Excellencies, distinguished delegates and experts,
Welcome to the 23rd session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy.
Competition comes down to the prices people pay. When markets work well, a family pays what its food costs to grow, move and sell. When markets work poorly — when too few players face too little competitive pressure — that same family pays more. Often nobody designed it that way. The structure of the market did.
This year, the pressure on prices is severe. The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has squeezed two lifelines at once: the Strait carries about a quarter of the world's seaborne oil and a third of its seaborne fertilizer. Some import-dependent economies could face losses above 5 per cent of GDP. And volatility creates its ow hazards when prices swing, gouging hides behind the shock. That is when your work matters most.
Your agenda meets this moment. Let me make three points, one for each of its themes: on food, on digital markets, and on showing that competition policy delivers.
First, food. In developing countries, food takes 40 to 60 per cent of a household's budget. Whatever happens in food markets lands on that budget. And the structure of these markets deserves attention: agricultural inputs are marked by economies of scale, information asymmetries and network effects. None of this is always misconduct in itself. But it concentrates markets and weakens competitive pressure — and where authorities have looked closely, they have indeed found coordination cases in fertilizers, in poultry, in staples such as sugar and flour. Keeping these markets open and contestable, through merger control and enforcement where needed, is one of the most direct ways to keep food affordable.
Second, digital markets. The opportunity is real. E-commerce sales across 45 major economies reached 28 trillion dollars in 2024, and developing economies are growing their sales nearly twice as fast as developed ones. But these markets concentrate naturally — data, scale and network effects reward size. UNCTAD data show the top five digital multinationals doubled their share of sales, from 21 per cent in 2017 to 48 per cent in 2025.
Governments have responded: competition actions in digital markets rose from 14 in 2020 to 153 in 2024. Developing countries, however, face this task with limited budgets, scarce specialists, and narrow jurisdictions. No single authority can oversee a global platform alone. Your session on regulatory frameworks and enforcement in digital markets seeks to tackle this issue head on.
Third, impact. Competition policy must show results people can see. A UNCTAD survey of competition authorities documents them: consumer savings, faster payments to small suppliers, markets opened to new entrants. Measuring this serves three purposes — it holds authorities accountable, it strengthens the case for competition policy, and it teaches institutions what works. The main obstacle is data. Many authorities cannot obtain the market information they need. Fixing that means investing in data systems, analytical capacity, and stronger information-gathering powers.
One thread runs through all three themes: these markets cross borders. A fertilizer supply chain spans regions; a platform operates everywhere at once. This week you will hear from our informal working group on cross-border cartels, where officials from every region compare cases and coordinate. And our Research Partnership Platform will connect you with scholars working on the questions you face daily.
Excellencies,
Over the next two and a half days, you have colleagues from every region in one room. Use them. Markets that cross borders need cooperation that crosses borders — that is what this Group exists to build, and UNCTAD stands with you as you build it.
I wish you a productive session. Thank you.