	Food products	559	483	479	-76	-13.5	-80	-14.3
			Agricultural products	83	92	95	8.9	10.7	11	13.7
			Fuels	4 328	1 571	1 378	-2 757	-63.7	-2 950	-68.2
	<b>.</b> .	<b>A</b> :	Ores and mineral	2 162	1 506	1 393	-656	-30.3	-769	-35.6
	ASIA	Australia	Fuelo	1.8	1.1	0.2	-0.6	-36.3	-1.6	-88.4
		China	Fuels	296	136	12	- 160	-54.1	-225	-/5.8
		China	Food products	1.0	1.1	120	-0.7	-40.5	-1	-30.9
		ELL 07	Fuels Eaad products	97	179	130	02	04.1	J2 19	35.3
		LU-27	Food products	2.6	15	12	-14	-27.7	-10	-52.9
		United States	Food products	2.0	1.5	1.Z Q	-1.1	-38 R	-1.4	-52.9
	Caribbean	Australia	Food products	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.3	71 6	۰۵ ۵ D	44 4
		China	Food products	3.7	7	8	3	81.4	4.4	117.7
			Agricultural products	13	14	15	1.3	9.8	1.6	12.5
			Fuels	122	35	0	-88	-71.6	-122	-100
		EU-27	Food products	226	131	134	-95	-42.1	-92	-40.8
			Agricultural products	1.8	3.1	3.4	1.3	72.9	1.6	88.9
1		1							-	
			Fuels	2 379	1 206	848	-1173	-49.3	-1 531	-64.4

#### Table A.3: Simulations results by country group, product and market (US\$, million)

_				Га	time at a division		Differer	nce fro	m benchm	ark
E	(porters	Importers	Commodity	ES	limated value	es	Scenari	o 1	Scenari	o 2
regi	ons/group			Benchmark	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%
	Caribbean	United Kingdom	Food products	149	106	86	-42	-28.5	-63	-42.4
		3.1	Agricultural products	0.9	3.7	4.3	2.8	309.3	3.4	369.6
			Fuels	130	135	106	5	3.9	-24	-18.5
			Ores and mineral	0.1	0	0	0	-92.5	-0.1	-100
		United States	Food products	160	111	100	-49	-30.5	-60	-37.5
		onited etalee	Agricultural products	11	6	5	-4.8	-43.3	-6	-54.4
			Fuels	1 218	851	715	-367	-30.1	-504	-41.3
			Ores and mineral	194	212	215	18	91	21	10.8
t	Pacific	Australia	Eood products	10	9	Q	-1 3	-12 7	-17	-16.6
br	1 doine	Australia	Agricultural products	26	26	25	1.0	-0.2	-0.1	-5.2
be			Fuels	309	40	40	-270	-87.2	-270	-87.2
ă			Ores and mineral	000		-0 0	0	-95.2	0	-100
dity		China	Food products	24	3	25	0	-87.8	-22	-80.8
õ		Onna		047	022	014	-21	2.6	-22	-03.0
Б				1 125	1 1 2 6	914	-23	-2.0	-00	-3.5
o			Orea and minaral	1 133	1 130	924	0.9	1.2	-211	1 2
		<b>EU 07</b>		01	410	442	-0.0	-1.3	-0.0	-1.3
		EU-27	A grigultural products	295	419	443	123	41.7	147	49.9
				0.9	0.3	0.1	-0.6	-67.6	-0.8	-03.0
		Lipite d Kingdom		50	20	76	-20	-50.3	-50	-100
		United Kingdom	A grigultural products	50	79	/0	23	41.9	21	57.2
		Linita d Otata a	Agricultural products	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-57	-0.1	-57
		United States	Food products	33	20	10	-13	-38.6	-17	-50.6
t	7	A 1 1	Agricultural products	2.8	2.9	2.9	0.1	3.5	0.1	3.4
den	bed	Australia	Food products	94	81	68	-13	-13.6	-26	-27.6
ene	/elo		Agricultural products	24	20	19	-4.4	-18.2	-5	-21.1
dep	dev			21	6	6	-16	-73.4	-16	-74.2
ity	lth		Ores and mineral	224	257	255	32	14.4	30	13.6
pou	ves	China	Food products	4 420	4 863	4 872	444	10	452	10.2
Ē	no no		Agricultural products	3 543	3 315	3 263	-228	-6.4	-280	-7.9
20	E		Fuels	7 236	6 079	5 609	-1 157	-16	-1 627	-22.5
Nor	S	<b>F</b> IL 07	Ores and mineral	4 115	3 563	3 431	-552	-13.4	-684	-16.6
		EU-27	Food products	8 1 / 1	6 339	6 081	-1 832	-22.4	-2 090	-25.6
			Agricultural products	405	404	405	-0.3	-0.1	0.2	0
			Fuels	29 239	24 023	22 767	-5 216	-17.8	-6 472	-22.1
			Ores and mineral	10 355	8 327	7 853	-2 028	-19.6	-2 502	-24.2
		United Kingdom	Food products	503	534	1 088	31	6.2	585	116.2
			Agricultural products	35	34	34	-1	-2.7	-1.2	-3.5
			Fuels	486	545	436	59	12.1	-50	-10.3
			Ores and mineral	1 033	388	204	-645	-62.5	-828	-80.2
		United States	Food products	10 237	9 084	8 889	-1 153	-11.3	-1 348	-13.2
			Agricultural products	6 676	6 305	6 225	-371	-5.6	-452	-6.8
			Fuels	96 807	68 514	62 105	-28 293	-29.2	-34 703	-35.8
	_		Ores and mineral	18 585	17 141	16 836	-1 445	-7.8	-1 749	-9.4
len	oinc	Australia	Food products	290	295	296	5.2	1.8	6.6	2.3
enc	elo		Agricultural products	16	16	16	-0.6	-3.5	-0.7	-4.4
dep	lev		Fuels	10 283	6 220	5 391	-4 063	-39.5	-4 892	-47.6
<u>i</u>	the		Ores and mineral	684	636	604	-47	-6.9	-79	-11.6
pot	eal	China	Food products	8 549	6 511	5 456	-2 038	-23.8	-3 094	-36.2
uu uu	MUQ		Agricultural products	1 395	1 587	1 583	192	13.8	188	13.5
ပို	Ĕ		Fuels	21 231	12 976	10 914	-8 255	-38.9	-10 318	-48.6
ò	no		Ores and mineral	8 172	6 935	6 534	-1 237	-15.1	-1 638	-20
<u> ۲</u>		EU-27	Food products	4 688	4 741	4 706	53	1.1	18	0.4
			Agricultural products	498	472	471	-27	-5.3	-28	-5.5
			Fuels	8 384	4 390	3 242	-3 994	-47.6	-5 141	-61.3
1			Ores and mineral	6 033	4 164	3 789	-1 869	-31	-2 244	-37.2

				_			Differen	ce fro	m benchma	ark
E	porters	Importers	Commodity	ES	limated value	es	Scenari	o 1	Scenari	o 2
regi	ons/group			Benchmark	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%
		United Kingdom	Food products	788	803	805	15	1.9	17	2.2
			Agricultural products	24	24	24	-0.1	-0.5	-0.1	-0.3
			Fuels	1 162	834	771	-328	-28.2	-391	-33.7
	lt		Ores and mineral	601	320	196	-281	-46.8	-405	-67.5
	g ve	United States	Food products	4 461	4 169	4 090	-292	-6.6	-372	-8.3
	nor		Agricultural products	107	110	105	2.6	2.4	-1.9	-1.7
	velo		Fuels	4 067	3 416	3 295	-651	-16	-772	-19
	Co de		Ores and mineral	10 816	5 649	4 766	-5 166	-47.8	-6 050	-55.9
		Australia	Food products	2 278	2 319	2 318	41	1.8	40	1.8
ц.			Agricultural products	277	276	276	-1.6	-0.6	-1.3	-0.5
len			Fuels	16 084	14 213	13 351	-1 870	-11.6	-2 732	-17
enc	1		Ores and mineral	5 329	4 856	4 661	-473	-8.9	-668	-12.5
dep		China	Food products	157 016	112 939	103 046	-44 078	-28.1	-53 970	-34.4
ž			Agricultural products	40 583	37 024	36 465	-3 559	-8.8	-4118	-10.1
por	-		Fuels	306 464	521 100	505 249	214 636	70	198 785	64.9
L L	alth		Ores and mineral	132 450	119 403	116 098	-13 046	-9.8	-16 351	-12.3
° S	Me	EU-27	Food products	72 016	67 586	66 894	-4 430	-6.2	-5 122	-7.1
Von	nor		Agricultural products	11 814	12 205	12 271	391	3.3	457	3.9
	Ju c		Fuels	304 206	251 062	239 588	-53 143	-17.5	-64 618	-21.2
	ŏ		Ores and mineral	72 498	67 552	67 917	-4946	-6.8	-4 581	-6.3
	Non	United Kingdom	Food products	18 606	18 178	17 870	-428	-2.3	-736	-4
	-		Agricultural products	3 000	2 510	2 385	-490	-16.3	-615	-20.5
			Fuels	235 204	27 619	20 091	-207 585	-88.3	-215 113	-91.5
			Ores and mineral	13 739	11 462	11 003	-2277	-16.6	-2 736	-19.9
		United States	Food products	45 305	46 372	46 093	1067	2.4	788	1.7
			Agricultural products	5 646	5 703	5 702	57	1	56	1
			Fuels	5 461 017	66 832	58 893	-5 394 185	-98.8	-5 402 124	-98.9
			Ores and mineral	42 519	37 983	36 611	-4536	-10.7	-5 908	-13.9

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset.

Note: The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

		1									
			Fet	imated valu	20	Differe	ence fro	m benchmark			
Category	Sub-category	Importer	LSU	intateu valu	63	Scenario	1	Scenario	2		
			Benchmark	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
	Dairy	Australia	329	273	256	-56	-17	-73	-22.1		
		China	5 451	3 847	3 699	-1 604	-29.4	-1 752	-32.1		
		EU-27	795	664	632	-131	-16.4	-163	-20.5		
		United Kingdom	36	39	39	3.4	9.7	3.9	11.1		
		United States	279	242	243	-37	-13.1	-36	-12.9		
		Australia	152	169	173	17	11	21	13.9		
		China	3 392	3 077	2 984	-315	-9.3	-408	-12		
	Edible oils	EU-27	2 655	2 805	2 831	149	5.6	175	6.6		
		United Kingdom	102	141	150	39	38.5	48	46.8		
		United States	2 368	2 494	2 519	126	5.3	152	6.4		
	Fish	Australia	180	147	137	-34	-18.7	-44	-24.3		
		China	9 376	6 315	5 014	-3 061	-32.6	-4 362	-46.5		
		EU-27	4 431	4 104	4 008	-327	-7.4	-423	-9.5		
		United Kingdom	438	308	295	-130	-29.6	-143	-32.6		
		United States	6 774	5 403	5 132	-1 370	-20.2	-1 642	-24.2		
	Fruits and nuts	Australia	127	114	90	-13	-9.9	-37	-28.8		
		China	3 468	2 358	1 917	-1 110	-32	-1 551	-44.7		
ts		EU-27	7 391	5 150	5 102	-2 240	-30.3	-2 289	-31		
duc		United Kingdom	859	966	907	107	12.4	47	5.5		
proc		United States	891	872	877	-19	-2.1	-14	-1.6		
po	Grains	Australia	175	164	152	-11	-6.2	-23	-13.2		
Ĕ		China	1 979	2 548	2 730	570	28.8	/52	38		
		EU-27	3 460	2 239	2 160	-1 222	-35.3	-1 301	-37.6		
		United Kingdom	799	926	1 475	126	15.8	6/5	84.5		
	N 4+	United States	2 676	2 / 96	2 828	120	4.5	152	5.7		
	Meat	Australia	35	26	24	-9	-24.7	-10	-29.7		
		China El 107	8673	7 456	7 1 15	-1217	-14	-1 558	- 18		
		EU-27	2 807	2 6 1 2	2 579	- 194	-6.9	-228	-8.1		
		United Kingdom	298	593	417 6 190	95	31.0	119	39.9		
	Salt		13	0 340	10	-525	-7.0	-002	-9.9		
	San	China	164	173	175	-1.7	-13.7	-2.2	73		
		FII-27	61	59	58	-2.2	-3.6	-2 7	-4.4		
		Linited Kingdom	6	53	7	-2.2	-3.0	-2.7	-4.4		
		United States	237	297	318	60	25.3	81	34.3		
	Sugars	Australia	3		2	-0.2	-6.6	-0.3	-10		
	Cuguio	China	53	67	61	15	27.6	8.5	16.2		
		EU-27	531	448	424	-84	-15.7	-108	-20.3		
		United Kingdom	105	100	75	-4.8	-4.6	-30	-28.4		
		United States	168	138	108	-30	-17.8	-60	-35.7		
	Cotton	China	570	1 001	1 146	431	75.7	577	101.2		
		EU-27	44	58	59	14	31.7	15	34.1		
		United Kingdom	0.4	0.2	0.2	-0.2	-45.8	-0.2	-58.9		
	Paper pulp	Australia	36	45	47	9.3	25.6	11	31.3		
s		China	2 913	3 056	3 083	143	4.9	169	5.8		
duct		EU-27	181	190	192	9.8	5.5	12	6.6		
or oc		United Kingdom	26	25	25	-0.6	-2.4	-0.8	-3.2		
alp		United States	1 701	1 620	1 602	-80	-4.7	-99	-5.8		
Itu	Rubber	Australia	4	6	6	1.9	46.1	2.3	57.1		
ricu		China	1 368	1 284	1 258	-84	-6.1	-110	-8		
Ag		EU-27	587	553	551	-34	-5.8	-36	-6.1		
		United Kingdom	14	12	11	-2.7	-19.1	-2.7	-19.3		
		United States	187	186	181	-1.3	-0.7	-7	-3.5		
	Wood	Australia	103	72	65	-31	-30	-38	-36.7		
		China	5 291	4 599	4 427	-692	-13.1	-864	-16.3		

#### Table A.4: Simulations results: annual imports (US\$, million)

			5-4	····		Difference from benchmark			
Category	Sub-category	Importer	ESI	imated valu	es	Scenario	1	Scenario	2
			Benchmark	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Value	%	Value	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
		EU-27	473	411	397	-62	-13.1	-75	-16
		United Kingdom	67	64	64	-2.3	-3.5	-2.8	-4.3
		United States	5 151	4 854	4 791	-297	-5.8	-360	-7
	Wool	Australia	5	4	4	-0.5	-9.5	-0.5	-10.5
		China	2 099	1 983	1 826	-116	-5.5	-273	-13
		EU-27	359	395	405	37	10.3	46	13
		United Kingdom	29	33	33	3.9	13.5	4.4	15.4
		United States	13	11	11	-2.2	-16.6	-2.7	-20.2
	Coal and	Australia	0.2	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-35.9	-0.1	-42.5
	lignite	China	4 820	11 423	11 423	6 603	137	6 603	137
		EU-27	2 890	2 323	2 180	-567	-19.6	-710	-24.6
		United Kingdom	119	79	38	-39	-33	-80	-67.8
		United States	37	50	51	14	36.8	14	39.2
	Crude oil	Australia	3 657	2 126	1 674	-1 531	-41.9	-1 983	-54.2
		China	17 652	14 009	12 352	-3 642	-20.6	-5 299	-30
		EU-27	42 045	30 103	26 961	-11 942	-28.4	-15 085	-35.9
s		United Kingdom	2 575	2 746	2 658	171	6.6	83	3.2
len:		United States	83 559	57 248	51 628	-26 311	-31.5	-31 931	-38.2
	Natural gases	China	20 807	19 980	19 343	-826	-4	-1 464	-7
		EU-27	8 846	6 312	5 824	-2 535	-28.7	-3 022	-34.2
		United Kingdom	130	135	106	5	3.9	-24	-18.5
		United States	4 613	4 218	4 063	-395	-8.6	-549	-11.9
	Refined oil	Australia	8 150	4 918	4 343	-3 231	-39.6	-3 807	-46.7
		China	12 491	6 445	5 068	-6 047	-48.4	-7 423	-59.4
		EU-27	22 881	12 932	10 834	-9 949	-43.5	-12 047	-52.7
		United Kingdom	1 170	835	772	-335	-28.6	-399	-34
		United States	18 213	12 836	11 750	-5 377	-29.5	-6 463	-35.5
	Diamonds	Australia	162	108	96	-54	-33.2	-66	-40.6
		China	6 034	4 156	4 211	-1 878	-31.1	-1 824	-30.2
		EU-27	5 883	4 928	4 761	-955	-16.2	-1 122	-19.1
		United Kingdom	115	213	217	98	85.9	103	89.6
		United States	11 052	5 535	4 624	-5 517	-49.9	-6 428	-58.2
	Fertilizers	Australia	286	426	429	140	48.9	143	49.9
		China	282	684	779	402	142.8	498	176.7
a		EU-27	500	444	439	-56	-11.1	-62	-12.3
ine		United Kingdom	5	5	5	0.1	2.6	-0.3	-4.9
E p		United States	3 051	3 305	3 355	254	8.3	304	10
an	Ores	Australia	3	2	0	-1.8	-52.4	-3.4	-99.1
res		China	80 132	75 930	74 686	-4 202	-5.2	-5 447	-6.8
0		EU-27	5 552	3 783	3 310	-1 769	-31.9	-2 242	-40.4
		United Kingdom	1 007	874	686	-133	-13.2	-322	-31.9
		United States	251	280	283	29	11.5	32	12.7
	Ores products	Australia	545	429	401	-116	-21.3	-144	-26.4
		China	10 578	9 126	8 614	-1 452	-13.7	-1 964	-18.6
		EU-27	10 912	9 256	8 905	-1 656	-15.2	-2 007	-18.4
		United Kingdom	792	439	314	-353	-44.6	-478	-60.4
		United States	18 329	16 477	15 992	-1 851	-10.1	-2 336	-12.7

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset.

Note: The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

Catagory	Sub-ostogony	Importor		Gro	wth rates (%	<b>)</b>	
Calegory	Sub-category	importer	2018	2019	2020	2020_1	2020_2
	Dairy	Australia	14.9	15.2	70.7	41.6	33.1
		China	7.3	27.8	64.6	16.2	11.7
		EU-27	11.3	-3.9	12	-6.4	-10.9
		United Kingdom	-9.4	-6.2	7.6	18	19.5
		United States	-7	0.4	21	5.1	5.4
	Edible oils	Australia	-8.1	-18.1	-14.6	-5.2	-2.8
		China	7.1	-0.4	26.6	14.8	11.3
		EU-27	4.8	-8.8	7.3	13.4	14.4
		United Kingdom	-20.3	-6.8	-40.2	-17.2	-12.2
		United States	-4.1	-2.3	-3.5	1.7	2.7
	Fish	Australia	0.3	-12.1	-9.6	-26.5	-31.6
		China	55.8	41.7	123.4	50.5	19.5
		EU-27	-0.3	-3.1	-2.7	-9.9	-12
		United Kinadom	-12.1	1.7	56.8	10.4	5.8
		United States	0.7	5	11.1	-11.3	-15.8
	Fruits and nuts	Australia	-14.5	-2.1	6.2	-4.3	-24.4
		China	27.2	31.6	102.6	37.7	12
		EU-27	8.6	-9	78.1	24.1	22.9
cts		United Kingdom	5.7	-10.3	-10.7	0.4	-5.8
npc		United States	-5.2	-10.7	11.6	9.2	9.8
brd	Grains	Australia	14.5	121.9	-22.7	-27.5	-32.9
poc		China	1.5	-4.7	-44.6	-28.7	-23.6
й		FU-27	-2.4	17.8	25.3	-18.9	-21.8
		United Kingdom	-11.4	14.4	31.4	52.1	142.3
		United States	5.2	-16.6	12.3	17.4	18.7
	Meat	Australia	1	-27	-31.4	-48.3	-51.8
	mout	China	34.3	57.1	53.3	31.8	25.8
		FU-27	10.6	-9.8	-4	-10.6	-11.7
		United Kingdom	2.8	-24.8	-19.5	6	12.6
		United States	22	31	11.6	31	0.5
	Salt	Australia	20.1	1.5	23.6	6.6	2
	Oun	China	25.4	-19.8	-30.5	-26.5	-25.4
		FII-27	20.4	-5.6	-11.2	-14.4	-15.1
		Lo 27	8.4	8.0	13	1/1.3	16.1
		United States	0.4	21.4	-13.6	8.2	10.1
	Sugars	Australia	-65	-5	-10.0	-6.8	-10.2
	ougars	China	24.9	-67	-0.5	-0.0	-10.2
		ELL-27	-25.5	-0.7	-00 _18.0	-42.0	-47.7
		Lo-27	-23.3	25	-10.9	-51.7	-50.4
		United States	-13.3	23	-43.3	-43.9	-59.4
	Cotton	Chipa	-33.3	41.4	-0.1	-24.3	-41
	Collon		20.1	-1.0	-55.0	-10.4	-0.0
		EU-27	59.1	-33	13.4	49.4	52.1
<i>(</i> <b>)</b>	Denerraula		59.4	30.4	-20.4	-00.9	-07.3
rcts	Paper pulp	Australia	-5.4	-40.6	-27	-0.3	-4.1
lpo.			21.0	- 15.9	-11.0	-7.3	-0.3
I br		EU-27	39	-37.2	-37.0	-34.2	-33.5
ura		United Kingdom	-18.8	23.7	-21.9	-23.8	-24.4
cult	Dubbar		1/./	-9.9	-10.9	-15.2	-16.1
grid	Rubber	Australia	-21.3	-42	-43.5	-17.5	-11.3
A		China	-21.9	-9.6	-5.2	-11	-12.8
		EU-27	-13.3	-5.2	-19	-23.7	-24
		United Kingdom	-12	-10.3	-24.9	-39.2	-39.4
	1	United States	-2.3	3.6	-19.4	-20	-22.2

#### Table A.5: Simulations results: annual growth rates (2018-2020)

Cataman	Cub astansmi	lunneuten		Gro	wth rates (%		
Category	Sub-category	Importer	2018	2019	2020	2020_1	2020_2
	Wood	Australia	1.6	-24.6	1	-29.4	-36
(0		China	8.3	-13.1	-17.7	-28.4	-31.1
ucts		EU-27	10.3	-8.7	-22.9	-33	-35.2
po		United Kingdom	-9.2	-4.9	-23.3	-26	-26.6
ā		United States	-3.8	-20.6	2.9	-3	-4.3
tura	Wool	Australia	-23.7	-12.4	-18.8	-26.5	-27.3
cul		China	15.7	-23.2	-3.9	-9.3	-16.4
Agri		EU-27	16.1	-17.9	-23.9	-16	-14
		United Kingdom	8.2	-6.7	-30.4	-21	-19.6
		United States	28.1	-10.9	2.3	-14.7	-18.3
	Coal and lignite	Australia	220.8	-39	87.2	20	7.6
		China	2.9	-9.4	-51.9	14.1	14.1
		EU-27	-4	-16.1	-48.3	-58.4	-61
		United Kingdom	10.8	-23.3	-21.5	-47.4	-74.7
		United States	-12.2	3.5	-76.6	-67.9	-67.4
	Crude oil	Australia	43.1	-26	-8	-46.5	-57.9
		China	40.3	31.1	1.4	-19.6	-29.1
		EU-27	43.6	-2.3	22.5	-12.3	-21.5
s		United Kingdom	133	-46.3	23.4	31.6	27.4
len		United States	17.5	3.2	13.1	-22.5	-30.1
<u> </u>	Natural gases	China	81.7	19	9.5	5.2	1.8
		EU-27	25.7	12	45.4	3.7	-4.3
		United Kingdom	590.4	-47.2	109	117.1	70.4
		United States	-13.5	0.4	-41	-46.1	-48.1
	Refined oil	Australia	30.6	-28.4	30.3	-21.3	-30.5
		China	38.1	-8.9	113	9.9	-13.6
		EU-27	22.3	-3.5	46.3	-17.3	-30.7
		United Kingdom	-17.2	115.8	-27	-47.9	-51.9
		United States	7.7	0.7	-4.7	-32.9	-38.5
	Diamonds	Australia	-1.2	-12.1	-15.1	-43.3	-49.6
		China	18	-19.3	-2.9	-33.1	-32.2
		EU-27	5.7	-12.2	1.5	-15	-17.8
		United Kingdom	5	-48.1	-86.2	-74.4	-73.9
		United States	11.2	-15.5	11.7	-44	-53.2
	Fertilizers	Australia	15.4	-14.8	134.9	249.8	252.1
		China	41.3	27.5	-72.4	-32.9	-23.5
als		EU-27	22.5	12.5	-3.9	-14.6	-15.7
iner		United Kingdom	11.1	22.7	-6.7	-4.3	-11.2
		United States	8	0.2	-6.4	1.4	2.9
anc	Ores	Australia	226.4	43.6	-34.1	-68.6	-99.4
es		China	-2.4	34.6	11.3	5.4	3.7
ō		EU-27	-9.2	39.9	14.4	-22.1	-31.8
		United Kingdom	-11.6	9.9	220.9	178.4	118.4
		United States	-5.7	34.6	5.6	17.8	19.1
	Ores products	Australia	31.1	-24.3	2.7	-19.2	-24.4
		China	11.6	-18.1	68.8	45.6	37.5
		EU-27	17.1	-16.5	-5.8	-20.1	-23.1
		United Kingdom	0.7	-19.7	101.3	11.5	-20.3
		United States	3.7	-13.2	9.4	-1.7	-4.6

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset.

Note: The COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of August 2020 for China and the end of October 2020 for other destinations in scenario 1. In scenario 2 the COVID shock is assumed to last until the end of October 2020 for China and the end of December 2020 for other destinations.

la	DIE A.0; TOTAI COMMODITIE;	s expo	rts: 20	18, 20	i y and	projec	cuons I	resuns	(055,	million	)
cw	Exporter	T18	T19	T20_0	T20_1	T20_2	NT20_0	NT20_1	NT20_2	DT20_1	DT20_2
1	Australia	87 832	105302	111 439	110 409	108 194	1.06	1.05	1.03	-1 030	-3 245
1	New Zealand	13 410	13808	17 628	15 826	15 539	1.28	1.15	1.13	-1 802	-2 090
2	Botswana	1 989	1343	1 322	1 725	1919	0.98	1.29	1.43	404	597
2	Cameroon	2 692	2657	2 191	2 008	1815	0.82	0.76	0.68	-183	-376
2	Gambia	28.4	76	44.6	28.9	26.1	0.59	0.38	0.34	-15.6	-18.5
2	Ghana	3 662	3649	5 610	3 056	2 902	1.54	0.84	0.80	-2 554	-2 708
2	Kenya	240	227	421	221	207	1.85	0.97	0.91	-199	-214
2	Malawi	45.6	46.1	46.0	78	84.1	1.00	1.69	1.82	32.0	38.1
2	Mozambique	2 385	2105	1736	1 535	1501	0.82	0.73	0.71	-200	-234
2	Namibia	1 390	1257	1052	931	857	0.84	0.74	0.68	-121	-195
2	Nigeria	32 673	31579	38 628	24 557	21 193	1.22	0.78	0.67	-14 071	-17 436
2	Rwanda	1.9	1.9	2.3	1	0.7	1.23	0.50	0.35	-1.4	-1.7
2	Seychelles	70.9	57.2	42.5	39.3	36.5	0.74	0.69	0.64	-3.3	-6.1
2	Sierra Leone	217	223	565	241	103	2.53	1.08	0.46	-324	-463
2	South Africa	18 159	18641	22 315	1/ 516	16 917	1.20	0.94	0.91	-4 /99	-5 398
2	Lanzania. United Republic of	401	290	318	228	215	1.09	0.78	0.74	-90	-103
2	Uganda	91.8	100	96.7	91.3	88.0	0.97	0.91	0.88	-5.4	-8.7
2	Zambia Devecione	4 473	3010	3972	3 307	3 1 13	1.13	0.94	0.00	C00-	-609
3	Maldivaa	0/0	1042	390 71 4	317	202	0.30	0.30	0.19	-60	-194
3	Rolizo	199.2	190	240	49.4	42.2	1.00	0.55	0.47	-22.0	-29.2
4	Granada	11 /	11.6	17.0	61	110	1.27	0.03	0.30	11.0	12.2
4	Guyana	217	216	225	10/	4.7	1.04	0.00	0.41	-11.0	-13.2
4	lamaica	59.5	53.7	64.0	46.6	101	1.04	0.30	0.04	-17 /	-19.5
4	Saint Lucia	6.9	5.1	9.2		5.3	1.10	1 17	1 04	-3.2	-3.9
4	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	5.1	4.6	8.7	4.8	3.5	1.89	1.03	0.77	-4.0	-5.2
4	Trinidad and Tobago	3 027	3888	4 102	2 528	1 983	1.06	0.65	0.51	-1 573	-2 119
5	Fiii	55.2	79.6	82.5	46.8	33.2	1.04	0.59	0.42	-35.7	-49.3
5	Kiribati	1.9	3.5	1.8	1.4	1.2	0.53	0.40	0.36	-0.4	-0.6
5	Papua New Guinea	3 270	3050	2 488	2 252	2 024	0.82	0.74	0.66	-236	-464
5	Samoa	2.5	3.8	2.2	2	1.5	0.59	0.52	0.38	-0.3	-0.8
5	Solomon Islands	576	430	342	411	425	0.79	0.96	0.99	69	84
5	Tonga	3.5	3.8	2.6	3	3.1	0.67	0.79	0.80	0.5	0.5
5	Vanuatu	15.8	12.8	9.5	2.7	2.2	0.74	0.21	0.17	-6.8	-7.3
6	Canada	143 583	142388	153 425	119 493	112 150	1.08	0.84	0.79	-33 932	-41 276
6	Cyprus	17.7	20.6	15.7	17.8	18.0	0.76	0.87	0.88	2.1	2.3
6	Malta	2.0	0.9	1.9	1.7	1.5	2.12	1.85	1.63	-0.2	-0.5
6	United Kingdom	48 899	46548	48 767	40 309	38 275	1.05	0.87	0.82	-8 458	-10 492
7	Antigua and Barbuda	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.3	1.88	1.55	1.26	-0.1	-0.1
7	Bahamas	186	149	131	118	104	0.88	0.79	0.70	-13	-26
7	Bangladesh	442	430	551	576	587	1.28	1.34	1.36	25	35
7	Barbados	3.2	2.0	2.1	1.5	1.5	1.05	0.77	0.77	-0.5	-0.6
7	Dominica	0.2	0.8	0.6	1.3	1.4	0.81	1.67	1.74	0.7	0.7
7	Eswatini	45.2	111.9	21.4	12.3	12.7	0.19	0.11	0.11	-9.1	-8.7
7	India	39 467	36860	40 662	27 150	24 247	1.10	0.74	0.66	-13 512	-16 415
7	Lesotho	533	391	439	322	295	1.12	0.82	0.76	-118	-144
7	Malaysia	22 369	22079	35 479	25 445	22 300	1.61	1.15	1.01	-10 034	-13 179
7	Mauritius	262	334	367	331	310	1.10	0.99	0.93	-36	-57
7	Pakistan	1 172	1605	3 633	2 400	2 092	2.26	1.50	1.30	-1 232	-1 541
7	Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.07	0.24	0.00	-0.1	-0.1
7	Singapore	12 301	10861	10 645	7 666	6 876	0.98	0.71	0.63	-2 979	-3 769
7	Sri Lanka	339	294	316	244	226	1.08	0.83	0.77	-72	-91

Source: Authors' simulations using ITC dataset.

Note: The CW clomun refers to Commowealth member countries grouping. Group 1 refers to commodity dependent developed members; group 2 refers to African commodity dependent developing members; group 3 refers to Asian commodity dependent developing members; group 4 refers to American commodity dependent developing members; group 5 refers to Pacific commodity dependent developing members; group 6 refers to commodity non-dependent developed members; group 7 refers to commodity non-dependent developing members.